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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE FUTURE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE

Denis Greenhill

'IN the Youth of a State' said Bacon, 'Arms do flourish: in the Middle Age of a State, Learning: in the Declining Age of a State, Mechanical Arts and Merchandise'. There is room for argument whether Western Europe is in its erudite middle age or its commercial dotage, but it clearly does not fit into the first category. It is not surprising therefore that European security—though much written about and discussed by the dwindling representatives of the warrior class—has been for the last ten years a non-subject in Western Europe. We are not, it is true, totally preoccupied with our mechanical arts and merchandise. But we have had more immediate and fashionable issues to think about than security. This is understandable. Since the Berlin crisis of 1960–61 and the Cuban confrontation of 1962, no-one in Western Europe has felt seriously insecure. The absence of real alarm during the Middle East crisis of October 1973 and the tendency to deprecate American precautions as being an 'over-reaction' were particularly noteworthy. And in the absence of a sense of insecurity, there is little incentive to worry about defence—except about how to pay less for it. I suspect however that this subject will be thrust into prominence again in the later 1970s by events already in motion.

The triangular relationship which governs the security of Western Europe—the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union—is clearly changing and, with it, the stable alignments of postwar Europe. Dr. Kissinger noted in his 'Year of Europe' speech in April 1973 that we have entered a period of 'radically different strategic conditions'. As these changes proceed further—hurried along by developments elsewhere in the globe—yesterday's non-subject is becoming topical once more. We should be thinking about it now so that these changes do not bring, with their many advantages, the disadvantage of another period of European insecurity.

Britain has not always been very closely affected by the state of European security. In previous centuries we were able to regard it with some detachment. We were dragged in—or willingly jumped in—from time to time. But the effort was expensive and usually distasteful. European security was something that continental Europeans had to worry about; Britain wanted, and long enjoyed an almost absolute national security that was qualified only by its desire to preserve its

overseas possessions and the European balance of power. It is a paradox that, after a period of relative peace unusual in our history and at a time when we are spending more on defence than in any peace-time period, we no longer have that absolute security.

We no longer enjoy the certainty of Lord St. Vincent when he once assured the House of Lords during the Napoleonic Wars 'I do not say that the enemy cannot come; I only say they cannot come by sea'. The reasons for the change are partly to be found in the relative decline in Britain's military strength but more basically in two technological developments which have revolutionised national defence policies: the aeroplane and the guided missile. These have ended the invulnerability once provided by a superior fleet and produced a situation in which nobody in the world has any guarantee against the arrival of a nuclear missile at a few minutes' notice. Security, in the late 20th century, for Britain as for all countries, means relative security: a situation in which the use of armed force against us seems sufficiently improbable to impose no major constraint on our domestic policies or on the reasonable promotion of our national interests abroad.

It is clear from a glance round the world that not all countries enjoy even this qualified form of security. Even in Europe, some countries are unable to arrange their domestic policies freely without risking armed intervention. It was the internal more than the foreign policies of the Czechoslovak government which led to the Soviet invasion of 1968. Other countries living in the shadow of larger neighbours feel the need to adapt their external policies accordingly. Some might argue that Finland's difficulties over ratifying its trade agreement with the European Community provided a case in point. Countries in such positions lack the sense of minimum security—and therefore the political self-confidence—which is necessary for the exercise of real as distinct from nominal sovereignty.

A sense of minimum security does not necessarily require lavish defence spending. Japan and Canada enjoy reasonable security at comparatively low cost. The test is not a budgetary one; it depends essentially on the capability, intentions and opportunities of other governments. For example, the Soviet Union and China have the capability to use their superior military power against Japan. But their mutual hostility (and American support for Japan) denies them the opportunity. We in Britain do not fear France—though it could probably destroy large chunks of the British Isles—nor the United States—though it could certainly destroy the entire British Isles. It is not necessary to spell out why we do not spend sleepless nights on account of the American and French capability to destroy us. Although we take no military precautions against them, our sense of security is not thereby diminished. By extension of this argument—eliminating those who lack the capa-

bility or intention or opportunity—the military threat to Western Europe can be narrowed down to four types. Of these, the first three can be dismissed rapidly as marginal to European security.

(*i*) *Threats to dependent territories*

Portugal is the only European country whose colonies require a substantial military presence. The remaining French, Dutch and British colonies are declining in number and importance. Responsibility for their administration must of course be taken seriously. There are cases where a security threat cannot be excluded. The ability to move military forces over long distances at short notice is therefore a necessary feature of British and French colonial administration. But the key to discharging our responsibilities lies in the political rather than the security field.

(*ii*) *Low-level violence*

Low-level violence—hijacking, kidnapping, guerrilla activities and now letter bombs—has been one of the growth areas in the security business during the last ten years. The problem is likely to go on increasing and diversifying. Western Europe will not be spared; because of its vulnerability, it may indeed remain a prime target. In most European countries, however, there is a strong feeling against using the military in such situations. Since the problem is essentially a political one, it is best handled by civilian police forces, who can be used more sensitively and with closer political control. Armed forces should be used only as a last resort, when political measures and police methods have proved insufficient. As the scale and frequency of low-level violence increases, so may the role of the armed forces in dealing with it. But that role is likely to remain a limited one.

(*iii*) *Threats to European interests overseas*

Western Europe's active military role abroad in the colonial and post-independence period has given way to a selective and low profile involvement. It is fortunate that the main motives for an active overseas defence policy—responsibility to former colonies and containment of communist expansion—have become less cogent as Western Europe's overseas capabilities have declined. This is perhaps not a coincidence. It is not now conceivable that Britain could mobilise the three aircraft carriers and 42 other naval vessels with land and air support which were involved in the Kuwait landing in 1961. Even successful examples from the recent past—confrontation with Indonesia, the landings in Jordan—are hard to imagine today. Our own forces are smaller. The developing countries are more able to hold their own.

We should not however interpret the lessons of Vietnam too literally. We should not for example rule out the possibility of providing specialised and indirect assistance, of the kind which is at present supplied to Oman and Malaysia/Singapore. But it is clear that Western Europe's overseas interests are too widespread to be defended by military means. The area outside Europe and North America accounts for a third of its trade and three-quarters of its energy imports. It holds over 70 per cent. of Britain's foreign investment. Furthermore, the most serious existing threats—expropriation or the withholding of vital raw materials—are not susceptible to military measures. There is no comprehensive insurance against these risks. But the best available insurance lies in building up mutually beneficial relations in the political and commercial fields and in indirect defence policies—help over training and equipment—rather than in defence deployments. Looking to the end of the decade, therefore, it is likely that the remaining West European deployments overseas will be progressively reduced and increasing reliance placed on civilian policies as the guarantee of Western Europe's interests abroad. The policy which the members of the European Community have taken towards the Middle East is an illustration of this preference for political and commercial rather than military involvement.

(*iv*) *Security threats in Europe*

All of these threats justify the maintenance in Western Europe of small, highly mobile forces—but no more. The case for keeping 3 million men under arms and in 1973 spending more than $40 billion on defence rests on the validity of the fourth threat to Western Europe—that posed by the capability of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. The classic definition of the threat to the countries of Western Europe is not that the Soviet Union and its allies actually intend to use military force against them. It is that the mere existence of superior Soviet forces will influence the policies of West European governments and make them prone to accommodate Soviet wishes. On this, two opposing doubts are commonly expressed: first that Western Europe is already over-insured against such a danger and could afford some reduction of its defence efforts without suffering any loss of confidence; and, alternatively, that since we are already too weak to contemplate armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, there is no point in maintaining our present expensive defence efforts to no purpose.

Is Western Europe over-insured?

Capabilities

On the relative capabilities of the two sides there are naturally two opinions. Looked at from the Soviet side, the Nato countries have a

stronger economic base, larger total forces and, in some sectors, superior technology. The Russians have learnt by bitter experience to see Western Europe as a threat to their security—if not in today's circumstances then in the past and, as some in Moscow may still think, conceivably in the future. The Soviet Chiefs of Staff are presumably more aware of their own problems and weaknesses than we are. And, whereas we are principally concerned with a balance in Europe, they must think in global terms. Their anxiety that the balance in Europe should not once more move against them is understandable; indeed it is even comprehensible that they insist on having a generous margin of insurance.

From the West European viewpoint, however, the picture is different. The Soviet Union is by far the greatest military power in Eurasia. It greatly outnumbers the armed forces of Western Europe. A balance is, therefore, not possible within a purely European context. Equilibrium can be achieved only if the New World is brought in to redress the balance of the Old. Even with full American involvement, as at present, the ratio of forces in Europe is seriously adverse.

In the Central region, the Warsaw Pact has something over 900,000 men in ground forces against Nato's 777,000. In terms of battle tanks the gap is 15,500 against 6,000; in field artillery 5,000 against 1,800. The ratios are even more lopsided in the Baltic region and Norway. Such figures may be disputed at the margin but the broad picture is generally agreed. The proponents of the over-insurance argument do not usually deny that, despite the large and controversial United States presence, the Soviet Union has a conventional preponderance in Europe which is not offset by the rapidly shrinking Western superiority in aircraft and ships. The argument rests instead on an assessment of Soviet opportunities and intentions.

Opportunity

Three reasons are put forward for thinking that the Soviet Union will not use its conventional strength against Western Europe: first, the emergence of new military/industrial powers on Russia's eastern frontiers; second, the growing Soviet stake in economic co-operation with Western Europe; and third, the danger of nuclear conflagration.

These are powerful constraints which cannot but influence Russian policy. But they are not—yet—enough to reassure Western Europeans that the imbalance in conventional forces does not matter. The growth of Japan and China, while it will certainly affect Soviet military planning, has not led to any reductions in Soviet force deployments against Western Europe. Indeed while 45 Soviet divisions have been built up on the Chinese border, Soviet forces on the Western front have actually been increased by five divisions and provided with better equipment.

Furthermore all Soviet units in Eastern Europe are at full readiness, whereas some of those in the Far East are below strength.

The Soviet stake in economic co-operation with Western Europe has undoubtedly increased, and will probably continue to do so. But two qualifications need to be stressed here. First, the entire foreign trade of the Soviet Union amounts to only 6–7 per cent. of its GNP. Its trade with the developed West as a whole amounts, in a normal year, to only a fifth of this. And in this comparatively minor area of Soviet economic activity, the role of Western Europe as a source of technology is now less important than a few years ago because of the increasing scale of American and Japanese efforts there. It seems fair to say that Western Europe, with its higher dependence on trade and its reliance on energy imports from the Soviet Union, has at least as much to fear as the Soviet Union from any disruption of East-West economic relations.

In the 'radically different strategic conditions' of the 1970s, fear of nuclear war is at least as serious a constraint on the United States as on the Soviet Union. We cannot assume that the American nuclear umbrella guarantees Europe against every type of military pressure of which the Soviet leaders are, hypothetically, capable. The era of the trip-wire strategy has gone. It is obviously right, from the European as well as the American point of view, that it should not return. In a crisis, we need to have options other than capitulation or the immediate use of nuclear weapons. Conventional forces will therefore have to be able to withstand minor attacks and to take the first shock even of a major invasion. But in this area no one disputes that the Soviet Union enjoys the advantages of local superiority of forces, more rapid mobilisation, shorter supply lines and, in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack, choice of terrain.

The constraints on the Soviet Union should not therefore be exaggerated or regarded as necessarily permanent. Even if they are at present stronger than I have given them credit for, we cannot assume that they will remain so. Relations between China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Western Europe are in a state of flux. They could conceivably develop in such a way as to lead the Soviet government to think that it could successfully exert pressure on Western Europe without risking the danger of nuclear war or of war on two fronts at once.

Intentions

If they have the capability and may have the opportunity, need one assume that the Soviet leaders intend to play the military card? An optimist would argue that, ever since the death of President Roosevelt, Western governments have tended to err on the side of scepticism when assessing Soviet intentions. They may have overstressed the ideological

element in Soviet policy and exaggerated the aggressiveness of that policy. The Soviet Union now exhibits some of the conservatism and caution of a world power. It has secured its objective of a glacis in Eastern Europe and (this is a much more doubtful argument) is now preoccupied with ambitions and problems elsewhere. It seems to have no active interest in setting up communist regimes in Western Europe. The present balance in Europe seems quite satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. Ideology still receives lip-service. But the real concern of the Soviet leaders—it might be argued—is, by co-operation with the West, to solve their acute economic problems; and, by a policy of detente in Europe, to keep their hands free for dealing with the Chinese.

I do not myself accept this optimistic view. Whatever their worries about the economy and China, the Soviet leaders still devote great attention to their status as a world power and to the exertion of their influence in Europe. In some ways the Soviet Union may appear to be on the defensive, but its concept of defence has always been an active one. Moreover, its leaders show every sign of self-confidence in the conduct of international affairs. They exhibit few of the doubts and reservations that assail Western leaders. They seem to believe that history is moving their way and that it is their duty to give it a helping hand. There is as much evidence to sustain the view that Soviet policy is dynamic as there is that it is defensive. But dogmatism either way is needless. We need only establish that there is room for uncertainty.

There can be no doubt that the language and, to a large extent, the conduct of Soviet diplomacy have changed greatly in the last ten years. The difficulty is to judge how genuine—or how permanent—are the stated intentions of Soviet leaders. Their policies are not, as in the West, subject to a process of scrutiny and questioning in parliament and in the media. They are not subject to the force of public opinion which, for a West European government, would have made any equivalent to the invasion of Czechoslovakia inconceivable. Indeed, Soviet public opinion has been kept in the dark about some of the developments in the process of detente—for example, the terms of reference of the second stage of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation. We cannot therefore rely on internal factors to prevent the Soviet leaders if, for various reasons, they decide to revert to a line of more pressure upon Western Europe.

The Soviet decision-making process is, to outside observers, opaque. We know that there are cross-currents within the Soviet leadership about policy towards the West. But we do not know the likelihood of present Soviet policy being changed or the direction which a new policy would take. A change of strategy would, after all, be consistent with the 'Leninist Strategic Course'. Even 'peaceful coexistence', although it

sounds admirable, is in the Soviet Union a term of art with ominous overtones, which were spelt out clearly by Mr. Brezhnev in July 1972: 'While trying to win the approval of the principles of peaceful co-existence, we realise that successes in this important matter in no way imply the possibility of a weakening of the ideological struggle. On the contrary, we must be ready for this struggle to intensify and to become a more and more acute form of the confrontation between the two systems'. This theme crops up regularly in Soviet statements. It raises the question of whether the Soviet leaders themselves—or their successors—could be relied on to observe the 'system of obligations' (whatever that may mean) which they have suggested should replace the present system of alliances.

Nor could it be ruled out that the Soviet leaders might have good reason for wanting to bring pressure to bear on Western Europe. Its very existence creates problems for Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. Its economic success poses something of a challenge to the Soviet view of history. It may well prove a more formidable trade partner than the individual states which compose it. And, as it evolves further, the European Community may well move in directions which are difficult to square with Soviet plans for Europe's future. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that fundamental differences of interest between Western Europe and the Soviet Union will continue.

The only tangible evidence of Soviet intentions, however, is what is happening to the Soviet armed forces. Here the best evidence is the size and composition of national defence budgets. Despite the prevailing atmosphere of detente and the decline, in real terms, of Nato defence budgets, Soviet defence spending is still growing at about 3 per cent. annually. Even at the most conservative estimate, the armed forces absorb 8 per cent. of Soviet GNP. In addition, defence seems to have a much higher claim on scarce research and development in the Soviet Union than in the West. This effort is a significant pointed to Soviet intentions. It would of course be unreasonable to expect unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union. But it is a reasonable expectation that a government committed to a policy of detente should respond to the consistent reductions in the last decade in the share of GNP devoted to the armed forces in all the countries of Western Europe. So far, the Soviet Union has on the contrary shown a determination, even at great sacrifice, to maintain larger forces than it needs for purely defensive purposes and to deploy the best of these forces towards Western Europe.

Preliminary Conclusion

My preliminary conclusion is that the Soviet Union already has a superior military capability in Europe and is working hard to increase its

advantage. It cannot be ruled out that the Soviet leaders might have the opportunity to coerce Western Europe without incurring unacceptable risks elsewhere. Their intention is to have as much influence in Western Europe as is necessary to prevent unwelcome developments there. They would clearly prefer to achieve their aims without fuss; indeed the success of their strategy depends—for the next few years, at least—on their being able to avoid the use of force. But it would be naive to think that the Soviet leaders are making such sacrifices to no purpose. They see their military strength as a significant factor in negotiations about Europe and expect it to buy for them deference and concessions. The danger is, therefore, that even on an optimistic view of Soviet intentions and opportunities, the mere existence of a Soviet military preponderance on the edge of Western Europe will—without even being used—lead governments to adjust their policies in order to avoid a confrontation. In this situation, if it occurred, Western Europe would no longer enjoy adequate relative security. And, if we take a more pessimistic view, the recent Middle East crisis is an object-lesson to us all in the dangers of basing prediction on the supposed intentions of the opponent rather than on his real capability and deployments.

Is Western Europe uninsurable?

The second argument accepts all this but goes further. It questions whether Western Europe can ever hope to balance Soviet military strength and, if not, whether we should sustain an alliance which is provocative without being protective. This argument rests upon two assumptions, one political, the other sociological.

The first is that there will be continuing strains between the United States and the European Community and that, for these and other reasons, there will be substantial withdrawals of American troops from Europe. This will, of course, put the onus on Western Europe to match the growing Soviet conventional forces, in order to spare the American President the impossible choice in any European confrontation between conceding early defeat and provoking an immediate nuclear escalation which would 'risk Chicago for Hamburg'.

But the second assumption is that, for sociological reasons, West European governments will not be able to plug the conventional gap. Western societies are now thoroughly permeated with ideas which are non-military and even anti-military: concepts such as welfare and 'consumerism'; and habits of bargaining, compromise and interdependence. In addition, military force is rightly seen by Western peoples as something whose value is, at best, negative and indirect. By contrast with the Soviet Union, where it is an integral part of the state's ideology, military force has lost much of its appeal in the West as a result of the

postwar reaction against fascism and colonialism and the post-Vietnam reaction against containment.

These traits are deeply embedded in most Western countries and are likely to remain so. They suggest that there will be heavy pressure for more social expenditure at the expense of defence. They may also lead to a faster decline in the West than in the Soviet Union of the things that make up military capability: this includes laudable qualities, such as the ability to demand sacrifice and to take risks, as well as less desirable ones such as chauvinism and autarky. Together these factors might lead to the sombre conclusion that Western Europe will never be able to match the Soviet Union militarily and should accordingly not waste even the present amount of money and effort on trying; and that, rather than sustain an antagonistic relationship with the Soviet Union on the basis of an inadequate (but still expensive) defence posture, Western Europe should seek security in neutrality rather than in alliance and in accommodation with the Soviet Union rather than in confrontation.

This line of reasoning is more difficult to answer because the premises and trends on which it is based are realistic. To counter the argument, it is not enough to point out that present trends are reversible and that nothing is inevitable. I would rely instead on three reasons for supposing that European security can be sustained at a satisfactory level without unacceptably high defence budgets and without risking the pitfalls of an over-complacent or an over-aggressive attitude to the Soviet Union.

The first is that our defence capabilities, although not enough to win a war—if the concept of winning still has any meaning—are still enough to pose incalculable risks to any aggressor. While it is true that present trends seem likely to erode this deterrent defence, the process will be gradual and, for many years, capable of being halted or reversed. Furthermore, the two relationships which underpin European security—the transatlantic one and the European one—are so fundamental to the vital interests of both the United States and Western Europe that their erosion will surely not be allowed to continue unchecked. The recent Middle East crisis—by highlighting the strains that now exist—may have provided a salutary warning. It was also a reminder of the real strength of the United States and of the effectiveness of American foreign policy. It will be a difficult and often painful process, but I hope that in, say, five years' time the link between Western Europe and the United States will have been rationalised and perhaps restructured without being weakened. There is a good chance also that the countries of Western Europe will come to take a more coherent view of their external relations in all their aspects, including defence.

The second source of consolation is that, even if the security balance

is less satisfactory than we would like, there are ways in which this can to some extent be compensated. There will, for example, be more economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and the West. Unless present Soviet policies are reversed, there will also be more co-operation in other fields—agreements on technology and patents, cultural exchanges, collaboration in common problems such as transport, pollution and so on. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States is likely to embrace all these subjects and more; the desire to develop it further will be an additional consideration in the policies which the Soviet Union adopts towards Western Europe. We also hope that the conferences on force reductions and on security and co-operation in Europe will lead to practical measures of detente: the reduction of forces to common levels and confidence-building measures. Although obviously not in themselves a substitute for adequate defence, these activities should give both sides a certain vested interest in avoiding the use or threat of force. They should also help to build up a relationship with the Soviet Union less dominated by the military factor and therefore less disadvantageous to Western Europe.

Thirdly, we need to bear in mind that the under-insurance argument is only the mirror image of an earlier and supposedly equally realistic one. Twenty-five years ago it was contended, by Bertrand Russell among others, that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and ought therefore to be anticipated by the West, who should strike while they still possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons. All of us have reason to be grateful that this idea was rejected by Western statesmen. They argued—and the argument is equally valid today—that the objective was to gain time, time in which patience and persistence could change the situation for the better. One Soviet conviction is that time is on their side. Might it not be on ours too? I cannot speak for the Soviet experience, but it is fair to say that Western governments have found the Soviet leaders easier to talk business with in recent years. As long as we continue to gain time, by maintaining such military security as we can, there is reason to hope that the coming decade will bring more movement in the same favourable direction as the last two: diminished Soviet aggressiveness, increased West European solidarity and, on the basis of this, genuine East-West detente.

The future

I have argued so far that it is both necessary and feasible for Western Europe to ensure that there is a balance of force in Europe. I have begged the question how much is enough, because the answer depends on factors which are prone to vary. If Soviet policies can be relied on to continue, our present inferiority, assisted by the uncertainties of the

situation and by economic and political linkage, may provide a level of relative security which, although risky, is adequate to meet the definition proposed at the beginning of this article. If the focus of tension were to switch permanently to the Far East, we might even get by with somewhat lower forces than at present. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union showed signs of reverting to a policy of more overt pressure, in which military factors carried greater weight, Western Europe would probably need to generate more defence effort than at present. Any of these developments is conceivable. We need to make sure that our defence policies do not move so far in either direction that we become incapable of responding.

As the pace of East-West negotiation gathers, the European kaleidoscope is likely to turn faster and to make prediction about European security even more risky. It is fair to assume that there will be further adjustments in the transatlantic relationship, one by-product of which will be to increase the rate at which the West Europeans are already assuming a greater share of the defence burden of the alliance. There will probably also be further integration of the industrial base and the foreign policy-making machinery of the nine Community countries—giving them, if they choose to exercise it, the option of a more effective West European defence system. Beyond these broad assumptions, I foresee two possible trends in European security. The first would be a continuation of present developments—leading to a detente which gradually became less verbal and more actual, in which the military factor became a lesser element in a growing nexus of East-West relationships and in which mutual wariness remained but was slowly overcome by personal contacts and the habit of co-operation. The second would involve a reversal of present trends, or rather the halting of current favourable trends and the continuation of less favourable ones, such as the campaign for ideological purity, the concentration on bloc-building and the further expansion of Soviet forces. These developments would not necessarily interrupt East-West negotiations. But they would probably make them less productive. They would certainly mark a retreat from the more hopeful expectations raised about European security in the last few years.

If the choice is left to Western Europe, the former course will clearly be favoured, if only because of the sociological pressures referred to above. I can however think of two circumstances in which the latter course might be adopted.

The first would be a major change, improbable but conceivable, in Soviet policy towards Europe, leading to direct confrontation and the use of threats. This would produce a shock in Western Europe and would be uncertain in its outcome. It might occur in such a way that Europe had no immediate choice but to accommodate Soviet wishes—

although in the medium term the consequences might be less accommodating. But the shock might be strong enough to check the evolution of a largely civilian European Community and to divert back to defence a much larger share of Western Europe's resources and industrial capacity.

The second possibility, which might happen gradually but could also occur quite soon, would be a realisation in Western Europe that the Soviet theory and practice of detente were incompatible. If, after years of talk about detente, Soviet defence spending takes roughly the same slice of GNP as at present—or if East-West contacts remain largely an inter-state affair involving safe representatives and 'dead' culture—this cannot but give rise to scepticism in Western Europe. Soviet policies will, of course, be interpreted in the light of what is happening elsewhere in the global balance. But, if Soviet defence procurement and the deployment of Soviet forces still seem to give as much priority as at present to the countries of Western Europe, the latter will begin to wonder whether detente holds any real benefit for them. They will conclude that the clear signals given in their own defence spending and in the openness of their societies and industries to Soviet initiatives have not been reciprocated. And, although the thought is not attractive, they will then have to find ways of compensating for their military disadvantage—by increasing their defence budgets, by fuller military integration or perhaps, as a desperate last resort, by a high-risk strategy of immediate use of nuclear weapons in the event of attack.

It is in the interest of all countries involved in East-West negotiations to avoid these outcomes. Whatever short-term benefits might accrue to individual governments, the end result would be a lower level of security for all. The Soviet Union would have to contend, sooner or later, with a less stable and probably more heavily armed Western Europe. Western Europe would face the need to reverse its present order of priorities and to force the pace of integration in an area where this is both difficult and costly to achieve. The United States might well be unable to reconcile two of its principal aims in foreign policy: to preserve a dynamic but co-operative Western Europe and to construct a safer and more relaxed global relationship with the Soviet Union. This situation would not help to alleviate the problems of Eastern Europe; it might well aggravate those of the neutrals. While interests in European security may differ, therefore, there is a common interest in avoiding a trend in which the military factor becomes more important.

Conclusion

I have attempted to explain why the defence of Western Europe is likely to be an important problem in the second half of this decade. But

I do not want to suggest that it is the only—or even the most important—problem facing Western Europe. Indeed, I consider that equally, if not more, important tasks lie elsewhere: in building up the European Community; in rebuilding a viable partnership with the United States and Japan; and in working out a permanent basis for East-West reconciliation. These tasks are inextricably linked with each other and with the problem of European security. A stable relationship with the other main powers of the world will be easier to achieve on the basis of a united and coherent Western Europe. This depends on sustaining the political confidence of Western Europe which, to continue the syllogism, depends on an adequate sense of military security. On any other basis, Western Europe is likely to be a less effective partner of Japan and the United States. It will certainly be less capable of sustaining a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union on which all the hopes for detente, economic co-operation and political reconciliation rest. For without an approximate balance of strength—as Lewis Carroll reminds us—it is difficult for even intelligent and well-intentioned people to share things equitably:

> The Panther took the pie-crust and gravy and meat,
> While the Owl had the dish as its share of the treat.
> When the pie was all finished the Owl as a boon,
> Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon,
> While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl
> And concluded the banquet. . . .

ARAB WEALTH FROM OIL: PROBLEMS OF ITS INVESTMENT*

Robert Mabro and Elizabeth Monroe

IN October 1973, the Arab oil-producing states curtailed their oil output in order to play a serious part in the Fourth Arab-Israeli War. They cut production by some 25 per cent. and imposed a boycott on Israel's friends, directed chiefly at the United States. Almost overnight, they made all mankind aware of an energy crisis the prospect of which had worried close observers since early 1972. This crisis stems from the dependence of most of the free world on Arab oil, and the possibility that rich consumer countries through appetite, and poor ones through inability to afford high prices, could at the sudden turn of a stopcock be made to suffer oil shortages that would mar their economic growth.

This general expectation is based on several hard facts. First, substitute fuels, though they exist (notably in the form of nuclear energy and gasification of coal) cannot be developed on a large enough scale to palliate world demand for energy until the 1980s; engineering bottlenecks stand in their way. Next, an accelerated rate of finding major new oil reserves is thought by geologists to be unlikely. (Britain will be helped out from the North Sea, but a current estimate of potential United Kingdom North Sea reserves is only 30 billion [1] barrels, whereas the *proven* reserves of the Arab states, excluding North Africa, are 300 billion barrels; both figures are constantly being revised upwards.) Lastly, the United States is no longer self-sufficient, and is expected by 1980 to be importing over half its requirements, of which two-thirds will come from the Middle East. Its consumption in that year, if rising at the pace that it did before consumers were ordered to go slow in November 1973, would be about that of the whole of Western Europe in 1972. Thus the incidence of known reserves promises, certainly for ten years and perhaps for fifteen, to confront consumers with a monopoly exercised by a handful of oil-producing states, most though not all of them Arab.

A related subject on which this article tries to throw some light is

* This article is in part based on a seminar held at St. Antony's College, Oxford, in the summer of 1973. We are grateful to the participants for their contribution to the discussion and for comments on preliminary drafts of this paper. We alone are responsible for the views expressed.

1 Throughout this article the term 'billion' represents 1,000 million.

the monetary consequence of this imbalance of supply and demand in an irreplaceable product. Several questions are worth asking now. Is there a ceiling to the price producing countries can ask for their most significant asset? What channels will they use in order to put their surplus funds to work? How will they hedge against fluctuations in the currencies of oil consumers whose balances of payments are likely to be in deficit? Will they be in a position to disrupt the international monetary system? What will happen to the economic growth of the rest of the world if they decide to curtail production not, as in the autumn of 1973, for immediate political reasons, but on the longer-term ground that conservation is wise because for some years to come oil in the ground is more valuable than dollars.

Price and bargaining power

Neither the size nor the timing of future price-rises are predictable. Hindsight is no guide. At Teheran in February 1971, the major companies and six Gulf producers agreed on an immediate price-rise, capped by schedules that allowed for further rises to match expected inflation until the end of 1975; the producers agreed to make no further demands until that date. Within months, producers owning Mediterranean terminals had obtained better short-haul prices. The two dollar devaluations at the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1973 led to further compensation agreements. In mid-1972, the producing countries also sought a share in the management of the industry, and obtained 'participation' in operating production to the tune of 25 per cent. immediately, rising by stages to 51 per cent. in 1982. Iran, negotiating separately, secured itself a more sophisticated arrangement, and in August 1973 Libya decreed instant 51 per cent. participation; this move was applauded by Kuwait, which said that its own participation agreement remained negotiable.

Arab experience of participation affected price. For it revealed to the producing states that owing to world demand they could get more for the share of their oil that they were selling themselves than the companies were paying them in royalties and tax per barrel on the rest. Therefore on October 16, 1973—that is, ten days after Egypt and Syria marched into Israeli-occupied territory—the producers summoned the companies and dictated a fresh round of price rises. Their demand implied an almost 70 per cent. increase in the government take for Arabian light oil in the Persian Gulf. The Teheran schedules had become a scrap of paper.

At first glance, the producers seem to have things all their own way, and, while their monopoly lasts, to be able to raise prices at will. There are, however, some limits to the price ceiling that they set. For one thing, although low prices are unlikely to arrest the development of

substitutes generated by consumer concern for security of supply, high prices will hasten the rate of invention. For another, Saudi Arabia and Iran are so much the two biggest producers that their word may count for more than that of small neighbours; both may prefer not to overdo the pressure on Western countries on whom they rely for technological and management expertise, and for the armaments which both are buying from the West, as well as for marketing their oil. Other producers who may not want to press unduly are the less affluent states—for instance, Algeria—who are catering for big and needy populations and look to the Western world for loans of funds for quick industrialisation. Again, producer countries that go in for '100 per cent. participation'—*alias* nationalisation—may, when they become sellers of all their own oil and get the whole of the price, grow more sensitive to the risks of competition, or of a temporary slackening of demand owing to some pause in world economic growth. Up to now, they have not felt these buffets because foreign oil companies have cushioned them against price-erosion. There is a ceiling, but the prices of October 1973 probably did not reach it. For many powerful players in the oil game have an interest in higher prices than those of October. The Americans' attitude to prices is ambivalent; low prices help their balance of trade, but high ones enable their government to justify the development of expensive substitutes without subsidy. The Soviet Union favours high ones in order to bring to life its remote but enormous resources of oil, gas and coal in Siberia, and the major companies do not have much incentive to resist price rises.[2] But whatever the balance struck between raising prices and holding them steady, it is unlikely that producers will ever let them slip back.

Accumulation of surplus funds

The main Arab and Gulf producers are, in order of magnitude of production in 1972, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, Algeria, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. In terms of reserves, Saudi Arabia's—by far the largest—are more than twice those of Iran. Ultimately, Iraq's reserves may turn out to be very large also. Kuwait, Libya and Algeria, by contrast, possess reserves that seem likely to taper off in the present century; with this contingency in mind, Kuwait and Libya cut back production in mid-1972. Abu Dhabi's prospects are more of a guess. But not all these countries will accumulate surplus funds. Iran, Iraq and Algeria possess large populations whose standards of living need to be raised; they also possess resources other than oil which await development; they could use all their surplus earnings at home. Abu Dhabi—a

[2] The sufferers by high prices are developing countries, such as India, which cannot afford them.

late starter—is expected to spend its whole revenue at home until 1975, but thereafter to enjoy a large surplus. Therefore in assessing the size of the surplus funds that are likely to accumulate by 1980, only those earned by four desert states with small populations and few alternative resources need to be taken into account. These four are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Libya (provided the last-named does not merge with Egypt—a project rendered less likely than it was by the disagreement of October-November 1973).

When calculating the size of the cumulative surpluses that these countries will enjoy, three variables affect the sum. These variables are: guesses about price, about world demand for oil, and about the future import propensities of our four states. First, on prices, enough has been said to show how much depends on the bargaining behaviour of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, future world demand for oil is hard to predict because it will not be entirely independent of price, or of the import behaviour of producing countries, or of the impact of their financial and economic actions on consumer balances of payments, or on the international monetary system. Thirdly, the future import propensities of our four countries depend on changes of policy or regime that cannot be foretold. For instance, fear of war can lead to escalations of armaments. Or Saudi Arabia, if it were to seek for its five to six million inhabitants the living standards and amenities that are today enjoyed by the born Kuwaiti citizen, would have to increase public expenditure and imports at a rate that would mop up far more of its earnings than hitherto. Examples of other changes that might absorb much income are a merger between an oil- and a non-oil-producing state, or a change in the political map brought about by domestic revolution, or a readiness to share oil earnings with fellow Arabs in peace as well as in war.

Guesses about the size of the surplus are therefore bound to be hazardous, but even the moderate ones are dramatic. Had prices remained steady on the Teheran basis, our four Arab countries would have accumulated a surplus of some $35 billion by 1980; a higher published estimate (that of James E. Akins of the American State Department in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973) was a cumulative surplus of over $100 billion by that year. Subsequent guesses, based on price rises later in 1973, and allowing for interest on the resultant cumulative surplus (calculating at a government take of only $5 per barrel) reach a total that is nearer $200 billion. This last and highest figure may underestimate the rate of growth of imports and public expenditures as Arab governments do their best to spread the wealth to all members of their population.

And yet more significant than the estimates of accumulation by a given year are guesses at the size of annual increments. The lowest estimate cited above implies an annual increment, for our four countries

together, of $15–18 billion by 1980; for the highest estimate, the figure would be $35–50 billion.

Present investment practices

At present, Arab holdings are small when set against world figures. In March 1973 the central bank holdings of our four states (about 80 per cent. of their funds) plus the foreign assets of their commercial banks and private investors added up to about $11·5 billion. Other Amirates in the Gulf held about another $1·5 billion. At the same date, central bank reserves of non-communist countries were estimated at $155 billion and the foreign assets of their commercial banks at $150 billion. Arab official and private funds represented a very small fraction of these international aggregates; they will represent a much larger proportion later.

At this stage, a distinction needs to be drawn between the public and the private investor. Up till now, the former has presented no problem on account of government conservatism. Arab managers of their own central bank funds have, contrary to general supposition, been careful if not model investors. There is no evidence that their behaviour has been instrumental in bringing about the monetary crises of 1972 and 1973. They have tended to manage their money through boards saddled with bureaucratic inflexibility, and unsuited to taking prompt decisions; these have favoured three- to six-month deposits, or investment in Euro-bonds or dollar bonds in which the secondary market is narrow and arbitrage difficult. Moreover, they have undergone some worrying experiences, and have learnt the hard way about their vulnerability if they hold a single currency and it comes under fire. Libya was hit after it shifted its reserves, for political reasons, out of sterling into various currencies, mainly dollars. Saudi Arabia has complained about the penalties it has incurred through being faithful to the dollar. Arab managers of public funds seem likely to diversify rather than concentrate their holdings. They also know that large shifts from one currency to another may generate defensive action, since countries threatened with excessive inflows frustrate such movements by imposing currency controls. All told, Arabs may prove as keen on monetary stability as are the well-to-do states of the Western world.

It is axiomatic that small operators have more freedom of action than large reserve holders. At the opposite pole from the central bank holding that cannot be moved quickly enough to create international monetary problems is the hot money that is lodged in short-term *masses de manoeuvre*, movable around for economic or political reasons, and that may be influenced by the *sauve-qui-peut* impulses of the classic speculator. There is risk of disruption by such investors because there

are contexts in which small marginal sums can upset the system. But here again there are limits to the degree of disruption that could be wrought. Private banks and investors at present hold perhaps 15 per cent. of the cumulative surplus in our four countries, though the relative size of the private sector will undoubtedly diminish in the decade under review. These investors are able to speculate. Nevertheless, many have taken cautious steps—for instance, to establish banks in partnership with Western houses; they seem unlikely to want to upset the world money market. Moreover, the increase that they are likely to bring to the pool of hot money will tend to reduce short-term interest rates, and so to alleviate tensions. Again, limitations on switching in search of quick kills can be applied by the countries into whose currencies they may wish to switch (as West Germany applied them in the winter of 1972–73). Lastly, continuing to keep very large amounts liquid is not profitable in an inflationary world.

In a word, the opportunities open to a single Arab holder have proved, for the more sophisticated such as the Kuwaitis, the same as those open to an individual Western investor or a multinational corporation. It is of course possible that some government or Arab holder of large surpluses might, acting in a fit of political pique and regardless of sending the market against itself, behave irrationally and upset the structure. The ability of central bankers and governments in other countries to devise protective measures in such instances should not be underrated.

Potential investment outlets

Arab governments are, and will be increasingly, looking around for safe outlets for their surplus funds. It behoves every major oil consumer to devise ways of enhancing the absorptive capacity of the producers' economies, as well as their confidence in investment prospects abroad, if they are to produce their oil today rather than leave it in the ground to await tomorrow's prices. There are four possible outlets for these funds—at home, in the rest of the Arab world, in the international oil industry, and on capital markets abroad.

In the four countries that possess few resources other than oil, openings at home are limited. The pattern of public expenditures of an oil state has fairly typical features. (a) Armaments and internal security absorb significant amounts. Rulers (or in some states a parliament or a council of state) spend on their own survival, protecting this with well-equipped, though not always very efficient, army and anti-subversion services. The larger countries aspire to become regional great powers and oil revenues reinforce this desire, enabling them to purchase the instruments of power. Most people assume that all Arab expenditure

on armaments is incurred with Israel in mind; in the Gulf much of it represents insurance against local neighbours. Military expenditure will tend to increase at a relatively high rate, not least because modern armaments become rapidly obsolete, and new models are always more expensive than the old.

(b) A second important head of domestic expenditure is public employment. Since a large share of the national income of oil countries accrues directly to the government, a special responsibility for redistribution arises. Public employment is the favoured method of channelling oil revenues into the economy. A large proportion of the labour force in Libya and Kuwait is on the government payroll. There is no doubt that as education develops in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, generating expectation of new and dignified jobs, and as the administrative and economic functions of the government expand with modernisation, public employment will tend to grow there also. Mounting revenues also lead to the payment of higher wages and salaries, bonuses and allowances of all kinds. Large and fast-growing sums are likely to be absorbed in this way.

(c) All the oil-producing states spend on their own people, providing health, education and welfare services to an extent that in Kuwait is proverbial. Saudi Arabia, partly owing to its huge area and the scattered nature of its population centres, lags far behind in this field; soon the weight of better-informed and better-educated home opinion will cause these expenditures to rise. The increase could become significant if welfare services were extended to all its five to six million inhabitants.

(d) Finally, all the Middle East oil states, however devoid of alternative resources, have home development or investment programmes. In our four rich desert countries, shortage of skilled manpower and paucity of non-oil resources restrict the range of profitable projects. They spend on their road infrastructure, public utilities, airlines and banking, and most of them have laid out money on prestige projects that vie for custom; examples are deep water harbours and international airports. Agriculture offers them few or no big openings apart from cattle-breeding in Saudi Arabia, and industrialisation is a slow process. Many oil states have invested in competing petrochemical industries; for example, several produced fertilisers that are already in over-supply. Some governments hope to tempt capital-intensive foreign industries into the area—for example, smelters of imported ores—with offers of free land, and free fuel from natural gas at present being burnt to waste; but foreigners are shy out of fear of political insecurity. Some of the states are considering the advantages of refining all their own crude oil instead of exporting it; this possibility is discussed in a later paragraph that reviews their openings for investment in the oil industry. But even were these innovations to come about, and were domestic pressure for

a better way of life at home to rise to Kuwaiti levels, it is clear that home investment is not a bottomless sink for funds.

The rest of the Arab world could absorb much more Arab investment than has hitherto come its way. The development needs of its populous countries—Egypt and Algeria, for example—are immense. The Arab-Israeli conflict has forced Egypt to curtail its investment and divert resources to defence. It has had to scale down, delay or shelve many good projects just at the time when completion of its High Dam has provided electricity and water for agricultural and industrial development. Algeria is engaged in an ambitious programme in petrochemicals, gas and refining for which it has had to seek large international loans. Other Arab countries could profitably use funds—Syria on irrigation, the Sudan on agriculture and transport, Lebanon on light industries catering for export and on services, to name but a few. Many Arab intellectuals believe that oil money should serve the region as a whole. In the past, rulers and governments have been cautious save in a few political instances. Some have been prompted by the Arab-Israeli conflict to make large and recurrent gifts of cash to the poorer countries on Israel's borders. For instance, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya have all subscribed to an annual £100 million to compensate Egypt for an idle Suez Canal. And, just before the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi promised President Sadat £500 million towards his war effort.

In the field of development aid, there are good examples of Arab bounty; take Kuwait's endowment of the lower Gulf with schools and teachers. In theory, there could be commercial rates of return on loans to industrial or commercial enterprises in Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Algeria, but apart from purchases of urban property, most Arab oil states have so far seen political risk in venturing money in other Arab lands. Investment in inter-Arab transport and telecommunication links would seem profitable, but is materialising only slowly. By far the most businesslike lending operation afoot is that run by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), which lends at low rates of interest, and after close professional scrutiny, to Arab enterprises reckoned to have an economic future; its total lending between its start in 1962 and mid-1973 amounted to 106·4 million Kuwaiti dinars (£123·4 million sterling). A broader all-Arab development fund was set up in 1971 with headquarters in Kuwait, but at the end of 1973 had not yet begun to operate. All told, the sums likely to be absorbed by investment in the rest of the Arab world are likely to remain relatively small unless significant political changes take place.

Many governments with surpluses to invest look first at the oil industry. They do so because old acquaintance counts, because investment in a field that they know is less worrying than the thought of invest-

ment exposed to the hazards of unfamiliar market forces, and because at least some of the investment would lie within their own fiscal area. Some indication of the amounts that could be so absorbed can be gained from studying estimates published in 1972 by the Chase Manhattan Bank. It then estimated that in the fifteen years 1970–85, the oil industry as a whole was likely to invest $600 billion. Of this sum, $230 billion would be spent on production of crude oil and gas (one-fifth of it in countries belonging to OPEC—the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), $335 billion on transport, refining and marketing and $35 billion on exploration (virtually all outside the Middle East). A breakdown of its figures suggests that if the Middle East producers were all wholly to take over their present companies (running production by hiring their expertise) but were merely to *produce* crude oil and natural gas, their total expenditure on their home industry would be only $23 billion over fifteen years—say, $2 billion per annum by 1980. Maybe all would spend outside their own frontiers by participating in the carrying and marketing trades. Some Arab governments already own tanker fleets; others so far prefer to let existing companies carry and market their offtake; a few have profited by the eagerness of Japan and certain OECD countries to break the Anglo-American near-monopoly of marketing, and have made bilateral arrangements with France, Japan or Italy. But none of these expedients would absorb vast amounts of their capital. Some of them think they would do well to refine their own crude oil at home instead of exporting it. They reckon, rightly, that refining is a highly capital-intensive enterprise, and deduce that to undertake it would bring prestige and be logical. Arab governments are also attracted by the notion that a country should use its natural resources for domestic industrialisation, and not merely as a source of external rents. But there are very large economies of scale in the transportation of crude. Any switch would take time, and might not be feasible during their years of peak earning. Their prospects of manufacturing and exporting goods obtainable from petrochemicals are much rosier. But looking at all aspects of the oil industry, it seems reasonable to deduce that surplus Arab funds will not be totally absorbed in oil ventures.

The upshot of the preceding paragraphs is that Arab investment opportunities at home, in the Arab world and in the oil industry will not absorb the whole of the Arab surplus funds—at least, not by 1980. Yet, as has been argued, to keep large sums liquid is not profitable, any more than are short-term investments, in an inflationary world. Therefore the rational course for large holders of investment funds is to place them in long-term investment—that is, in equities or real estate. So far, the Arabs who do this have been private investors, mainly Kuwaitis. For governments, investment of this kind is a new and worrying venture. They hesitate to soar into realms that expose them to fluctuations over

which they have no control. Even a high yield from equities or property may not be tempting if they expect future prices of oil to reach much higher levels than those of today. Some of them see no stable vehicle whereby to transfer from oil into equities.

Yet the opportunities beckon, or ought to be made to do so if the consumer world wants them to maintain oil production now. It is arguable that opportunities exist on the world's stock markets that are of more permanence than those offered by hanging on to a single commodity for which substitutes will eventually be found. Equities bought with a good set of advisers, and diversified into a wide range of enterprises, would be a hedge against the day when oil's monopoly tapers off.

Impact on the world equity market

Just as it is topical to inquire whether huge amounts of hot money could disturb the world's exchanges, so pessimists wonder about the impact of huge Arab investments on the world's equity market. But here again worries about concentration are two-sided. At 1972 prices, the total world market in equities amounted to $1,000 billion, of which perhaps $20 billion constituted new issues. Estimating that by 1980 Arab surpluses for investment in equities were $20 billion or even $30 billion, and that, calculating at the above volume of new issues, the world total had risen to $1,500 billion, the Arab share, though large, would not be overwhelmingly so. Moreover, it would be diversified, or could be made so by safeguards such as the United States regulation whereby holdings that constitute more than 5 per cent. of an enterprise's total have to be publicly declared, or whereby Congressional consent is required for equity investment by foreigners in public utilities. A blackmail position is avoidable. Much depends, of course, on the ways and the rate at which these funds are channelled onto the equity market. As has been mentioned, sums which seem small when compared with the aggregate may be very large in relation to the flow of new issues or to turnover.

Yet incentives to use the surplus funds must be devised or the oil will remain in the ground. Japan, which increased its central bank reserves in four years from $2 billion to $18 billion, took refuge in stockpiling commodities; Arab states, not being industrialised, might not be interested in this kind of hoarding. Some other asset must be devised.

The major risk ahead

For it becomes increasingly clear, as this survey proceeds, that the worst contingency facing the Western world is not the appearance of Arab rogue elephants speculating in currencies, invading the world's stock markets, or upsetting its currency system by floating liquid funds

from country to country in accordance with political fancy. Far more dangerous to world economic stability is the risk that out of nervousness generated by the weakness of the currencies of consumers whose balances of payments are in deficit, there will be no incentive to get oil out of the ground. 'Why should we produce more than we need to live on?' Even if Arabs continue to want Western goods—armaments, capital equipment, consumer durables—this offset no longer counterbalances the mounting Western and Japanese appetite for oil. What is to happen to world economies if all Arab producers reduce their rate of output, not for the political reasons that frightened consumers in November 1973, but because no foreign asset seems attractive to countries in financial surplus and already living the good life that they desire?

The outlook for consumers is not so starkly bleak as the previous paragraph implies, because the needs and intentions of producers vary from country to country and in some the need of funds for development and welfare is immense. Iran, Iraq (once it sorts out its administrative tangles), Algeria and Oman need to sell every barrel they can if they are to live up to the rising expectations of their people. But though the first three are big producers now, their potential reserves (apart from Iraq's) are small or in doubt; in Iran the ratio of reserves to production may fall so low as to act as a constraint on production. For this reason, Kuwait and Libya have cut back already. Saudi Arabia is quite otherwise placed. Its oil prospects are splendid. It has reserves and potential earnings more than twice as large as anyone else's, and proven reserves are constantly rising. The latest find in its Empty Quarter (hitherto aptly-named) may be the largest of all, and the country is thought to be capable of producing 20 million barrels a day by 1980.[3] Is is the crucial producer for the world. Alone or with Abu Dhabi, it would be capable of preventing Western economies from satisfying their appetites for fuel during the hiatus years before alternative fuels supplement oil.

Policy implications

The main problem for consumers therefore is to devise incentives that will induce Saudi Arabia and others to produce, in the course of the next ten or fifteen years, the volume of oil that the world seems likely to need. The incentive to produce will depend first, on prices, and secondly, on these states' ability to manage and profitably to invest the proceeds.

Is there some price high enough to nullify the attraction of leaving the oil in the ground? The gap between present and future prices has recently narrowed, and has but to narrow more to render the value of oil

[3] 1972 rates of production (in '000 barrels per day): Saudi Arabia, 5,375; Iran, 5,050; Kuwait, 2,999; Libya, 2,230; Iraq, 1,455; Algeria, 1,100; Abu Dhabi, 1,050; Qatar, 482; Oman, 280.

in the ground less attractive than the value of other assets. But the problem of investing surplus funds will remain; indeed, it may be aggravated as prices rise. Therefore a task for all those concerned is to devise policies that may enhance the ability of the owners of these surpluses to make profitable investments. Its fulfilment calls for co-operation between consumers and producers, and a few measures that are worth their consideration are briefly described below.

One relates to developing the domestic economy of desert countries. Until the 'oil crisis' spotlit the special problems of countries rich in foreign exchange but poor in human and natural resources, development economists, Arab or other, had devoted little attention to it; there is need for more Arid Lands Research Centres like that run by Abu Dhabi on one of its islands. A small international organisation specialising in economic research and technical assistance for oil-rich desert countries might be worth founding to encourage the efforts that producers are making to invest in their own economies, and so increase their capacity to absorb their own funds.

A second measure would be to promote greater participation by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the management of the international monetary system. Their monetary reserves, though small at present, are growing so fast that all parties concerned would benefit by their early co-operation within the sanctums in which monetary discussions take place. Once inside the board room, Arabs would gain experience. Interest rates would come to weigh with them, and the worries which assail them when they contemplate a diversified portfolio might diminish. Their freedom of action would to some extent be restricted (as in any international club) but their chances to invest in well-managed assets would be greater and more obvious than they are now.

Even were our four countries to succeed in quickly expanding their own absorptive capacity, they would still accumulate sizeable surplus funds. They might remain nervous and still be tempted to leave their oil in the ground, if they have to lodge their immediate inflow in short-term deposits exposed to the risk of currency fluctuation and continuous depreciation owing to world inflation. Two further measures are therefore suggested. One is to create for a portion of their surpluses a short-term liquid asset which does not depreciate against major currencies; they might welcome this if it were to take the form of special drawing rights, or an equivalent, based on a basket of the stronger currencies, including perhaps their own. But this asset does not provide a hedge against inflation and would be unsuitable for the larger part of their holdings. As they accumulate reserves, their wish for a diversified portfolio including equities and real assets is bound to increase. The fourth and last suggestion is the creation of world unit trusts—preferably several such international organisations with func-

tions that are in the main those of an investment bank. They would need to be set up by treaty between the governments of oil-producing states and those of industrialised countries. They would buy equities and property around the world, and issue units to shareholders. The unit-holders, whether oil-producing countries or other investors, would need safeguards against confiscation in the form of either political guarantees, or financial guarantees through deposits of funds by the industrial countries with the trust, or both. Industrial countries would be safeguarded against the danger of foreign control of their major companies by the very nature of the trust. Finally, unit-holders would participate in the management of these trusts. They would be entitled to sell a stated proportion of their holdings upon request. Ideally, they should, if they wished, be able gradually to withdraw most of their holdings in the late 1980s and 1990s, by which time the absorptive capacity of their own economies would be on the upgrade, and their revenues from oil might have started proportionately to decline.[4]

Much remains to be done to ensure the future of oil supplies over and above warding against the political hazards to which they were subjected in the last quarter of 1973. But we believe that new and imaginative forms of monetary co-operation between producers and consumers will provide a more lasting guarantee against disruption than some of the remedies that have been mentioned—notably, the setting up of consumer cartels, or threats of armed force leading, as sure as fate, to Arab acts of self-inflicted sabotage of oil installations. Consumers would stand to lose even more than producers throughout the time that the damage would take to repair.

[4] This proposal was submitted by R. Mabro and I. M. D. Little for discussion at a seminar held at Nuffield College, Oxford, In October 1973.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

ESPECIALLY in the United States, but also increasingly in other countries as well, there has been growing interest during the past generation in the development of theories of international relations. This has taken the form of a quest for theories to explain such phenomena as conflict and integration, to develop an understanding of the relationship between the structure of the international system ('bipolar' or 'multipolar') and patterns of foreign policy behaviour; to assess the impact of domestic politics and political structures on a country's foreign policy and to establish international-domestic 'linkages'; and to study the decision-making and bureaucratic processes as they affect foreign policy behaviour.

Scholars have long studied phenomena such as international law, the nature of power, the state and sovereignty, and the problems of the management of power and the development of international political institutions. As an organised field of study, however, international relations dates only from the early 20th century. After the First World War, the study and teaching of international relations gained recognition as an autonomous field of study in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in other countries. As E. H. Carr has observed, international relations came into existence as a field of study as a result of an abiding desire, in the aftermath of the First World War, to understand the causes of conflict and to build a more peaceful world.[1]

This perceived need influenced not only the substantive emphases of international relations in its formative phase, but also the types of theory that emerged in the interwar period. In part, the study of international relations consisted of the analysis of diplomatic history. In this respect the study of international relations was in no significant way different from the study of history as practised traditionally by the diplomatic historian. In addition, however, international relations included international law, largely as studied traditionally by the legal scholar, as well as international organisations with the principal emphasis

[1] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks. 1964), pp. 1–5. Originally published in 1939 by Macmillan, London, and St. Martin's Press, New York.

on the League of Nations and the specialised international agencies that had been developed since the latter part of the 19th century. Few, if any, efforts were made to develop theoretical frameworks within which available data could be organised and analysed. Nor was there any widespread attempt to derive from research findings a reliable body of generalisations. In the tradition of diplomatic history and international law, studies were usually case-specific.

Instead, the theoretical interest of scholars lay for the most part in normative, or value, theory. In the 'utopian' theory of the interwar period, there existed a normative bias towards international law and organisation, collective security as an alternative to balance of power ('forever discredited' in Woodrow Wilson's estimation), national self-determination, and disarmament. The foreign policies of nations and international relations in general were evaluated on the basis of their conformity, or failure to conform, to the standards embodied in international law and organisation. The Covenant of the League of Nations, together with treaties such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, provided an additional source of normative standards against which international conduct could be judged and towards which it could aspire. Inter-state behaviour based on national interest, power politics, and the balance of power was generally condemned in favour of the 'higher' standards established by international law, collective security, and international organisation.

International relations theories of the interwar period came increasingly under challenge as the gap between normative theory and political practice widened in the 1930s.[2] The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935, Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 against the explicit prohibition of the Versailles Treaty, the *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria, followed by the Munich crisis and, in 1939, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and the outbreak of the Second World War with the invasion of Poland all pointed up the deficiencies of the normative theories of international relations of the times. Essential to normative theory, but largely absent in the period, was an understanding of *why* nations acted as they did.

Despite the prevailing tendency of international relations described above, several scholars, both in Britain and the United States, sought in the interwar period, through the analysis of data, to develop explanatory theories of international relations. For example; the British mathematician Lewis F. Richardson used statistics and mathematical models to study the relationship between arms races and wars.[3] Writing in the United States, Quincy Wright produced a monumental work which compared wars from earliest times to the present in an effort to produce a

[2] See, for example, E. H. Carr, especially Ch. 2.
[3] Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood. 1960), and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1960).

theory of war and conflict.[4] Scholars such as Harold Lasswell began to study the relationship between world politics and psychology with the principal emphasis on images, symbols, and perceptions.[5] Other scholars produced works on the problems of ethnic and racial minorities, the role of climate and geography and the effects of population growth and its distribution on international relations.[6] Many of the interests that occupied scholars in the 1930s, especially the study of conflict, became once again the object of more intensive analysis in a later generation and helped to shape the study of international relations in more recent times. Nevertheless, the dominant reaction to the normative, utopian theorising of the interwar period was realist theory.

When it gained ascendancy in the decade after the Second World War, realist theory represented an effort to develop a theoretical approach to international relations that both described interstate behaviour and provided a framework for the use of policymakers. Hans Morgenthau and his fellow realists, many of them emigrés who had left Central Europe between the wars, provided both a radical departure from the 'utopian' phase of international relations and posed questions that set a tone for international relations theory that endures to this day. Like those preoccupied with theory-building today, the realists sought answers to essentially the same kinds of questions as later scholars in the 1960s and the 1970s. Morgenthau, for example, had as his major purpose 'to reduce the facts of experience to mere specific instances of general propositions'.[7] Realists developed a theory which relied for its validation principally upon historical experience. Through the analysis of history, they attempted to demonstrate that there were recurring patterns in international behaviour. They sought to isolate power for intensive analysis as the explanatory variable in international behaviour. As Morgenthau suggested: 'International Politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.'[8] Central to the study of international relations and the practice

4 Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942).

5 Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: The Free Press. 1965). First published in 1934.

6 See, for example, Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton. 1962). First published in 1919. See also Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1924); Warren S. Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Population* (New York: Knopf. 1959); Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials* (New York: Macmillan. 1934); Robert Strausz-Hupé *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York: Putnam. 1942).

7 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf. 1972), Fifth Edition. Other realist writings include: Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1942); George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton. 1966); Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1962); Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored—Europe After Napoleon: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap. 1964); Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1951).

8 Morgenthau, p. 27.

of statecraft, moreover, is the concept of national interest. Those statesmen who have been most successful have sought to preserve the 'national interest', defined ultimately as the prudent use of power to safeguard those interests most vital to the survival of the nation-state. The study of history, according to realist theory, yields a body of generalisations about the essential preconditions for the successful pursuit of national interest and for the attainment of a more stable international system.

Realist theory helped decisively to move the study of international relations from its normative, utopian emphasis to the description and analysis of the existing world. Yet realist theory was faulted by its critics for essentially two reasons: its allegedly excessive preoccupation with power as a central element in international relations and its lack of precision in defining concepts such as power, national interest, and balance of power and its failure or inability to subject such concepts to rigorous analysis through measurement. American international relations scholars have never felt fully comfortable with the study of power or with the utilisation of power as a concept in explaining political behaviour. Whenever possible, many would prefer to impute to international behaviour motives other than a 'struggle for power'.

The 'behavioural revolution'

Added to an aversion to the analysis of power as a central element of international relations was the onset, in the 1950s and increasingly in the 1960s, of the 'behavioural revolution' in the American study of political science and international relations. The 'behavioural revolution' brought to the theoretical study of international relations a quest for theory which was explanatory and predictive. The 'behaviouralist' faulted the earlier non-quantitative scholars, or 'traditionalists', for not having been concerned explicitly with the formulation and testing of hypotheses and the construction of models or theories based upon logically interlinked hypotheses. Whereas many traditionally-oriented scholars had questioned the extent to which events or other phenomena can be treated as similar, the behaviouralist was concerned explicitly with recurring patterns rather than the single case as a meaningful focus of inquiry. If a reliable story, or theories, of international relations was to be developed, it must rest upon a capacity for generalisation arising from the validation of hypotheses. In contrast, the traditionalist held that the factors that sustain international life are so numerous and complex that they cannot be isolated into more or less important variables which, as in the case of power in realist theory, purport to explain a wide range of international phenomena. In response, the behaviouralist contended that it is essential to isolate and study key variables, to construct theories, and to make hypotheses operational—that is, to construct precise

indicators of phenomena under investigation. The behaviouralist sought greater precision both in the use of concepts and in the testing of hypotheses. There was a heavy emphasis on quantification as a basis for precision.[9]

For this reason, scholars of international relations, as well as their colleagues in other social science disciplines, turned to methodologies based upon statistics and mathematics. They made use of such techniques as the content analysis of documents and survey research of elite and mass public opinion. They developed archives from which data on a wide range of phenomena might be stored for retrieval and use by scholars. There was a conscious concern with method or technique for the conduct of research and with the collection and analysis of data. In this endeavour, the perfection of the computer and its increasingly wide use in universities for social science research provided an essential ingredient. Without the computer for the storage, retrieval and analysis of information, the conduct of much of the quantitative research of the past generation would have been impossible. Similarly, the availability of large grants by private foundations and research funded by the United States government contributed greatly to the behavioural study of international relations. Especially in the 1960s, large-scale funding, together with the growing use of the computer, led to a rapid expansion in the numbers of international relations scholars, especially in the United States. While there was an influx of older (and younger) scholars from other disciplines, bringing with them theories from such fields as economics and mathematics, international relations grew in numbers of scholars largely as a result of the entry of young Ph.D.s into its professional ranks.

The behaviouralist-traditionalist, like the earlier utopian-realist controversy, led to a divergence among scholars about the nature of international relations theory that has yet to be resolved. One conception holds that a theory of international relations, as in the literature on the philosophy of science, is defined as a symbolic construction, a series of inter-related constructs or concepts, together with definitions, laws, theorems and axioms. In this conception, theory is a group of laws that are deductively connected. Such a theory may or may not depend upon empirical referents for its validity. It need only state logically-deduced

[9] For an examination of this debate, see Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, 'Tradition and Science in the Study of International Politics'; Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: the Case for a Classical Approach'; Morton A. Kaplan, 'The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations'; J. David Singer, 'The Incompleat Theorist: Insight without Evidence'; Marion J. Levy, Jr., '"Does it Matter if He's Naked?" Bawled the Child' in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1969), pp. 3–110. See also James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971), esp. Chs. 1 and 13.

relationships among the phenomena with which the theory is concerned.[10] Although such theoretical systems may be free of direct linkages with the real world, they may nevertheless be compared with the real world. The international systems models of Morton A. Kaplan, for instance, provide an example of such a conception of theory. Kaplan sets forth in elaborate form a set of inter-related laws deductively connected on a range of alternative international systems including, for example, tight and loose bipolar, balance of power, hierarchical with a world government possessing a coercive capacity, and unit-veto or fully multipolar system with all actors possessing nuclear weapons.[11]

Whether or not real world empirical referents can be found for any or all of these systems, they nevertheless provide a basis for comparison and analysis of real world systems, some features of which may be comparable to the model. Such systems are models in the same sense in which a theory of molecular structure could be translated into a model which, if a correct model, would relate to the observable real world. They are theoretical models which can be applied to real systems, but which in principle can also be expressed in purely logical form. Most analysts of international relations, although perhaps with less formalistic logic and rigour, develop 'models' of international systems based, for example, upon a form of bipolarity, multipolarity or perhaps balance of power. Nevertheless, scholars concerned with the development of theory as a group of deductively connected laws have usually held that, if possible, they should be capable of empirical validation, by the testing of hypotheses that can be made 'operational' or measurable by quantification.

Yet this conception of theory is not universally accepted among international relations scholars. There has been disagreement about the relative importance of deduction as opposed to induction in the building of theory.[12] Much of the theory-building effort in international relations has consisted of inductively derived generalisations about political behaviour developed either from quantitatively based studies or from the comparative examination of case studies drawn from historical or contemporary materials.

Another conception of theory as used in international relations consists of the development of propositions or statements about, for example, rational behaviour based on a dominant motive such as power. Such a theory purports to furnish a description of the political behaviour

[10] Gustav Bergmann, *The Philosophy of Science* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1958), pp. 31–32; Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science* (San Francisco: Chandler. 1964), esp. Ch. 1.

[11] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley. 1958).

[12] For an example of this difference see: Oran R. Young, 'Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor', *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), pp. 486–511. For Russett's reply, see 'The Young Science of International Politics', *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), pp. 87–94.

of rational actors. For example, Hans Morgenthau sets forth a theory of international politics which, 'by the very fact of painting a rational picture of the political scene, points to the contrast between what the political scene is and what it tends to be, but can never become '.[13] The idea of rationality has provided a core concept in other theories, including game theory and deterrence theory, as well as certain types of decision-making theory.

Finally, international relations theory has also consisted of the development and analysis of norms or values about the 'ethical desiderata' of international relations. Much of the traditional writings on political philosophy, from Plato to the 20th century, consists of such theory. Normative theory, like that which abounded in international relations literature, especially in the interwar period, has purported to establish standards against which existing conduct could be measured and towards which political behaviour might aspire.

The kind of theory to be emphasised—normative or explanatory, inductive or deductive—is not the only area of disagreement among international relations scholars. There have been differences over the issue of the appropriate level of theorising. Is it possible to develop 'grand theory', that is, a theory which, by reference to a key variable such as power, purports to account for a wide range of international phenomena? Because of its focus on a model which, by reference to power and national interest as key explanatory variables for most of international behaviour, realist theory, together with certain of the systems approaches, represents probably the most ambitious effort so far to develop a grand theory of international relations. Of course, it may not be possible to create a grand theory of international behaviour, just as efforts to develop such theories in most other disciplines have not borne fruit.

Other scholars have concerned themselves with the development of 'middle range' theories, intended to explain more limited, yet important, phenomena such as international conflict and integration, foreign policy decision-making and, at an even more limited level, transactions patterns among national units during crises or the relationship between patterns of domestic violence and the propensity of a nation to engage in international conflict. If a reliable body of generalisations about such more limited phenomena could be created, there would exist 'islands' of theory which one day might be linked into a more comprehensive theory of international relations.

Especially in the past decade, scholars have made an effort to delineate various levels of analysis and to develop theories addressed specifically to each of these levels: the international system, the national

[13] Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations', in William T. R. Fox (ed.), *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1959), p. 17.

unit, and the individual.[14] Much of the theorising of the last decade can be categorised within one, and in some cases more than one, of these levels of analysis.

At the first of these levels, the international system, a variety of theories which examine international relations at the macro-level have been developed. The patterns of interaction that provide the general parameters for the development and conduct of international relations have been the object of theorising. International relations theorists of the realist school and, more recently, those concerned with systems theory, have stressed the importance of the structure of the international system, asserting that states act as they do because of its nature or because of the role they play in alternative kinds of international sytems, such as those based on a 'balance of power' or 'bipolarity' or 'multi-polarity'. For example, Hans Morgenthau has described an international system based on a balance of power structure, which for more than four hundred years 'succeeded in preserving the existence of all members of the modern state system from the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 to the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century'.[15] In his pioneering work on systems theory and international relations, Morton A. Kaplan deduced rules of behaviour for states in each of the international systems that he developed.[16] Conflict or co-operation among states is considered to be largely a function of the nature of the international system and, in particular, the number of actors and the distribution of power among them.

For the last decade, there has been an abundance of theorising about the implications of change in the international system from bipolarity to a form of multipolarity (not clearly defined). An effort has been made to test hypotheses about the relationship between international conflict and bipolarity/multipolarity. From the extensive literature about the relationship between the structure of the international system and foreign policy, it is possible to set forth several questions: To what extent will a particular type of international system limit or extend the range of foreign policy choices available to states? What is the implication of multipolarity, as contrasted with bipolarity, for the frequency and intensity of war?

According to one hypothesis, as the international system 'moves away from bipolarity to multipolarity, the frequency of war should be expected

[14] For a conceptualisation of the 'levels of analysis' in international relations, see Kenneth M. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); J. David Singer, 'International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis', *World Politics*, XII (April 1960), pp. 453–461; J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations' in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77–92.

[15] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 202.

[16] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*.

to diminish '.[17] In a multipolar world, states presumably enjoy a greater choice of alternatives. Interaction with many nations is said to produce cross-cutting loyalties which supposedly reduce hostility between any single dyad, or pair, of nations. However correct theoretically such a proposition may be, it does not take account of the propensity of nations, in practice, to focus much of their attention on a few nations. The perceived importance of a specific country, rather than the total number of states in the international system, may be the key variable determining another country's allocation of energies and resources in foreign policy. Israel will probably continue to devote greater attention to Egypt than to Paraguay or New Zealand. The results of research conducted to test this general hypothesis about the relationship between multipolarity and conflict have been inconclusive.[18]

Another quite different hypothesis states that the greater the bi-polarity, the greater the prospect for restricting international conflict. Kenneth Waltz contends, for example, that such a system, with the great disparities between the capabilities of the super-powers and the lesser states, is more stabilising than a multipolar system. Because both super-powers have a preponderance of power to inflict and control violence, they are able ' both to moderate others' use of violence and to absorb possibly destabilizing changes that emanate from uses of violence that they do not or cannot control '.[19] In seeking to restrain each other from attaining predominance, while acting together in mutual interest to limit conflict or to oppose challenges from other states, the super-powers maintain a balance of power based on a wide range of capabilities.

While many scholars have hypothesised about each of these questions and more have tested hypotheses, the results have been, to say the least, inconclusive. We know little about the relationship between the structure of the international system and the nature of foreign policy behaviour and the patterns of interaction. There is no theoretical certainty that any particular international structure can assure stability. Perhaps all structures have a potentiality for system stability. Polarity may be associated with stability only when combined with other variables, about which we know relatively little at this time.[20] Yet the need to develop more reliable theories about the relationship between the structure of

[17] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, ' Multipolar Systems and International Stability ', *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), p. 390.

[18] See, for example, J. David Singer and Melvin Small, ' Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945 ', in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: The Free Press. 1968), pp. 247–286. See also J. David Singer and Melvin Small, ' Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitative Description ', *Journal of Peace Research*, III (1966), pp. 1–32.

[19] Kenneth N. Waltz, ' International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power ', *Journal of International Affairs*, XXI (1967), p. 229.

[20] Joseph L. Nogee, ' Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept '. Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, Sept. 1973, pp. 17–18.

the international system and the propensity for conflict is increased by trends in the contemporary world. American foreign policy in the 1970s, for example, is based on the premise that the bipolar system of the postwar period has been replaced by a system with some characteristics of multipolarity.[21]

The second level of analysis, on which much of the theory of international relations over the past decade has focused, is the nation-state, or, as some have suggested, the national unit and its various sub-systems. At this level, authors have attempted to examine in detail the nature of differences as well as similarities among nation-states. Increasingly, scholars have been drawn away from the single descriptive case study to an effort to utilise a common conceptual framework to compare the foreign policies of several or many nations. What similarities, for example, can be found in the foreign policies of great powers,[22] or what are the common features of the foreign policies of small powers? [23] Some writers have attempted to identify similarities in the foreign policies of democracies as contrasted with authoritarian political systems. Others have sought to explain differences and similarities in the foreign policies of states as a result of their stage of economic development. Modern, as opposed to transitional or traditional, societies display differences in their approaches to foreign policy problems.

Influence of domestic factors

Much of the analysis of the factors affecting foreign policy is focused on those internal or domestic factors, as well as the perceptual variables, that influence foreign policy. What are the perceptions of the leaders and elites that help shape a country's foreign policy? How do they view the world around them, or what is their ' psycho-milieu ', and how do their

21 *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace.* A Report to the Congress by President Nixon. May 3, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. 1973), pp. 2–10; 232–234.

22 See, for example, Joseph Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., *Foreign Policies in a Changing World* (New York: Harper & Row. 1963); Michael Brecher *et al.*, ' Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior ', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (March 1969); Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: OUP. 1963); E. L. Morse, ' Transformation in Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and Externalization ', *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), pp. 371–392; James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press. 1967); F. S. Northedge, *The Foreign Policies of the Powers* (London: Faber. 1968); James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press. 1971); Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc. 1971); Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., *Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: OUP/RIIA. 1971); and Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 1972)

23 See Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships* (New York: The Free Press. 1972); Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York and London: Columbia University Press. 1968).

erceptions affect the foreign policy choices made? [24] In particular, ecision-making studies have emphasised perceptions and the psycho- ilieu in which the decision-maker operates as well as the backgrounds, alues, and working relationships of policy-makers. An effort has been ade to assess foreign policy decision-making as a process of trade-offs, argaining, and competition among various groups within a bureaucracy. o different types of foreign policy issues result in different types of ureaucratic relationships? [25] Are there major differences in the patterns foreign policy decision-making depending on whether the decision is ade in a crisis or not? For example, some theory-oriented studies have ggested that a crisis increases the importance of idiosyncratic and stemic variables and decreases the relative importance of societal ctors.[26]

Although theories abound in international relations about the rela- onship between domestic political and economic structure and foreign olicy, we know very little about the effect of domestic structures on a untry's foreign policy. It has not been possible, for example, to estab- sh correlations between domestic political and economic structure, or vel of economic development, and the propensity of nations to engage conflictual foreign policies.[27] It is not possible with great precision infer from a country's domestic structure the probable shape of its reign policy. Some democratic states have been less prone to con- ctual foreign policies than others. Some communist and fascist states ave been expansionist, while others have not.

Recognising that inputs from the international system impinge upon omestic policy and foreign policy, scholars have begun to describe inkages' between the international system and domestic political stems and subsystems. What has been the impact of the Vietnam war American domestic politics, to cite but one example of an interna- onal-domestic 'linkage'? Such linkages have increased as nations have come more permeable as a result of modern technologies, especially

See, for example, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965); 'Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics', in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 1963); and Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970).

See, for example, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown. 1971).

See, for example, Charles F. Hermann, *Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill. 1969); by the same author, 'International Crisis as a Situational Variable', in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press. 1969), pp. 409–421; and Glen D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24–30, 1950* (New York: The Free Press. 1968), pp. 273–323.

See, for example, Rudolph Rummel, 'The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior'. In J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York: The Free Press. 1968), pp. 187–214.

in the field of mass communications. Recognition of linkages between the international and domestic systems diminishes the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. The concepts of linkage and penetrated political systems have led scholars to develop several interesting hypotheses.[28] For example, we may hypothesise that there are likely to be significant differences among nations in the extent to which they are 'penetrated' from outside, or in the degree to which linkages exist between the international system and a domestic political system. Such a hypothesis leads, in turn, to several other questions: what is the relationship, if any, between the size of the state and its ability to cope with the impact of foreign events? Are big states better able than smaller states to ward off foreign influences? Does the impact of external events decline where the political system enjoys a high degree of stability? Does a state with a relatively homogeneous political culture or a sense of national cohesiveness have a better chance to minimise the linkage between the international environment and the internal decision-making system? Such questions, of course, remain unanswered in the literature of international relations.

If political systems have been increasingly 'penetrated' and the object of international-domestic linkages, it becomes essential to find explanatory concepts or theories to account for such phenomena. For example, although the Vietnam war has had an impact on American domestic policies, precisely how does such a linkage occur? *Coups d'état* provide yet another example of international-domestic linkages. Many states in Asia and Africa have experienced a series of coups which have replaced post-independence civilian governments with military regimes. Does a coup in one country help to trigger off another coup elsewhere by the power of example or by a 'demonstration principle'? Similarly, many countries around the world have experienced student unrest. There has emerged a kind of transnational student culture. How do political activities by students in one country affect similar phenomena in another

28 On the concept of 'penetration' of external elements into the foreign policy making of a country and on linkages between national and international elements of the policy-making process in general, see James N. Rosenau, *Of Boundaries and Bridges; A Report on a Conference on the Interdependence of National and International Political Systems*, March 4–6, 1966 (Princeton: Center for International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. 1967); James N. Rosenau, 'Toward the Study of National-International Linkages', in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: Free Press. 1969), pp. 44–63; James N. Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1966), p. 53. According to Rosenau, a 'linkage' is defined as a recurring sequence of behaviour originating in one system and reacted to in another. A 'penetrated' system is one in which 'non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals'. Occupied Germany and Japan after the Second World War provide examples of penetrated political systems.

country? When might intervening factors prevent the establishment of such linkages?

Working at yet another level of analysis—that of the individual—some scholars have sought to explain much of international behaviour by reference to psychological theories about individual behaviour. The distinction between the individual and the national unit as alternative focal points for analysis is by no means always clear-cut. For example, it might be possible, in principle at least, to study the personality of a specific decision-maker or any individual human being whose behavioural patterns, it might be inferred, can be generalised to other persons, including decision-makers

Many psychologists, earlier in the 20th century, sought to explain aggression in a stimulus-response framework and, more specifically, by reference to a frustration-aggression hypothesis. Aggressive behaviour, it was hypothesised, is always the consequence of frustration, defined as 'an interference with the occurrence of an instigated-goal response at its proper time in the behavior sequence'.[29] Other writers have attempted to explain aggression by reference to animal behaviour. According to Konrad Lorenz, for example, aggression is not *inter*-specific, but rather *intra*-specific.[30] Aggression occurs principally among members of the same species. Animals kill other animals of the same species for control of territory against intruders of the same species. They kill members of other species for food. Similar characteristics, it has been suggested, can be found in human behaviour.

Difficulties arise in drawing inferences about aggression at a societal level from the study of the individual. Do men in large groups behave more or less aggressively than as individuals? Some writers have attempted to analyse the behaviour of larger groups by reference to individual behaviour, using the frustration-aggression hypotheses and animal instinct theories. Others have developed image theories, in which the phenomena of 'displacement' and 'projection', utilised at the individual level, are applied to the concept of 'national images'. Such images are said to reflect a process of selective perception (or perceptual distortion) resulting from a person's, or collectivity of persons', view of other peoples and nations as transmitted through the educational system, news media, literature, the family structure, and the prevailing cultural milieu in general to which a person, especially in his formative childhood years, is exposed.[31] Still other writers have sought to adapt learning theory

[29] John Dollard, Neal E. Muller and Leonard W. Doob, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1939), p. 7.

[30] Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, trans. by Marjorie Kerr Wilson (New York: Bantam Books. 1967).

[31] Otto Klineberg, *The Human Dimension in International Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1964) and *Tensions Affecting International Under-*

to the study of international relations, suggesting, in the words of Hadley Cantril, that 'The way we look at things and the attitudes and opinions we form are grounded on assumptions we have learned from our experience in life. . . .' [32] Yet the question remains as to whether wars and revolutions are simply the product of collective perceptual distortion or psychological insecurities, or the product of more profound differences among peoples. It is by no means certain that elimination of the factors to which social-psychological theorists address themselves will necessarily diminish man's propensity for conflict. The removal of perceptual distortion could conceivably make individuals and larger groups even more aware of differences between themselves as well as the vulnerability of their opponents. Nor is it self-evident that psychological analysis at the level of the individual can provide important insights into the study of aggressive behaviour in an international context, especially if we do not know when and how such individuals fit into the larger political and social framework of the international system as well as the constraints under which they operate.[33]

Since the Second World War a major body of literature on international strategic theory has emerged. While scholars and other analysts have dealt with a wide range of phenomena, including limited war, escalation, conventional and unconventional conflict and arms control, the greatest emphasis has been on the development of theories of nuclear deterrence. The great destructive potential of nuclear weapons led writers to analyse the conditions for deterring conflict between powers possessing nuclear capabilities. Writers such as Kahn and Wohlstetter addressed themselves to the basic questions of the requirements for achieving a condition of stable mutual deterrence as a result of the deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union of ICBMs and other capabilities. To what extent was it necessary to deploy such forces in order to make it impossible for either power to consider itself capable of launching a surprise first-strike against the other's missile forces and, possibly, his cities without incurring an unacceptable level of damage in retaliation? [34]

standing (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1950); Hadley Cantril, ed., *Tensions That Cause Wars* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1950); Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Culture* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company. 1969). See also Kenneth E. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), pp. 120–131; Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1956); Urie Bronfenbrenner, 'The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report', *Journal of Social Issues*, XVII, No. 3, pp. 46–48; William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, 'A Test of the Mirror Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (September 1967), pp. 325–332.

32 Hadley Cantril, *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1967), p. 16.

33 Herbert C. Kelman, 'Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations', Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1965), pp. 5–6.

34 See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate Balance of Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), pp. 211–234. See also Herman Kahn, *On*

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Much of the literature of deterrence theory was developed when the United States enjoyed strategic superiority in a nuclear bipolar world. The advent of strategic 'parity', together with the emergence of additional nuclear powers, may have important implications for the adequacy of existing deterrence theory. In short, how much strategic power would be 'enough' for the United States and the Soviet Union under conditions of nuclear multipolarity? Does the development of additional nuclear powers make necessary the acquisition of major new systems and both qualitative and quantitative changes in the strategic posture of super-powers? Is it necessary for a super-power to possess a capability to deter an attack from several other nuclear powers? Alternatively, it may be hypothesised that nuclear multipolarity reduces the risks of nuclear confrontation by making it impossible for any single nuclear power to destroy the retaliatory power of all, and maybe even several, other nuclear powers. Nuclear multipolarity may enhance invulnerability. Other hypotheses, however, suggest that nuclear multipolarity increases the risk of nuclear war simply by adding to the number of nuclear powers. Hence we know very little about the stabilising or destructive effects of additional nuclear powers either upon political leaders' perceptions of their defence requirements or their propensity to use such weapons. Conceivably, scholars and defence analysts will give renewed attention to theories of deterrence in a changing international system.[35]

The nature and management of conflict

Much of the theorising in international relations has been, and will continue to be, concerned with the nature of conflict and the management and deterrence of conflict. Theories of conflict abound at each of the levels of analysis. However, there is no single general theory that can explain the varieties of international conflict. Such a theory, if it could be developed, would require contributions from many disciplines and would combine insights from each of the levels of analysis. Clearly, the foreign policy decision-maker approaches the problems facing him in a context which includes: (1) societal and individual values; (2) his perception of the problem and the world around him; (3) the capabilities and goals of his nation and other nations; (4) the bureaucratic and

Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1960). See also Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1957); William R. Kintner, *Peace and Strategy Conflict* (New York: Praeger. 1967).

35 Although not addressed specifically to nuclear multipolarity, illustrative of the interest in a more adequate deterrence theory is the following recent article: Fred C. Ikle, 'Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century', *Foreign Affairs*, LI, No. 2 (January 1973), pp. 267–286. See also Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Ra'anan, eds., *The Superpowers in a Multi-Nuclear World* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1974).

organisational framework within which foreign affairs decisions are made; and (5) the international system within which he must operate (bipolar, multipolar, classical balance of power, etc.). Each of these levels and focal points has been apparent in most of the foreign policy decision-making of the past generation.

While many scholars have focused on conflict, others have turned to the study of integration at the international level. In an effort to find an alternative to conflict, some normatively-oriented scholars have designed proposals for international organisation. Others, however, have attempted to develop theories of integration. Scholars have sought to compare the historic nation-building experience in Europe and North America as well as the efforts to create political communities beyond the nation-state. The European integration movement since the Second World War, as well as the European Community itself, has provided an important source of data for integration studies.[36] Although integration theorists have developed a variety of models and drawn upon several disciplines for concepts and hypotheses, they owe a considerable intellectual debt to the interwar writings of David Mitrany. More recent writers have attempted to refine and reconceptualise hypotheses about functionalism that he first set forth.[37] Scholars have sought answers to questions that he first raised: to what extent, and under what conditions, does integration in one sector lead to integration in other sectors? Does the integration of certain 'technical' and economic sectors, such as trade or monetary policy, lead to 'spill-over' to other economic sectors? Many of the writings of integration theorists have been addressed to the role of sector integration, or incrementalism, in the building of political communities. In addition, other writers, especially in recent years, have seen the need to develop theories that incorporate hypotheses from neofunctionalist literature as well as writings which attach greater importance to the role of coercion and the impact of the international environment upon integration. Current integration models may be faulted, however, for their relative neglect of the role of conflict as an integrating force. The experience of the Second World War was an important, if not crucial, catalyst in the post-war European integration movement. Yet the phenomenon of conflict

[36] See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1958); Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York: Scribner. 1967); Carl J. Friedrich, *Europe: An Emergent Nation?* (New York: Harper and Row. 1969); and Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 1970).

[37] See, for example, David Mitrany, *Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1966), p. 97; David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization', *International Affairs*, XXIV (July 1948), p. 359.

is largely missing from most models of integration, even when they are applied to the postwar European experience. Except perhaps as a result of the normative biases against conflict of some students of integration, it is difficult to understand the reason for this oversight, since traditional writers, such as Georg Simmel, and contemporary writers, such as Lewis A. Coser, in the field of conflict have examined in considerable depth the role of conflict in increasing the cohesiveness of groups.[38]

Like conflict, integration is a multi-dimensional concept. Integration has political, economic and social components. Theories of integration should take greater account of the potential role of conflict and coercion as well as consensus and co-operation. An adequate conceptualisation of integration should encompass the broad societal factors, including mass public opinion support, the growth of elite support, the increased volume of transactions such as trade and communications, the nature of intergovernmental co-operation, and the building of political institutions at the international level. There is evidence that integration studies in the 1970s are focused more than those of the past generation on integration as a multi-dimensional concept.[39]

In short, there is need for integration as a concept to be broken down into economic, political and social components. Integration should be conceptualised to account for the potential role of conflict. Yet a theory of integration, not unlike that of conflict, would incorporate contributions from many disciplines and levels of analysis. Therefore, the prospects for a theory that can explain a broad range of integrative behaviour are hardly more promising than is the development of a theory of conflict.

The numerous theory-building efforts of the past generation have not yielded a general theory of international behaviour, nor have they even produced a widely accepted middle range theory. Instead, there are many theories of conflict, foreign policy decision-making, and integration, often using widely different concepts, definitions and indicators, with predictably diverse results. This is akin to the proverbial story of the blind men who touch a different part of the anatomy of the elephant and then attempt, each from his limited experience and perspective, to describe the elephant. The development of both middle range and general theory presupposes a level of agreement among scholars about the relevant concepts and methods for research, which is now lacking in international relations, since scholars would have to be prepared to replicate each other's work and to use commonly accepted theoretical frameworks for research. In the absence of such agreement, we can hardly expect large numbers of

[38] Georg Simmel, *Conflict*, trans. by Kurt H. Wolff in *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 1964) and Lewis A. Coser. *The Functions of Conflict* (New York: The Free Press. 1956).
[39] See, for example, Barry B. Hughes and John E. Schwarz, 'Dimensions of Political Integration and the Experience of the European Community', *International Studies Quarterly*, XVI (September 1972), pp. 263–295.

scholars to replicate studies with whose conceptualisation and methodology they are in disagreement, except perhaps in order to refute them. As a result, international relations is a field consisting of a variety of theories, paradigms, and methodologies in search of a replicator.

In the next decade, several trends are likely to characterise the development of international relations theory. An effort will probably be made to synthesise concepts and findings from existing literature and to develop theories and methodologies for the more adequate study of major international issues facing mankind in the period ahead. At the same time, scholars will continue to press their quest for theories with greater explanatory and predictive capacity. The next phase in the development of international relations theory is likely to be characterised by a continued search for concepts and methodologies from other disciplines, and by an effort to be more comparative in studies at each of the levels and units of analysis. Research is likely to be focused on the development of more precise linkages between various levels of analysis along the continuum from the microscopic (the individual person) to the macroscopic (the international system). There is also likely to be a renewed interest in bridging the gap between normative and behavioural-quantitative theories, and between theory and policy.

Among the substantive interests of scholars, the study of the evolving global international system of the 1970s and beyond is likely to be a focal point of continuing interest. This includes not only the analysis of great-power interaction and changing patterns of alignment, but also the role of smaller powers. Traditionally, there has been a great-power bias in the literature of international relations. Only in the past decade have some scholars made a major effort to develop a general literature that deals with smaller powers, but this literature is devoted primarily to the Western or European actors in the international system. Conceivably, the bourgeoning literature on multipolarity, in the context of the global international system of the 1970s, will contribute to the development of propositions about the foreign policies of the smaller powers as well as the major power centres.

While continuing to develop more adequate middle-range theory in fields such as conflict, integration, decision-making, and international-domestic linkages, there is a need to link more systematically the theories of international relations and the development of public policy. In choosing one course of action rather than another, the policy-maker operates on the basis of his assumptions and theories about international relations. These are often implicit in his policy statements about such phenomena as alliances, trade agreements, escalation, crisis management, diplomacy, and deterrence.[40] Over the past generation many new social

[40] The following statement by President de Gaulle, taken from his Thirteenth Press Conference, February 21, 1966, is illustrative: 'For it is quite clear that, owing

science theories have been developed. While their relevance to, and reliability for, the policy-maker is debatable, no effort has been made to categorise and link them to policy needs. Most of this knowledge has remained confined to the social science community itself, and very little effort has been made to show how such knowledge might usefully be introduced into the policy-making process. Yet foreign policy decisions should be predicated on knowledge that is as complete as existing research makes possible. For this purpose, an effort should be made systematically to inventory and match the concepts, assumptions, interests and other attributes of policies, with the similarly identified attributes found in the theories and hypotheses formulated, researched, and tested by social scientists. These include, for example, theories about national power, threats, deterrence, crisis behaviour, international sanctions, escalation, negotiation, all of which are vitally important concerns of the makers of foreign policy.

There has always been a major interest among scholars in the development and analysis of public policy. Both the utopian and realist phases of international relations gave some emphasis to policy. The efforts of scholars to give a more explicitly theoretical and methodological (and often quantitative) orientation to the field represent more a supplement to, rather than a replacement of, a concern with policy problems.[41] In fact, attempts have been made to develop more rigorous techniques for the analysis of public policy, especially in the form of systems analysis.[42]

to the internal and external evolution of the countries of the East, the Western world is no longer threatened today as it was at the time when the American protectorate was set up in Europe under the cover of NATO. . . . Consequently, without going back on her adherence to the Atlantic Alliance, France is going, between now and the final date set for her obligations, which is April 4, 1969, to continue to modify successively the measures currently practiced, insofar as they concern her. . . . In sum, it means reestablishing a normal situation of sovereignty, in which that which is French as regards soil, sky, sea and forces, and any foreign element that would be in France, will in the future be under French command alone.' New York, French Embassy, *Speeches and Conferences*, No. 239, pp. 8–9. Such a statement is predicated upon certain assumed or expected relationships among members of alliances. The policy statement could be given as the following hypothesis: As perceived threat from the power against which the Nato alliance was formed declines, alliance members reduce their commitment to the alliance and seek to maximise their independence by extricating themselves from entangling relationships with other alliance members, especially the leading power.

41 For a collection of essays by scholars concerned with the relationship between social science and public policy in the post-Second World War period, see Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1951). For a more recent discussion, see Norman D. Palmer, ed., *A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance*, Monograph 10, The American Academy of Political and Social Science (October 1970), esp. pp. 154–274.

42 Charles J. Hitch and Ronald N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1963); Ronald McKean, *Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis* (New York: Wiley. 1958); Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York: The Free Press. 1968); Harold Lasswell, 'Policy Sciences', in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press. 1968), XII, pp. 181–189.

Such work has been designed to find criteria to aid in the choice and evaluation of alternative policies or strategies for the attainment of specified objectives. Techniques such as mathematical models, human gaming, and the canvassing of expert opinion have been used to find 'optimal' or preferable solutions among a series of alternatives based on relative costs and benefits. Such efforts represented a reaction against policy recommendations derived from untested hypotheses, unstated assumptions, and uncertainty about the implications of alternative choices and outcomes. The deficiencies of systems analysis in dealing with such irrational and uncertain forces as charisma and ideology, or the propensity of actors to adopt high-risk or low-risk strategies, as well as its deficiencies in explaining the value assumptions of systems analysis, all serve to illustrate the need for additional efforts to develop more reliable theory related to public policy.

In the period ahead, scholars are likely to continue their quest for more precise, accurate and reliable theories of integration, conflict, decision-making, deterrence, and international-domestic linkages, to mention but a few of the major areas of concern to international relations. An effort will be made to delineate more clearly the various levels of analysis and to develop more adequate theories about such phenomena as bipolarity-multipolarity and international stability.

In addition, increased emphasis is likely to be placed upon yet another level of analysis, namely, non-state actors, including the multinational corporation. Such actors are likely to play an increasing role in international relations in a world of greater economic-technological interdependence. Such non-state actors, as well as the nation-states themselves, will be engaged in the exploitation of resources on the seabed. The need for a variety of resources, including energy, may alter patterns of international conduct and give to the oceans a new geopolitical significance. The implications of such change for the study of international relations are not readily apparent. Conceivably, this will give rise to a renewed interest in geo-political theorising, about which there has been little interest in the study of international relations in recent decades.

Of great importance to international relations for at least the past decade has been the development of conceptual and methodological tools to anticipate change. The rapidity of change as a result of technology has affected international relations in every part of the world. Changes in the nature of the nation-state and the transformation of the international system itself make more urgent the development of more systematic knowledge about the future. In the development of weapons systems and in the designing of policies, whether in foreign affairs or in the domestic field, more accurate understanding of the future is of crucial importance. We need more accurate methods for developing and projecting trends into the future. Although for many centuries efforts have

been made to set forth conceptions of the future, the need for more systematic forecasts has grown as the leadtime for policy planning, the complexity of issues facing policy-makers and the urgency of problems have grown. If futurology can clarify the choices available to nations by reducing uncertainty about the future, it will make possible the more accurate calculation of the leadtime and the resources needed for alternative policy choices. It may also lead to a more precise understanding of the outcomes of alternative policy choices. Yet it is not likely that theories of international relations will soon achieve a level of predictability which will make possible a high degree of specificity in alternative policy choices.

In the various theory-building efforts of the future, it will be essential to achieve a balance between empirical-analytic theory and innovative theory, between basic and applied research in the study of international relations. Whether this will be possible is uncertain, for the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and their practitioners, remains great. Yet the various approaches and methods are in many cases mutually reinforcing. Normative theory can suggest alternative goals and preferences for political leaders and can also provide propositions for testing, and empirical-analytic theory can furnish guidance as to the kinds of policy choices essential for the achievement of desired goals. Thus, the study of international relations could achieve a synthesis among those areas of continuing concern to scholars and practitioners, as well as the basis for more adequate theory, or theories, of international behaviour.

INDIA AND THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Michael Lipton and Peter Tulloch

Introduction

INDIA and the enlarged European Economic Community seem to have much to offer each other in the shape of trade complementarities, investment opportunities and political influence. British accession to the EEC could provide an ideal opportunity for the two to reassess and strengthen their relations; especially given improved Indo-British relations since the Bangladesh independence crisis. However, neither party—but particularly not the Community—seemed until recently to have taken much constructive interest in pursuing such a strengthening of links. This paper explores the prospects, in the light of a recent Chatham House conference and subsequent events.[1]

India's economic interest in the EEC should be clear. As enlarged, it is the largest trading partner of the 'Third World'[2] and its largest source of private foreign investment,[3] while total aid flows from the Community members are now virtually equal in value to those from the United States,[4] and growing faster. The EEC is also a rapidly growing market for manufactures from less developed countries (LDCs). For India, the enlarged Community is still its largest export market, accounting for some 18·5 per cent of India's exports in 1970/71, as against 13·5 per cent for the United States and 13·7 per cent for the Soviet Union. Britain and West Germany are large contributors to the World Bank's India Consortium; and investment in India by companies based in the Community, particularly in Germany and Belgium, has grown rapidly, although it remains a very small share of total foreign

[1] This article originates in a conference held in September 1972 at Chatham House by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, attended by scholars, diplomats, officials and business representatives from India, Britain, other Community member states and the EEC Commission. Papers delivered to the conference have been drawn on by the authors, who have supplemented these from their own experience and subsequent events and who take full responsibility for the views expressed in this paper.

[2] In 1970 the enlarged Community was responsible for taking some 35% of LDC exports (cf. US 20%: Japan 11%: USSR 3% of LDC exports).

[3] In 1971, the enlarged EEC's 'net' private investment in LDCs was $3·7 billion, or 40% of the total for all DAC countries (cf. US $3·5 bn.). Source: *Development Co-operation*, 1971 Review, OECD.

[4] In 1971 net official development assistance from the enlarged EEC countries was $3·0 billion (cf. US $3·3 bn.). Source as 3.

investment (itself small in the Indian economy).[5] Politically, the development of good economic co-operation—the genuine exchange of advantages—between the Community and India could give the EEC the opportunity of building a new type of relationship, not with tiny LDCs still heavily dependent on their former colonial masters, but with a Third World equal. India contains more (and poorer) people than Africa and Latin America combined[6]; it is the world's largest democracy (and, since the Chilean coup of September 1973, arguably the only lasting and full parliamentary democracy among LDCs); and, despite its enormous economic problems, it is a major continental Asian power. India, too, stands to gain from closer relations with the EEC, both because many products can be obtained more cheaply from Europe than from Indian sources (provided the Community will take more Indian exports) and because an EEC link could, without offending the Soviet Union, widen India's options from the present bilateral, somewhat exclusive, Indo-Soviet links.

Since the formation of the EEC, however, its relations with India have been distant. Although India has maintained a diplomatic mission to the European Community since 1962, most Indian scholars and diplomats have shown some coolness towards any active expansion of an 'EEC relationship', while the Community has concentrated its relations with LDCs on association with African ex-colonies of France and Belgium, for reasons which may have more to do with a few EEC firms' interests in these countries than with the welfare of African or EEC labour or business. The Indians' initial political distaste for the 'neo-colonial' relationship which association appeared to force on LDCs[7] was reinforced by the failure, during Britain's first attempt to enter the EEC in 1962–63, to reach adequate arrangements for a trade agreement between India and the Community.[8] India has consistently been attempt-

[5] Deepak Lal, 'UK entry to the EEC and direct investment flows to India', Chatham House conference paper, September 1972 (mimeo) Table I, showed that although Britain had historically been the largest single foreign investor in India, the rate of growth of investment by British companies in India had slowed down in the 1960s compared with the growth of British investment in other LDCs. During the period 1955–1968, EEC investment in India grew very fast, by 35% per annum, but by 1968 the Six still accounted for only 12% of total foreign capital in India.

[6] India's population in 1970 was 538 million, and GNP per capita $110: Africa's and Latin America's population was about 536m and GNP per capita $325. (Source: *World Bank Atlas*, 1972 edition.)

[7] Dharma Kumar, *India and the European Economic Community*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House for the Indian Council of World Affairs, 1966, p. 53: 'Europe in general was still regarded as tainted by colonialism. This feeling applied to the Community as well and was certainly not removed by its arrangements for Association with the overseas territories: these arrangements looked like colonial exploitation under another name . . . mere devices to continue the exchange of colonial primary commodities for metropolitan manufactures.'

[8] At the time, the EEC had proposed a 'comprehensive' trade agreement with India, Pakistan and Ceylon which would have applied the Common External Tariff (CET) to Indian textiles by 1967 and to almost all other goods by 1970. Tea and spices would enter duty-free, as would some minor industrial products such as sports goods, and duties on handloom products would have been partially suspended. To

ing for the past ten years to persuade the EEC authorities to give some priority to such arrangements, but until recently without success. On the other hand, India's policy towards trade and foreign investment has overall been restrictive, in terms both of straightforward trade barriers and of bureaucratic procedures that make it harder to do business[9]; the degree of self-reliance sought has often verged on autarky. The Community's emphasis on the building up of relations with African associates has given special rights to countries containing less than 5 per cent of the population of the LDCs[10]—a proportion which would rise only to 12 per cent even if all the African and Caribbean Commonwealth 'associables' associated.[11] Moreover, association itself is a discriminatory arrangement which takes a fairly well-favoured place in a hierarchy of trade relations which the Community has built up around itself over time, although associates' exports generally face harsher terms of entry into the EEC than goods traded within the EEC or industrial products from the 'rump' of EFTA.[12] In this hierarchy, 'non-associable' LDCs take a low place. Their only advantage over developed non-European countries lies in the EEC's 'general scheme of preferences' (GSP) for LDC manufactures. But even this embraces very restrictive tariff quotas on many goods of interest to Indian exporters—small compensation for India's loss of Commonwealth preferences in the British market by 1977.

It is probably misleading, and certainly patronising, to see Britain as a special 'broker' in Indo-EEC relations.[13] During the 1960s the long disengagement of relations between India and Britain accelerated

counter these proposals, the Indian government suggested that EEC import duties should be abolished on cotton textiles, handloom cloth, jute sacking and hessian, coir mats and matting, hand-knotted carpets, East India kips, tea, castor oil, linseed oil, spices, cashewnuts and essential oils; if this were not acceptable, Britain should defer application of the full CET until satisfactory negotiations had been concluded between India and the enlarged Community. (See Kumar, p. 61.)

9 Lal, p. 15.

10 *Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Development*, Vol. I, House of Commons Paper 294–I, HMSO, July 1973, para. 41.

11 *Ibid.*, para. 49.

12 This hierarchy may be outlined as follows. At the top of the scale is the enlarged Community, which aims to achieve complete free trade among its members by 1977. Secondly, free trade in manufactures is to be achieved with the 'rump' of EFTA by the same year. Next, the Yaoundé associates in Africa, the Commonwealth African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the Mediterranean countries are all eligible for various types of special trading relationship with the Community, usually involving some form of reciprocal preferential terms. Then, other LDCs, including India, gain *limited* duty-free access for manufactured goods under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which also extends small, virtually insignificant tariff cuts on a few processed agricultural goods. Finally, exports from other developed countries (the US, Japan, Eastern Europe, Australia, etc.) are subject to the 'most favoured nation' rates of the Common External Tariff.

13 Although a Joint Declaration of Intent written into Britain's Treaty of Accession to the EEC commits the EEC to 'examine with (Commonwealth Asian) countries . . . problems . . . in the field of trade with a view to seeking appropriate solutions', and Britain was reported in late 1972 to be pressing its EEC partners for a trade and co-operation agreement with India, a more recent report (*Financial Times*, July 10, 1973) stated that Britain had rejected an Indian proposal for a joint commission on the development of Indo-British relations.

sharply. British aid flows, net of interest and capital repayments, remained static, falling proportionately and in real terms,[14] although with some recovery since 1970. The value of Indo-British trade both ways fell sharply.[15] Similarly, the value of new British investment in India, at least in the early 1960s, grew less rapidly than either British investment in the LDC or EEC-based investment in India,[16] although, by virtue of a large stock of old investments, Britain is still India's largest foreign capital owner.

The economies of India and the EEC, however, are strongly complementary—India being well endowed with employable labour at all levels of education and with technical skills, but (because poor) unable to accumulate capital quickly; the EEC being a productive source of capital for investment, with a considerable labour shortage. Such complementarity could be exploited in a way which would not consign India, as the poorer partner, to a subsidiary, 'dependent' role, or to the taking up of declining European industries as 'new' export prospects. Properly handled, India's 'labour-intensive' exports to the EEC of the 1980s could include watches, transistor radios, and desk calculators. During 1972 and 1973 India has made a renewed effort—with the support of Britain and the EEC Commission—to interest the EEC in a broadly-based 'trade and co-operation agreement' (TCA): to this end, the distinguished Mr. K. B. Lall has returned as Indian ambassador in Brussels, heading a joint Indo-EEC consultative committee. So far, however, the results have been less impressive than India might have hoped; no coherent pattern has emerged, although a new, partly preferential agreement on jute and coir manufactures has been negotiated, and although the EEC has undertaken unilaterally to abolish some tariffs (*e.g.* on cashews and packaged tea) and make 'transitional' concessions on others (*e.g.* manufactured tobacco).

[14] Calculations from official British statistics reveal the following data:—

British Aid to India 1961/63—1970/72 (3-year moving average)

£'000	*Gross*	*Net of Amortisation*	*% of Gross*	*Net of Amortisation and Interest*	*% of Gross*
1961–63	20,301	n.a.		n.a.	
62–64	24,877	n.a.		n.a.	
63–65	26,960	n.a.		n.a.	
64–66	35,525	28,640	(80·6%)	20,308	(57·2%)
65–67	36,320	26,642	(73·3%)	18,106	(49·9%)
66–68	40,419	28,546	(70·6%)	20,019	(49·5%)
67–69	33,442	24,510	(73·3%)	16,381	(48·9%)
68–70	39,601	27,724	(70·0%)	20,129	(50·8%)
69–71	46,932	35,917	(76·5%)	27,951	(59·6%)
70–72	54,199	44,063	(81·3%)	35,181	(64·9%)

[15] A forthcoming book by Michael Lipton and John Firn gives the following figures:

£ million	*1950*	*1960*	*1970*
British exports to India	97	152	73
British imports from India	98	148	106

[16] See Lal.

It might be useful to set out a possible list of integrated aims for such a TCA:—

a) Initially, targets for total levels of India-EEC trade should be set, aiming at a balanced expansion with eased access to markets on both sides. A suitable target, given the low initial levels of trade and the size and prospects of the Indian and EEC economies, would be a tripling of the real 1973 value of trade in both directions by 1980.[17]

b) Within these overall targets, the products in which Indian exports to the Community and EEC exports to India should grow most rapidly should be identified as closely as possible on the basis of market demand and economic complementarity.

c) Firms and workers which 'lose' as a result of the creation of new trade should receive grants to adapt to new lines of production, along with other measures of 'adjustment assistance' undertaken in both India and the EEC[18]; this might be partly financed by domestic taxes on goods falling into the liberalised categories.

d) Some aid funds should be devoted to helping India to set up the new capacity required to meet the expected EEC requirements under (b) above and, where necessary, to assisting Indian firms (public and private) and industrial research and marketing organisations with problems of marketing, delivery, and other aspects of expanding sales to the EEC market.[19]

This approach requires both sides to adopt measures to liberalise trade and promote investment. It may therefore appear out of line with the attitude, which has grown during the past decade, that LDCs need not, or should not, offer reciprocal 'concessions' in return for those 'given' by developed countries. This wishful thinking has been written into the GATT ground rules of world trade in Part IV,[20] and was expressed once again in the recent Tokyo ministerial declaration opening the present 'Nixon Round' of trade negotiations.[21] It has misdirected the LDCs' negotiators into dealing with issues of trade in a way appropriate only to (if anything) inter-governmental aid. They have seen as the natural reaction to their (partly misplaced) pessimism about exports, not an *exchange* of trade liberalisation with the rich world, but import

[17] This would probably do less than restore India's share of British and EEC trade in 1958!

[18] The European Social Fund can be used to provide adjustment assistance for industries which suffer as a result either of intra-EEC trade liberalisation or of increasing imports from 'third' countries.

[19] See below, pp. 12–13. The work of Hone and others at the GATT-UNCTAD International Trade Centre is highly relevant. Note, too, India's success in exporting leather goods, contrasted with its failure in some other fields to cater to Western tastes.

[20] See GATT: *Basic Instruments and Selected Documents*, Vol. IV—Text of the General Agreement, 1969, Article 36, para. 8.

[21] 'The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in the negotiations to reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of developing countries, that is, the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of the trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs.' GATT Press Release No. GATT/1134, September 14, 1973.

substitution *à l'outrance*, with demands for one-way concessions which are just not on offer on any important scale.[22] This non-bargaining not only yields very little but has concentrated the rich countries' attention on the alleged damage to particular (vociferous) industries from liberalising trade with the Third World, to the neglect of the net benefits which both groups of countries could gain from an expansion of trade between them.

The overall object of a broad TCA as outlined above is to reopen a range of trading options which have been little used or constructively discussed in the recent past. Although the direction and origins of India's trade have been diversified in the past decade, an important element in this—bilateral trading arrangements with the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern countries—is based on a system of strict barter which, although far better than nothing, leads to imports and exports rigid in both structure and destination. How is the EEC placed to help? Its Commission shows much goodwill—though not much expertise—towards India; individual member states have trade agreements with India,[23] and the EEC as a whole has conceded duty-free entry to some Indian products.[24] West Germany in particular has been an important market for India's exports ($74 million of India's $206 million exports to the EEC in 1971) and a major donor of aid through the Consortium. But there is no coherent Community policy: no bilateral trading arrangement as with, for example, Turkey; no plan to allocate any of the Community aid funds to India, or even to co-ordinate aid given to India bilaterally by EEC member states[25] or to allow it to be used to buy imports from EEC members other than the donor—a lacuna totally against the spirit of the EEC. In such a situation, vague declarations of good intent are worse than useless. The problem for both the EEC and India is how to create an open, active, specific and substantial relationship between the two parties.

22 Even unilateral trade liberalisation is usually a net gain for both exporting and importing countries. But it is notoriously hard to sell to the latter's public. The Generalised Systems of Preferences (GSP), applied by most rich countries as a unilateral trade 'concession', took eight years to negotiate; the US still does not apply a GSP scheme; and those which are in being are severely limited in scope.

23 See Goetz Schoffer, 'The Indian Trade of the European Economic Community: Attitudes, Policies and Trends', Chatham House conference paper (mimeo) September 1972, p. 6.

24 The EEC's external tariff on bulk tea (from all sources of supply) was suspended in 1963. EEC also conceded 'nil duties on East India kips (in 1967), handloom fabrics (1968) and certain handicraft goods (1969)'. (Schoffer, p. 2.) Tea is still subject to heavy consumption taxes, *e.g.* in West Germany.

25 The EEC Commission's *Memorandum on a Community Policy for Development Co-operation*, published in 1972, admitted that 'the Community has not so far worked out an overall approach to its relations with this immense continent (Asia) . . . it is even more difficult to work out a cooperation policy for Asia than for Latin America'. (*Synoptic document*, p. 37.)

Trading relations

Many of the problems of poor countries feature a 'double bind'. Remove just one of two constraints on progress, and the other is quickly felt. For real advance, both must be attacked at once. The expansion of India's exports to an enlarged EEC is constrained both by problems of supply—as witness its inability since 1965 to fulfil cotton textile quotas agreed with Britain [26]—and of demand, notably the past success of producers in Belgium, France and West Germany in persuading the Community to deny India larger quotas for jute and coir products.[27] Owing to this 'double bind', proper exploitation of Indo-EEC trade complementarities requires the type of co-ordinated package set out above.

Although the ratio of exports to national income in India is low (less than 5 per cent.) [28]—as in most large, diverse economies—trade is crucial in financing major developmental imports of machinery, raw materials, oil and transport equipment, and in enabling India to maintain stocks of foodgrains against bad harvests. Recently, over an eighth of export earnings has been needed to import cereals and cereal preparations alone, and a further quarter (owing to past 'hard' aid terms) for foreign debt servicing. If India, as intended, dispenses with *net* aid by 1978-79,[29] export revenue will become even more important. India's two main, and complementary, routes to efficient trade expansion are to diversify its commodity export structure and to increase its trade in markets providing easily convertible foreign exchange. The former is an explicit aim of the Indian government's present strategy; of the latter, there is yet little sign.

The most dynamic Indian exports in the past decade have been 'non-traditional' products in markets other than Britain, the United States and Western Europe. Such products include iron and steel sheet manufactures, bars, and structural components; crustacea; iron ore; and leather. Indian exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have grown most rapidly in the decade 1960/61–1970/71. The Soviet bloc purchased 23·6 per cent. of India's exports in 1970/71 as against 4·5 per cent. ten years earlier. Japan is the only other trade partner to which

[26] Ajit Mozoomdar, 'India's Trade in Cotton and Jute Textiles with the Enlarged European Community', Chatham House conference paper (mimeo) September 1972. p. 11

[27] Schoffer, pp. 9–10, notes that an agreement signed in 1970 on jute manufactures covered only part of the goods exported, and gives no concession on tariffs beyond the Kennedy Round cuts; while one on coir products signed in 1969 only set up a joint advisory committee. Although under a new agreement, signed in 1973, EEC tariffs on jute manufactures have been cut by 60% (50% on carpet backing), Germany, France and Britain can retain bilateral quotas on imports.

[28] The discussion which follows owes much to a paper submitted to the conference by David Wall.

[29] 'Towards Self Reliance: An Approach to the Fifth Plan', Planning Commission, Government of India, July 1972.

India's exports have grown at anything approaching a comparable rate (13·3 per cent. in 1970/71 as against 5·3 per cent. in 1960/61). To some extent, the development of new exports, particularly of semi-finished goods, has defined (and been defined by) the markets to which they are exported: thus in 1970/71 25 per cent. of all India's leather exports went to the Soviet Union: 80 per cent. of iron ore to Japan: 61 per cent. of precious stones to Belgium and Hong Kong. Exports to the Soviet bloc and the Middle East have largely depended on the existence of bilateral barter deals based on rupee payments, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are now the largest importers of Indian clothing, leather and oilseed cake and meal.

But an important result of the changing direction of trade towards 'bilateral-agreement' countries has been to reduce the flexibility provided by trade-generated foreign exchange. Indian revenue from these exports cannot easily be used for the purchase of goods and services from other sources. The problem created is similar to that resulting from aid tying, which restricts purchases to one foreign source, not necessarily the cheapest. Again, such revenue cannot be used to finance Western debt servicing; if, while this expands, bilateral-agreement trade increases its share in Indian exports, this will aggravate the debt problems. It is therefore important to India that its trade options should be kept open by maintaining a growing value of exports to convertible currency areas such as the EEC.

Prospects for trade with the EEC

We wish we could agree with a speaker at the Chatham House conference who maintained that 'through Britain joining the Six, the goodwill and excellent connections India enjoys in that country will somehow "overflow" into the Community at large and enable her . . . to extend her sales to the whole territory of the European Community'.[30] Rather, we feel that many of the doubts expressed by Indians, and observers of India, about the possibility of a healthy expansion of trade with the EEC are justified. The changes in India's trading environment likely to result from the enlargement of the EEC, in the absence of a TCA really favourable to India's interests, will create new risks for India. In the short run, over the next five years, as the enlargement of the EEC takes effect, there will be a substantial (and artificially created) loss of competitiveness by India, both in the EEC as a whole (because more favourable terms of entry for exports from new members and new associates mean stiffer competition for India) and, more severely, in Britain (as remaining Commonwealth preferences are replaced by preferences for EEC members and associates).

[30] Schoffer, p. 17.

Overall, Britain's importance to India as a market has already declined considerably. Even at current sterling values, trade both ways fell sharply after 1960[31]; and Britain's share of India's exports was only some 11 per cent in 1970/71, as against 26 per cent in 1960/61. Manufactured tobacco, leather, cotton piece goods and tea (38 per cent in 1970/71) together comprised almost two-thirds of India's exports to Britain; with woven jute fabrics, cotton yarn and thread, oilseed cake and vegetable saps and extracts, over 75 per cent of India's exports to Britain are accounted for. This traditionally-based export pattern is one of the reasons why Britain has not been a dynamic market for Indian products; supply problems (particularly in textiles, as has been noted)[32] are another cause; but the increasingly European orientation of British trade is an important third factor.

Even before Britain's entry to the EEC, Commonwealth preferences had been steadily eroded.[33] After the formation of EFTA, its industrial trade was conducted on terms at least as favourable as those for British imports from the Commonwealth (and more so for textiles).[34] Secondly, the Kennedy Round reduced the 'most favoured nation' (MFN) duties, and hence the benefits of Commonwealth preferences, on many products of interest to India—for example, textiles, tobacco, clothing and footwear, leather and spices. A third, more openly discriminatory, move was the introduction in 1972, on top of the import quotas already enforced,[35] of new protective tariffs on British imports of cotton textiles from Commonwealth sources.[36] Fourth came the introduction by Britain, also in 1972, of its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which extended duty-free entry to all manufactured goods except textiles and footwear, and to some processed agricultural goods, imported from all developing countries. The main class of goods on which substantial Commonwealth preferences remained after January 1, 1972, was agricultural processed and semi-manufactured goods not included in the GSP. For India this group includes tobacco, oilseed cakes, sugar, groundnuts, canned and frozen shrimps,[37] jute manufactures[38] and leather. Once these are phased out, by 1977, the only compensating factor (in the absence of a TCA) will be the Community's own GSP.

This has been adopted since January 1, 1974, by Britain, Ireland and

31 Lipton and Firn, tables 3.1, 4.4. (See note 15 above.)
32 See Mozoomdar.
33 This question is discussed by Tulloch in *The Seven Outside*, ODI, 1973, Chapter 2.
34 Textile products from EFTA countries entered Britain duty-free, while those (other than cotton textiles) from the Commonwealth were charged import duty at slightly reduced preferential rates.
35 The import quota system applied is complex, including specific quotas reserved for India and Hong Kong within a global quota. In one sense it helps to protect India's textile exports to Britain.
36 Generally applied at 85% of MFN duties.
37 Included with 'agricultural' goods in the Brussels tariff nomenclatures (BTN).
38 Duty-free but limited by strict application of British import quotas.

Denmark. In spite of a measure of improvement made in 1973, it is less liberal, except in its treatment of textiles, than the original British scheme, particularly for processed agricultural goods. The list is so structured as to protect internal EEC production and, as far as possible, to maintain existing preferences for the Community's African associates. No tariff cuts are given on goods which compete with products falling under the common agricultural policy. In the few cases where tariff preferences are given on processed agricultural products, the margins conceded are still small.[39] For India, British adoption of the Community's GSP is likely to mean that some important agricultural goods such as lentils, opium, bones and bonemeal and mango chutney, which are included in the British GSP, could be excluded from GSP treatment altogether and face full rates of import duty; while other products (shellfish, sweetened cocoa powder and fruit are examples), which now gain entry at GSP duty-free terms to Britain and which are included in the EEC's GSP, will come to face new, higher duties, in some cases as high as the former British MFN rates.[40] As far as these products are concerned, India is due to be heavily discriminated against, instead of (as formerly) benefiting from tariff discrimination in its favour.

For manufactures, duty-free access is in principle extended under the GSP to all imports from developing countries; but in practice products which are seen to be in active competition with Community industries—classed as 'sensitive'—are subjected to a complex set of overall tariff quotas: limits on the value of goods imported duty-free from any one developing country and pre-allocated ceiling levels of imports into any one EEC member state,[41] designed to protect EEC industry against 'market disruption'. The effects of this system are threefold: first, to create uncertainty in the minds of EEC importers and LDC exporters as to how much of their product will actually enter the market at a preferential rate; second, once global tariff quotas are applied, to bar any further preferential entry from *any* developing country [42]; third, where only one or two LDCs export a particular item, to 'sterilise', or render unavailable for use, part of the theoretical global quota for the product.[43]

39 The average margin of preference given on processed products is 40% of the MFN rate (usually 6 or 8 percentage points). Effective protection of value added in Community or associates processing remains high.

40 *e.g.* fruit will bear a preferential duty of 15%, as compared to Commonwealth zero rate and MFN 15% under the old UK tariff.

41 In fixed proportions bearing no relations to each country's actual imports of any given product.

42 Angus Hone has proposed that new exporting LDCs' interests could be safeguarded by establishing minimum, as well as maximum, tariff quotas.

43 General criticisms of the scheme's provisions for sensitive products are voiced by UNCTAD in TD/B/C.5/3, *Operation and Effects of Generalised Preferences granted by the European Economic Community: Study by the UNCTAD secretariat*, January 11, 1973.

At the Chatham House conference, it was argued that GSP access to the market of the Nine for India's traditional manufactures was likely to be of considerable value. Imports by the original Six from India doubled in the period 1958–1971, from $103 million to $206 million (contrasting with the fall in Indian trade with Britain) [44] without benefit of preferences. The products which gained most included frozen meat, preserved fish and shellfish, tea, oilseeds, timber, leather, carpets, precious stones, clothing, footwear and leather manufactures. It was argued, therefore, that 'on the Community's side, apart from some textiles, there were few limiting factors operative in recent years and one would readily imagine that a more consistent and vigorous export policy on the part of India might possibly have achieved better results ',[45] while the GSP would, in principle, encourage this process.[46]

If this is so, the case for greater efforts in trade promotion, including aid to, and investment in, the development and marketing of new export products and bringing existing manufactures up to European specifications (like marketing, partly a matter of education and information), is all the greater. But the shortcomings noted above create considerable doubt how far GSP access to the EEC can really help to promote India's and other LDCs' exports of manufactures. The restrictive effect on India's trade of the quota limits applied to 'sensitive' products has fallen mainly on textile exports, which have in some years reached their duty-free ceilings. The effect on other goods has been small. Potentially, however, the system discourages the rapid expansion of competitive manufactures by setting strict limits to the volume of goods allowed to compete on equal terms with EEC products.

Cotton textiles and jute products present a particular problem in the context of EEC enlargement. The 'double bind' operating on Indian exports of cotton textiles is mentioned above. The average unit costs of the spinning and weaving industries in India are high by international standards—especially in those areas (mainly in South India) with spare capacity—particularly in relation to Japan, Hong Kong and Pakistan.[47] India's export incentive policy, which allows textile manufactures preferred allotment of foreign exchange for re-equipment and access to high quality imported cotton (which is often cheaper than Indian cotton), itself depends on adequate foreign exchange being available to finance it. Indian textiles, furthermore—mainly grey and bleached pure cotton fabrics—are not a growth sector in rich countries' demand; the markets in synthetic and blended fabrics, and in garments and other made-up goods, of which India is not a major exporter, are much more buoyant.[48] On the side of the developed importing countries, knowledge that Indian

[44] Schoffer, p. 10.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[47] Mozoomdar, p. iv.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. vii.

textiles benefit from special export incentives gives rise to pressure from domestic producers to restrict 'unfair' trading. That is one reason why EEC tariff quotas imposed under the GSP on textile imports are considerably more stringent than on other goods; while some growth element was built into the general tariff quotas, duty-free access on cotton textiles was (and still is, pending the registration of a multi-fibre textile agreement internationally) limited to the *volume* of imports into EEC countries in 1968.[49]

Jute imports to the Community were not given duty-free access under the GSP, pending special agreements with India and Bangladesh. Jute products account for some 15 per cent. of India's export earnings; but (largely because of quota restrictions in Britain and the EEC) exports to Europe have stagnated. An agreement initialled in November 1973 allows partial cuts (60 per cent. reduction on all jute manufactures, except carpet backing where the cut is 50 per cent.) in EEC tariffs on Indian jute products and permits some increase in the level of imports allowed into the Community market: but Britain will, from 1974, be required to levy the reduced common tariff rate (up to about 10 per cent.) on goods that were formerly admitted to the British market duty-free. Once again, this package is likely to handicap Indian trade prospects in the enlarged EEC as a whole.

The role of private overseas investment (POI)

The development and diversification of exports seems a field in which foreign investors might be encouraged to contribute to India's own development objectives. Much more than trade, the role of POI in India since independence has been marginal, reflecting the Indian government's highly selective policy towards foreign participation in the economy.[50] Unless this changes radically, foreign investment will remain a supplementary source of development capital, to be attracted (if possible) to those sectors of industry for which domestic capital, enterprise and technical knowledge are deemed inadequate.[51] Broadly speaking, these have been the 'high-technology' sectors (such as chemicals), so far producing mainly for domestic markets on the basis of import substitution.[52]

British-owned assets are still the largest single component of India's *stock* of foreign capital.[53] But in recent years new POI from other Common Market countries has grown much more rapidly than that

[49] See Tulloch, p. 10.
[50] Lal, p. 19.
[51] Mozoomdar, quoted in Maurice Zinkin and Colin Dunn, 'Implications for Private Foreign Investment', Chatham House conference paper (mimeo) September 1972.
[52] Lal, p. 19.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 2 and Appendix, Table 1.

from Britain.[54] Sectorally, British investments are relatively largest in foods, beverages and tobacco, metals and metal products, electrical goods and machinery and miscellaneous manufactures, while West German firms (the most rapidly growing and largest of capital flows to India from EEC countries) are relatively strongest in transport equipment, machinery, machine tools and building materials; Italian firms in textile products; and French companies in the textile sector.

There was wide agreement among participants in the Chatham House conference that the *direct* effect of EEC enlargement on European investment in India was likely to be negligible,[55] although probably negative. In so far as British and other European companies are involved in industries exporting to the EEC, the coming losses in ease of access of India's exports compared with the gains for African and Caribbean associates may cause a switch of investment to the latter, particularly if Nigeria agrees to take part in the new association convention. But the most important constraint on foreign investment in India is likely to remain the Indian government's own policy. In order to appreciate the indirect effect which an Indo-EEC TCA could have on this, the policy itself must be briefly outlined.

Under criteria originally established in the Indian government's Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, modified in 1970 and, more recently, by a government statement in February 1973, foreign companies, along with domestic 'large industrial houses',[56] are restricted to investing in nineteen 'core' industries,[57] mainly of the 'import saving' type. Foreign investors can only enter India through collaboration agreements with Indian firms, and foreign equity participation is now (since September 1973) to be limited to 40 per cent. of joint capital invested.[58] Royalty payments are strictly limited in amount and in duration,[59] but remittance of profits is relatively liberally permitted. The bureaucratic procedures involved in gaining permission for foreign investment remain extremely complex and time-consuming, despite efforts by the government to reduce delays.[60]

54 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 20; Zinkin and Dunn, p. 1.

56 Now defined as firms with assets of Rs200m (about £11m.) or over. See K. K. Sharma, 'More confused than ever', *Financial Times*, March 21, 1973.

57 *i.e.* metallurgical industries, boilers and steam generating plant, prime movers, electrical equipment, ships and commercial vehicles, industrial machinery, machine tools, agricultural machinery, earth-moving machinery, industrial instruments, scientific instruments, nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilisers, chemicals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, paper and pulp, motor tyres and tubes, plate glass, ceramics and cement products. (See Sharma.)

58 See Sharma, 'India moves on foreign companies', *Financial Times*, September 5, 1973.

59 See Lal, p. 15: also Sharma, 'India revises policy on patents', *Financial Times*, June 19, 1973.

60 Lal, pp. 16–17, notes that in 1968 the Foreign Investments Board was established in an attempt to streamline procedures and reduce the delay involved in government approval from an average of 21 months to a 'target' level of 3 months, but that its effect was small.

The Indian policy may be criticised on several scores. Perhaps the most serious of its effects is the concentration of POI, to the point of monopoly power, in the sectors where foreign investment is *not* discouraged—leading to the very type of exploitation which the policy ostensibly seeks to avoid. Successful applicants for permission to invest are in a dominant position in their own industries as long as local entrepreneurs are unable to break into the market, and the existence of a foreign firm with a well-known brand name may itself discourage local enterprise.[61] Secondly, stipulation of minority foreign holding does not ensure local control (although at the 40 per cent. level there is much more chance of this). 'It would be strange to find foreigners willing to invest in Indian-held companies just for the sake of dividends. More likely, the shareholders are foreign companies with a minority holding. . . . Supplying, as they normally do, technical knowhow, the critical plant and equipment, as well as patent rights over processes and goods, they also wield large international resources. . . . Consequently, they tend to have a large, if not controlling, voice in the management of companies in which they have sunk their funds '.[62] Thirdly, reinforcing this, POI has been encouraged by India in the very sectors (drugs, heavy electrical equipment, chemicals, motor vehicles) where foreign companies might seek monopoly power in Indian markets, rather than where export-oriented industry might be built up—although in recent years Indian government policy, in line with a generally more positive attitude to export promotion, has tried, with some success, at least to reduce the number of foreign collaboration agreements containing *restrictions* on exports.[63]

Can new links with the EEC assist India's export promotion efforts, by using foreign collaboration to help build competitive industries which can contribute to India's foreign-exchange earnings? The general tenor of Indian policy appears to discourage POI, although foreign investors may be encouraged to establish factories in 'export processing zones' (EPZs)—enclaves free of customs and other restrictions, within which foreign firms can set up labour-intensive lines, initially using their own materials, for partial or entire processing and re-export. One EPZ has been established in Bombay for the manufacture of electronics accessories under bond. Within the framework of a TCA, foreign collaboration could also aim at encouraging trade and commercial connections between Indian companies with marketable products and European marketing

[61] Sharma's report of September 5, 1973, also notes that 'the Indian Government's new policy will bar foreign companies from using established brand names in India for their products, since it is believed this places Indian companies at a disadvantage'

[62] N. K. Chandra, 'Western Imperialism and India Today—I': *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay, Annual Number, February 1973, p. 238.

[63] See TD/B/389, *Restrictions on exports in foreign collaboration agreements in India: Report by the Indian Investment Centre, New Delhi*; UN, 1971.

and sales agents with a sound and detailed knowledge of European tastes, sales channels and markets. Clearly, this connection with existing markets is one of the major advantages which foreign firms using EPZs have over local exporters. Again, the sectors in which new European investment in India is permitted should not be defined in relation to their contribution to India's inputs of 'high technology', which may not be the most appropriate form of technology in the Indian context. What counts is the employment of factors of production in relative surplus in India and shortage in Europe, and a realistic assessment of the likely demand in EEC markets for their products, and in India of the prospects for meeting such demand with reliable, regular and growing supply.

Such a strategy will require changes in the type of industry in which POI is encouraged by the Indian government—and in the EEC's structure of protection. For India, it means accepting that if some monopolistic and high-cost sectors of industry (whether foreign or locally owned or controlled) are forced out of production, this is no bad thing. Monopoly rents are almost always a high economic cost; and it is quite likely that, for example, both Indian medicine and the Indian balance of payments would gain more from importing drugs competitively on the open market than from having them 'manufactured' at very high cost locally.[64] Within the EEC, such a policy would imply a change of attitude to imports from 'low cost economies'; from the limitation of such imports in the 'interests' of 'vulnerable' sectors of industry or regions, to their encouragement, coupled with a longterm, continuing policy of compensation for capital loss (possibly on condition that new lines of production were explored), and of providing retraining facilities and monetary grants for workers, as adjustment assistance for industries which lose from the competition thus encouraged. National policies could combine with the enlarged European Social and Regional Funds in this effort.

A place for aid?

The Indian government's *Approach to the Fifth Plan* postulates the reduction of net aid to zero by the end of the Plan period (1978/79), basing this on an expected gross aid inflow of 30,000 million rupees. This averages £320 million per year, less than the average received in the late 1960s,[65] but there is doubt, particularly since the aid cut off by the United States during the Bangladesh independence crisis has not yet been resumed, whether even this will be available.[66] In recent years

[64] Chandra, p. 237: 'The profitability ratios (in the drug industry) are exceptionally high even by Indian standards. . . . The bulk selling prices ranged between 160 and 350% of ex-factory costs; and mark-up of retail prices ranged between 600- and 2,000%. . . . Basic drugs canalised through government agencies were imported at far above the lowest international prices in most cases'.

[65, 66] For footnotes please see p. 64.

gross aid flows have stagnated, while the percentage devoted simply to debt servicing has steadily risen, reaching nearly 50 per cent. of all gross aid in 1969/70.[67] If India is genuinely to dispense with—or to have to do without—gross aid, then clearly 'a significant breakthrough in exports is vitally essential to pay for the imports and meet the external obligations'.[68]

Generally speaking, aid is not a *Community* subject. Although the original EEC countries (except Luxembourg) and Britain are all members of the World Bank India Consortium, and Britain and West Germany are two of its major donors, this co-ordination takes place outside EEC institutions. On the whole, there is no co-operation or co-ordination among EEC members on flows, terms, or tying of aid.[69] The only area where a Community aid policy exists is in the Yaoundé Convention under which African countries are associated with the Community. The total sum of aid committed by the Community to the Yaoundé associates and the dependencies of EEC members through the 'Community' channels of the European Development Fund (EDF) and European Investment Bank (EIB) during the second Yaoundé Convention period (1969–74) was 1,000 million units of account (old dollars), or around 8 per cent. of total official aid, net of amortisation, from the Six. Of this, 81 per cent. was given in grant form, and a further 9 per cent. as soft loans with an average interest rate of 1·5 per cent. repayable over periods of up to forty years (thirty years plus a ten-year grace period).[70]

Negotiations currently under way for a new five-year association convention to run from January 1975 could bring up to 19 Commonwealth African, Caribbean and Pacific independent states and up to 20

[65] Indian statistics show the following:

(Rs million)	*Up to end of 1st Plan*	*During 2nd Plan*	*During 3rd Plan*	*1966/67*	*1967/68*	*1968/69*	*1969/70*
	– – –	*annual average*	– – –				
1 Gross aid (total)	403	2,681	5,733	10,549	11,957	8,026	8,663
2 Gross aid (excl. PL480 and grants)	253	1,850	3,817	6,361	7,932	6,798	6,716
3 Debt servicing	48	239	1,085	2,745	3,330	3,750	4,125
3 as % of 1	11·9	8·9	18·9	26·0	27·8	46·7	47·6
3 as % of 2	19·0	12·9	28·4	43·1	41·9	55·1	61·4

Source: Rows 1–3, Chandra (original source, *Indian Government Economic Surveys*); rows 4 and 5, calculated.

[66] See Sharma, 'Growth versus social justice', *Financial Times*, February 4, 1973.

[67] See note 65 above: Sharma, *ibid.*, states that 'of the average of $700m gross aid received annually from countries belonging to the Aid India Consortium, more than three-fourths goes towards repaying principal and interest payments falling due on past debts.'

[68] C. Sinha, 'Doing without aid', *Eastern Economist*, Vol. 60, No. 80, May 4, 1973, p. 907.

[69] Although the EEC Commission's *Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Co-operation* (1972) suggests, *inter alia*, that aid flows from EEC member states should be more closely co-ordinated and untied among EEC members.

[70] See David Jones, *Europe's Chosen Few*, ODI, 1973, p. 20.

British dependencies into association with the enlarged EEC. One commentator has estimated that, if all 'associable' countries and territories join the proposed new convention, aid through the EDF and EIB may more than treble, to about £267 million per annum. Of this, the British share—paralleling that of France and of West Germany—might be expected to be just below 24 per cent. (some £64 million per annum at current prices, or between £50 and £60 million at constant 1972/73 prices).[71] But even if *no* associables joined the association, Britain would be expected to contribute *something* to the existing EDF/EIB aid programme—presumably not much less than West Germany. Our own tentative estimate is that this could be in the region of £25 million a year at 1972/73 prices.[72]

What effect is this likely to have on British aid to LDCs outside the association and, in particular, to India? Whether or not the group of EEC associates is enlarged in 1975, the British contribution, through the EDF, to the 18 original francophone associates will still have to be paid. This must lead to a relative diversion of aid away from non-associated states. Moreover, the slice of British 'net' aid which the EDF payment will represent will be larger than that of 'gross' aid simply as a result of the soft terms—in themselves very commendable—on which EDF aid is given.

What policy should Britain and its EEC partners follow on aid to India? We welcome the British government's initiative in proposing that a new fund, separate from the EDF, should be established to give Community aid to non-associates; although Britain's own refusal to accept the United Nations' 0·7 per cent. aid target makes it too easy for France to continue blocking this proposition on technical grounds. But without such a new fund, the British government's present attitude, that the total sum of *gross* aid to India and other 'non-associable' Commonwealth countries should not fall as a result of EEC enlargement and EDF commitments, is hardly satisfactory, given continually rising prices, the growing share of India's gross aid needed to repay capital and interest from past aid loans, and Britain's rising aid totals together with the growing proportion of *net* aid which the EDF is likely to represent in future. How can a more positive attitude be encouraged?

The priority given to relations with the associates in the past—a relic of French colonialism, but a necessary condition, *at the time*, of French membership of the EEC in 1958—has conditioned the Community (of Six)'s view of 'development' and of relations with LDCs. Not all EEC members accept it uncritically; in particular, West Germany and the Netherlands have been active in promoting areas of policy which

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[72] Using Jones's assumption of 4–5% inflation annually and no major exchange rate changes.

might enlarge the geographical scope of Community policies to take into consideration the interests of other equally poor, and bigger, countries.[73] Britain might (although there is little public sign of this so far) usefully align itself with these EEC partners against the further growth of the 'Eurafrique' concept promoted by France, and, to a lesser extent, Belgium.

More generally, the Nine could in principle be a remarkably coherent 'consortium' in their own right as regards relations with India; this would help, not compete with, the co-ordinating role of the existing World Bank aid consortium. Three fields of aid might initially be taken up by the Community as a group. First, a joint EEC policy on debt relief could be formulated, with the aim of easing the existing Indian debt burden and softening the terms of future aid. Second, aid given by EEC members to India (and to other non-associated Commonwealth LDCs) could be untied with respect to purchases from any of the EEC members or from other LDCs, following the model of EDF aid. Third, a co-ordinated approach to technical assistance could provide appropriate, needed skills (for example, in the field of marketing) and technical knowledge in a complementary, non-competitive way. Eventually, though not, probably, in the short run, a coherent 'Community package' of aid to India might be designed. Ideally, in our view, this should be an integral part of a comprehensive co-operation programme, aimed at benefiting both sides, such as we have tried to outline in this article. In any event, it must await a clarification of India's own aid intentions, in view of the severe setback to the Fifth Plan from the bad harvests of 1972/73 and the huge impending rise in the oil import bill.

Postscript. Since this article was written, India and the Community have signed a commercial co-operation agreement whose most important provision is the establishment of joint machinery for future general collaboration on trade questions. Although the agreement falls considerably short of the type of specific, well-defined treaty which we have proposed, it may well open the way to much closer Indo-EEC relations.

[73] *e.g.*, the Generalised System of Preferences, of which these EEC members were particularly in favour.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

*John Dugard**

INTERNATIONAL public concern has been aroused by the killings at Munich, Lod airport and Khartoum. But the intensity of the campaign to outlaw acts of international terrorism has obscured the complexity of the problem of defining international terrorism and of creating international machinery for its suppression. This paper will deal only with the first aspect, which promises to raise problems of definition hitherto encountered only in respect of aggression.

Basically the problem is to identify those acts of terror designed to bring about political change which disrupt international relations and which the international community considers contrary to desirable international norms of behaviour. The problem is not a new one and recent history provides several examples of international co-operation aimed at the suppression of acts of violence which undermine the international order.

History of attempts to suppress international terrorism

The law of extradition is the best starting point. While states had accepted the principle of non-extradition in the case of political offenders by the middle of the 19th century,[1] they were not prepared to refuse extradition in the case of persons whose criminal acts extended beyond the national domain of states. Anarchism and the assassination of heads of state were the forms of conduct most frequently excluded from the benefit of non-extradition. Although the equation of anarchism with terrorism is probably incorrect,[2] the spectacular acts of terrorisation committed by avowed anarchists such as Ravachol, Emile Henry and Leon Czolgosz [3] led states to agree to the extradition of anarchists [4]

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1 I. A. Shearer, *Extradition in International Law* (Manchester: Manchester University Press; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1971), pp. 166–167.

2 George Woodcock, *Anarchism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1963), pp. 12–14.

3 *Ibid*., pp. 14, 288–294, 438–9.

4 Harvard Research Draft Convention on Extradition (1935) 29 *American Journal of International Law* (supplement), pp. 115–117; General Assembly Official Records, 27th Session, 6th Committee, A/C 6/418 pp. 19–20.

who were viewed not as the opponents of a particular government but as 'the enemy of all Governments'.[5] In 1856, after an attempted assassination of Napoleon III, Belgium excluded the assassination of a head of state or member of his family from the category of a political offence[6] and thereafter this exclusionary clause—known as the *attentat* or Belgian clause—was included in many extradition treaties.[7] Today this clause finds expression in Article 3 (1) of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and the Arab League Extradition Agreement of 1952. The latter Agreement also permits extradition in the case of acts of premeditated terrorism.[8]

The most relevant anti-terrorism precedent is the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. This Convention, which was signed by twenty-four states,[9] was ratified by only one and never came into force. It was a direct response to the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the President of the Council of the French Republic, Louis Barthou, in Marseilles in 1934 by persons who would today be described either as Yugoslav freedom fighters or terrorists (depending upon one's political ideology), alleged to have been harboured by Hungary.[10] Not surprisingly, the Convention, which was drawn up under the auspices of the Council of the League of Nations,[11] was unduly concerned with the repression of those acts which had occasioned it and is primarily aimed at the protection of heads of state and other public figures. In this respect the drafters were clearly acting within their terms of reference, namely the preparation of a convention 'to prohibit any form of preparation or execution of terrorist outrages upon the life or liberty of persons taking part in the work of foreign public authorities and services'.[12]

The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism[13]

5 *In re Meurnier* [1894] 2 Q.B. 415 at 419.

6 The clause reads as follows: 'There shall not be considered as political crime or as an act connected with such a crime an attack upon the person of the head of a foreign government or of the members of his family, when this attack takes the form of either murder, assassination or poisoning'.

7 For a list of these treaties, see Harvard Research Draft, note 4 above, pp. 114–117. Some treaties did not restrict the *attentat* clause to heads of state alone, however, and defined all acts of murder or attempts at life as non-political unless committed in 'open battle': *ibid.*, p. 115.

8 Article 4. The text appears in 159 *British and Foreign State Papers* 606.

9 Albania, Argentina, Belgium, India, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Greece, Haiti, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Romania, Spain, Turkey, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

10 For a description of this incident, see Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press for the R.I.I.A. 1934), pp. 537–587.

11 The Convention was drafted by a committee of experts established by the Council and approved by a special conference. See *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism* 1937, C.94. M.47. 1938.V.

12 Resolution of Council of the League of Nations, October 10, 1936: *ibid.*, p. 183, Annex I.

13 C.546. M.383. 1937.V. For an excellent discussion of the history and text of this Convention, see Antoine Sottile 'Le Terrorisme International' (1938) *Académie de*

was intended to suppress acts of terrorism having an 'international character' only, and most of its provisions are devoted to a definition of the international element. 'Acts of terrorism' are categorised in Article 1 as 'criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public'. Article 2 then obliges each contracting state to make the following acts committed on its own territory criminal offences if directed against another contracting party and if they comply with the test for terrorism laid down in Article 1:

(1) any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to heads of state, their spouses, or persons holding a public position 'when the act is directed against them in their public capacity';
(2) wilful damage to public property belonging to another contracting party;
(3) any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public;
(4) any attempt to commit one of the above offences;
(5) the dealing with arms and ammunition with a view to the commission of one of the above offences in any country whatsoever.

The Convention reiterates the unlawfulness of support for armed bands in 'reaffirming the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against another State' (Article 1 (1)). This principle is taken still further by Article 3, which obliges states to enact legislation to punish incitement to commit terrorism. This provision in effect sought to make hostile propaganda by private individuals against foreign states contrary to international law. Predictably, it was objected to by Britain on the ground that it would restrict 'the free expression of public opinion which, especially in the political sphere, had for centuries been zealously safeguarded in Great Britain'.[14]

Several of the provisions of this convention sought to prohibit activities which could hardly be described as 'terrorism'. Article 13 outlawed the unlicensed transfer of arms and ammunition while Article 14 made it an offence to forge travel documents. Although one may sympathise with the view that such activities might constitute 'indirect terrorism',[15] it was provisions of this kind, together with the sweeping definitions of terrorism already described, which made the Convention unacceptable to many states.

The most controversial issue at the 1937 International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, which finally approved the Convention,

Droit International, Vol. 65, p. 87. See, too, the note in *British Year Book of International Law 1938* (London, OUP/RIIA), p. 215.

[14] *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism*, note 11, above, p. 53.

[15] Sottile, p. 137.

was that of the extradition of offenders. While several central and east European states [16] were prepared to extradite all offenders under the Convention, the Western powers,[17] led by the United Kingdom, strongly resisted an amendment which sought to compel states to extradite political offenders. Therefore, although Article 8 (1) describes the offences under the Convention as 'extradition crimes', Article 8 (4) provides that 'the obligation to grant extradition under the present article shall be subject to any conditions and limitations recognised by the law or the practice of the country to which application is made'. In this way the Western powers retained their discretion to grant asylum to offenders under the Convention where they considered the offence to be of a political nature.

The 1937 Conference was to a large extent not concerned about the causes of terrorism, despite the fact that the Yugoslav 'freedom fighters', whose action had prompted the holding of the Conference, undoubtedly had legitimate grievances.[18] In this respect, the discussions at this Conference stand in sharp contract to those at the Sixth Committee in 1972 on the subject of terrorism.

The period since the end of the Second World War has seen the identification of several forms of conduct, which may broadly be described as terrorism, as contrary to international law. These range from support for armed bands to hijacking and the terrorisation of diplomats. That encouragement given by one state to guerrilla activities in another state is a form of terrorism contrary to international law is reaffirmed by the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, prepared by the International Law Commission in 1954,[19] and by several resolutions of the General Assembly, notably Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The Draft Code, however, pre-dates the decolonisation movement and Resolution 2625 (XXV) gives some support to the view that wars of self-determination are an exception to the traditional rule. The principle that support for guerrilla or terrorist groups is *always* contrary to inter-

[16] Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the USSR. M. Pella, the Romanian delegate and rapporteur, favoured the inclusion of a clause to the effect that terrorism could never be a political offence. The Romanian Penal Code and its extradition treaties with Spain and Portugal already contained such a provision. See *Proceedings*, note 11 above, pp. 99ff and 67.

[17] United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Finland and Belgium. See *Proceedings*, note 11 above, pp. 99ff. See further on the British attitude, A.24. 1936. V.

[18] Toynbee, note 10 above, pp. 542, 551.

[19] Article 2 (6). For the text of this Draft Code, see *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* (New York: 1951), United Nations. Vol. 2, p. 134 and 1954, Vol. 2, p. 150.

national law must therefore be seen as uncertain and will be discussed later.

Hijacking may be described as a special type of terrorism—'aerial terrorism'—which is contrary to international law. Three conventions concluded under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the Tokyo Convention of 1963,[20] the Hague Convention of 1970[21] and the Montreal Convention of 1971,[22] seek to prohibit different aspects of aerial terrorism. Problems of definition have not been as great here as those of enforcement, which remains one of the prime goals of the ICAO.

The kidnapping and terrorisation of diplomatic officials in recent times has led to international measures to combat this species of terrorism. The Organisation of American States and the International Law Commission have both produced instruments which, by taking steps to protect persons engaged in foreign service, cover much the same ground as the 1937 Convention.

On February 2, 1971, the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States gave its approval to the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance.[23] Unlike a draft prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee[24] which defined terrorism in general terms, the Convention is limited in its scope to the protection of persons employed in the foreign service of states. The decision to settle for a narrow convention was not unanimous and led to the withdrawal of the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay from the Assembly session.

The OAS Convention is restricted both in respect of the acts it seeks to punish and the persons it seeks to protect: the acts of terrorism prohibited are kidnapping, murder and other assaults as well as extortion in connection with these crimes, and the persons protected are 'those persons to whom the State has the duty according to international law to give special protection' (Art. 1). These crimes are to be considered as 'common crimes of international significance, regardless of motive'

[20] Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft (1963) 2 *International Legal Materials* 1042.

[21] Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (1971) 10 *International Legal Materials* 13[illegible].

[22] Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (1971) 10 *International Legal Materials* 1151.

[23] (1971) 10 *International Legal Materials* 255. For an analysis of this convention, see Nicholas M. Poulantzas, 'Some Problems of International Law Connected with Urban Guerrilla Warfare: The Kidnapping of Members of Diplomatic Missions, Consular Offices and other Foreign Personnel' (1972) 3 *Annals of International Studies* 137, at 154.

[24] Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping of Persons for Purposes of Extortion: (1970) 9 *International Legal Materials* 1177. For an explanatory memorandum on this draft convention, see (1970) 9 *International Legal Materials* 1250.

(Art. 2). The purpose of this provision is clearly to remove the shelter of political asylum, which on the face of it is incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention which declares that 'none of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum'. It has, however, been suggested that 'Article 6 does not refer to the perpetrators of terrorist acts described in the Convention. It aims rather at reaffirming the institution of diplomatic asylum, prevalent in Latin America, which is granted to political offenders'.[25]

As wars of self-determination are essentially an Afro-Asian phenomenon, there was little concern for the social and political causes of terrorism. Although the Inter-American Juridical Committee warned that states should 'remove certain domestic factors that increase the use of wanton violence'[26] the Convention makes it clear that motive is irrelevant in determining guilt under the Convention. Moreover, the General Assembly of the OAS, in its resolution which initiated the Convention, declared:

> The political and ideological pretexts utilized as justification for these crimes [acts of terrorism] in no way mitigate their cruelty and irrationality or the ignoble nature of the means employed, and in no way remove their character as acts in violation of essential human rights.[27]

In 1972 the International Law Commission, a body of individual experts engaged in the codification and development of international law, submitted Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Diplomatic Agents and other Internationally Protected Persons.[28] These were noted with satisfaction by the General Assembly[29] and placed on the provisional agenda for 1973 'with a view to the final elaboration of such a treaty by the General Assembly'. Like the OAS Convention they seek only to punish 'violent attacks' directed at an 'internationally protected person', as defined in Article 1. Here, too, the offence is committed 'regardless of motive'.

The year 1972 saw the proliferation of new forms of terrorism: the Lod Airport massacre in Tel Aviv in May, in which twenty-eight persons were killed and scores wounded by a Japanese suicide squad; the Munich Olympic Games disaster which resulted in the death of seventeen persons; and the wave of letter bombs directed at Israeli diplomats. In response to this terror, the Secretary-General requested the General Assembly to consider at its 27th Session 'measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take human lives or

[25] Poulantzas, p. 159.

[26] In statement for reasons for the Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping (1970) 9 *International Legal Materials* 1250 at 1252. See, too, the Inter-American Judicial Committee's opinion, cited in A/C 6/418, p. 38.

[27] Resolution of June 30, 1970: (1970) 9 *International Legal Materials* 1084.

[28] (1972) 11 *International Legal Materials* 977.

[29] Resolution 2926 (XXVII) of November 28, 1972.

jeopardize fundamental freedoms.' [30] The item was referred to the Sixth Committee in an amended form, which directed the Committee to include within its field of concern a study of the causes which lead to international terrorism,[31] an amendment which was motivated partly by a desire among some states to exclude wars of self-determination from the ambit of terrorism and partly by the insistence of the Arab nations that terrorism was to be seen as a response to 'governmental terror' and injustice.

The item was thoroughly debated in the Sixth Committee, which had before it a Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism [32] submitted by the United States and a helpful study on international terrorism prepared by the Secretariat.[33] The United States insisted that its draft convention would not 'adversely affect the right of self-determination' and claimed that it should not be rejected on that score.[34] The General Assembly later rejected an American resolution calling for 'a plenipotentiary conference in early 1973 to consider the adoption of a convention on the prevention and punishment of international terrorism' [35] and instead resolved to invite states to make proposals on the matter, to be considered by an *ad hoc* committee of 35 which would report at the next session of the General Assembly.[36] This resolution, which was adopted by 76 votes in favour, 35 against and 17 abstentions, received its support largely from Arab, African and East European states. In essence the resolution showed more concern for the legitimation of wars of national liberation than for the suppression of terrorism. In its third paragraph it

> *reaffirms* the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations.

The debate in the Sixth Committee [37] was particularly instructive as it revealed the extent to which the legitimacy of wars of national liberation has been accepted by states. While many delegates expressly asserted that the use of force is permissible in order to achieve self-

[30] A/8791.

[31] The item was finally placed on the agenda in the following form: 'Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and the study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.'

[32] (1972) 67 *Dept. of State Bulletin* 431 (October 16). A/C 6/L 850.

[33] GAOR, 27th Session, 6th Committee, A/C 6/418 of November 2, 1972.

[34] GAOR, 27th Session, 6th Committee, A/C 6/SR 1357, p. 9.

[35] (1972) 67 *Dept. of State Bulletin* 433.

[36] Resolution 3034 (XXVII).

[37] GAOR, 27th Session, 6th Committee, A/C 6/SR 1355–1374.

determination, only the target states of these offensives—South Africa, Portugal and Israel—emphatically denounced their legality. The Western powers in general adopted an equivocal approach which fell short of a condemnation of wars of self-determination.

In July and August 1973, the *ad hoc* Committee of 35 met,[38] but was unable to agree on a common approach to the problem of international terrorism. The opposing views which had characterised the 1972 debates in the General Assembly and Sixth Committee obstructed the work of this Committee. For while one group—consisting mainly of the Western powers—favoured the adoption of a convention to prevent and punish terrorism, the other group—consisting of Afro-Arab and East European states—expressed more concern for the underlying causes of terrorism and refused to support any measures which might interfere with the activities of liberation movements or which failed to condemn organised state terror on the part of 'colonial, racist and alien regimes'. In a 'concluding statement', the chairman of the Committee merely declared that international terrorism was a 'delicate and complex problem' and acknowledged that there had been a 'frank and extensive exchange of ideas' on the subject. These conflicting views were then handed over to the General Assembly for consideration during the 1973 session. In short, the *ad hoc* Committee failed to achieve a compromise between the opposing views expressed in the 1972 debates. It therefore seems unlikely that any consensus will emerge from the present division during the 1973 session of the General Assembly.

An ideal definition of terrorism

Ideally, a convention which aims at combating international terrorism should cover the following matters.

(a) The convention should reaffirm that every state has a duty to refrain in all circumstances from encouraging guerrilla activities in another state.

(b) The convention should prohibit acts of terrorism which strike at the stability of the international order and not those acts which merely undermine the political order in any particular country. The definition of international terrorism should therefore clearly identify the international element which renders the act one of concern to the international community.

(c) The convention should confine itself to death and bodily injury only. It should avoid the temptation to which some national legislatures have succumbed of defining terrorism so widely that it embraces any

[38] Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism, GAOR, 28th Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/9028).

form of extra-constitutional conduct and thereby transforms a political opponent into a 'terrorist'.[39] Some may argue that a convention limited to the punishment of acts directed at the physical integrity of the person would be too narrow and that it would be preferable to include under the umbrella of terrorism all acts, whether directed at persons or property, which produce a state of terror among a section of the population and, at the same time, threaten human life. This formula, which was contained in Article 4 of the Inter-American Judicial Committee's Draft Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping of Persons for Purposes of Extortion, is appealing, but it is too imprecise to be adopted at this early stage in the development of international law on the suppression of terrorism.

(d) The convention should expressly state that motive is irrelevant in determining whether an act of terrorism has been committed.

(e) The convention should accept the principle of *aut dedere aut punire* as a guide to its enforcement procedures. According to this principle, the state which takes the alleged offender into custody is obliged either to try him before its own courts or to extradite him to another state having jurisdiction over the offence.

(f) The convention should reaffirm the international community's abhorrence of state-controlled terrorism as expressed in the Nuremberg principles, the Genocide Convention and those international instruments designed to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Obstacles in the way of a convention

There are two main obstacles in the way of a convention of the kind outlined above: first, the dubious status of wars of national liberation; secondly, the highly treasured right of states to grant asylum to political offenders.

A. *Wars of national liberation*

The UN Charter is clear on the circumstances in which force may be used lawfully in international relations, namely in the exercise of the right of self-defence and under the authority of the Security Council. Not only does the Charter fail to permit the use of force to eradicate colonialism, but it expressly recognises the legitimacy of colonialism in Chapter XI. Under the Charter, if one state harbours guerrillas (freedom fighters/terrorists) who conduct military operations against another state, it is guilty of an unlawful use of force.[40] As has already been

[39] For an example of such a statute, see the South African Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967 (section 2).
[40] See J. Dugard, 'The OAU and Colonialism: An Enquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism'

shown, this principle has been reaffirmed by the International Law Commission in its Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind—which extends criminal responsibility to individuals who engage in such operations—and by several resolutions of the General Assembly.[41]

Since the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the legitimacy of colonialism has become suspect and, as a corollary, the notion has grown that force may be used to destroy it. Resolutions of the General Assembly have given implicit support to this view by calling upon states to give 'material assistance' to liberation movements[42] and by recognising 'the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples for their freedom by all appropriate means at their disposal'.[43] The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 2625 (XXV)) gives encouragement to this argument by proclaiming that

> Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

From this Declaration it has been inferred that 'liberation movements have a *jus ad bellum* under the Charter'.[44] As the Charter does not specify wars of decolonisation as an exception to its prohibition on the use of force and instead expressly recognises colonialism as an institution compatible with the Charter, it is difficult to refute the view that wars of national liberation directed from the territory of one state at another are contrary to the Charter.

While maintaining this legalistic stance it must nevertheless be acknowledged that there is an absence of consensus on the legal status of liberation movements. Moreover, although the General Assembly resolutions referred to above may not have changed the law of the Charter, they have conferred a *political* legitimacy on wars of national liberation. As Inis L. Claude has pointed out:

(1967) 16 *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 157; George Ginsburgs '"Wars of National Liberation" and the Modern Law of Nations—the Soviet Thesis', in Hans W. Baade (Ed.), *The Soviet Impact on International Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1965), pp. 87–88.

41 A/C 6/418, pp. 27–30.

42 See, for example, Resolutions 2945 (XXVII) and 3031 (XXVII) adopted in the 1972 session.

43 Resolution 2936 (XXVII). For similar resolutions, see 2908 (XXVII), 2923E (XXVII) and 2955 (XXVII).

44 Georges Abi-Saab, 'Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War' (1972) 3 *Annals of International Studies* 93 at 100. See too Umozurike Oji Umozurike, *Self-Determination in International Law*, pp. 80–84.

> Obviously, the doctrine of the invalidity of colonial sovereignty has not achieved universal support, and its claim to legal status is most tenuous. But that is beside the point; it has been established by the political process of collective legitimization, and, while lawyers are free to brush it aside, statesmen are bound to take it into account as one of the facts of international political life. If the doctrine is illegal, its supporters would claim that this only convicts the law of legitimacy. In this respect at least, they attach greater weight to the political consensus of the Assembly than to the established provisions of international law. Thus, in one of its aspects, collective legitimacy represents a revolt against international law.[45]

The political toleration of wars of national liberation is a fact of international life which cannot be ignored by the drafters of a convention on terrorism. This does not mean that the convention should give its express approval to such wars, as this would certainly be unacceptable to most Western states. All that is suggested is that a 'showdown' should be avoided on this issue since it could only lead to the abandonment of a convention or the assertion of the legality of wars of self-determination, given the apparent numerical superiority of those in favour of such wars. Clearly a compromise convention is required which omits all reference to support for armed bands in the concept of international terrorism. This might be seen as heresy by those who maintain that peace is the first value of the world community, but a realistic appraisal of current world values leads inevitably to the conclusion that self-determination is a co-equal prime value to many states.

B. *International terrorism and political offences*

Most states reserve to their own courts or executive the right to decide whether a fugitive requested for extradition is a political offender or not, and most extradition treaties recognise this right. This is a practice which any multilateral convention seeking to impose criminal responsibility upon an individual must acknowledge. An attempt to ignore this tradition in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was, as we have seen, firmly resisted and finally abandoned. The refusal of the Genocide Convention (Art. 7) to permit states to qualify genocide and related offences as political offences for the purposes of extradition resulted in Britain withholding ratification until 1969, and has increased the opposition to ratification of the Genocide Convention in the United States. The Western powers are not alone in insisting on their right to determine whether a fugitive is a political offender: to South American states the right to grant asylum to political offenders is a part of the fabric of the Inter-American system,

[45] 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations' (1966) 20 *International Organization* 367 at 377.

ıs was stressed by several South American delegates in the Sixth Committee in 1972.

Although the practice of non-extradition of political offenders must be seen as an obstacle in the way of a successful anti-terrorist convention, it should be recalled that from a doctrinal point of view the *international* terrorist does not fall within the category of political offender. As has been pointed out, 'The clear rationale of the rule against the extradition of purely political offenders is that they do not, like "common" criminals, generally present a threat to the life or property of citizens of other States'.[46] Where a person commits an act which threatens the stability of other states or undermines the international order, he ceases to be a political offender and becomes a criminal under international law, like the pirate or hijacker. It was this philosophy which prompted an English court in *Meurnier's* case to grant the extradition of an anarchist—on the ground that he was not an opponent of one government but of all governments.[47] The war criminal, the offender under the Genocide Convention and the person guilty of a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are likewise deprived of the benefit of non-extradition because 'a crime against humanity or the rules of war is of international concern and should not be protected because it happens to have a national political objective'.[48] It is also possible to explain the practice of excluding assassins of heads of state from political asylum on the grounds that the head of state represents a state on the international level with the result that his assassination will in most cases disrupt relations between states.

A full appreciation of the *raison d'être* of the non-extradition of political offenders might persuade states to adopt a less intransigent attitude to the extradition of *international* terrorists and a full acceptance of the principle of *aut dedere aut punire*. International terrorists, after all, do not merely affect the political order of a national society, but of international society.

The United States Draft Convention

The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism,[49] submitted to the General Assembly by the United States in September 1972, faces most of the difficulties to which I have referred and is worthy of more attention than it has hitherto received.

[46] Shearer, p. 188. See, too, Lord Radcliffe's dictum in *Schtraks* v. *Government of Israel* [1962] 3 All E.R. 529 at 540.

[47] [1894] 2 Q.B. 415 at 419.

[48] J. E. S. Fawcett in *British Year Book of International Law 1958* (London, OUP/RIIA, 1959), p. 391.

[49] For text, see (1972) 67 *Dept. of State Bulletin* 431 and A/C 6/L 850.

Wisely, it does not include a prohibition on support for armed bands in its operative part,[50] although it does reaffirm this principle in its preamble by means of a reference to Resolution 2625 (XXV). Even this reaffirmation of a trite principle of law, however, is likely to provoke a response from Afro-Asian states who will probably insist *at least* on a restatement of the paragraph in Resolution 2625 (XXV), which appears to legitimise wars of national liberation. In the present climate of opinion, there is much to be said for the view that the reaffirmation of the traditional rule that support for armed bands is a form of terrorism should be omitted from the preamble: this would harm the rule less as a principle of customary law than would a strong qualification in favour of wars of self-determination.

The Draft Convention defines international terrorism in limited terms, both as regards the act and the international element. Article 1 confines acts of terrorism to homicide, serious assaults and kidnapping, as well as to participation in such offences. Under the same Article, an act of terrorism assumes 'international significance' if the act:

(a) is committed or takes effect outside the territory of a State of which the alleged offender is a national; and
(b) is committed or takes effect:
 (i) outside the territory of the State against which the act is directed, or
 (ii) within the territory of the State against which the Act is directed and the alleged offender knows or has reason to know that a person against whom the act is directed is not a national of that State; and
(c) is committed neither by nor against a member of the Armed Forces of a State in the course of military hostilities; and
(d) is intended to damage the interests of or obtain concessions from a State or an international Organization.

The result of this restrictive definition of 'international significance' is that acts of terrorism committed in one state against that state by its own nationals are left to municipal law and if the offender escapes he may still raise the plea of political offence against an extradition request. Moreover it does not extend to the standard-type war of self-determination where the act takes effect inside the territory of the target state and where the actor will normally be a national of the target state.[51] On the other hand it does punish acts of terrorism which have real international repercussions, such as the Munich incident, letter bombs through the mail and the Lod airport massacre. Consequently it serves to localise a conflict and prevent a war of national liberation

[50] See the plea by the delegate of the United Kingdom for such a provision: A/C 6/SR 1359, p. 20.

[51] This is clearly the intention of the United States: see Mr. Bennett's statement in the Sixth Committee: A/C 6/SR 1357, p. 11.

from escalating. In this way it takes cognisance of the view expressed by the Swedish delegate in the Sixth Committee:

> every country should enjoy a right to neutrality not only with regard to belligerents in war situations, but also with regard to acts of violence committed by individuals as a result of the internal political tensions of foreign countries.[52]

The American definition of international terrorism is narrowly formulated and should appeal to a wide cross-section of public opinion, particularly if one bears in mind the Marxist-Leninist ideological opposition to acts of individual terror. There are two principles, however, drawn from past experience, which, although implied in the American draft, need to be stated more clearly: first, that motive is irrelevant in determining whether an act of terrorism has been committed (as stated in the OAS Convention of 1971 and the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the protection of diplomatic agents); secondly, that the act should be intended to, or calculated to, inspire terror in a section of the public (as provided for in Article 1 of the 1937 Convention and Article 4 of the Inter-American Juridical Committee's Draft Convention).

Article 3 of the American Draft Convention obliges a state either to extradite an offender or to 'submit without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State'. This article is modelled on Article 7 of the Hague and Montreal Conventions on hijacking and at first sight is intended to prevent the international terrorist from being classified as a political offender and granted asylum. Commentators on the Hague Convention, however, have denied that Article 7 has this effect and maintain that a state retains the right under the Convention to refrain from prosecuting a political offender.[53] The intention of the American draft may be to leave this matter in the same vague form as the Hague Convention in order to attract as many states as possible to the Draft Convention; that would be highly understandable. On the other hand, if the intention is to prevent the terrorist from being classified as a political offender in all circumstances, this should be expressly stated, as in the Genocide Convention, together with an explanation of the *international* interest in the extradition or prosecution of the international terrorist.

The American Draft Convention makes it clear, in Article 13, that

[52] A/C 6/SR 1355, p. 6.

[53] R. H. Mankiewicz, 'The 1970 Hague Convention' (1971) 37 *Journal of Air Law and Commerce* 195 at 204–206; Gillian White, 'The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft' (1971, No. 6) *Review of the International Commission of Jurists* 38 at 42; Oliver J. Lissitzyn, 'International Control of Aerial Hijacking: the Role of Values and Interests' 1971 *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* 80 at 81–83.

it does not encroach upon the field of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or of the rules of international law governing armed conflicts. Although probably not intended, this Article may be seen as further evidence of the exclusion of wars of self-determination from the scope of the Draft Convention, for in recent times the General Assembly has declared that the principles of the Geneva Conventions should be applied in part to those engaged in wars of this nature.[54]

Unfortunately the American draft was ignored by most delegates in the Sixth Committee in 1972, although several acknowledged that it provided a suitable basis for future discussions. In essence it appeals to the lowest common denominator among states, to the minimum degree of consensus, by confining its scope to exported terrorism. Its limitations will not satisfy all states. The target states of wars of national liberation, in particular, have little to gain by such a convention and their opposition to the narrow definition of 'international significance' in the American draft is understandable. Less understandable is the Afro-Arab opposition to the Draft Convention; after all, it clearly excludes wars of self-determination from its ambit, and one might have expected these states, particularly since the Khartoum killings, to oppose exported terrorism. Inevitably, the motives of the United States have been questioned in the light of its record in Vietnam and its support for Israel, and there is little doubt that this has contributed to the opposition to the Draft Convention. Suspicions of this kind might be allayed by a denouncement of state-controlled terror in the preamble, along the lines suggested above, because silence on this subject will unavoidably be interpreted as acquiescence. Despite weaknesses of this kind, the American draft does offer a realistic basis for a convention to prevent and punish terrorism. The adoption of such a convention would constitute a clear affirmation by the international community of its opposition to the expansion of terrorism to states not party to a particular conflict and might serve to halt the escalation of violence in the international order.

[54] See, for example, Resolution 2674 (XXV) which 'affirms that the participants in resistance movements and freedom fighters in Southern Africa and territories under colonial and alien domination and foreign occupation, struggling for their liberation and self-determination should be treated, in the case of their arrest, as prisoners of war in accordance with the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949'. See, too, Resolution 2852 (XXVI).

BOOKS

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

Geoffrey Warner

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. *Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (for USA Department of State). Indexes.*

Vol. I:	General; The United Nations.	*1972. 1544 pp.*	*$7.25.*
Vol. II:	Council of Foreign Ministers.	*1970. 1586 pp.*	*$7.25.*
Vol. III:	Paris Peace Conference; Proceedings.	*1970. 882 pp.*	*$5.25.*
Vol. IV:	Paris Peace Conference; Documents.	*1970. 956 pp.*	*$5.50.*
Vol. VI:	Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union.	*1969. 993 pp.*	*$5.50.*
Vol. VII:	The Near East and Africa.	*1969. 941 pp.*	*$5.25.*

(Department of State Publications 8573, 8497, 8491, 8492, 8470, 8490.)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. *Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (for USA Department of State). Indexes.*

Vol. I:	General; The United Nations.	*1973. 1096 pp.*	*$6.80.*
Vol. II:	Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria.	*1972. 1251 pp.*	*$6.00.*
Vol. III:	The British Commonwealth; Europe.	*1972. 1131 pp.*	*$5.75.*
Vol. IV:	Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union.	*1972. 887 pp.*	*$5.25.*
Vol. V:	The Near East and Africa.	*1971. 1377 pp.*	*$6.50.*

(Department of State Publications 8674, 8530, 8625, 8532, 8592.)

IT has been three-and-a-half years since the last review article dealing with the US State Department's unique volumes on the history of American foreign policy appeared in these pages.[1] It dealt with the year 1945, to which no less than twelve volumes of documents were consecrated. The pace has slackened slightly since then—mainly, we are told, because of the exigencies of time and money[2]—but we are still faced with the daunting prospect of eleven volumes for 1946 and eight for 1947. It is clearly impossible to do justice to all these within the framework of a relatively short review article, and those dealing with the German problem, the Far East and Latin America have been reserved for later treatment. As for the rest, the reviewer intends simply to take note of the vast amount of documentation now made available on the early development of the United Nations and the preparation of the peace treaties with Germany's European

[1] 'The United States and the Origins of the Cold War', *International Affairs*, July 1970, pp. 529–44.

[2] William M. Franklin, 'The Future of the "Foreign Relations" Series', *Department of State Bulletin*, September 15, 1969, p. 249.

allies[3] and to concentrate upon the events which led up to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in March and June of 1947 respectively. This story has already been told by a well placed participant,[4] but now, for the first time, many of the key documents have been published in full, thus enabling the historian to judge the issues involved for himself.

One should be chary, however, of thinking that these documents tell the whole story. Considerations of space have clearly prevented the publication of some material. American relations with Finland and Afghanistan, for example, receive very short shrift: twelve pages devoted specifically to the former and none to the latter.[5] The State Department Policy Planning Staff's study of July 23, 1947, 'Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint', is omitted, despite the fact that George Kennan, who was the Staff's director, expressed the hope in his memoirs 'that it may some day be published in full, because I think it gives the most succinct and yet comprehensive picture of the official rationale of what our government attempted to do in this connection'.[6]

Considerations of current policy have also played a part in restricting the kind of documentation that can be released. As Mr. William Franklin, the director of the State Department's Historical Office, explained in 1969: 'We found it not too difficult to publish the record of our diplomacy and politico-military policies for the period of World War II, for most of the wartime problems were peculiar to the war and ended with it. And if we did not have many official fellow travellers on our safari through the wartime documentary jungles, we certainly did enjoy the company of a goodly crew of unofficial but authoritative memoirists, who helped by letting a lot of top-secret cats out of the bag before we ever arrived on the scene. But with 1946, even reliable and detailed memoirs become few and far between. And suddenly the major subjects have a contemporary ring . . . In some cases publication of the record may be helpful to the current US position; in other instances we may have to admit, or accept the decision, that it would be unhelpful, at least for a while.'[7] For these reasons the historian will be doubly well advised to cast his net as widely as possible in search of all the relevant source material, as I am sure the editors of these volumes would be the first to agree.

* * *

Events in Greece were the immediate cause of the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, but they were only part of a wider picture covering the

[3] See particularly *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, Vols. I, II, III and IV. Future references to the documents will be in the form: *FRUS*, followed by the year and the volume and page number(s).

[4] Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1964). This is the paperback edition. The original hardcover edition was published by Viking Press in 1955.

[5] These two countries are not chosen capriciously. Much of the documentation published in these volumes concerns American anxiety at the policies the Soviet Union was pursuing towards countries on its periphery. It would be interesting to have more information on what the United States thought was happening in these two strategically placed peripheral countries.

[6] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston: Atlantic Little, Brown. 1967), p. 352.

[7] Franklin, p. 250. No doubt 'revisionist' historians will see all sorts of sinister omissions and suppressions to help bolster their view that the United States was primarily responsible for East-West tension. One might have a little more sympathy with their position if the Soviet Union published a tenth of what the United States does.

strategic situation of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole. Indeed, in 1946 the danger had appeared to lie further east: in Iran and Turkey. At the Moscow foreign ministers' meeting in December 1945, the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, had failed to secure a pledge from the Russians that they would withdraw their troops from northern Iran by March 2, 1946, in accordance with a wartime agreement. Moreover, Byrnes's journey to Moscow coincided with the successful culmination of a Soviet-supported (and probably Soviet-inspired) rebellion in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and the formation of a pro-Russian provincial government.

Not only did the Russians fail to withdraw their troops by March 2, 1946, they began moving them in what the American vice-consul at Tabriz was to describe as 'a full-scale combat deployment'.[8] When the first news of these troop movements reached the State Department on March 7, they were portrayed on a map for Mr. Byrnes's benefit. One of those present later recalled: 'Mr. Byrnes asked the significance of each arrow and noted that they aimed at the Turkish border, the Iraqi border, [while] a third was headed due south (possibly indicating a thrust toward the oilfields), and a drive toward the capital at Teheran. Mr. Byrnes . . . remarked that it now seemed clear the USSR was adding military invasion to political subversion in Iran, and, beating one fist into the other hand, he dismissed us with the remark: "Now we'll give it to them with both barrels".'[9]

In fact—and despite President Truman's dramatic assertion at about this time that 'we may be at war with the Soviet Union over Iran'[10]—the American reaction was somewhat less emphatic. At a meeting on March 8, the Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 'stated that we ought to let the USSR *know that we were aware of its moves*, but "leave a graceful way out" if it desired to avoid a showdown'. A note to this effect was dispatched to Moscow and the United States government simultaneously resolved to appeal to the newly constituted United Nations Organisation if the Soviet troops failed to withdraw.[11]

Quite what the purpose of the troop movements was remains a mystery. George Kennan, then the American chargé in Moscow, reported on March 17 that they were almost certainly not aimed at Turkey, although he was less sure about Iraq.[12] It is possible that they were designed to overawe the Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, who was about to leave for talks in Moscow. During the discussions the Russian leaders raised the question of oil concessions, and on March 20 the new Soviet ambassador to Iran hinted that the troops would be withdrawn if such concessions were granted. Qavam was ready to negotiate on this basis and agreement was reached on April 4. By May the Soviet troops were gone.[13]

President Truman was later to claim that the Russians withdrew their troops as the result of an ultimatum he sent to Stalin, but the editors of these documents point out that 'no documentation on the sending of an

[8] Rossow tel., March 7, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, VII, p. 344.

[9] Wright memo., August 16, 1965, *ibid.*, p. 347.

[10] Undated memo. by Averell Harriman, cited in Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror* (London: Blond. 1970), p. 83.

[11] Wright memo., August 16, 1965, *FRUS, 1946*, VII, p. 347; Byrnes tels., March 8, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 345–46, 348. Emphasis in original.

[12] Kennan tel., March 17, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 362–64.

[13] Murray tels., March 11, 22, April 9, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 351–52, 369, 413–15; Allen tel., May 25, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 484.

ultimatum to the Soviet Union has been found in the Department files or in the files of the Department of Defense, nor have several of the highest officers of the Department in 1946 been able to affirm the sending of an ultimatum'.[14] The most that the United States seems to have done was to support the Iranian complaint to the Security Council, which was submitted on March 18, and to oppose a Soviet request to postpone discussion of it. This undoubtedly rankled with Stalin;[15] whether it influenced his actions in any way is a moot point.

In any event, the threat to Iran did not disappear with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The pro-Russian regime in Azerbaijan remained and when Qavam negotiated an agreement with it in June, the American ambassador reported: '. . . instead of Azerbaijan returning to Iran the province seems likely to take over the country . . .'.[16] This tendency seemed to be reinforced in August, when Qavam took members of the communist-dominated Tudeh Party into his own central government, but this was probably only a ploy on the prime minister's part in order to obtain a breathing-space. The Tudeh ministers were dropped in October and, despite repeated Russian warnings, Qavam sent central government forces into Azerbaijan in December to topple the provincial regime. Much to everyone's surprise, the latter collapsed quickly and completely, while the Russians failed to make a move. If the issue had been solely between the Soviet Union and Iran, the American ambassador reported from Moscow, the Russians might have intervened militarily. 'But because of Qavam's appeal [to the Security Council] issue threatened to become concern of UN with USA actively interested in it. It was these considerations which presumably gave Kremlin pause. Iran is no stronger than UN and UN, in last analysis, is no stronger than USA.'[17]

The geopolitical stakes in Iran were thought to be very high. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out in October 1946, 'as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. . . . As to counter-offensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favourable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counter-offensive action from any area.' The best estimates, the Chiefs went on, indicated 'that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war', so that her reasons for negotiating an oil agreement with Iran 'are subject to suspicion'. Denial of the oil resources of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to either side would force it to fight 'an oil-starved war' and it was 'therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East'.[18]

14 Editorial note, *ibid.*, pp. 348–49.
15 See Smith tel., April 5, 1946, *ibid.*, VI, p. 734.
16 Allen tel., June 17, 1946, *ibid.*, VII, p. 500.
17 Smith tel., December 27, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 566.
18 Hilldring memo., October 12, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 530. To the impartial observer, there is more than a shade of 'doublethink' in the American position. By the Chiefs' own

Equally, if not more, important than Iran was Turkey. The Soviet Union had been pressing the Turks for a new regime for the Dardanelles and for the return of territory ceded after the First World War since the middle of 1945. Hints were dropped early in 1946 that the Straits were the key issue, but the American ambassador in Ankara felt that Russian aims were more far-reaching. 'Soviet objective regarding Turkey', he cabled on March 18, '. . . is to break present Turkish Government, install "friendly" government, resulting in closing Turkish gap in Soviet security belt from Baltic to Black Sea, giving USSR physical control of Straits and putting end to Western influence in Turkey. In short, domination of Turkey.'[19]

This view was shared by the ambassador's superiors in Washington, as can be seen from their reaction to the Soviet note to the Turkish government of August 7 concerning the Dardanelles. Among other things, the Russians proposed the establishment of a new regime for the Straits under the exclusive control of the Black Sea powers and joint Soviet-Turkish defence of the Straits against hostile outsiders.[20] 'In other words', Truman wrote later, 'both we and the British would have been eliminated from any future agreement, and Turkey would have been faced by a combination of three Communist states: Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria', while 'if Russian troops entered Turkey with the ostensible purpose of enforcing joint control of the Straits, it would only be a short time before these troops would be used for the control of all of Turkey. We had learned from the experience of the past two years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant Soviet occupation and control.'[21]

A joint State-War-Navy memorandum, presented to the President on August 15, argued that 'if the Soviet Union succeeds in its objective obtaining control over Turkey it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East . . . When we refer to the Near and Middle East, we have in mind the territory lying between the Mediterranean and India. When the Soviet Union has obtained full mastery of this territory, which is strategically important from the point of view of resources, including oil, and from the point of view of communications, it will be in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China.' The three departments therefore felt that 'the time has come when we must decide that we shall resist with all means at our disposal any Soviet aggression and in particular, because the case of Turkey would be so clear, any Soviet aggression against Turkey . . . In our judgement the best hope of preserving peace is that the conviction should be carried to the USSR, Turkey and all other powers that in case the United Nations is unsuccessful in stopping Soviet aggression, the United States would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of American arms.'[22]

President Truman was in complete agreement with the views of his advisers. He told them, that 'we might as well find out whether the

admission, the United States did not 'derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war' either, but her motives in seeking oil concessions in the Middle East were not 'subject to suspicion'. Here, surely, one can sympathise to some extent with Soviet concern at American activities so close to Russia's own borders.

[19] Wilson tels., February 1, 13, March 18, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 812, 816, 819.

[20] Orekhov memo., August 7, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 827–29.

[21] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday. 1956), pp. 96–97.

[22] Acheson tel., August 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, VII, pp. 840–42.

Russians were bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years'. He accepted a proposal to send a naval task force to the Mediterranean, thus in effect establishing what was later to become the Sixth Fleet.[23]

There was of course no armed conflict, and the 'Straits crisis' petered out in an exchange of notes between Turkey, Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Like the Iranian crisis of March, however, it demonstrated the importance which the United States attached to the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and its determination to prevent that balance from being tilted to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

* * *

The weakest link in the chain of threatened countries in the area, however, was Greece. A left-wing rebellion and continual border incidents with its communist neighbours to the north led Acheson to write on October 15, 1946 'that strained international relations focussing on Greece may result in early major crisis which may be a deciding factor in future orientation of Near and Middle Eastern countries. It is of importance to US security that Greece remains independent and in charge of her own affairs, and we are prepared to take suitable measures to support territorial and political integrity Greece'.

Nevertheless, criticism of the Greek government's handling of the situation was evident throughout Acheson's assessment. His advocacy of the need for a 'clear statement by US to Greek Govt of view that Greek frontiers should remain those of 1939 in interest of justice, peace and stability' reflected his lack of patience with Greek claims for changes in the border with Albania and Bulgaria.[24] On the internal front, he said that the Greek government must learn to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal oppositions, or the former would be driven into the arms of the latter. The authorities 'should be made to understand Dept's view that measures for internal order have not been impartially applied in recent months but have instead encouraged lawlessness of Extreme Right groups', while the September plebiscite favouring the return of the monarchy, although representative of the will of the people, was marred 'by falsification and unfair practices of Govt in power'.[25]

American policy in Greece and Turkey was carried out in close co-operation with Britain. Indeed, the two countries were felt to be more a British than an American responsibility with the result that Britain supplied much of the economic and all the military assistance. But the magnitude of the Greek crisis was such that this arrangement soon broke down. On February 21, 1947, Acheson wrote that reports from American observers in Athens were 'unanimous in their alarm over the probability that Greece will be unable to maintain her independence. Determining factors are the probability of an imminent economic and financial collapse and the fact that Greek communists and the Soviet dominated governments of Albania,

[23] Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press. 1951), p. 192; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton. 1969), p. 195.

[24] The US representative in Albania went so far as to claim that the 'root of [the border] problem inescapably lies in unfounded Greek claims to southern Albania which have been pressed with increasing aggressiveness for more than two years'. See Jacobs tel., October 5, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, VII, p. 229. This was not the view of the ambassador in Greece, however, who blamed the Soviet government. See MacVeagh tel., September 30, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 226–27.

[25] Acheson tel., October 15, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 235–237.

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are making every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal affairs. These efforts are designed to make untenable the position of any Greek Government not subservient to Soviet aims'. What we would now call the 'domino effect' of Greece's going communist was thought to extend far beyond the Middle East. 'The capitulation of Greece to Soviet domination through lack of adequate support from the U.S. and Great Britain', Acheson wrote, 'might eventually result in the loss of the whole Near and Middle East and northern Africa. It would consolidate the position of Communist minorities in many other countries where their aggressive tactics are seriously hampering the development of middle-of-the-road governments.'[26] Arguing that 'under present arrangements Greece will receive neither adequate economic aid from the United States nor adequate military aid from Britain', Acheson urged 'reconsideration of our policy and decision to assist Greece with military equipment'.[27]

As if to underline the truth of Acheson's final diagnosis, the British government chose this very moment to present the United States with two *aide-mémoires* in which it declared that, because of its own economic problems, it was no longer able to extend any financial assistance to Greece after March 31 and could provide nothing for the re-equipment of the Turkish armed forces or for Turkish economic development.[28] As the new Secretary of State, General George Marshall, told his cabinet colleague, Navy Secretary James Forrestal, shortly before a meeting with President Truman on February 24, this 'was tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East with obvious implications as to their successor'.[29]

A special State Department committee, in terms that seem to have been endorsed by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the President himself, considered 'that this Government has only this choice: (a) either to accept the general responsibility implied in the British memoranda or (b) to face the consequences of a widespread collapse of resistance to Soviet pressure throughout the Near and Middle East and large parts of western Europe not yet under Soviet domination or the adverse consequence, from the standpoint of United States interests, of a possible new British deal with the Russians', and that 'for this reason . . . this Government should accept the responsibilities in question and should do its best to discharge them in such a way as to maintain confidence in the United States and in their own ability to resist Soviet pressure'.[30]

On March 12, 1947, President Truman went before a joint session of Congress to request $400 million of aid for Greece and Turkey. His speech, however, struck a more militant and generalised tone than its immediate purpose might imply. Pointing out that 'at the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life', one of which was 'based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees

[26] France and Italy, in particular, were meant. See Ethridge tel., February 17, 1946, *FRUS, 1947*, V, p. 24.

[27] Acheson memo., February 21, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 29–31. This memorandum was addressed to the Secretary of State.

[28] British *aide-mémoires*, February 21, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 32–37. It should be emphasised that these documents were delivered *after* the Acheson memorandum, cited above, had been written.

[29] Millis, p. 245.

[30] Annex 2 to undated Henderson memo., *FRUS, 1947*, V, p. 53; unsigned minutes of a meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, February 26, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 56–57; Truman, pp. 100–01.

of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression', while the other was 'based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority . . . upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms', Truman roundly declared: 'I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.'[31] It was small wonder, therefore, that the President was seen as articulating not a request, but a doctrine.

Some were alarmed at the possible consequences of such a stance. George Kennan, who was about to become head of the State Department's newly formed Policy Planning Staff and who had participated in the discussions on the Greek crisis, was later to write: 'It implied that what we had decided to do in the case of Greece was something we would be prepared to do in the case of any other country, provided only that it was faced with the threat of "subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures". It seemed to me highly uncertain that we would invariably find it in our interests or within our means to extend assistance to countries that found themselves in this extremity.'[32]

It was certainly felt that Greece and Turkey were not the only countries which might need massive American assistance. On March 5 Acheson wrote to the Secretary of War: 'In the course of our discussions on the Greek and Turkish problem, frequent reference was made to the fact that this is only part of a much larger problem growing out of the change in Great Britain's strength and other circumstances not directly related to this development. I believe it important and urgent that study be given by our most competent officers to situations elsewhere in the world which may require analogous financial, technical and military aid on our part.'[33] The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was accordingly entrusted with the task and in an interim report on April 21 stated that, in addition to Greece and Turkey, 'the nations of the world which the United States may find it necessary and desirable to aid in the next few months are in presently estimated order of the urgency of their need in the light of US interest: . . . Iran-Italy . . . Korea . . . France (for political and not economic reasons) . . . Austria (assuming conclusion of the [peace] treaty) . . . Hungary'.[34] The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not altogether agree with these priorities. They felt that countries like Hungary, which were within the Soviet sphere of influence, should be removed from the list, and their pecking order actually put Turkey and Greece fifth and sixth behind Britain, France,

[31] Jones, p. 272.

[32] Kennan, p. 320. According to one source, even General Marshall was taken aback by the 'flamboyant anti-Communism' of the speech and sought to tone it down, only to meet with the response 'that in the considered opinion of the executive branch, including the President, the Senate would not approve the doctrine without the emphasis on the Communist danger'. See Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929–1969* (New York: Norton. 1973), p. 261. The documents, as published, give no support to Bohlen's assertion, however. They contain one telegram of minor amendments to a draft of the speech and a letter to Senator Vandenberg in which Marshall stated: 'When I reached Paris on March 6, the President telegraphed the proposed text of his message of March 12 and I informed the Department that I fully concurred.' See Marshall tels., March 7, April 19, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, V, pp. 100–01, 148.

[33] Acheson letter, March 5, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, III, p. 197.

[34] Unsigned report, April 21, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 206.

Germany and Italy.[35] Meanwhile, Acheson and his staff were working on a speech which would '" elaborate our Greco-Turkish program into a more comprehensive statement of foreign policy" to be based on the concept of "further extension of aid to foreign countries" '.[36]

* * *

These efforts coincided with the abortive meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March and April. While he was in the Russian capital, General Marshall had a long conversation with Stalin on April 15. According to his adviser and interpreter, Charles Bohlen, 'Stalin's seeming indifference to what was happening in Germany made a deep impression on Marshall. He came to the conclusion that Stalin, looking over Europe, saw that the best way to advance Soviet interests was to let matters drift. Economic conditions were bad. Europe was recovering slowly from the war. Little had been done to rebuild damaged highways, railroads, and canals. Business alliances severed by years of hostilities were still shattered. Unemployment was widespread. Millions of people were on short rations. There was a danger of epidemics. This was the kind of crisis that Communism thrived on. All the way back to Washington, Marshall talked of the importance of finding some initiative to prevent the complete break-down of Western Europe.'[37]

Immediately upon his return Marshall instructed George Kennan to assemble his Policy Planning Staff without delay and get to work on the problem.[38] The Staff's interim report was ready on May 23. 'The Policy Planning Staff', it stated, 'does not see communist activities as the root of the difficulties of western Europe. It believes that the present crisis results in large part from the disruptive effect of the war on the economic, political, and social structure of Europe and from a profound exhaustion of physical plant and of spiritual vigor. This situation has been aggravated and rendered far more difficult of remedy by the division of the continent into east and west. The Planning Staff recognizes that the communists are exploiting the European crisis and that further communist successes would create serious danger to American security. It considers, however, that American effort in aid to Europe should be directed not to the combatting of communism as such but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in other words, to combat not communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which Russian communism is now exploiting.'

Apart from a short-term problem, which the Planning Staff saw in terms of 'some particular bottleneck or bottlenecks in the economic pattern of western Europe' (such as the production and distribution of Rhine Basin coal), there was a long-term problem 'of how the economic health of the area is to be restored and of the degree and form of American aid for such restoration'. It was important, the Staff insisted, to distinguish between the two aspects of the long-term problem. 'It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally and

[35] Appendix to Lalor memo., May 12, 1947, *ibid.*, I, pp. 737–38.
[36] Editorial note, *ibid.*, III, pp. 219–20. This speech was delivered in Cleveland (Mississippi) on May 8. See Jones, pp. 274–81.
[37] Bohlen, p. 263. For the record of the Marshall-Stalin conversation, see unsigned memo., April 15, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, II, pp. 337–44.
[38] Kennan, pp. 325–26.

to promulgate formally on its own initiative a program designed to place western Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The formal initiative must come from Europe; the program must be evolved in Europe; and the Europeans must bear the basic responsibility for it. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of the later support of such a program, by financial and other means, at European request.'

Whom should the programme include? 'Presumably', opined the Planning Staff, 'an effort would first be made to advance the project in the [United Nations] Economic Commission for Europe, and probably as a proposal for general European (not just western European) cooperation; but then it would be essential that this be done in such a form that the Russian satellite countries would either exclude themselves by unwillingness to accept the proposed conditions or agree to abandon the exclusive orientation of their economies. If the Russians prove able to block any such scheme in the Economic Commission for Europe, it may be necessary for the key countries of western Europe to find means of conferring together without the presence of the Russians and Russian satellites. In general, however, the question of where and how this initiative should be taken is primarily one for the European nations, and we should be careful not to seek unduly to influence their decision.'[39]

Although the Policy Planning Staff's report raised many important issues, it did not strike a note of desperate urgency. This was to be the contribution of a memorandum by the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton, which was written a few days later on the basis of first-hand observations in western Europe. 'Europe is steadily deteriorating', he wrote. 'The political position reflects the economic. One political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of grave economic distress.' The current balance-of-payments deficits of Britain, France, Italy and the Anglo-American zones of Germany totalled $5 billion.[40] This represented 'an absolute minimum standard of living. If it should be lowered, there will be revolution. *Only until the end of this year* can England and France meet the above deficits out of their fast dwindling reserves of gold and dollars. Italy can't go that long . . . Without further prompt and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe. Aside from the awful implications which this would have for the future peace and security of the world, the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war debt. *These things must not happen.*' They could be prevented, Clayton maintained, by a $6 or $7 billion a year grant of goods for three years. 'This three-year grant to Europe should be based on a European plan which the principal European nations, headed by the UK, France and Italy, should work out.' Other nations could help with the provision of food and raw materials, 'but we must avoid getting into another UNRRA. *The United States must run this show*'.[41]

Both the Policy Planning Staff's report and the Clayton memorandum were discussed at a top level meeting with the Secretary of State on May 28.

[39] Enclosure to Kennan memo., May 23, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, III, pp. 224–26, 228.
[40] *i.e.* $5,000 million.
[41] Clayton memo., May 27, 1947, III, pp. 230–32. Emphasis in original.

There was clearly some anxiety at the prospect of a proposal for economic assistance to the whole of Europe, including the Soviet Union: the Russians might wreck it, or alternatively try to obtain the lion's share of the benefits. According to his own later account, Kennan argued that 'we would play it straight. If they responded favorably, we would test their good faith by insisting that they contribute constructively to the program as well as profiting from it. If they were unwilling to do this, we would simply let them exclude themselves. But we would not ourselves draw a line of division through Europe.'[42] On June 6, the day after the speech at Harvard in which he launched the plan that bears his name, Marshall reverted to this point. Would the Russians, he asked Kennan and Bohlen, accept an invitation to take part in the plan? Both men, according to Bohlen, gave a similar answer. 'We did not feel that the Soviet Union would accept American verification of the use of goods and funds.'[43] They were right. Although Molotov brought a large Russian delegation to a preliminary meeting in Paris to discuss the American offer, he soon walked out, to an almost audible collective sigh of relief in the West.

As for the Soviet satellites in eastern Europe, 'there was general agreement . . . that the plan should be drawn with such conditions that Eastern Europe could participate, provided the countries would abandon near-exclusive Soviet orientation of their economies'.[44] This, of course, was quite unacceptable to the Russians. Both the Polish and Czech governments originally indicated their intention to take part in the larger conference convened for mid-July to discuss the plan, but the Soviet Union prevented them from doing so.[45] Commenting on the Russian veto upon Czech participation, the American ambassador cabled from Moscow: 'In no previous instance has the Soviet Govt been so firm in handling its satellites . . . The lines are drawn. Our response is awaited. I do not need to point out to the Dept the repercussions of a failure to meet the Soviet challenge, in terms not only of the control of Europe, but of the impact which such a failure would have in the Middle and Far East and throughout the colonial world'.[46]

The lines were indeed being drawn in Europe in 1947, and not only in the way described above. In eastern Europe, the communists moved to tighten their grip upon Hungary.[47] In western Europe, on the other hand, communist ministers were dropped from the governments of France and Italy.[48] In Germany, the failure of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November and December finally convinced both sides that partition was inevitable.[49] While few people would now maintain that the cold war started in 1947, that year certainly marked an important stage in its development.

[42] Kennan, p. 342.
[43] Bohlen, p. 264.
[44] Allen memo, May 29, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, III, p. 235.
[45] Steinhardt tels. July 10, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 318–20; Griffis tels., July 10, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 320–22.
[46] Smith tel., July 11, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 327.
[47] For documentation on events in Hungary, see *ibid.*, IV, pp. 260–401.
[48] For documentation on events in France and Italy, see *ibid.*, III, pp. 688–826; 835–1001. The documents are silent on what, if any, pressure the United States put on the French and Italian governments to persuade them to drop their communists, but it is clear that their departure was welcomed.
[49] For documentation on the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see *ibid.*, II, pp. 676–830.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States. By Joseph Frankel. *London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 134 pp. Index. £1·25.*

This is an elegantly written and judicious appraisal of 'theoretical ways of thinking about international relations' and particularly of behavioural approaches to foreign policy analysis. Professor Frankel writes interestingly about the relation between theory and practice, which he sees as necessarily 'uneasy and distant'; but knowledge of the relevant theory—*e.g.*, integration theory—may be an asset to a diplomat in a bargaining situation—if only as a form of 'one-upmanship'—while, more generally, theory can help broaden, deepen and systematise the gathering, ordering and interpretation of data. Unfortunately, the fact that most theorists only too often seem to regard practice as of little relevance and that 'methodological obsession is a besetting sin' (p. 11) with them is enough to deter most practitioners from acquiring more than a nodding acquaintance with even the better theoretical writings.

Professor Frankel is an informed and on the whole a sympathetic—if at times a sceptical—guide to the different modes of theorising: the use of models, the limits of quantification, the utility of simulation techniques. Systems analysis he sees as comprehensive but imprecise. He is, perhaps, a bit kind to the functionalists and the neo-functionalists in the context of integration theory; very few of their prognostications have stood the test of time or allowed for the extent to which many so-called 'technical' or 'welfare' issues have become matters of 'high politics.'

On theories which relate directly to the actions of states, Professor Frankel, as himself one of the foremost theorists in this field, is very much at home; his analysis of the different types of decision-making approach is particularly valuable. And the analysis of the 'theory of games' as it relates to states in interaction is a model of clarity.

Nevertheless, the concluding case study of Britain and the EEC illustrates the modest contribution that theory can as yet make to illuminating the actual practice of states. The account Professor Frankel gives is sensible and informed, but it owes more to the author's experienced handling than to the theories to which he has provided such a commendably succinct introduction.

Geoffrey Goodwin

Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies. By Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan. *New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley. 1973. 293 pp. Bibliog. Index. (A Wiley-Interscience Publication. Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science. A Wiley Series. Eds.: Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner.) £6·50.*

EXPERIMENTAL psychologists find that some people categorise widely and tend to see similarities between different objects, while others draw fine distinctions and categorise narrowly. The authors of this book would probably be counted among the former group, for they have decided to treat as 'international alliances' all those formal agreements made from 1814 to the present day between two or more nations 'to collaborate on national security issues' (p. 4). They admit the possibility of distinguishing among such terms as alliance, coalition, bloc and pact but prefer to use them interchangeably, adding 'the Communist system' for good measure. It seems hardly surprising, therefore, that the authors admit defeat in their original aim of progress towards a general, integrated theory of alliances, for they have failed to isolate a genuine class of phenomena about which to generalise. Nor have they got around the difficulty by settling for the more modest task of identifying 'the scope and limits of alternative explanations' (p. 43), for the thing to be explained must also form a recognisable class.

Another finding of experimental psychologists is that some people are heavily influenced by the type of objects they have been viewing recently, and others are not. Again our authors would be placed in the former category, for their orientation to the problem of alliances is largely shaped by the post-World War II system of large blocs. This is reflected in their bureaucratic or institutional approach to the subject: there is considerable emphasis on performance, decision-making structures, cohesion and disintegration. It is also revealed in the subject matter of the empirical chapters. Apart from one chapter surveying the performance of 130 alliances between 1815 and 1939 (on the basis of coded data and factor analysis), all the chapters deal with post-World War II alliance systems: the effect of East-West conflict on the cohesion of Nato and the communist system (1948–67), and the behaviour of France and China as non-conforming partners in their respective postwar alliances. These too rely largely on the methodological apparatus of American social science, notably content analysis and events data analysis.

The authors' main conclusions are not startling: (1) the data on the 1815–1939 period 'do not completely support or reject' (p. 84) the competing theoretical approaches which emphasise principles on the one hand and expedience on the other as dominant motives of alliance formation and performance; (2) the data on the communist system and Nato 'generally, though not always' (p. 143) confirm a relationship between the degree of conflict between alliance systems and the cohesion within them; (3) the data on France and China provide 'at least preliminary empirical support' (p. 214) for hypotheses on linkages between the attributes of nations which deviate from alliances and the nature of the alliances themselves.

On the Popperian view that a discipline advances as much by the refutation of theories as by their confirmation, there may be some value in the authors' negative conclusion that none of the traditional alliance theories—'affiliation', 'balance of power' and 'minimum winning coalition'

theories—is clearly validated by their research. But even this outcome is vitiated in the case of balance-of-power theories by the use of a curiously limited criterion—the choice of politically stable regimes as alliance partners.

That the book is not more than the sum of its parts is largely due to a factor beyond their control. This has been aptly put by George Liska: 'It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name. For the same reason, it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis'.[1]

MOORHEAD WRIGHT

The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World. By David Kimche. *Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press; Chichester: Wiley. 1973. 296 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. (The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. The Monograph Series.) £6·50.*

Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy. By Leo Mates. *Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications Inc. 1972. 534 pp. Index. $12.00.*

LOOKING back on the early diplomacy of the Afro-Asian states it is tempting to conclude that it was all a shadow play, a projection of lofty aspirations which had little to do with the realities of world politics. Also, so much of the early literature on the separate but overlapping themes covered by these two books was transparently naive: if Pandit Nehru saw non-alignment as a moral force capable of extending 'the area of peace', many Western liberals viewed the whole of the ex-colonial world as an 'area of hope', and non-alignment as a short-cut to an international order based on decency and justice. Yet, when the humbug is stripped away, the problems to which both the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements addressed themselves remain of obvious contemporary importance. Both these studies, which approach these problems from different but complementary perspectives, studiously avoid moralising and make a very useful contribution to our understanding of the subject.

Dr. Kimche views the Afro-Asian movement as an historical episode: it was never a coherent ideological movement but 'a child of political expediency whose parentage was the desire to hasten the process of de-colonisation on the one side and the need to react to great power conflict on the other' (p. 264). Thus, from the early contacts between Asian and African nationalists in London and Paris, and their subsequent attempts, once in power, to frame foreign policies appropriate to the new situation, he traces the movement with its conferences, summit meetings and resolutions through the high noon at Bandung in 1955 to its gradual decline in the 1960s when the area of the world under colonial rule had dramatically shrunk and the detente between the super-powers had reduced the outward pressure on all but a few strategically placed small states. The latest meeting—The Third Conference of Non-Aligned States held in Lusaka in 1970—

[1] *Nations in Alliance.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1962), p. 3. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1963, p. 277.

he regards as little more than an echo, which made 'but scant impression on world public opinion' (p. 266).

But the demise of Afro-Asianism also reflects tensions which have been present from the start within the movement itself. Some of the most interesting parts of Dr. Kimche's narrative are those in which he shows how these internal conflicts, particularly the Sino-Soviet and Indo-Pakistan disputes, combined to undermine both the diplomatic movement and its popular counterpart, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, despite the attempts of AAPSO to keep the movement alive by institutional means (p. 135). The pressure to take sides on these specific disputes in turn exposed a further dilemma: did Afro-Asian solidarity imply a degree of ideological and political conformity, or were the conferences merely convenient occasions at which to articulate common interests and press common claims on the international community? The various solutions proposed depended partly on the external situation, partly on the political philosophies of the nationalist leaders, and partly on the internal political structures over which they presided. To illustrate this point Dr. Kimche devotes three chapters to case studies of India, Indonesia and Tanzania respectively. The contrast between India and Indonesia is particularly striking. Thus, when Nehru pressed the importance of world peace over anti-colonialism at the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference in 1961, he did so not only because of his personal conviction as to where the priorities lay, but also because the Indian government was aware of India's geopolitical vulnerability between the two great communist land powers. Dr. Kimche rightly points to the inherent conflict between the political outlooks of China and India (p. 221) but while this conflict effectively destroyed the basis of India's foreign policy, he probably underestimates the extent to which Nehru himself was aware of the risks involved. In Indonesia the balance between the large Communist Party and the fiercly anti-communist Muslim parties largely dictated the government's stand on foreign policy, while Dr. Sukarno's mission 'to act as a champion of all people still under colonial rule' (p. 234) was buttressed throughout the 1950s by Indonesia's claim to West Irian, and led him to press anti-colonialism above peaceful coexistence. Africa came late to the Afro-Asian movement and in a sense left early. Most African states were deeply suspicious of the Sino-Soviet conflict, if only because it tended to divide the liberation movements, whose unity was an OAU objective, into pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions. Although Dr. Kimche makes good use of an extensive interview with Oskar Kambona, it is perhaps questionable whether he should have placed quite so much weight on the evidence of an exiled politician (whose views admittedly corroborate his own thesis), particularly as President Nyerere's regime in Tanzania is one of those most firmly committed to the continuing relevance of Third World solidarity.

Although there is a wide area of agreement on the historical record, it is on this last point that Professor Mates's study of non-alignment essentially differs from Dr. Kimche's book. He participated in many of the events described, and it is clear that, from the inside, non-alignment was not merely a response to external events, important as he shows these to have been, but, in an economic and social sense, a structurally determined position. Although he starts by tracing the Asian origins of non-alignment, it is Chapter 3 (pp. 175-220), on the Yugoslav policy, which forms the heart of his book. In the cold war period, Yugoslavia provided the link between

the two themes of peaceful coexistence and anti-colonialism which bound together the otherwise disparate group of non-aligned states. Yet, because 'she moved towards non-alignment from isolation in her own continent and not from an environment where, like the other non-aligned countries, she could have developed natural ties and friendships within a relatively close neighbourhood', non-alignment probably retains more importance for Yugoslavia than for most other states (p. 217). But Professor Mates has too good a sense of history and is too acute an economic sociologist to rest his argument merely on Yugoslavia's European dilemmas. It is true that, in a social sense, most non-aligned states have common economic problems rather than common interests, but they have also always aspired to forms of economic co-operation which would help to alter the present asymmetrical structure of the world economy, and so offset their own economic and political vulnerability. Professor Mates, therefore, expands his study to link the political and economic objectives of the non-aligned states, to analyse the ways in which the relationship has altered over time, and to assess current prospects.

As the selection in the excellent documentary appendix indicates, the author regards the activities of the UNCTAD Group of 77 as a logical outgrowth of the non-aligned movement. But he also concludes that useful as was the UNCTAD attack in highlighting the politico-economic dimensions of the development problem, the continued insistence on broad collective action 'to narrow the gap' between rich and poor as a whole is mistaken. Instead the poor should 'bring their strategic objectives into line with reality' first by concentrating less on growth than on 'the intensive modernisation of society' (p. 351) and secondly by drawing a sharp distinction between political and economic co-operation. So far as the former is concerned the front should be as broad as possible to better the chances of exerting moral and political pressure on the great powers; but economic co-operation should be confined to concrete issues in which only those states with similar interests and problems would be engaged (p. 360.) Professor Mates successfully combines the traditions of liberal economics and socialist humanism. Whether the states of either the industrialised or developing worlds will heed his advice is, sadly, much more doubtful.

JAMES MAYALL

The United Nations and East-West Relations. By Roderick Ogley. *Brighton: Institute for the Study of International Organisation. University of Sussex. 1972. 58 pp. Bibliog. (ISIO monographs. First series, No. 6.) £0·75. $2.00.*

The United Nations in a New Era. By Evan Luard. *London: Fabian Society. 1972. 24 pp. (Fabian Tract, 415.) £0·25.*

The United Nations and the News Media. A Survey of Public Information on the United Nations in the World Press, Radio and Television. By Alexander Szalai with Margaret Croke et al. Preface by Davidson Nicol. *New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1972. 309 pp. Bibliog. (A Unitar Study.) $6.50.*

IN this carefully researched and informative monograph, Mr. Ogley examines the experience of communist states at the League of Nations and

.e United Nations. He does so by way of asking whether the anti-ommunist members have taken advantage of their majority position in oth organisations to discriminate against their ideological opponents. Not urprisingly, he concludes that they have. He argues that on constitutional sues in the UN the Western powers have behaved in ways which 'they ould have regarded as illegitimate . . . if used against themselves' (p. 39), nd that on substantive matters too, despite increasing restraint during the ast ten years or so and some communist successes in the sphere of ecolonisation, the UN displays, in communist eyes, 'a long history of as' (p. 51). Mr. Ogley allows that the UN has sometimes made useful ontributions to East-West relations but says that it must provide further nd better evidence of its impartiality if it is to play a larger part in pro-oting good relations between communist and non-communist states.

This approach raises several questions. Is the UN the kind of body of hich impartiality, at least on issues of substance, is expected? How readily ill its members reach a common mind as to whether it is, as it were, in a ate of grace? And even if the UN comes to be generally regarded as fair nd unbiased, does it follow that it would thereby be accorded greater eference by the major states of the world, or, for that matter, by the minor nes? Reservations are therefore in order concerning the assumptions which e behind Mr. Ogley's enquiry, but the material he presents within it will e of considerable use.

Mr. Luard's pamphlet analyses the current disillusion with the UN and s implications, notes the limits on UN action in a world of sovereign states, nd suggests a number of fashionable but fairly modest changes in the rganisation's structure and procedure to enable it to cope better with olitical problems. He then goes on to argue that 'the real growth point'). 19) for the UN lies in the expansion of its existing functional activities 1 such fields as economic aid and development and their extension to the ea-bed, the environment, and other areas which are being given an inter-ational dimension through the advance of science and technology. In this onnection reference is often made to the need for 'international authority' o grow. States, however, may take a less favourable view of this concept han Mr. Luard, which would obstruct the implementation of his ideas. One possible, albeit indirect, way around this difficulty is suggested by the laim that more information about the UN's activities would lead to greater ublic understanding of (and, by implication, greater sympathy for) them. 'his is the theoretical background to the thorough enquiry sponsored by Jnitar into the coverage given to the UN by the major news media through-ut the world, the results of which are presented, with a wealth of statistical ables, by its organiser, Professor Szalai.

ALAN JAMES

Annual of Power and Conflict 1972–73: a survey of political violence and international influence. Edited by Brian Crozier. *London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1973. 174 pp. Maps. £3·00. $8.50.*

'he second issue of this annual follows the pattern laid down in the first. Part I egins with an essay by Brian Crozier entitled 'Transnational terrorism', followed y country-by-country notes on situations of conflict in 1972 and early 1973. 'art II contains five contributions, each of which considers the evolving balance of olitical influence of the United States, the Soviet Union and China in Western

Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, south and east Asia and Latin America. The appendices list world extremist movements and communist parties engaged in guerrilla warfare.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1973. 447 pp. Index. (A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book.) $11.95.*

THIS book contains the papers and discussions used in the Fifth International Arms Control Symposium, held in October 1971, together with some revisions of the texts and an additional section which provides a commentary on the Soviet-American agreements reached in May 1972. It also includes the texts of those agreements and a useful glossary for non-arms controllers. It is a fascinating book, of unusually consistent and high quality: the separate contributions and the summaries of the discussions bear many marks of careful and thorough preparation: a business-like minimum of jargon and a bearable level of wishful model-making enhance its appeal.

It opens with a canter by W. W. Rostow through the assumptions of the early 1960s about arms control agreements between the super-powers, and then begins in earnest with three papers by Robert Pfaltzgraff, Thomas Wolfe and Joseph Coffey about the aims and the interests of the two participating states. The discussion section deals with a range of conflicting interpretations about the rationale for super-power arms control agreements. The second section is a fairly lengthy and detailed discussion about technological change and the strategic arms race; but inevitably it ends a little tamely by pointing out the uncertainty, especially from the Western viewpoint, of what was really desired from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt). (The first and the fifth sections, by contrast, identify areas of research and issues requiring further study.) The third section deals with the processes by which negotiations and agreements take place, and might generally be described as a consideration of the international political aspects of Salt, principally with the major powers in mind. Robert Bowie, Robert Scalapino and William Kintner provide papers here, and almost get involved with tripolar and pentagonal scenarios. The discussion section inevitably becomes rather generalised and suppositional when dealing with interactions between states in regard to hypothetical developments. Part Four has papers by Geoffrey Kemp and Ian Smart, Wynfred Joshua, George Quester and Takeshi Murumatsu, on European nuclear forces, Israel, India and other 'nth power' candidates and on Japan. There is a lot of very interesting if somewhat speculative, material in this section and the discussion deals especially well with more recent problems relating to nuclear proliferation. The fifth part has two substantial papers by William Van Cleave and James Dougherty about the implications of Salt for the future and for international security, and once again the report of the discussions is very full and stimulating. The last section is a summary of what the 1972 agreements comprise, with a brief but very perceptive analysis, by the editors.

The principal limitation of the book is, of course, that current interest in arms control extends beyond the super-powers and below the strategic

nuclear level of armaments; to that extent the symposium only sets out to survey a segment of the spectrum. But, given that this was a deliberate concentration, the papers and the discussions do remarkably well in alluding to many of the implications which arms control agreements at the Salt level may have upon other activities. A number of the contributors provide an unusually broad range of material to support their contentions about national interests, motives and attitudes, and Kemp and Smart offer an interesting analysis of what might be the politico-military rationale behind small national deterrents of the British and French type: what sort of damage levels, what sort of target limitation and what, in effect, 'minimum deterrence' is. They also discuss, and so did the symposium, Anglo-French nuclear co-operation: but very wisely do not go into the problem whether co-operation at such a high technological level—if it were to extend to the design and production of new equipment—could be successful without a very long and persistent learning process. This topic illustrates the care which has been taken to provide a broad basis of data and reflection in the collection: though it was principally concerned with Salt, the symposium was careful to avoid only super-power preoccupations and perspectives.

PETER NAILOR

Strategic Arms Limitation Part I: The First Agreements. *Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press; London: Paul Elek. 1972. 35 pp. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Research Report No. 5.)*

Strategic Arms Limitation Part II: The SALT Agreements and the Future of the Arms Race. Preface by Frank Barnaby. *Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press; London: Paul Elek. 1972. 28 pp. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Research Report No. 6.)*

The Strategic Balance 1972. By Edward Luttwak. *Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies in association with the Library Press, New York. 1972. (Distributed by Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London.) 132 pp. (The Washington Papers 3.) $2.50.*

Strategic Sufficiency: Fact or Fiction? By James L. Buckley and Paul C. Warnke. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1972. 87 pp. (Rational Debate Series.)*

STRATEGIC arms limitation has, as two of its central concerns, notions of strategic nuclear stability and sufficiency. It is thus concerned with arms control rather than disarmament *per se*. The SIPRI pamphlets are useful additions to the literature on current trends in the subject and they are well up to SIPRI's usual high standards. Part 1 (prepared by Jozef Goldblat) contains the texts and a fairly technical analysis of the Moscow agreements of May 1972. It is carefully done, concise and clear. In short, it is an excellent reference work. The brief political assessment of the agreements is rightly rather sober. It points to the switch from a quantitative to a qualitative arms race. In Part 2 Professor Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology takes up the political analysis. He argues cogently

that both the United States and the Soviet Union still harbour hopes of strategic superiority rather than of strategic sufficiency. Such bargaining from strength, as Professor Rathjens points out, makes agreement difficult to achieve. While he fears both states will seek to 'level up' in the second part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt II), Professor Rathjens presents a sensible analysis of the advantages (and difficulties) in seeking to 'level down' asymmetrically to a lower level of armaments. In so doing he has some interesting comments on the relationship between changes in ASW capability and vulnerability to submarine-launched ballistic missiles. So far no arms control agreement appears to have led either super-power to forgo weapons systems for which it has felt a strong and unanimous need. If in Salt II a movement can be made in this direction, then we shall be approaching disarmament *per se*. In the SIPRI analyses perhaps more could have been made of the difficulties of achieving agreement on national policies before embarking on international negotiation. Such a discussion would then have thrown light on the extent to which the strategic nuclear arms race is an action-reaction phenomenon or one more dependent on internal factors.

Neither of the two remaining monographs has as much to offer the reader. Edward Luttwak starts by performing the same task as Jozef Goldblat, only with less competence and with far too many unsubstantiated comments of significance, as for example, on developments of ASW capabilities. His attribution of Soviet motives for building a deterrent can also be questioned; so can his view that the Soviet Union did better out of Salt I than the United States—it all depends on your political values. In the second part of his monograph Mr. Luttwak develops the theme that the Soviet Union is striving for a capability in nuclear diplomacy in ostensibly non-nuclear conflicts. In his view Salt I has given the Soviet Union such an opportunity, which it will be successful in exploiting. However, Mr. Luttwak underestimates the sophistication of the United States' allies and his historical examples are unconvincing. In short, his whole argument is sloppily presented, completely unsupported by research, especially on Soviet policy, and lacks satisfactory justification of its assumptions. Only when counting missiles does reality creep in.

The monograph in the 'Rational Debate Series' raises fundamental issues but it also reveals that after two decades of 'strategic studies' our analyses and prescriptions are closely tied to our assumptions which still await proper examination. On the theme of 'strategic sufficiency' a proponent and opponent present papers followed by a brief rebuttal and comments from an expert audience. Senator Buckley argues that current American policy is likely to lead to dangerous shortcomings in the American nuclear armoury and Paul Warnke, formerly of the Johnson administration, views the present administration's interpretation of nuclear sufficiency as more than enough. No new ideas or data are generated, nor is there a striking presentation of a well-known argument. The debate is knowledgeable to a degree but conventional, and it never really approaches the political dilemmas of analysis of intentions rather than capabilities. The audience might have spent its time better at home reading, say, McGeorge Bundy's 'To Cap the Volcano' (*Foreign Affairs*, October 1969).

A. J. R. GROOM

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Developing Democracy. By William A. Douglas. Foreword by Dante B. Fascell. *Washington, D.C.: Heldref. 1972. 231 pp. Index.*

Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. By Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill. 1972. 232 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £2·50.*

'DEVELOPMENT in general and especially political development is an art, not a science.' So says Dr. Douglas on the first page of his Introduction. He discusses his subject in depictive rather than analytical terms, by means of empirical statements based on assumed self-evidence or subsequently supported by particular pieces of evidence. For example:

> Serious malfunctions often develop when political democracy is installed in an area of ignorant, credulous peasants. Too often they vote for reasons unrelated to their interests. For example, many of them sell their votes for cash or a drink.... Another common problem is for peasants to vote docilely as their aristocratic landlord tells them.... Experiences such as these in many countries seem to confirm the theoretical expectation that ignorant peoples cannot operate political democracy (p. 46).

By implication, Dr. Douglas would appear to believe that stable, viable Western democracies possess widespread political awareness combined with a civic conscience. We have a good many studies which seem to suggest that this is not markedly the case. If we accept these findings, then his thesis rests on questionable foundations.

Space does not permit a listing of all fifteen chapter headings; the first three, 'The Necessity for Democracy', 'The Inadequacy of Dictatorship', 'The Inefficiency of Communism', will serve to indicate a high degree of prior commitment. Chapters VII and IX are entitled 'Characteristics of Developing Democracy' and 'Differences between Western and Developing Democracy'. Unless we can share Dr. Douglas's belief that these differences are wide, we may not see great value in his suggestion that the political parties of the Western democracies should exercise some kind of tutelage over their opposite numbers in the 'New Nations'. After all, a number of attempts of this sort have already been made, none of them notably successful. However, the book lays a finger on many of the problems facing political democracy; it does so in a very readable way and the bibliography is a useful one.

Readability is not a characteristic of the second work. Its first three chapters give a survey of the quasi-mathematical 'tendency' theories covering situations likely to be encountered in plural societies. This has considerable value in itself. The second half, however, discusses concrete cases—ten of them in 133 pages. After much labour, the careful reader may well be persuaded that these examples reinforce verbal generalisations derived from the mathematics. Unfortunately, this evidence comes at second hand from sources which lack a common method of presenting their facts. So much inherently complex material is dealt with so rapidly that each case cannot be adequately considered at a level commensurate with the sophistication of analytical methods postulated at the start. 'Switzerland, the Persistent Counterexample' receives a scant four pages of consideration almost at the end of the final chapter entitled 'Conclusions'.

PHILIP WHITAKER

Constitutionalism in the Emergent States. By B. O. Nwabueze. Foreword by S. A. De Smith. *London: C. Hurst & Co. in association with Nwamife Publishers, Enugu, Nigeria. 1973. 316 pp. Index. £4·25. Naira 8.40.*

PROFESSOR NWABUEZE, himself a Nigerian but working in Zambia, is understandably concerned, in this new study of constitution-making and constitution-breaking, with the situation in the African countries in particular; but despite the author's own frequent reference to the past and current political and constitutional situation in Nigeria (which in many ways is a microcosm of constitutional problems at large), this is a general treatment of the subject, with ample reference to Britain, the United States, India and Pakistan, among other countries brought into the comparison.

The first and most essential question must be: what is constitutionalism? Constitutionalism implies limitations on governmental power generally imposed under a written constitution; but the mere existence of a written constitution, says Nwabueze, is no guarantee of constitutionalism. He cites the Soviet Union as a prime example. Contrariwise, the United Kingdom at this stage of the argument would seem to be left out in the cold, without a written constitution and without, therefore, the opportunity of constitutionalism. One may comment that if constitutionalism merely meant adherence in practice to a written constitution (without any examination of the content of the constitution), then the Republic of South Africa would be a classic example of constitutionalism. Once it is conceded that the content and mode of operation of the constitution, and the attitude of the rulers to it, are essential ingredients of 'constitutionalism', how far is one to go? Is protection of human rights the touchstone? Or is the key to be found in the separation of powers? Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, and perhaps also of administrative action, may be essential features—but here again the United Kingdom is found wanting.

From constitutionalism Nwabueze moves on to a broad survey of constitutions and constitutional problems in emerging states. The constitutions of new states have little of history behind them: their air of impermanence and their openness to breach explain the ease with which they can be rejected or evaded. A chapter reviews the 'Westminster export model' handed over by Britain to its former colonies. Nwabueze sides with those critics who see this model as being ill-adapted to the needs of new countries. This may be so; on the other hand, it may be that any model of constitution which fettered the hands of the ruling party, clique or leader was likely to be attacked and eventually replaced. There is a paradox here, of course; on the definition usually accepted—a written constitution, limits on parliamentary sovereignty, judicial review, bills of rights, independent judicial power—of the Westminster model as established in the African ex-colonies, the United Kingdom itself does not have a Westminster-model constitution!

Other chapters discuss constitutionalism and national unity in Nigeria, federalism, constitutional malpractices generally in emergent states, emergency powers and the doctrine of necessity, *coups d'état* and secession. In this comprehensive, balanced and thoughtful survey, there are just one or two points which call for comment. It seems unfair to blame the British colonial administration for the fact that southerners live in separate quarters in northern Nigerian cities, or because Muslim schools are found there (p. 90); recent constitutional changes in Cameroon make the reference to 'federal law' (p. 180) out of date; similarly Zaire must now be substituted for 'Congo (Leopoldville)'. Whether or not the President of Nigeria had power to hand

over power to the military under the 1963 constitution, and whether a 'doctrine of necessity' can be read into the constitution to justify this action, seem questions hardly worth pursuing in the context of the violent events in Nigeria of January 1966. Constitutions by their nature cannot make provision for unprecedented and unforeseen emergencies of this type; in such circumstances the civil authorities, if they still retain any actual power, must do the best they can: necessity, yes, but hardly a constitutional necessity. Suppose, for instance, that an atom bomb had wiped out London, including the Cabinet and Parliament, while the Queen was safe at Balmoral: would there be any point in seeking for an implied term in the British constitution which would justify Her Majesty's asking the senior surviving military officer to take over? In the argument whether a government which has seized power by a coup but legislates to preserve the 'existing laws' (a common situation in Africa) thereby recreates the validity of these laws *de novo*, or merely acknowledges their validity under the old constitution, which thus carries over into the new regime (see the discussion on pp. 239 ff.), Nwabueze comes down on the opposite side to Kelsen, who said that such saved laws 'are no longer valid by virtue of having been created in the way the old constitution prescribed'. One's inclination is to follow Kelsen, who sees a hiatus in the legal continuity at this point. Lastly, one may take leave to doubt whether Nkrumah's government in Ghana 'was less than an autocracy, and much less than a totalitarian regime' (p. 305). In its last years, unfortunately, this is just what his regime became.

Students of constitutional law and political change in the developing world will welcome this important new book, which is economically and clearly argued and includes a great deal of relevant case material.

A. N. ALLOTT

Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered. By E. F. Schumacher. *London: Blond & Briggs. 1973. 288 pp. £3·25.*

REVIEWING this book for *International Affairs* is an assertion that international studies today ought to be much more concerned than they are with the morals and politics of the international economy, and rather less concerned with the old game of diplomacy played by foreign offices. More than anything else, it is a collection of modern sermons, the distillation of a lifetime's serious contemplation of the problems and priorities of an industrial society whose influence has now penetrated to every corner of the world. These range very widely in subject from education and taxation to land use, and from the energy problem—Dr. Schumacher was for many years Economic Adviser to the National Coal Board—to the problem of unemployment in India. Their unifying theme is that this international industrial society—misled by the abstractions of economics—is engaged in a 'forward stampede' to economic growth and the ever-increasing production of marketable goods, and that, when so high a moral and political price has to be paid, it cannot be right to say that the result is 'progress' and the outcome 'wealth'. Not only, Dr. Schumacher argues, does it devalue the quality of life while increasing the quantity of goods, it spoils the environment for the rest of creation and for human posterity, squanders non-renewable resources and most evidently, by widening the rich/poor gap, increases the injustice of international society.

Development economists at least will be familiar with one of Fritz Schumacher's ideas, that of Intermediate Technology. For twenty years he has been passionately arguing that the provision of aid financing large-scale capital-intensive development does more harm than good in Third World countries, and that it would be more sensible and helpful to provide technical equipment and stratagems at an intermediate level that was more efficient and productive than primitive technology and more labour-intensive than advanced technology. Although the organisation he initiated has made some progress, it has not been able significantly to overcome the indifference of donor governments nor the suspicion of aid-receiving governments. If one asks why not, it might be argued that the poor country governments have never been given an unloaded choice in the matter, the big finance mostly being offered only for grandiose projects and programmes. But this is not the whole answer—as Dr. Schumacher would be the first to agree. The neglect of intermediate technology is partly a matter of human folly and vanity; and partly a matter of scale. It would be too difficult and too demanding to mount such an aid programme on a scale commensurate with the conventional ones.

This moral and radical approach to problems is typical and makes it impossible to attach labels to Dr Schumacher's philosophy. He is as apt to quote Chairman Mao or Jesus as Tawney or Galbraith. He might be described not only as a Buddhist economist, but also as an egalitarian capitalist, a Franciscan socialist and a traditional technologist. He offers us no easy escape from the political dilemmas of the international economy but he is asking the right questions and directing our attention to some real and urgent issues.

SUSAN STRANGE

The Charity of Nations: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid. By David Wall. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 181 pp. Index. £3·95.*

Aid Performance and Development Policies of Western Countries: Studies in US, UK, EEC, and Dutch Programs. Edited by Bruce Dinwiddy. *New York, Washington: Praeger for the Overseas Development Institute; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 139 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £4·50.*

ODI Review 6. Edited by Bruce Dinwiddy. *London: Overseas Development Institute Ltd. 1973. 118 pp. £1·50.*

ANY consideration of aid is complicated by the fact that it involves the emotions as well as the intellect, politics as well as economics. David Wall takes as his starting point the proposition that 'political economy involves the systematic (and hopefully explicit) expression of political bias concerning economic factors at play in given environments' (p. 3). As market forces do not produce an ideal global distribution of resources, aid policies (defined as 'government-sponsored flows of resources made available on concessional terms to foreign governments' (p. 3)), either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, are required as a form of government-enforced international income redistribution. Donor governments have to make up their minds and reassure their electorates on such questions as why aid is necessary, how much is needed, who should have it, how its use should be

controlled, what form it should take, and the chances of its being used efficiently. These questions are discussed in Wall's book in relation to the aid policies of the United States and the Development Assistance Committee members generally.

Wall argues that the aid policies of donor countries have political as well as economic objectives. Most of the twenty countries receiving most aid per head 'were until recently (and one still is) colonies of the donor countries' (p. 29). The less-developed countries fall into 'political affinity groups' (p. 31) which reflect the bilateral aid flows of France, the EEC aid agencies, Britain and the United States. Reference and security factors have affected the position in the aid charts of Malta, South Vietnam, Laos, Israel and Singapore. These considerations, together with the desire to guarantee supplies of food and raw material, Wall argues, are the reason why politicians and voters feel that it is a 'worthwhile use of their tax revenues and payments to provide such assistance to poor countries' (p. 49). However, it does not follow that a government's aid programmes will 'accurately reflect the view of the majority of its electorate towards aid' (p. 55). Aid policies do not determine elections, and the resources involved are only a small part of total government expenditure. In any case voters are 'frequently ignorant of the size, purpose and nature of the aid programmes their tax money supports' (p. 56). Opinion polls show that in Britain and the United States it was widely believed that programmes were running at many times their actual level and consisted of money being given away freely, not loaned. Add to the general lack of information about the content of aid programmes such known facts as that governments of developing countries are prone to corruption, have heavy armament expenditure, are not always friendly to donor countries and rarely grateful, and it is clear why anti-aid opinion is easy to arouse. For this reason, although aid programmes can be operated 'more or less independently of the state of public opinion' (p. 78), they nevertheless enter into domestic policy battles and in the absence of strong political leadership are 'vulnerable to administrators and politicians who wish to use them to serve their own political ends' (p. 78) either in the role of taxpayer's guardians or as upholders of enlightened international views. Wall's conclusions, after examining the report of the Peterson Commission (March 1970) and President Nixon's statements on August 15, 1971 on introducing the new economic policy measures, is that aid programmes 'represent the juxtaposition of an identification of donor self-interest in the provision of aid and domestic political forces which are divorced from any concept of a need of poor countries for aid' (p. 79).

Having set the motives and policies of donor countries in perspective, Wall turns to the recipients. He concludes that the amount of aid needed to solve the problems of the Third World cannot be calculated by existing methods, 'but is certainly beyond the capacity of the world economy to supply' (p. 95). Given the problems of absorbing aid, the supply available is still less than the amount the developing countries could effectively use. It is important therefore that the limited supplies of aid available should be handled by professional and technical people free from outside pressures, and 'that the ways in which aid is provided maximise the contribution of that aid to the reduction of poverty' (p. 96). While there is dissatisfaction with existing levels and forms of aid, attempts will be made to increase its volume and improve the form it can take. The search for ways of using aid

more effectively leads to the conclusion that multilateral agencies, particularly the World Bank Group, which 'operate in ways consistent with the objectives of donors' (p. 148), are to be preferred by those who favour donor control. Not everyone will agree with Wall's assessment, but its liveliness is difficult to resist.

The two publications of the Overseas Development Institute are confined to specific problems very different from the wide-ranging analysis required for a book designed to fit into a series of 'The Political Economy of International Relations'. Both contain an appraisal of British development policies from 1970 onwards. *Aid Performance and Development Policies* suffers from having been a long time in production, as to judge from the Introduction it left the editor in February 1972. The first part of the book describes British policies after the absorption of the Overseas Development Ministry into the Foreign and Colonial Office, comments on the government's decision not to accept the Pearson Committee's target that 0·7 per cent. of gross national product should go annually to official development assistance, and discusses the White Paper 'British Private Investment in Developing Countries' (Cmnd. 4656). This section needs to be taken in conjunction with the corresponding chapters in *Review 6*. This includes a useful section by Bruce Dinwiddy on the work of the new Select Committee on Overseas Development, and chapters on French aid (Yves Berthelot) and Swedish Aid (Göran Ohlin). Peter Tulloch writes on the agricultural trade of the developing countries, and concludes that the indications so far are that Community policies have been aimed at national self-sufficiency and have minimised the role of imports so that the prospects, particularly for the non-associated developing countries, are anything but bright.

The final chapters in both ODI publications are contributed by Guy Hunter, Visiting Professor of Agriculture at the University of Reading and ODI Senior Research Fellow. In *Review 6* his reflections on 'Income Distribution, Agricultural Development and Political Will' voice the growing concern with poverty and unemployment in the rural areas of the developing countries. Hunter points out that peasant agriculture has 'nothing like the power of industrial development to accelerate radical social change' (p. 105). It follows, therefore, that 'in the great majority of developing countries, a strongly hierarchical society, with wide income differentials, will continue to exist for at least a generation, whether or not a revolution takes place' (p. 105). Carrying the opportunities of new farm technology to the lowest levels may necessitate land reform which involves, in Hunter's view, two main problems—the need for political will and for economic and administrative arrangements 'to direct development policy towards the poorer sections of developing societies without sacrificing narrowly defined (but real) economic growth' (p. 109). Looking back over the past five years, Hunter finds hope for gradual reform and sees in economic growth 'a partial solvent of traditional social attitudes and a partial creator of new groups and classes with more resources, more self-confidence, and more determination to take an active part in their society' (p. 112). This is a long way from the analysis of objectives of donors and recipients in the other parts of the two ODI publications and in Wall's book. However, it contains a necessary reminder that development is not only about targets, economic objectives and investment opportunities, but about people's lives and how they spend them. Perhaps the basic question we should be studying is quite simply whether it is not the case that developing

countries want development and so long as it comes don't mind what form it takes. The answer might cut through a lot of the conventional wisdom as now applied to aid.

RICHARD BAILEY

Sovereign State: The Secret History of ITT. By Anthony Sampson. *London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1973. 288 pp. Index. £2·95.*

THERE are too few studies of corporate diplomacy. Anthony Sampson's study of the American conglomerate, ITT, shows how one company has used its political influence in the international arena, and it should remind us that much of the history of the Third World, at least, needs to be seen against the background of specific corporate interests.

Born in the 1920s, ITT was, through its interests in world-wide communications, inevitably as political an animal as the oil companies. Its rapid expansion in Europe took it deep into the industrial structure of Britain, Spain, France and, particularly, Germany. Sampson does not go into the diplomatic unease that ITT's expansion was causing the imperial establishment as early as the Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference of 1928,[1] but he does give a clear picture of the extremely equivocal role played by its founder, Colonel Sosthenes Behn, in the economic life of Germany both before and during the Second World War.

The war brought ITT into close contact with American intelligence services, and this relationship continued through some murky attempts at economic disruption in postwar Hungary to the débâcle of the company's attempts to find ways of blocking Salvador Allende's return in the 1970 Chilean elections. The documentary record shows that ITT, with an ex-CIA director on its board, was in fairly constant dialogue with the CIA, the State Department, the White House and sections of Chile's political scene from early 1970. Initially, the company was talking of an election fund for Alessandri, but, after the popular elections had produced their inconclusive verdict, attention switched to ways of stopping Congress from electing Allende. A million dollars was on offer to schemes for blocking this. Plans for economic disruption and the eventual deposition of Allende were also discussed. The rightwing paper, *Mercurio*, was subsidised and pressure against further American aid to Chile were stepped up. Then, in the midst of discussions with Allende on the terms of compensation for ITT's expropriated assets, a comprehensive set of copies of relevant memoranda and letters between the actors involved was released to the press, and the rest is history.

Sampson admits it is not really possible to assess the influence ITT had, if any, on the overall formulation of United States policy on Chile. But it is the intense single-mindedness of the company's pursuit of a limited goal which sticks in the mind, along with the numerous different points of attack it made on the policy machine.

What is lacking is an attempt to put the ITT story in a wider context. For instance, in the 1920s its involvement in Germany could have been compared with Ford's,[2] or it could have usefully been put against the

[1] Ludwell Denny, *America Conquers Britain* (London, New York: Knopf. 1930), Chapter 14.

[2] Mira Wilkins & F. E. Hill, *American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1964).

wider political activities of the oil industry in the Middle East, in Mexico and in Soviet relations with the West. Likewise, the point about the Chile incident is that it failed (at the time). Comparisons with United Fruit in Guatemala in 1954, Union Minière in the Congo in 1960, or even Shell-BP in Biafra in 1967 would suggest a steady decline in power (or inclination to use it) of companies in the developing world.

LOUIS TURNER

Oxford World Atlas. Geographic Editor: Saul B. Cohen. Prepared by the Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press. *London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 190 pp. Gazetteer. £5·75. Paperback: £3·25.*

THIS new atlas is designed for the general and college markets, and it incorporates a number of unusual cartographic techniques and design features in attempting to present simultaneously physical and economic information. The editors have succeeded in reaching a reasonable compromise in collecting on a single map a number of elements which would normally be presented separately. Inevitably, however, there are occasions when too much has been attempted; for example, the map of Africa on page 10 is difficult to interpret with respect to structure, despite the claim on the dustcover that 'balanced cartographic design affords complete legibility'.

The physical environment is covered by world series on the scale of 1:25 million, and human aspects at 1:12·7 million. On both these series topography is suggested by a hill-shading technique. Conventional topographic maps account for approximately one third of the material, and these are clear and legible, but one is puzzled by the emphasis given to North America, which accounts for almost half of this important section. It was disturbing, for example, when the reviewer wished to use the atlas to refer to West Africa, to find that only Nigeria was presented in any detail, and the only map covering Mali was at the 1:12·7 million scale. The Middle East is also indifferently covered in the useful topographic map section, which includes only Egypt and Israel.

The printing is of good quality and the design somewhat bolder than is usual, especially the place names, which are often heavy. Space is saved by using the whole page for the map and sensibly dispensing with a title. The projections selected are consistent with the purpose of the maps and are clearly indicated. It was, however, puzzling that metric units were used for the climatic data and on most maps except those of North America; this seems to confirm that the atlas is designed for the United States market.

It may take users a little time to adapt to some of the unusual features, such as the positioning of page numbers in the middle of the side margins, and it was disturbing to see that pre-June 1967 data had been used as a basis of the sea communications portrayed on page 119. 1967 was the year when the pattern of shipping changed dramatically with the closure of the Suez Canal. Nevertheless this collection of maps will prove useful to schools and colleges, with much that is new and valuable especially in the series of thematic and urban maps.

J. A. ALLAN

R. O. Buchanan and Economic Geography. Edited by M. J. Wise and E. M. Rawstron. *London: Bell. 1973. 226 pp. Maps. (Bell's Advanced Economic Geographies; Gen. Ed.: R. O. Buchanan.) £4·00.*

PROFESSOR ROBERT OGILVIE BUCHANAN's distinguished career in the field of geography has been marked by the publication of twelve of his best known but sometimes inaccessible papers. The purpose of the editors, M. J. Wise and E. M. Rawstron, has been to provide an appreciation of Buchanan's work as a teacher and administrator in the University of London and as one who intervened constructively in many related fields. They also wish to mark his contribution to the development of the subject of geography, and especially of the aspect in which he specialised, economic geography. Here he brought a 'conceptual approach' to what had previously been a 'compendious but undisciplined collection of facts'.

The papers of Buchanan are extremely readable and sensibly grouped by the editors to demonstrate, first, his view of geography and its context, secondly, his contribution to research in his home country, New Zealand, and, thirdly, his perception of how his students and colleagues could contribute practically to matters of public concern. In treating such topics, and through the inclusion of the title in the publisher's list of 'economic geographies', the book is addressed very specifically to the academic community in geography departments. It will be useful to university teachers in that it will make available a number of papers worthy of attention by students, who will benefit from the example set by one trained in the field of economics as well as geography. Inevitably there is a sense, as in any work of this sort, that the ideas are not fresh and the viewpoint retrospective. Such a perspective can have its virtues, however, as in the review of the activities of the Institute of British Geographers, with which Buchanan was intimately involved since its founding in the 1930s. In recording his comments about the institute's early years, when he discusses its relationship with other societies, such as the Royal Geographical Society and the Geographical Association, one can detect something of Buchanan's perceptiveness, as well as his skill in reconciling the conflicting views of his peers. This succinct appraisal of the professional geographical institutions should be read by all associated with, or preparing an association with, the discipline of geography.

J. A. ALLAN

Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean. By John M. Bryden. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 236 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £4·75.*

This book throws considerable light on tourism, an industry often seen as the economic saviour of various poverty-stricken micro-states. The author has carried out a meticulous investigation of the industry's economics in the Caribbean, concentrating mostly on the Windward and Leeward Islands, and demolishes most of the positive arguments in favour of it. Although his discussion of the social and political factors connected with the industry are not quite as deep as the economic analysis, one is left with a picture of an industry with (counter-intuitively) no great economic value and considerable worrying domestic and international ramifications.

LAW

The British Year Book of International Law 1971. Forty-fifth Year of Issue. Edited by Sir Humphrey Waldock and R. Y. Jennings. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 536 pp. Index. £11·50.*

As elegantly and eloquently as ever, *The British Year Book of International Law* enters its forty-fifth year of issue with the publication of the 1971 edition. As idiosyncratically too; potential readers should not be deterred on finding that the *Year Book* appears a little dated. That the 1971 *Year Book* should be published in 1973 is wholly typical, as is the age of some of the cases analysed and books reviewed—for example, *La Conciliation internationale* by Jean-Pierre Cot, reviewed on page 455, was first published in 1968.[1] Such inherent quiddities may explain why the first edition of Professor O'Connell's two-volume *International Law* was not reviewed in a previous edition of the *Year Book:* see the full and thorough review of the second edition by K. Skubiszewski on page 493.

All seven articles in this volume are substantial and important contributions, either because they consider problems which urgently require solution, or because they provide an *excursus* into areas otherwise relatively uncharted, or because they do both. In the first category are Professor O'Connell's article on 'The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea' and the articles entitled 'Political Crimes in English Law and in International Law' by Professor Wortley and 'The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare' by Colonel Draper, all of which are scholarly and penetrating analyses of manifestly contemporary legal and political significance. In the second category are two articles on treaties, 'Reservations to the Constitutions of International Organisations' by Dr. M. H. Mendelson, which examines the law and practice on reservations to the constitutions of the League, United Nations and Specialised Agencies, and Dr. C. H. Schreuer's 'The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts'. Professor O'Connell's second article, 'Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law', and Philip Allott's 'Language, Method and the Nature of International Law' straddle both categories, the latter being of special interest to the present reviewer.

Mr. Allott is Legal Counsellor in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His fine study considers the language of international law, its relationship to method, and the contribution which different methods and styles of writing have made and can make to the practising and development of the law. In particular he compares and contrasts 'traditional' or 'classical' methods of writing about international law, exemplified by Gidel's and Hall's works, with the 'new' style and method, exemplified in *The Public Order of the Oceans—A Contemporary International Law of the Sea* by Myres Smith McDougal and William T. Burke.[2] The 'classical' style is literary, calm and reflective. Its language is that of the study or the learned society. The 'classical' method is 'controlled intellectual confusion'. The object of discourse is to convince, persuade, cajole by any suitable means, even should this result in an admixture, in one argument,

[1] Paris: Pedone. 1968.
[2] New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1964, p. 302.

of propositions whose verification principles are fundamentally different. Conclusions, statements of rules and principles are authoritative and at least seem logically satisfying. The 'new' method is fundamentally different in two respects. It is concerned with constructing rather than with finding the law, and it is overtly value-laden, policy-laden, utilitarian and so 'aggressively subjective'. *A priori* rules are rejected as irrelevant and unilluminating in a complex, unique and relativistic world. The author concludes that though there are important benefits to be obtained from this latter approach it would be regrettable if it were to become *the* method for international law. Being highly subjective, it could be employed to secure improper, as well as proper, political and legal ends. Being essentially suited to political and legislative debate, it is inappropriate for use by practitioners and governments who require the maximum clarity and certainty possible in applying law in day-to-day conflicts. This appraisal does scant justice to the range of Mr. Allott's article, which if of the 'classical' school itself is none the worse for that.

It is interesting to speculate on the place of Professor O'Connell's two articles in Mr. Allott's scheme. That on mid-ocean archipelagos (Philippines, Indonesia, Mauritius, Bermuda, etc.) examines closely proposals and practice in relation to archipelagos, no longer 'legal aberrations', and argues that 'the conceptual nature of the law of the sea is too rigid to take account of the diversity of situations, the complexity of interests and the range of apprehensions' (p. 72) of these entities. To Professor O'Connell 'the only progressive approach' (p. 75), to 'rationalise' maritime activity, is to construct a flexible doctrine which reconciles potentially competitive interests (mineral exploitation, fishing, pollution control, shipping, etc.), even if this should mean 'genuine concessions of legal principle' (p. 76). The object of the second article 'is to demonstrate the connection between the question of the juridical nature of the territorial sea and the theories of governmental power which have at various times dominated jurisdiction, and to identify the traces of these theories in contemporary practice and doctrine. Only by this type of inquiry can a number of real and practical issues be accurately evaluated . . .' (p. 304). The author concludes that: 'If the function of international law is to secure general recognition of the exercise of authority by sovereign states, one must look to constitutional and not to international law to determine the extent and degree of that authority' (p. 381). All this raises the question whether the Chichele Professor's reviewer, Mr. Skubiszewski, is wholly right in attributing to him 'a predilection for the more conservative and traditional' outlook (p. 506).

A note entitled 'Oil Pollution' by Alec Samuels, the usual collection of reports, both of decisions by British courts during 1970–1971 involving questions of public and private international law (Dr. Brownlie and Mr. Carter respectively) and of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities during 1970 (Dr. Akehurst), and over forty book reviews complete the present volume. The distinguished editors must be exceptionally pleased with it. Certainly all teachers of international law will declare the 1971 Year Book an excellent vintage.

CLIFFORD HALL

International Legal Aspects of Federalism. By Ivan Bernier. *London: Longman. 1973. 308 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. £4·95.*

DR. IVAN BERNIER, Professor at the Laval University (Quebec), divides his study of international legal aspects of federalism into two main parts, the first concentrating on 'Federalism and Traditional International Law', the second on 'Federalism and Evolving International Law'. Federal law is basically municipal law but it is municipal law *sui generis*, for it deals with relations between states: the member states of a federation and the federal centre. *Prima facie* only the federal centre appears within the orbit of international law, since external sovereignty is vested in the federal government. But in certain federations the member states have a measure of external legal personality. In this respect it would have been helpful to distinguish between administrative and contractual federations, the latter being established by a federal pact between independent states which transferred part of their sovereignty to the federal centre (*e.g.*, United States), while the former impose the federal structure from above for administrative convenience (*e.g.*, Austria). While in contractual federations the member states often preserved some of their rights in international law (*e.g.*, Switzerland), administrative federations are only nominally federal but in essence they are unitary states. They are sometimes termed quasi-federations. The Soviet Union obtained for the Ukraine and Byelorussia separate seats in the UN but Russia is politically a highly centralised entity. Whether India is a real federation or a quasi-federation is still an open question. After discussing the problem of international personality in relation to the federal centre and member states, the author examines international responsibility and international immunity *vis-à-vis* both. He reaches the conclusion that international responsibility must depend on the existence of international personality and so must the immunity of member states in foreign courts. The first part of the book is richly documented and based on careful research. There are some gaps in the literature, such as Professor Wagner's book on judicial aspects of federalism or C. D. Wright's study on the judicial interpretation of the Canadian constitution.

The second part deals with the impact of the federal model and of federal law on international law. The author offers here a stimulating discussion of the EEC as a supranational model which displays characteristics of a federal set-up. More emphasis should have been placed on the element of direct applicability of Community law in member states. In the last chapter the author refers to the use of precedent drawn from federal law in international law and vice versa, *e.g.*, in the law of inter-state rivers or in boundary disputes. The author defines the relationship between federalism and international law as a love-hate relationship. He states that international law has the tendency to rely on state sovereignty as the starting point for the solution of international legal problems. On the other hand, federalism divides sovereignty for the purpose of more effective action. The author considers the two positions as not quite reconcilable since each is a danger to the other. But in essence he looks at federalism not in a scholastic but in an empirical way and this no doubt is helpful to reach compromise solutions. It is, however, important to remember that war and political or economic crises contribute persistently to the strengthening of the federal centre at the cost of member states and thus to the decline of federalism as a structural model. On the other hand, the federal pattern finds increasing

application in certain international regional agencies, a fact rightly emphasised by the author.

CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ

The Concept of Custom in International Law. By Anthony A. D'Amato. Foreword by Richard A. Falk. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1971. 286 pp. Bibliog. Index. $9.50. £4·55.*

International Customary Law and Codification: An examination of the continuing role of custom in the present period of codification of international law. By H. W. A. Thirlway. *Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. 1972. 158 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Awarded the John Westlake Prize (1971) of the Institut de Droit International.) Fl. £29·50.*

ST. AUGUSTINE of Hippo wrote in book eleven of his *Confessions:* 'What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not'. The attitude of international lawyers towards customary international law is somewhat similar; they invoke rules of customary international law every day, but they have great difficulty in defining customary international law.

According to the traditional theory, a rule of customary international law arises from the practice of states, accompanied by an *opinio juris*, that is to say, by a belief that the practice is required or permitted (as the case may be) by international law. This traditional definition of *opinio juris* is obviously unsatisfactory because it leads to the paradox that a rule cannot begin to become law unless states believe that it is already law. Many writers have tried to re-define *opinio juris* in order to escape from this paradox. The authors of the two books under review have each tried to find a new way out of the paradox. Dr. Thirlway defines *opinio juris* as a belief that the practice in question *ought* to be a rule of international law. Professor D'Amato substitutes for *opinio juris* the requirement that the practice in question must be preceded or accompanied by the 'articulation' of a (proposed?) rule of international law. 'The articulation of a rule of international law . . . in advance of or concurrently with a positive act (or omission) of a state gives a state notice that its action or decision will have legal implications . . . The absence of prior notification that acts or abstentions have legal consequences is an effective barrier to the extrapolation of legal norms from patterns of conduct that are noticed ex post facto' (p. 75). It is unlikely that such a view would be accepted by most international lawyers; many rules of international law (*e.g.*, the contiguous zone, a concept which was first 'articulated' by Gidel) are attempts to explain and rationalise the *previous* conduct of states.

As regards the type of act which is capable of constituting state practice, Professor D'Amato takes a very restrictive view. Only physical acts count; 'a claim is not an act' (p. 88). But such a view bears no relation to reality; when states are arguing about the width of the territorial sea, they count the claims made by other states and do not limit themselves to counting the states which have actually enforced such claims by arresting foreign ships. Dr. Thirlway's view is slightly less restrictive. He is prepared to accept claims as elements of state practice, but he insists that claims and other acts must be 'material or concrete in the sense that they are intended to have an immediate effect on the legal relationships of the state concerned; and acts which are relevant only as assertions in the abstract,

such as the recognition by a representative of a state at a diplomatic conference that an alleged rule exists are not constitutive of practice and thus of custom, but only confirmatory of it ' (p. 58). This distinction is not only imprecise but also unrealistic, in as much as it emphasises appearances at the expense of reality. For instance, at a conference on the law of the sea the Arab states and Israel may appear to be making abstract assertions about the right of passage through straits, but it is probable that what they really have in mind is the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran; assertions about a particular dispute are dressed up as abstract assertions, and it is not always possible for an outside observer to tell whether this has occurred.

Both Professor D'Amato and Dr. Thirlway regard treaties as evidence of state practice—an attitude which is not easy to reconcile with their restrictive definitions of state practice. Professor D'Amato is more forthright in this point than Dr. Thirlway (who in any case is only concerned with treaties codifying international law); he cites a great deal of authority and successfully challenges previously held ideas about the relationship between treaties and custom. Of course, not all treaties ' generate ' rules of customary international law; the conclusion of hundreds of extradition treaties, for instance, has not undermined the rule that there is no duty to extradite under customary international law. The true explanation of this particular case would appear to be that extradition treaties are *capable* of ' generating ' a rule of customary law requiring extradition; it is just that they have not done so in fact, because there is too much evidence of state practice pointing the other way, in the form of municipal laws forbidding extradition in the absence of a treaty. But Professor D'Amato cannot use this explanation, because municipal laws are excluded from his over-restrictive definition of state practice, and so he is forced to fall back on the extraordinary argument that ' the failure of two states to conclude an extradition treaty can conceivably be interpreted as the constructive conclusion of a " treaty " to grant reciprocal asylum ' (p. 144).

Both authors consider that it is harder to prove that a state is bound by a special (*i.e.* local) custom than it is to prove that a state is bound by a general custom. This distinction is perhaps illusory; in many cases different states follow different customs (a problem with which neither author really comes to grips), and it may be very difficult to say which group of states is following the general custom and which is following a special custom.

In addition to the topics mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this review, each of the books covers a great deal of ground. Professor D'Amato discusses the nature of international law, the question whether there is a presumption in favour of freedom of state action and the role of consent, estoppel and reasonableness in the formation of custom. He is particularly good in emphasising what one might call the relativity of customary law; a state will win if it can invoke a larger number of precedents than its opponent, and consequently it is pointless to argue how many precedents and how much time are needed to create a custom. Dr. Thirlway discusses the nature and role of codification, the nature of the sources of international law in general, the question whether United Nations resolutions are a source of law and the question whether subsequent contrary custom can override a treaty codifying international law. His philosophical subtlety is reminiscent of Italian writers on international law, but both he

and Professor D'Amato would have made a clearer distinction between permissive rules and rules imposing obligations if they had mastered Hohfeld's analysis of basic jural relationships; this would have prevented them making loose statements such as 'to assert the existence of a right is also to assert the obligation of other subjects of the legal system . . . to respect the right' (Thirlway, p. 8) and 'if a state has a right under international law to send up an artificial satellite, other states have a correlative duty not to shoot it down' (D'Amato, p. 89).

In such a controversial area of international law, it is probably inevitable that any book will contain a lot with which a reviewer will disagree. But everyone who reads these books will agree that they are lucidly written, based on solid research, full of original and carefully reasoned ideas, and well worth reading.

MICHAEL AKEHURST

International Law and the Revolutionary State. A Case Study of the Soviet Union and Customary International Law. By Richard J. Erickson. *Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications Inc.; Leiden: A. W. Sijithoff. 1972. 254 pp. Bibliog. Index. $15.00.*

THIS book has an ambitious objective; it seeks to analyse Soviet attitudes towards the nature of customary international law and Soviet practice in the major areas of customary international law. Any book on such a subject must be welcomed; the fact that the Soviet Union is a super-power makes it essential for international lawyers to know what the Soviet Union's practice is in the field of international law, and Soviet writings on the nature of customary international law have raised questions which have not even been considered, let alone answered, by most Western writers on the topic, despite the fact that previous studies of Soviet attitudes have been published in the West. However, the welcome which this book deserves must be qualified. For a start, despite the vast area which it seeks to cover, it is extremely short; leaving aside the appendices (which contain a useful who's who of Soviet international lawyers), the bibliography and the index, it runs to only 166 pages. The inevitable result is that the book consists of brief summaries which distort Soviet views and make them appear to be less intellectually cogent than they really are. For instance, the author quotes Tunkin to the effect that 'a norm of international law of universal application . . . should be recognised by all the states' (p. 34), but he fails to mention that Tunkin adds: 'the recognition of a particular rule as a rule of international law by a large number of states raises a presumption that the rule is generally recognised' (reviewer's translation).[1] A further defect is that the book appears to have been written several years ago and not brought sufficiently up to date; it is significant that the bibliography, which fills fifty pages, lists nothing published after January 1967.

MICHAEL AKEHURST

[1] G. I. Tunkin, *Droit international public: problèmes théoriques* (Paris: Pedone, 1965), p. 87. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1966, p. 276.

What are Human Rights? By Maurice Cranston. *London, Sydney, Toronto: Bodley Head. 1973. 170 pp. £2·00.*

An Introduction to the Study of Human Rights. Based on a series of lectures delivered at King's College, London in the Autumn of 1970. Edited by Sir Francis Vallat. *London: Europa. 1972. 127 pp. Bibliog. £2·00. Paperback: £1·25.*

Professor Cranston begins by distinguishing between 'positive' rights, by which he means rights guaranteed by law, and 'moral' rights, by which he understands justified claims. One of their distinguishing characteristics is that there is an authoritative determining agency for finding out what positive rights are—the courts—whereas there is no such simple process for discovering moral rights. It is Professor Cranston's purpose to give some answer to this determination for that category of moral rights that we call natural or human rights. He carries it out in nine short—some extremely short—essays over some eighty pages of clear but informal prose. In a work so short on a topic so difficult, the obvious complaint is that the ideas are not worked through. Indeed, Professor Cranston hardly gives an answer at all. We can infer that he accepts, proves even, that 'life, liberty and property' are natural rights. But he does not spell out what is the content of these rights or whether there are any others, although he does tell us that he does not regard economic and social rights as natural rights. He is unfairly critical of the role of legal positivism in elucidating the content of positive rights, especially in its crucial contribution of focusing attention on the duty of obedience. And it leads him to an important error. He gives as an example of a moral right, the right to leave one's country, Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration. It is, he says, a moral and not also a legal right because it is patently not a right enjoyed by men in all jurisdictions. The conclusion is correct but the reasoning is wrong. It is not a legal right because the Universal Declaration does not impose any legal obligation on states. That a particular right is not being enjoyed by all men does not show conclusively that the right is a moral one only: it may be an indication that a positive right is being denied.

Although there are other points with which one can take issue, or perhaps because there are, this book would make an intriguing introduction for law students to the whole question of human rights. Or at least it would in a more economical form: £2·00 for eighty pages of text (the remainder is taken up with the Universal Declaration, the United Nations Covenants and the European Convention) will hardly encourage its use among students.

The essays edited by Sir Francis Vallat are a diverse collection of lectures delivered by men and women of high distinction at King's College, London. It is sad to say that too many of the contributions are characterised by rhetoric or complacency or pitched at an inspirational level. Notable exceptions are the urbane historical survey of Professor Burns and J. E. S. Fawcett's realistic assessment of the practical difficulties in the way of the protection of particular rights. The young are too sceptical of the efficacy of the processes used for the protection of individual liberty to be uplifted by the grand phrase; and rightly so.

Colin Warbrick

WESTERN EUROPE

Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination. An expanded version of the BBC Reith Lectures, 1972. By Andrew Shonfield. *London: Allen Lane; Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1973. 96 pp. £1·25. Paperback: £0·30. A$1.00 NZ$1.00. C$1.25.*

THE debate about 'What kind of Europe?' continues. Andrew Shonfield's recent contribution—the 1972 Reith Lectures collected and expanded in a short book—deserved much more attention and discussion than it received. The lectures were, perhaps, too densely packed for radio listeners (are the Reith Lectures an anachronism in the age of television?). The book, in contrast, might have had more impact if, rather than following so faithfully the pattern of the lectures, it had been written as a book with the main arguments further developed and deployed more systematically.

Mr. Shonfield's purpose was partly to inform, but, unless I misread him, he was also seeking to open a new phase of the debate, not to shut it off by handing down the answers. I agree with so much of what Mr. Shonfield had to say that I shall doubtless have to exaggerate the differences between us to make it clear which aspects of his central thesis seem to me to need more probing. Like him, I think that the federal model is misleading; that what is taking place in the European Community is a process of managing relationships in a new way among a group of rather similarly placed, highly interdependent countries; that the ultimate shape, or architecture, of the new system is unclear and will remain unclear for a very long time; that the Community should play a useful role as a countervailing power to the United States; that that relationship will not be a friction-free one, but that neither the United States nor the Community has the option of taking itself out of the wider international economic system to which they both belong; that the magnetic pull of the Community on the smaller countries of Eastern Europe is already strong and will grow stronger and, if managed with skill and discretion, might make the division in Europe 'less complete and less painful' (p. 68); that, for reasons that are rooted in circumstances existing at the time the Treaty of Rome was negotiated, the developing countries to the South have occupied a disproportionate amount of attention and that the Community should now view the needs of the developing world more broadly; and that the Community might well be more effective and more generous in its relationships with poorer countries if it recognised openly that it was a rich man's club (p. 62). All that (and a good deal more) is common ground. Much of it is also fairly familiar ground, although Mr. Shonfield, as always, has added fresh and subtle insights.

The new and most interesting part of his argument, which is scattered throughout the book but is to be found mostly in Chapters 1, 3 and 5, is the concept of the Community as, essentially, a means of reasserting public power over private power in a situation in which, because of the extent of transnational relationships and the high level of interdependence among countries, the individual nation can no longer do so, save at an unreasonably high political and economic cost (p. 14). Coupled with this view of the essential purpose of the Community, and flowing from it, is his institutional prescription for relying a good deal less than current Community doctrine suggests on the transfer of power from national governments to central institutions and much more on the encouragement of intensive

'transnational' collaboration to find solutions to common problems, that is, on the close working together, across frontiers, of all those groups—governmental and non-governmental—that affect policy within national societies—cabinets, parliaments, civil services, trade unions, employers' associations, professional groups and so on. Consistent with this, he also advocates (with appropriate acknowledgment to Professor Kahn-Freund) a shift in emphasis away from the Commission's current efforts to promote Community legislation to more reliance on parallel legislation (pp. 78–79).

Much of his argument is persuasive. But three questions, or doubts, arise. First, will it really be quite as long as he suggests before the United States also comes to accept (as he concedes it will eventually do) that it, too, has lost its 'secluded playground' and will have to participate in much more joint, or collective, management? Second, are the most powerful transnational forces, the ones that really pose the problem of uncontrolled public power, primarily European phenomena that are controllable by European action or are they only susceptible to control on a broader basis? Third, are the European governments really so *much* more 'interventionist', so much more concerned to meet the social, ecological and other welfare needs of their peoples than is the United States? (Is not the picture of a United States still dominated by the philosophy of Calvin Coolidge and Cordell Hull a bit of a caricature?) And, if the answer to all these questions should prove to be a good bit more qualified than he suggests, where does that leave 'Europe'? Might it not be that unless Europe develops rather more in the way of common policies and rather more in the way of common institutions than Mr. Shonfield suggests, it will prove to have been an experiment in the management of relationships among the highly industrialised countries which for a time led the field but was eventually overtaken?

I also wonder whether the Community can play the creative external role Mr. Shonfield quite rightly wishes it to play, without a little more structure and a little more in the way of common (not simply co-ordinated) policies than he suggests. A bloc can block, but can it lead? He is surely right when he warns that: 'The fascination of exercising direct governmental power may prove to be so great that the European Commission will confine itself to a role which finds its closest analogy in the federal regulatory agencies of the United States—the Federal Trade Commission, the Inter-State Commerce Commission, and so on', rather than playing the far more important role of 'innovator in the formulation of strategic policies for Europe' (p. 86). But if it is really to play the role of stimulator and innovator the Commission (or some body like it) must, I think, have rather more independence and rather more authority than Mr. Shonfield—in his eagerness to rid it of its unreal pretensions to be the embryo of a federal government—seems prepared to yield to it.

MIRIAM CAMPS

The European Community in the 1970's. Edited by Steven Joshua Warnecke. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 228 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £6·25.*

THIS book is an assortment of papers presented to a conference held in October 1971 at the City University of New York, plus one or two other pieces. For those who have ploughed through the bulk of the recent

literature on the Community's external relations, it offers little that is new. For those who are less *aficionado*, it provides a fairly comprehensive collection of essays on relations between the Community and the United States, seen from different points of view, with a mixed bag of contributions on other aspects of the Community.

The most revealing paper is that by Harald Malmgren, on economic relations between the Community and the United States. Writing when he was still a consultant and an academic, Malmgren was not subject to the constraints which doubtless lie on him as an ambassador and deputy to the American trade negotiator; and the results are not exactly encouraging. The Community is in the dock not only for the CAP and the preferential arrangements, but also for making free-trade arrangements with European non-members, for being liable to construct 'defensive policies' against foreign-owned companies, and for providing 'special safeguards' against disruption by imports from Eastern Europe. Doubtless there is room for improvement in the Community's international behaviour, but Malmgren's hunt for gnats to strain at comes near to being obsessive; and his wish that other countries will be able to 'force the Community into an international framework of rules and procedures' reflects a mixture of self-righteousness and big-stickism that is inimical to the sort of framework he says he wants.

It is a relief, after this homily, to turn to William Diebold's essay on much the same subject. He sticks to the unfashionable view that the unity of Europe is useful, even when it hurts the United States, and that 'an integrated Europe should be able to help more effectively than a divided one in managing the international economic system'; and he enjoins Washington not to try to frustrate monetary integration in Europe. Well-known ideas well expressed. Ralf Dahrendorf's paper on the idea of a Community foreign policy is also well, indeed brilliantly, expressed; but there is nothing that he likes less than a well-known idea. This passion for novelty can go too far (he says that tariffs are the 'irrelevant factors of yesterday'). But it can also stimulate. Political union is seen as an incremental process rather than a big bang or even a series of middle-sized bangs. The importance which the Community seems to have acquired in the eyes of the countries outside it is contrasted with the weakness of the Community's 'single . . . voice', which 'fails to speak or speaks only seldom, and then in an enigmatic language of little elegance and often obscure meaning'.

The two pieces on foreign policy and defence are fairly orthodox. Andrew Pierre of the Council on Foreign Relations expects American troop cuts to be balanced by moves towards West European unity in the 1970s; thinks that Western Europe needs better institutions to deal with Russia and keep relations with the United States good; and recommends a European defence commission to run an integrated conventional defence system for the Community, a European nuclear committee and joint European arms production. Louis Jaquet, of the Netherlands Society for International Affairs, takes a broadly similar line, but with a strong emphasis on keeping the nuclear *status quo* and making no compromise with France about Nato.

Of the remaining heterogeneous papers, Gordon Adams presents some interesting information and findings from research on the African Association, although this case, studied through the de Gaulle period, is too thin a basis for his conclusion that the Community cannot make a foreign policy

—especially as the Community *did* in fact make a policy towards Africa, even if one does not approve of it. Christopher Wright, on advanced technologies as an integrating force, brings us the glad news that there is a need for better studies and clearer political choices. Uwe Kitzinger has a brisk run round the course of monetary union, regional policy, the CAP, growth and the environment, and institutions. Extracts from the Community's 1971 report on the medium-term economic policy remind us how turgid such a document can be and how smugly the Community was then inclined to refer to its 'option for stability of prices'. Heinz Hartmann breaks newer ground with his review of industrial relations in the Community, showing how differences in the societies of the member countries make union difficult and how the spread of spontaneous industrial action could undermine economic integration.

Steven Warnecke makes a gallant attempt to give all this a framework. But it fails to carry conviction because he uses simple models which are not the stuff of Community politics. Jean Monnet never thought, as Warnecke suggests, that integration in specific areas would 'inevitably' spill over into complete political and economic union. Neither Spinelli nor any other federalist with any political weight believes that the trumpets of a mass political movement will sound so that the Council of Ministers will suddenly fall down and a classic federation emerge. Armed with a crude dialectic between a simplified federalist and a confederalist view, Warnecke comes near to trying to trap the Europeans in de Gaulle's version of *Catch 22*: you cannot give up sovereignty except to bodies which have the necessary legitimacy; but the Community does not have legitimacy, which still belongs to the nation-states; therefore you cannot give up sovereignty to the Community. But reality is, thank goodness, more complex and offers more scope for incremental change.

JOHN PINDER

The European Community: A Superpower in the Making. By Johan Galtung. *Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 195 pp. (PRIO Studies from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo no. 1.; PRIO Publication no. 22-21.) £3·75. Paperback: £1·85.*

Creating the European Community. By R. C. Mowat. Foreword by Jean Rey. *London: Blandford Press. 1973. 235 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·10.*

IF you can believe that the Brussels Community, so far from being a boon and a blessing to men, is only another form of colonialist exploitation, and that counterforces from Eastern Europe and the Third World, representing the revolt and emancipation of the masses, will eventually produce a brave new world geared to the values of Gandhi and Mao Tse-tung—which are identified here as 'self-respect, self-reliance and fearlessness'—then Johan Galtung is your man. This closely reasoned critique of current orthodoxy by the founder and director of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (1959–69)—the product, we are told, of lectures and seminars in 16 countries including Poland, Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Uganda as well as the United States—is certainly something quite new for us old sweats of the West. The author's thesis, baldly stated, is that in the long-term perspective 'the Community is an effort to turn history backwards, only adding a dimension of modern technology'. In other words, we are saddled with

a super-power in the making, based on the vertical division of labour, the effect of which must be to recreate a Eurocentric world, a Europe with its centre in the West, to the continuing detriment of the world proletariat and the world community in general. The member-states of the EEC, together with their associates in Europe and in Africa, are presented here as so many pawns in a system of world hegemony, shared with the American and Soviet giants. Economic and monetary union, closer co-operation in foreign policy—these 'deepening' processes, in Community language—no less than the extension of membership, about which there has been so much palaver, are for Johan Galtung portents of a sinister structural power, of a structural (and ideological) dominance which operates through 'exploitation, fragmentation and penetration' at the expense of the rest of the world. Integration in the military field—'hardware or software oriented'—is but another facet of this new-style imperialism.

Mr. Galtung's voice is patently that of the 'no' majority in the Norwegian referendum, discussed briefly in an epilogue. Abominating technocracy, the author indicates a personal preference for a pattern of small social units bound together in a federation; but this, he says, is a matter for the West Europeans themselves. Of more general concern is the adjustment of the EEC to the world outside. And his argument is that in place of 'development aid' as now construed, there should be, under the UN umbrella, a channelling of maximum capital and assistance to the less developed countries 'in the way they themselves want', *i.e.*, building on such patterns as the Group of 77 and the Beograd-Cairo-Lusaka conferences.

In short, here is, wrapped up in a cocoon of social science jargon, the case for a 'people's war of liberation' explicit in all the radical movements of our time, but with special application to the *Pax Bruxellana*. Fantasy? Perhaps. But it is no bad thing that these ideas should find expression: in Cockney parlance 'it makes a change'.

Dr. R. C. Mowat's book, on the other hand, is a straightforward account of what he likes to call the *re*integration of the fragmented Europe of the interwar years. The story has been told so many times. This version, by a historian of distinction—Dr. Mowat is now Head of the Department of Arts and Languages at the Oxford Polytechnic—is a sort of 'united Europe' without tears: lucidly written, solidly based on the vast amount of literature that has accumulated and taking us up as far as the October 1972 'summit' conference (plus Andrew Shonfield's Reith Lectures). It is particularly good on the antecedents of, and the negotiations leading up to, the Schuman Plan.

W. HORSFALL CARTER

The European Community in Perspective. The New Europe, the United States, and the World. By Gerhard Mally. *Lexington, Toronto, London: D. C. Heath. 1973. 349 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.50.*

THE author himself states in his preface that the purpose of his study is to look at the European Community in perspective; 'to consider its successes and failures, to examine its internal structures and dynamics, and to evaluate its prospective role in the world of the 1970s' (p. xx). It is an ambitious purpose which he seeks to fulfil in workmanlike, if rather pedestrian, fashion. Clearly the book is intended for 'classroom purposes' in the

United States and, as such, it should not be judged too harshly for its manifest lack of original insights into the present functioning and future purposes of the European Community.

One annoying aspect of the book is the extent to which Dr. Mally quotes from other scholars, when he could have made the same points much more succinctly in his own words. For example, in one sentence on page 239 he has to use no fewer than five notes to give the references for five different jargon definitions of the same platitudinous phenomenon. This is not scholarship: it is unnecessary mystification.

The first two chapters offer the reader a simplistic typology of international organisations and a brief review of the various approaches to the study of regional integration. Sadly, Dr. Mally feels compelled to offer his readers yet another meaningless model—his so-called gestalt model—which simply confuses the issue by further pointless disaggregation of the various factors involved in regional integration. Such quantification and disaggregation are really no substitute for the insight and understanding which the book ought to provide.

Chapter 3 is a useful historical account of the ebb and flow of European integration since the war. Chapter 4 is a convenient résumé of the Community's progress to date. Chapter 5 includes some interesting observations about the catalysts of integration and disintegration in the Community. The next three chapters deal factually with the enlargement of the Community, the alternative political structures so far proposed, and the external needs and responsibilities of the Nine. One important point which Dr. Mally does bring out in his section on European public opinion (pp. 205–208) is that at the level of the masses there is still a 'permissive consensus' in favour of European unity, but that this has not been adequately exploited by the elites because they give priority to the preservation of their own privileged position within national structures. In Britain there are now unfortunate indications that the 'permissive consensus' in favour of European unity is turning into resentful hostility against it, which makes the task of the 'Europeans' that much harder.

Unfortunately, Dr. Mally reverts to jargon and platitude in his last two chapters, and he offers his readers the uninspiring conclusion that 'the European Community is a pluralistic system in evolution from nationalism to regionalism, using economic integration as a means of promoting political unity' (pp. 239–240). His so-called gestalt model is devoid of worthwhile predictive power, and the best which he can do with it is to tell us that the future of Europe will be either that of a United States of Europe, or an Association of European states, or a European Confederation. Surely it does not require 253 pages of text to reach such a tentative and banal conclusion?

NIGEL FORMAN

European Monetary Unification. By Giovanni Magnifico. Foreword by Guido Carli. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 227 pp. Indexes. £4·25.*

OF all the Community central banks, the Banca d'Italia is probably the most European in its outlook and the most tolerantly encouraging of intellectual endeavour and intercourse. Dr. Magnifico, after a spell in Frankfurt, was head of the London office until a year ago, when he was made

ead of the bank's department of international economic co-operation in ome. He is best-known for his co-authorship with Professor John Villiamson of the report on European monetary integration of a Federal rust study group. This report, it will be recalled, suggested the creation f a European Bank which would issue and manage a new currency, the uropa, which would circulate within the Community side by side with ational currencies. The latter would be exchanged at rates flexible only ithin narrow bands and would be freed of a good many divisive exchange ontrols. Externally, the Europa would float in a wide band against the ollar. These ideas were already a great advance in realism on the self-eluding imbecilities of the Werner Plan, even though the proposals still onfused—as all mechanistic and organisational blueprints for international o-operation commonly do—the power conferred on a monetary authority n paper and its real power in practice when it is obliged to choose between olitically conflicting interests and differing orders of priority.

Dr. Magnifico reprints as an appendix to this book the text of the ederal Trust report which, though it appeared first in February 1972, still eserves consideration in view of the repeatedly bursting snake. The rest f his book consists of four essays, occasionally repetitive but all dealing rom one approach or another with the central theme of European monetary nification, both the normative questions of what main purpose it should eek to fulfil and with the no less difficult question of how it may be accomlished. Since the existing literature on the subject is mostly in the form of ionographs or articles not always easily come by, and usually tends to the bstract and theoretical rather than the practical and political, this repetiion is a minor fault. Dr. Magnifico's purpose in any case is, as he says, not o dispense the last word but to stimulate a full-blooded debate.

The first section reproduces a Princeton Essay published in August 1971 n which Dr. Magnifico first argued his belief that 'monetary unification hould be pursued with the primary object of solving the internal problems f growth and balance within the participating countries and regions' (p. v). The last word is the key one, for the essay put forward proposals vhereby the issue of a European currency could serve the dual purposes of nonetary integration and of financing regional growth and development or egeneration. As a native son of Southern Italy, Dr. Magnifico's filial oncern does him credit. But it seems more than a little naive politically o suppose that there can be any technical short-cut to a redistribution of esources, notably credit, between the rich Rhineland and the poor Mezzoiorno that somehow would slip past the politicians without being noticed. f the strongest and most politically independent central bank in the Community, backed by a well-intentioned national government, has failed o do the trick, it is doubtful if some newly-created confederal European ody is going to find it easy to do so.

This theme of regional aid is one Dr. Magnifico returns to in the third ssay, based on an exposition of his ideas on monetary union made to some European parliamentarians in March 1972. It does at times concede the lifficulty of getting a Community consensus on the basic philosophy that hould guide and inspire the European Bank. But it is a bit optimistic surely o think that if only 'the reservations and misgivings which governments ntertain about harmonisation would be brought into the open', they would e 'hopefully disposed of' (p. 100).

Similarly, the idea of optimum currency areas, re-explored in the second

essay, suggests once again that this whole concept may have been an academic will-o'-the-wisp that has already distracted too much attention from more serious and politically realistic problems. At one point it was suggested by Robert Mundell to the Commission as providing an attractive rationale for European monetary union and has been much discussed by theoretical economists. Dr. Magnifico is closer than some of the latter to the real world when he suggests that an optimum currency area will include those areas with a similar propensity to inflation. But this is surely inverting cause and effect. It is the monetary authority that first defines the area and extent of its authority and then, within it, is responsible for the prevailing rate of inflation (whether the intended one or another). The North American experience is misleading because Canada is increasingly absorbed into the monetary area dominated by United States monetary policies and integrated into the markets for which United States monetary authorities take responsibility. In Europe, even if all the national monetary authorities managed, with superhuman effort, to hit the same rate of inflation at any given moment, it would be like a fruit-machine turning up a row of cherries. At the next go, they would most probably be at odds again. Therefore, whether one believes with Dr. Magnifico that European monetary union should start by tackling internal problems or that its first task is to present a common external front to the dollar, there is no avoiding the fundamental necessity of providing an adequate political authority to back up the monetary authority. The latter has to make difficult and unpopular political decisions and cannot therefore operate without political legitimacy.

Possibly the most interesting of Dr. Magnifico's essays—because it is here that he is particularly qualified and experienced—is the last one, hitherto unpublished, in which he considers the steps needed to create a truly European money and capital market. He is persuasive, for example, in advocating a polycentric pattern of financial centres, distributed around the Community. He is possibly less persuasive in arguing that a Europa, issued by a multi-role European Bank (somewhat reminiscent in its mixed public and private roles of the early Bank of England) and available indiscriminately to tour operators, transnational executives and banks, would be able by some magic process to dislodge the dollar and the Eurodollar from their established perches. The attraction of the latter was that so few restrictions hedged its use, competition in dealing in it was so wide open and profits so free, yet at the same time it was backed by a national government that could be relied on to maintain at least a minimum confidence in the currency. Thus it may be easier for Euromarks to displace (as they partially have) the Eurodollar than for a new-fangled Europa to do so, backed as it would be only by the professed determination of European governments to march in monetary step with one another.

All the same, non-specialists will find that Dr. Magnifico gets them into the subject of European monetary union with persuasive ease. We must hope for as useful contributions from his opposite numbers in other central banks.

SUSAN STRANGE

The Common Agricultural Policy and Britain. Edited by S. T. Rogers and B. H. Davey. *Farnborough: Saxon House, D. C. Heath; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1973. 158 pp. Tables. (An Agricultural Adjustment Unit Symposium, published in conjunction with The Agricultural Adjustment Unit, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.) £3·50.*

THE eleven papers included in this volume were presented at a conference on Agriculture: Britain and the EEC, held in July 1972 at Newcastle-on-Tyne. They fall into four groups. The first, dealing with international aspects of agricultural trade, includes papers by Ojala, Schnittker and Rogers. The second includes two pages discussing various aspects of the working and development of the Common Agricultural Policy, by Van Lierde and Ries, both officials of the European Commission. Third, come papers by Britton, Falk, Josling and Davey on aspects of the implications of enlargement for British agriculture. Finally there are two papers by Wallace and Drudy, on 'Social Problems of Rural Communities' and by Gaskin on 'The Economic Potential of Rural Areas'. The book will interest both professional economists and those who, while concerned about the subject, have little familiarity with the professional jargon.

Time has dealt severely with some of these papers so that the pre-occupations of 1972 seem rather dated in 1973. Changes in world commodity prices and exchange rates have made some of the statistics seem less relevant. Despite this there are good things in these papers for which the reader will be grateful. Schnittker's paper on 'Problems of International Agricultural Trade' provides a helpfully balanced approach. He points out that despite agricultural protectionism, trade has expanded and warns that no country in the world is ready to submit its agricultural policies to meaningful international bargaining. In a colourful phrase Schnittker suggests a pattern of international discussion in which agricultural trade negotiations become a series of agricultural 'orchestrations', at which governments simultaneously choose to change their own policies for reasons of self-interest.

Many of the changes discussed in Britton's paper on 'Problem of Adapting UK Institutions in the EEC' are now taking place. In this paper, however, there is a hint of a vision of European unity larger than the sum of national self-interests. British agricultural institutions are advised to be ready for a change of approach when Britain begins 'to shed the mystique of her own uniqueness'. Many readers will feel indebted to Falk for his clear, dispassionate paper on 'Agricultural Co-operatives in an Enlarged EEC'. The information is useful and often relatively inaccessible for those unfamiliar with European co-operation. The analysis of the differences between agricultural co-operatives in England and among our partners in the Community is penetrating and convincing.

The Agricultural Adjustment Unit have performed a useful function in making these papers available to a wider audience.

J. S. MARSH

Britain's Legacy Overseas. By Geoffrey C. Bolton. *London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 168 pp. Bibliog. Index. £1·30. Opus paperback ed.: £0·65.*

PROFESSOR BOLTON is concerned with the process of contact and interaction between Britain and its former overseas possessions. He discusses the

motives for empire, emphasising how they differed widely at different periods. He then concentrates on cultural and social, economic and strategic factors, devoting only one chapter to 'patterns of government'. This departure from the more common preoccupation with the constitutional and legal issues, studied from an 'Anglocentric' position, is deliberate, and welcome.

In a book as short as this many topics and ideas can only be touched on superficially, but the author certainly chooses some interesting ones. He suggests that the 'scramble for colonies may have been a safety-valve, rather than a cause of international crisis' in the latter half of the 19th century (p. 24). In discussing education he reminds us that the British traditionally were more interested in character than learning and therefore, outside India, were 'slow to encourage the spread of education among non-Europeans', leaving the provision of schooling largely to the missionaries (p. 98). He suggests, interestingly, that this may have been due in part to British slowness in defining aims for educational institutions, even at home, recalling that the only legal requirement enjoined on English grammar schools was the teaching of Latin and Greek. He states, rightly, that the role played by officials in colonial administrations, a role incorporating political, judicial and administrative tasks and responsibilities, was no advertisement for parliamentary democracy, even though the work of the administrators was 'often creative and benevolent' (p. 131).

One of the values of Professor Bolton's survey is that it is wide-ranging and allows him to draw lessons from unusual comparisons. For example, he surveys the long periods of rule by governments of one party in Australia and Canada, and comments: 'but if the idea of Parliament as dialogue has fared badly in former British colonies in Asia and Africa, it is as well to remember the practice of democracy in the provinces of Canada and Australia, rather than the somewhat idealised theory of the Westminster model. Quebec and Queensland know as much about one-party rule as do many African states' (p. 129).

There are unfortunately some irritating errors of detail. For example, it was not in the Heath, but in the Wilson, government that the Minister of Overseas Development ceased to be a member of the Cabinet (p. 6); the Rhodesian Federation broke up in 1963, not 1964 (p. 62); the Commonwealth is no longer known as the British Commonwealth.

W. P. KIRKMAN

The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth Republic. By D. Bruce Marshall. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1973. 363 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

THE record of France's colonial policy after 1945 is often contrasted unfavourably with that of its British neighbour. Britain carried out a relatively orderly, peaceful decolonisation, whereas France's rigorous assertion of its *imperium* resulted in two tragic colonial wars and the fall of the Fourth Republic.

The disasters of Indochina and Algeria have been told and retold *ad nauseam* and Mr. Marshall has wisely resisted the temptation to stray on to the well-worn path of decolonisation. The key question which he seeks to answer is: why in 1945–46 did the French rush to reassert their colonial position? The most important single factor, he suggests, was the power of

the colonial myth—' the image of colonial relationships held by an important segment of the French political elite for whom unity with the colonies was conceivable only if French authority and sovereignty were unchallenged' (p. 314).

Mr. Marshall devotes considerable attention to the historical roots of the myth. Overseas expansion in the 19th century was increasingly regarded as compensation for loss of influence in Europe. The erosion of France's post-Versailles supremacy was accompanied by a new interest in the empire. Events from 1940 to 1944 served to tighten the traditional ties between France and its overseas territories. *La France d'outre-mer* was a symbol of national grandeur. Finally, the international situation of 1945–46 ensured the triumph of the colonial myth. As France desperately strove to regain its place among the powers, colonies were seen as guarantees of independence and greatness. It was an idea which communists and Gaullists alike endorsed.

Were the mistakes and tragedies of the late 1940s and 1950s unavoidable? Perhaps not. The chief merit of Mr. Marshall's study is that he focuses on the Constituent Assemblies of 1945–46 and shows that in the twelve months after the end of the war in Europe an opportunity existed to bring about fundamental changes in colonial policy. In the early planning stages of the French Union, schemes offered by native deputies might have ensured a gradual transition to full independence. However, the Bidault government, imbued with the colonial myth, intervened and imposed its own version of the French Union.

The book is a scholarly work and should be widely read because there are no comparable studies in English or French on the same theme. One small criticism is that the author relies almost entirely on published sources. Some participants were interviewed, although interviews were not exploited in any systematic way. Material from private papers might have enriched the analysis. But these are minor criticisms which do not detract from an excellent work.

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Le Mouvement communiste en France (1920–1972). By Ronald Tiersky. Preface by Annie Kriegel. Translated by André Chassigneux in collaboration with the author. *Paris: Fayard. 1973. 421 pp. Bibliog. Index. 45 F.*

La Gauche Française. Le Nouvel Âge 1958–1965. By Jean Poperen. *Paris: Fayard. 1972. 492 pp. 45 F.*

IN publishing his thesis—appropriately with a preface by Madame Annie Kriegel—Dr. Tiersky has considerably furthered our understanding of French communism. Other recent studies—on the relation between votes cast for the *Parti Communiste Français* and economic trends, for example, or on the workings of its internal organisation—have added new dimensions to the problem of interpreting this notoriously enigmatic phenomenon and have destroyed the impression of a monolith, but they have solved little. The PCF obviously cannot be written off as a deluded brand of 'extremism'. It is too powerful, actually or potentially, for its inconsistencies to be plausibly explained as irresponsible sectarian aberrations. At the most dramatic moments of political history it advertises its impotence by demon-

strating in orderly fashion in defence of the 'Republic' or 'Democracy', both in the abstract. Is it 'objectively' conservative? Why is the communist vote so steady whatever the leadership says or does? Is it worth while combing its publications in the hope that the doublespeak may yield the key to some solid political thinking? Dr. Tiersky's answer to the last question would be in the affirmative. He has returned to the field of political ideas, and his approach shows itself to be fruitful in converting many of the inconsistencies into paradoxes that can be understood.

According to the hypothesis here put forward, history on the one hand and Lenin on the other have bequeathed to the PCF theories and concepts that are inherently ambivalent as handled by an organisation operating not in Russia but in an advanced, Western, democratic society. Nevertheless they could not be lightly discarded as they were indispensable to the life of the party in the periods in which it stood without allies (1920–34, 1939–41, 1947–62). The old theories insisted on the necessity of maintaining *one* true revolutionary party which would be the spearhead of the revolution; on the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party in the world proletarian movement; on the inevitable advent of a revolutionary situation in a capitalist state; and on the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat after the revolution—its legitimacy residing, as for the Jacobins, in the will of the people. The PCF has used these myths to define its separate identity and ensure its internal cohesion, but has also modified or muted them as circumstances required in the periods of its participation in the political institutions of the nation. It must at all times stand *outside* society, yet simultaneously operate *within* it. Yet latterly the old ideas have made the divorce between theory and practice in the conditions of a modern democracy increasingly evident and have generated a chronic schizophrenia, so that since 1956 cautious changes in the doctrinal position have succeeded one another. The possibility of a specifically French road to socialism, of peaceful co-existence between disparate economic systems, of a non-violent transition from capitalism to socialism, and even of joint leadership of a plurality of parties during the revolutionary period, have all become official party policy. In June 1972 the party accepted (p. 251) the corollary to its ambition to share governmental power with the Socialist Party: to wit, it recognised that in a subsequent election it might find itself out of power once more. The new positions have been reached under the pressure of prevailing realities and in response to the need for allies. But with Holy Russia no longer in the lead, and the old myths robbed of their magic, will the PCF be able to hold its own in rivalry with the new Socialist Party? What would a new 'hard line' entail? The question 'What does a revolutionary party do while waiting for a revolutionary situation?', has been given more satisfactory answers than heretofore, but the very resourcefulness of the party on the theoretical level inspires little confidence that the present ones are final.

Dr. Tiersky also examines the practical roles of the PCF as *avant-garde* of the revolution, as forming a counter-society within the nation, as a political representative or tribune of the people, and as participant in government institutions under the capitalist regime. Here again he finds confirmation of his hypothesis on the 'two-faced' nature of the party's stance and brings intelligibility to activities which often, to non-communists, seem to lack all consistency. It is in justifying his thesis several times over from different angles that he betrays the fact that we are indeed reading a 'thesis' in the other sense. The points are such cogent points, however,

that they deserve to be hammered home. On the function of the party as offering a counter-society, within which a member lives out his whole existence, Dr. Tiersky is perhaps least persuasive. It may be that the sociological concept of a counter-society or sub-society is insufficiently defined. For in so far as it is incumbent on a communist to influence others at his place of work (be it factory or learned society) and in his daily life, he must not only intimately mingle in the general life of the nation; he must do so more systematically than he did before he obtained his party card. Just as his party is at once 'in' the system but also 'outside' it, so too is he as an individual. How does the party retain the allegiance of its members on the individual level? Conscious of deprivation of all kinds in the world at large, the comrade is offered the secret satisfaction of knowing he is really one of a comradely elite, bound together by sharing in a special wisdom. These illusions are more difficult to maintain (not less so, as Dr. Tiersky seems to think) in a mass party than in a small clique, and will be more difficult still as the old myths fade.

M. Poperen's book on the metamorphosis of the Left opposition as a whole belongs to a very different genre. It is a chronicle—part diary, part journalism, part commentary—from the pen of a socialist politician who has himself taken part in some of the events described. This type of writing is very useful as a record and provides easy access to a great deal of detail. Its disadvantages are equally obvious. The reader cannot always disentangle the testimony from the comment. Dr. Tiersky quoted his sources for believing that the support of the PCF for Mitterrand in 1965 represented a break from Russian tutelage. For M. Poperen, however, '*les Soviétiques eux-mêmes ont encouragé Waldeck Rochet à soutenir Mitterrand*' (p. 461). To an insider in the manoeuvrings of the new French opposition, tactics are all-absorbing. An intricate dance is performed to counterpoint music. As politicians visit one another they are too cunning to reveal their full intent, but half-hints are seized on and more than half-understood. Moves are countered and voting-strengths totted up. A '*véritable tour de passe-passe*' succeeds, although we were perpetually on our guard. In this nightmare world the French opposition achieves a modicum of unity for a limited objective and of a transitory kind. Of such stuff is the political process really made, and it is well to be reminded of the fact. M. Poperen's narrative will be continued in a second volume.

M. HILTON

The Rise of Western Germany 1945–1972. By Aidan Crawley. *London: Collins. 1973. 315 pp. Index. £4·00.*

AIDAN CRAWLEY has written a relatively short book—less than three hundred pages of text—and has sought to outline the history of the Federal German Republic as well as of those first four postwar years when Western Germany was part of the limbo of Allied military occupation. Considering that he deals with a period of history in which a tremendous amount happened—in which indeed the whole course of German history, and even the character of the German people, was sensationally changed—there is not room for much detail. Much, even most, of the outline offered in this book is already familiar—the despair and degradation of the first postwar years, the startlingly sudden economic recovery, the crystallisation of the division of Germany between two power-blocs, the consolidation of a working

democracy in Western Germany and the first moves, under Willy Brandt, towards an independent if firmly Western-oriented role in Europe. The author has not come up with new information, although some of his views are novel. His purpose has been essentially to give a clear picture in concise terms of a country which has developed from a bitter enemy into a friendly neighbour and ally.

In this task he has succeeded admirably, for he strikes exactly the right balance between appreciation of the metamorphosis which has taken place in postwar Western Germany and a guarded hopefulness for the future of the country and its people. In particular, he believes that democratic parliamentary institutions have consolidated themselves, that good labour relations have been a social as well as an economic boon, and that the average German citizen—in spite of his 'vigorous but rather vulgar life without much style or distinction'—is reasonably satisfied with his lot and an asset to the community rather than a mere functional unit.

It does seem to me that he has been rather too harsh about the military administration of Germany by the Allies. As somebody who worked as a journalist in Germany during most of it, I believe that its main features were an absolutely understandable desire to root out Nazism and considerable confusion of mind as to just how this should be done. Thus denazification was never intended to be 'an act of indiscriminate vengeance'; the Nazi era had produced such bestiality that the victorious Allies genuinely believed that something like a nation-wide cauterisation was needed. The dismantling of German industry was not designed simply to leave the Germans poor, or eliminate their competition in the world's export markets; behind dismantling was the thought that Germany must be deprived of the industrial potential to make another world war, a thought which took concrete form in the 'Level of Industry Plan'. And it is a little hard to say that Allied personnel 'lived in ostentatious luxury' in the first postwar years; some did and many did not. The sinister black marketeers and the less baneful 'Champagne Charlies' were a minority.

This book has a more obvious and more serious defect. For what is intended to be 'straight' history, bound together by an admirably economical commentary, it has far too many factual errors. Thus Konrad Adenauer is depicted as having 'resolutely opposed the Nazis'; his only overt act of opposition was to try to stop them from flying their flags on 'his' Cologne bridges, and his dismissal from the mayoralty propelled him into obscure retirement. He was not offered the Reich Chancellorship 'in the last days of the Weimar Republic', but in 1926. Nor did his friend Robert Pferdemenges help him 'to escape from prison'; he put a car at his disposal to take him from Cologne to the railway station at Dortmund before the Nazis laid a hand on him. Adenauer's car was in collision with a tram, not a train, in 1917; and he married a Zinsser, not a 'Zinser'. These are errors of fact, not mere questions of judgment. But where the latter are concerned, one cannot go along with the view that Willy Brandt 'formed' the Grand Coalition of 1966, and 'seized' power in 1969. The senior partners in the 1966 coalition were the Christian Democrats, not Brandt's Social Democrats; and Brandt came to power in 1969 by normal democratic procedure and formed a perfectly 'legal' government coalition with the Free Democrats.

There are terribly frequent misspellings and misprints, and some blatantly wrong usage of words. These need not be detailed here, but corrected if the

book should go into a second edition. This is desirable—and not merely as a more successful exercise in proof reading. For there are many good things about the book—I liked especially the chapters on the relationship with France, on West German labour relations, and on the persistent and much disregarded East German campaign of subversion. This last has put the Federal Republic under a continuous and periodically cruel strain, which the outside world has ignored. Aidan Crawley is well qualified to explain the personal entente between Adenauer and de Gaulle (he wrote a book about the latter) and his view that Adenauer was completely captivated by the General, and unaware of the latter's ability to deceive, is entirely convincing. So too is his summing-up—that the people of Western Germany have done rather more than work their passage as members of the Western community and partners in the Western Alliance, and that they therefore merit a fair degree of trust and confidence. The chief danger to the people of the Federal Republic lies in the withholding of that confidence, rather than in a revived German instinct for playing off East against West, or a revived German interest in power for its own sake.

TERENCE PRITTIE

East and West Germany: A modus vivendi. By Karl E. Birnbaum. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co. 1973. 157 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Saxon House Studies Series.) £3·50.*

From Cold War to Ostpolitik. Germany and the New Europe. By Michael Freund. Trans. by R. W. Last. *London: Oswald Wolff. 1973. 124 pp. Paperback: £1·50.*

Vom Antagonismus zur Konvergenz? Studien zum Ost-West-Problem. By Wilfried von Bredow. *Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner Verlag. 1972. 218 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: DM 19.00.*

OF the three books under review by far the most important is Karl Birnbaum's *East and West Germany: a modus vivendi.* Birnbaum's work, essentially a sequel to his earlier study, *Peace in Europe,*[1] analyses the process of East-West negotiations during the period 1970–72. His study of these negotiations is focused on an examination of the governmental policies of the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union towards each other. While all five chapters are of a high standard, chapter 4 on 'The Formalisation of Inter-German Relations' is particularly impressive.

Birnbaum's general approach of concentrating more or less exclusively on the official policies of the main actors has the advantage of providing the most concise explanatory framework. It also works fairly well, particularly in relation to the GDR and the Soviet Union. Its use, however, in relation to the Federal Republic is less happy since it precludes a serious examination of the domestic constraints operating on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic.

Even in a work which sets such a consistently high standard as this, there are bound to be one or two passages with which the reviewer disagrees.

[1] London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Harvard Center for International Affairs and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1972, p. 100.

Thus, on page 31, Birnbaum refers to Egon Bahr's 'Tutzing speech' being 'severely criticised by the whole political establishment of the FRG, *including the SPD leadership*'. This, I think, gives a misleading impression since the importance of Bahr's speech lay precisely in the fact that it was a *ballon d'essai* for Brandt. This was certainly known to Erler and other members of the SPD leadership (evidence from Erler's private papers). Therefore, while they distanced themselves in public at least from some aspects of the speech they did not severely criticise it. Again, on page 83, Dr. Birnbaum puts rather an optimistic gloss on events when he refers to the GDR leadership accepting the Federal government's 'letter on German Unity' *unreservedly*. Despite these minor blemishes this is a book of unmistakable quality and should be read not only by students of German foreign policy but by all those interested in East-West relations. It will also be extremely useful as a work of reference since it has a very useful index and a compendious appendix of documents.

If Karl Birnbaum's work was hard to fault then Michael Freund's *From Cold War to Ostpolitik* is equally hard to praise. Given that it was produced as a *pièce d'occasion* for a German audience and given its poor quality as compared with Professor Freund's earlier works, it is very hard to see why it was ever translated. Perhaps it was thought that the mere mention of *Ostpolitik*, a feature missing in the original German title, would be enough to guarantee a sale. Publishers, being creatures of fashion, appear at the moment to believe that every book on West Germany must contain as many references as possible to Willy Brandt and *Ostpolitik*. The book as a whole has a schizophrenic character. It begins on a very conservative note. Professor Freund refers on page 10 to the Dönitz government being 'deposed and also interned in a particularly shameful and unworthy manner'. One wonders if Professor Freund would have had the Allies fête them. Again, on page 14 the Poles who occupied the land left by the retreating Germans are referred to as 'adventurers, plunderers and even criminal elements who were seeking cover from the hangmen in a land where they themselves could be judge and executioner'. Unfortunately, missing from Professor Freund's account is any reference to the horrors of the German occupation—horrors that made it seem absolutely appropriate for Willy Brandt to lower himself to his knees at the site of the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw. Equally surprising to students of modern German history is Professor Freund's judgment of Adenauer as a man 'with no trace of hysteria' (p. 31). After this somewhat reactionary beginning the tone of the book alters and the discussion of *Ostpolitik*, although short on information, is balanced and even liberal in judgment. The total effect of the book is very curious. It can best be categorised, I think, by saying that it is the sort of book that a rather conservative adherent of the Beck-Geordeler tendency would have written on postwar history.

Professor Freund has also been ill-served by his publishers. There is no index and the translation is lamentable. There are also a series of misprints, some of which are arguably even an improvement on the original, such as the reference to the nation shaving itself on page 26. No academic of Professor Freund's experience and distinction is likely to write a totally bad book and there are two features which deserve praise. One is the author's gift for the felicitous phrase. This gift is perhaps seen at its best when, with reference to the GDR, he describes a little statehood being as implausible as a little pregnancy. He also has some very well-chosen quotations, *e.g.*,

Brandt on reunification: 'I falter when I hear this word, especially the first syllable "re". It gives the impression that things have to return to some previous stage. That will not happen. In no circumstances could it happen. I believe in the unity of our people but it does not have to be realised in the context of a national state' (p. 85).

Wilfried von Bredow's study and critique of convergence theories is both timely and useful. His remarks on the deficiencies of most convergence theories because of their neglect of the ideological dimension are particularly sensible.

W. PATERSON

The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961. By Robert M. Slusser. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. 509 pp. Indexes. £7·90. $17.50.*

IN this well-documented book, Robert M. Slusser, a history professor at Michigan State University, attempts to demonstrate that it is possible to apply the traditional techniques of his craft to the analysis of the events of the recent past. He asserts that, contrary to popular belief, 'there is a veritable wealth of material available in Soviet internal and foreign policy during the years of Khrushchev's dominance' (1957–64). In his study, as in others, therefore, the 'basic problem is to devise suitable methods for making the available sources yield their fullest significance'. Slusser's solution to it includes the proposition of three basic principles: 'observance of strict chronological order'; 'attention to the close and continuous interaction between Soviet internal and foreign policy'; and 'recognition of the wide-ranging scope of recent Soviet history' (pp. vii-viii). At the same time, he does not attempt to disguise his own sympathies, contrasting at the outset 'Kennedy's patient search for a basis for negotiations' with 'a process of foreign policy formation in which an opposition faction could play Russian roulette with the peace of the world by taking actions which deliberately risked nuclear war, and in which a struggle for internal political power was successfully masked from the outside world, only to erupt in disguised form as a major schism in the international Communist movement' (pp. x-xi).

The early chapters of the book concern the preliminaries to the crisis, from the Vienna meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy to the eve of the construction of the Berlin Wall. On the whole, Western policy during this period is looked upon as a response to Soviet truculence rather than the reverse, as would be the Soviet, or Western revisionist, view. After an analysis of the climactic event itself, a long chapter is devoted to a consideration of the collective leadership's review of the ensuing situation. Here, Slusser makes an interesting parallel between the hard-line opposition of Frol Kozlov to Khrushchev's policies towards the United States in 1961 and that of Bukharin and Ordzhonikidze towards Nazi Germany in 1936. The final and longest chapter is introduced with speculation on the likelihood of 1961 leading to the same ghastly internal consequences as 1936. The question was decided largely at the 22nd Party Congress, discussion of which is the central theme of this last chapter.

Within the limits imposed by his own bias, Slusser manages to maintain a commendably close adherence to his three declared principles. His carefully constructed chronology is accurate, and the taciturnity of the Soviet

press rather than his own lack of diligence must be blamed for his inability to tell us exactly when Khrushchev went on vacation and returned from it. On the interaction between the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet government, Slusser is quite right to point out the relevance of such problems as that of agriculture to the discussion of the erection of the Berlin Wall, although here he might have said more about the pressures of Soviet patriotism and pride upon the government. To achieve the proper context for the central events, the author is completely justified in his reference to tensions within the communist camp and to those in the world outside. Perhaps, however, he could as a historian have made that context historical as well as geographical, going back at least far enough to discuss the shifts in great power alignment brought about by the two world wars. The main virtues of Slusser's book are that it shows the extreme limitations of the still persistent typification of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian monolith and that it clearly indicates that the Soviet hard-liners are the greatest beneficiaries of hard-line initiatives or responses from the West.

PAUL DUKES

Blockade. Berlin and the Cold War. By Eric Morris. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1973. 278 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £3·95.*

THE author is a lecturer at the department of war studies at Sandhurst, and his book gives the impression of a series of very loosely linked lectures on the history of the cold war, with main emphasis on the East-West confrontation in Europe and some reference to West European integration; Berlin is a recurring theme but hardly the main one, and a consecutive account of the Berlin problem does not emerge. The book contains little fresh material and is marred by a rather slapdash method of presenting complex events and by minor errors of fact: *e.g.*, the abortive 1960 summit meeting took place in Paris, not Vienna (p. 209), and in 1955 the Soviet Union did not cede to the German Democratic Republic 'the sovereign rights over the access routes' to Berlin (p. 246), but specifically retained control of them, even if only 'temporarily'. However, for the uninitiated reader the book goes with a swing and there is a graphic and well-written account of the Berlin air-lift (pp. 98–110).

ELISABETH BARKER

Die Berlin-Frage 1949–1955. Verhandlungsgrundlagen und Eindämmungspolitik. By Dennis L. Bark. Foreword by Hans Herzfeld. *Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1972. 544 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin. Band 36.) DM 96.*

THIS 526-page work is a translation from English into German, in expanded form, of a dissertation written by the author, who stems from Stanford University, for the philosophy faculty of the Free University of Berlin; it is published under the auspices of the Berlin [West] Historical Commission. It covers the period from the end of the Berlin blockade to the Geneva summit conference of 1955, and sets out in great detail, with a wealth of source references, both the local developments in Berlin itself and the East-West diplomatic confrontations and negotiations in the wider field of the

cold war, in so far as these had any bearing on the Berlin question. Broadly speaking, the author's standpoint is that these six years brought political gains to the Soviet side and the East Germans, and a political setback to the West. The book is scholarly, well-documented and closely argued.

ELISABETH BARKER

Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom, 1933–36. By Jens Petersen. *Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. 1973. 559 pp. Bibliog. Index. DM 90.00.*

THIS is a careful and detailed survey of the relations between Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany during the four years before the proclamation of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The author has made good use of primary and secondary sources from many countries, although there is a rather disturbing contrast between the wealth of the available German documents and the sparsity of the relevant *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* so far at the disposal of the historian. An introductory chapter considers Hitler's early concept of the role of Italy in foreign affairs and especially his renunciation of South Tyrol in 1928 for the sake of the desired co-operation with the Fascist regime. A few months before Hitler's coming to power Mussolini and the new German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, but not the German foreign ministry, favoured Italo-German co-operation in south-east Europe. Yet after Hitler's accession the ideological affinities between the two authoritarian states could not prevent their intense rivalry in the Danube basin. With the conclusion of the 'Roman Protocols' in March 1934 Mussolini felt sure that Austria and Hungary were in his orbit. Dr. Petersen sees the first meeting of the two dictators in Venice in June 1934 in a less negative light than has been customary, but he does full justice to 'the fall in the climate' of German-Italian relations after the events of June 30, 1934 in Germany and the *Putsch* of the Austrian Nazis soon afterwards. 'Nazism . . . has made crime the political tool of destruction, murder and terror', a leading Italian newspaper could then write (p. 363). For a while Mussolini turned to France and at Stresa posed as the champion of Western security pleading for a coalition 'with absolute superiority over Germany' (p. 399). Sir Robert Vansittart's hopes of being able to detach Italy from Germany seemed to be well grounded, but soon the impact of Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure proved them to be a major illusion.

It is interesting that in August 1935 Hitler secretly insisted on the recall of Cerruti, the pro-Western Italian ambassador in Berlin, a fact which, by the way, is nowhere recorded in the papers of the German foreign ministry. On the other hand, in Rome von Hassell managed to retain the confidence of both Hitler and Mussolini and to work adroitly for the strengthening of the ties between them. Entrusted a few weeks before the German reoccupation of the Rhineland with the delicate task of ascertaining the likely reaction of the Italians to such a step without their betrayal of this information to the French, Hassell received an indirect message from Mussolini that if the Germans should undertake something, 'the Italians would stand at the window and be interested onlookers' (p. 473). From then onward the two anti-Bolshevik regimes co-ordinated their foreign policies step by step. The rapprochement gathered momentum in the summer of 1936 when Mussolini approved von Papen's agreement between Germany

and Austria and the joint German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War began. When in October of that year Ciano, the new and ambitious Italian foreign minister, visited Germany he was able to impress the Führer with a stolen set of Mr. Eden's confidential papers entitled 'The German Danger'. A few days afterwards, in a speech at Milan, Mussolini coined the phrase 'Berlin-Rome Axis'.

Was the formation of the Axis inevitable? The author, who incidentally pays tribute to the pioneering work of the late Miss Elizabeth Wiskemann in this field, is inclined to think it was. He agrees with K. D. Bracher's statement that 'the Axis Berlin-Rome, an alliance between two men and two systems' had to come 'with a nearly compulsory necessity' (*fast zwangsläufig*). He also shares the view of the late Professor Toscano that 'the path chosen by Mussolini, at least from the day Hitler came to power, could only lead to the goal that he achieved later on', for the sequence of events from 1935 to 1939 had its own 'rigorous and quasi-irresistible logic' (p. 493). Not all historians will be ready to accept such fatalistic determinism, but even the critics of this thesis will acknowledge the many fresh insights into a complex relationship offered in this methodical book.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

The Soviet Communist Party and Scandinavian Communism: The Norwegian Case. By Trond Gilberg. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1973. 271 pp. Bibliog. Index. Kr. 42.00.*

IT seems almost incredible now, but in the early 1920s Norway came very near to a revolutionary situation. Enthusiasm for the October Revolution in Russia and the rapid pace of a retarded industrialisation, coupled with the heavy casualties that inflation inflicted on the Norwegian proletariat, made it possible for communist and left-wing elements to entrench themselves in the Labour Party. It was not until 1923 that the Norwegian Labour Party, after a bitter struggle, seceded from the Comintern.

Why did the revolution fail? In the first place, because of the stubborn but abortive attempts of the Russians to centralise in Moscow their control over the Norwegian Labour Party (p. 31). Secondly, because of the Russian Marxists' profound ignorance of what made the Norwegians tick. There was a quality of 'resistance-mindedness' in the Norwegian character which the Nazis later underestimated to their cost. The Norwegians do not kneel to the foreigner, and this is what Moscow tried to make them do. Later, in 1945, the absence of the Red Army was another factor. In Eastern Europe its presence made a communist takeover almost inevitable. 'The policies of the Norwegian communists during the summer and fall of 1945 were strikingly similar to the approaches used in Eastern Europe, where Social Democrats were first wooed and then slowly emasculated' (p. 130). But the communists undertook the same purges as in Eastern Europe. 'The ferocity of the cleansings (up to 1949) was only theoretical because the Norwegian Communist Party had no direct power and therefore could not liquidate the "traitors". There seems little doubt that such intentions were present, at least in some of the new leadership; one of its prominent members stated that "when we come to power, these men will hang"' (p. 149).

This well-documented and useful book by Mr. Trond Gilberg makes it

clear why the Norwegian communists, after the break-up in 1923, never succeeded in making the grade in Norway. The constant changes in the policies of the Comintern, and after that of the Russian Communist Party, placed an almost intolerable burden on the Norwegian leadership. 'The party leadership in its efforts to follow the changing lines of Soviet foreign policy as expressed through the Comintern introduced political practices and rhetoric quite alien to the Norwegian working class, even to the extent of translating Russian language phraseology directly into Norwegian . . . which in many cases produced an impression of "foreignness" in the party appeals' (p. 88). Finally, the Norwegian Communist Party's 'support of Moscow's position on the Korean conflict served to convince most of the Norwegian public and virtually all political elites that the communists were first and foremost Moscow's men, and Norwegians second' (p. 143).

It is a pity that the author misuses the word 'bourgeoisie'. This is a literal translation of the Norwegian word *borgerlig*. There is no English equivalent for it. In using the word 'bourgeoisie' the author intends to refer to the anti-socialist opposition, which amounts to about one half of the nation. 'Bourgeoisie', I take it, stands for the mercantile or shopkeeping middle class (unless of course, we use the term in the Marxist sense).

THOMAS BARMAN

Faroe. The Emergence of a Nation. By John F. West. *London: Hurst; New York: Eriksson. 1973. 312 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·25.*

THE Faroes are a group of some twenty islands, lying halfway between Shetland and Iceland. They cover an area of some 550 square miles and have a population of around 38,000, descendants of the first Norse settlers who went there in about the year 800 A.D. Until very recently the islands had no written language of their own (p. 40), and even at the beginning of the 20th century Faroese had no official status. But as the use of Faroese as a written language spread in private life, opposition to its use in public affairs weakened and, by the eve of the Second World War, it had become acceptable for nearly all public purposes (p. 165). Until that time all official business was conducted in Danish.

There were Danes who resisted the linguistic changes; there were also Danes who did their utmost to enable the Faroes to achieve economic and political independence. The first book in the native language—written by a Dane—appeared in 1822 (p. 108), and a dictionary followed shortly thereafter. The Danish Governor of the islands from 1849 to 1861 did his utmost to improve their economic resources: he sent young men to Denmark for training in agriculture; he brought a Danish ploughman from Denmark to Faroe; and in 1855 he had hares brought from Norway and set free in the North. They spread rapidly and became common on some of the larger islands (pp. 94–95). But the story of the Faroes is mostly about fish: cod, herring, haddock, coalfish, ling, cusk, Norway haddock and lemon sole (p. 3). And the prosperity of the islands rests largely on fish and fishery products.

Home Rule came in 1948. The Act of March 23, 1948 defined the Faroe Islands as 'within the framework of the law, a self-governing community within the Danish kingdom'. Foreign affairs and defence remain a Danish responsibility.

This book is an excellent introduction to the Faroe Islands. The author makes the point that he has ' tried to write a book of service to the general reader, yet which I hope the scholar will not despise ' (p. v.) He has succeeded in his effort.

THOMAS BARMAN

Current British Foreign Policy 1971. Edited by D. C. Watt and J. Mayall. *London: Temple Smith. 1973. 1322 pp. £12·00.*

The first volume of this annual reference work was fully reviewed in the July 1972 issue of *International Affairs*. The present volume deals among other topics with the negotiations leading to Britain's entry into the Common Market. The editors have wisely refrained from including the large number of ministerial speeches and statements which were devoted to informing the British public about these negotiations; nevertheless, the number of entries under Mr. Geoffrey Rippon's name in the index come second only to those under the Prime Minister's.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Siberia and the Pacific: A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects. By Paul Dibb. Foreword by T. H. Rigby. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1972. 288 pp. Bibliog. £7·25.*

Now that both the American and the Japanese oil-gas interests have decided to participate in the development of the energy resources of Yakutiya, Mr. Dibb's most precisely documented study of the economic resources and prospects of the Soviet Far East and eastern Siberia (or Pacific Siberia in his definition) acquires a considerable topical significance altogether apart from its value as a fine work of scholarship. It is in fact a most useful background to these developments and to the increasingly powerful Soviet strategic stance in the Pacific.

Mr. Dibb has one outstanding advantage over the few non-Russian writers venturing seriously into this field of study. He was able to conduct very worthwhile conversations with Soviet officials in Siberia and the Far East during his travels from Moscow to Nakhodka a few years ago.

He is also extremely well versed in the Russian documentation on Siberian economic development, including basic Soviet economic statistics, and all these materials are acutely and critically analysed in these pages.

The environmental setting to the economic resource base of Pacific Siberia is unusually harsh and Mr. Dibb was well advised to devote some initial chapters to this subject before embarking on his analysis of the economic structure, *i.e.*, employment patterns and investment and the problems of industrial growth. He studies the latter *seriatim*, devoting separate sections to the steel industry, chemicals, machine-building and engineering and consumer goods. Each of these sections is marked by the same informed and balanced approach. Among the more important points noted in this recapitulation of the industrial development of Pacific Siberia are the much more impressive results occurring in the mining and power sectors of the economy compared to the important timber and fishing industries; the labour problems hampering the development of

Pacific Siberia and especially the inadequate numbers of 'volunteer workers' provided by the central Moscow authorities; and the long outstanding inability of the region, based on an 'inflexible agricultural system', to feed itself, with the result that all major foodstuffs have to be imported from other parts of the Soviet Union or occasionally from overseas. Mr. Dibb in fact believes that Pacific Siberia falls into the 'relatively neglected' category, from the labour aspect, among relatively neglected and relatively favoured areas of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, he does not give any concrete figures to support his assertion that 'recently investment in the Far East has been rising almost twice as fast as investment in eastern Siberia, though this would be a natural development, because of Soviet concern over relations with China' (p. 54). There is something rather misleading in Mr. Dibb's comparison of the total investment in Pacific Siberia, in the four years 1966-69, with that in west Siberia in the same period, because taken separately both eastern Siberia and the Far Eastern region (with their entirely different requirements) each received less investment than western Siberia (where the Tyumen oil-gas development absorbed large state funds) in the same period.

It is a good indication of how quickly the most careful text may be overtaken by events in Siberia, that in dealing with Pacific Siberia's rich energy resources, Mr. Dibb mentions neither the oil nor gas of Yakutiya (save in a footnote to a statistical table and a brief mention of Japanese joint working of gas deposits in south Yakutiya). Both are now the centre of international attention owing to the Soviet-American-Japanese development project which has only come to fruition since Mr. Dibb finished his book in 1972. Although admittedly, these Yakut energy resources were not in the front line of Soviet development plans at this time, it is a pity that Mr. Dibb did not cast his perceptive eye on this great if latent energy potential, for the further enlightenment of his readers.

In view of the quite ambitious Soviet plans for what is termed 'Pacific rim trade', it is most useful to have Mr. Dibb's two concluding chapters on Soviet attitudes toward Siberian trade and on the commodity outlook for Pacific trade. The first chapter also includes a short summary of Soviet-Japanese joint development plans in the area and stresses the disagreements over prices and the intransigence on both sides which has frequently held up agreement on various co-operative projects. Nevertheless, as time goes on, the Japanese are likely to be involved in Siberian raw materials development from the Tyumen oil-gas industry to timber-coal and other energy projects in the Far East, an arrangement which is likely in the long run to be of benefit to both sides. With an eye primarily to the possibilities of increasing Australian trade with the Soviet Far Eastern region, Mr. Dibb examines the import requirements of Pacific Siberia. If the convertible currency problem were out of the way and the hitherto rather rigid Soviet trade attitude were relaxed, the prospects for the food surplus producing countries of the Pacific, such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States, would be extremely good. The long-term prospects for Siberian exports of minerals and timber are also encouraging and Mr. Dibb even envisages a potential threat from Siberian minerals to the 'emerging mineral and metal export markets in Asia or Europe' of other Pacific countries.

But in view of its long experience of barter trade in the Soviet Far Eastern region and its proximity to the area, Japan has a great advantage

over other Pacific competitors in this market as well as being ahead of them in regard to production-sharing projects to secure a raw material base 'almost off-shore'. Trade relations with any other Pacific country are incomparably less developed and in Mr. Dibb's view unlikely, at least under present conditions, to catch up in the near future, while Japanese exports of machinery, equipment, consumer goods, footwear and clothing may be expected to increase.

VIOLET CONOLLY

Plan and Market: Economic Reform in Eastern Europe. Edited by Morris Bornstein. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1973. 416 pp. Index. $15.00. £6·50.*

The Manager and Economic Reform in Hungary. By Geza Peter Lauter. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1972. 189 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

Socialist Economic Policy. By Béla Csikós-Nagy. *London: Longman. 1973 238 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·25.*

THROUGHOUT the world of European command economies the latter 1960s witnessed a strong reformist drive. The acute sense of the need to remould the obsolescent traditional system had a corollary in high expectations and illusions. These have been largely belied by experience; sceptics have proved vindicated: with one exception (on this below) the reforms have boiled down to secondary changes. But they have generated—in both East and West—a near-avalanche of publications on the subject. Very few have contributed to our understanding of the matters involved; among those which have, the book edited by Dr. Bornstein is certainly one of the best.

Thus, to begin with, readers of *International Affairs* will find the paper by Dr. Brown and Dr. Marer in this book of outstanding value. Its excellence is enhanced by its focus on the case of Hungary—the only country still valiantly trying to evolve a model with a practicable element of decentralisation. But, as the authors show, even in the case of Hungary a formidable assortment of direct and indirect control weapons has been put into operation in foreign trade to protect—so it is said—the embryonic market. Hence Brown and Marer wonder whether, so far as foreign trade is concerned, the new market rules are operationally meaningful at all. Specifically, as they convincingly point out, decentralised decision-making in foreign trade is inherently incompatible with the Comecon mechanism of bilateralism; and they invoke, very much *à propos*, Jacob Viber's remark that trade with centrally planned economies requires direct controls even on the part of their free-trade partners.

Aspects of the Hungarian experiment are also treated in other papers in this book; the focus is naturally on the post-reform role of the enterprise. In this context the overall balance, fairly drawn for the Hungarian 'New Economic Mechanism' (NEM) by Dr. Bela Balassa, is positive. As he sees it, domestic prices increasingly reflect relative scarcities; firms are shifting from the traditional emphasis on output to one on profits (although, as he notes, the very existence of the supervising ministries creates a danger of intervention). Balassa's discussion has a more descriptive counterpart in the book by Lauter on the manager's function under the Hungarian

NEM. The book edited by Bornstein contains two other studies which provide fruitful comparisons with the Hungarian NEM. In his discussion the Czechoslovak reform (which was more ambitiously conceived than the Hungarian and had collapsed by the turn of the 1960s), Dr. Holesovsky points to the extra-economic elements involved in restructuring the economic mechanism: to what he terms the relationship of 'market, planning and philosophy of power'. The other study, by Dr. Neuberger and Dr. James, stimulates thinking on the NEM's similarities with, and differences from, the Yugoslav prototype of 'market socialism' outside the Comecon family; here, too, the emphasis, in a 'systematic' approach, is on socio-political elements.

A good prolegomenon to all I have mentioned so far is Dr. Béla Csikós-Nagy's treatise on *Socialist Economic Policy*. Coming from an exceptionally qualified pen (Csikós-Nagy is a distinguished scholar and at the same time one of the authors of the Hungarian reform mechanism), his book tells us a good deal about the intellectual foundations of the NEM architecture. It is an attempt at generalisation, but it well reflects the dominant feature—the pragmatism—of the Hungarian experiment. (It is this feature which, one presumes, makes Hungary's partners in Comecon, the Soviet Union included, watch that experiment with special interest—as a possible example to follow if it proves successful in practice.)

More formalised theorising is the subject of two papers in the book edited by Bornstein. One, by Dr. Montyas, is devoted to analysing a simplified plan-implementation in a 'centralised' and in a reformed economy. It elegantly models a three-tier hierarchy, and then pursues its logic. The other paper is concerned with the strategy to be adopted in decentralising a command economy. A decade and a half ago the author, Dr. Thomas Marschak, published a brilliant, rigorous study of centralism and decentralism which opened a new way of looking at their informational and efficiency aspects and the 'trade-off' involved. This study—one of the cornerstones of contemporary theory of decentralisation—has helped to free the concepts involved from conventionalised prior value-judgments and its relativistic approach also pervades Dr. Marschak's present study. He tentatively arrives at the conclusion that price-making, profit-seeking firms may turn out to be compatible with contemporary reformers' aims, *given a proper institutional framework* (my emphasis being on the condition I have italicised).

I would not like to conclude this review without paying tribute to the late Jerzy Karcz, whose paper in this volume concludes his life's study on agriculture in socialist economies.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

Honecker and the New Politics of Europe. By Heinz Lippmann. Translated by Helen Sebba. *New York: Macmillan. 1972. London: Angus & Robertson. 1973. 272 pp. Index. £2·95.*

BECAUSE of their control over the relevant documents and virtually all the witnesses, it is exceedingly difficult to write worthwhile biographies of most of the ruling communist leaders. To some extent the East Germans are exceptions. Leading personalities, such as Friedrich Ebert (SED), Heinrich Homann (NDPD) and General Hoffmann, were born in what is now the

Federal Republic. Others have relatives, friends or acquaintances, or again their former superiors or subordinates in politics, education, industry or the forces, in the West. But some of the latter are defectors whose accounts must be treated with caution.

As so many witnesses abound, it is surprising that we have not had a biography of Herr Honecker before. After all, he was Ulbricht's heir apparent for many years, and research in the field has been subsidised by the Bonn authorities. Erich Honecker was born and brought up, and started his political career, in the Saar. He has relatives still living there. There are witnesses in the West who knew him when he was building up the Free German Youth after the war. Heinz Lippmann is one of these.

Herr Lippmann, we are told on the jacket, ' was a personal friend of Honecker, and his deputy for seven years '. This was in the Free German Youth. Lippmann appears to have done a thorough job of research and, surprisingly, even managed to get some co-operation from East Berlin. On the whole, this reviewer finds the part of the book dealing with Honecker's earlier years more convincing and more valuable than those covering the 1960s. But the entire book is useful even if some of the overlong quotes (on p. 22, for instance) from official documents could have been shortened.

What emerges from Lippmann's account is a vivid picture of the working-class lad who made good, a boy born into a secular religion, whose experiences reinforced his belief in that religion. The hard lot of the Saar miners made his father a communist, Erich's hard lot ' proved ' the correctness of his father's teaching. That the bourgeoisie would resist the working-class movement was ' proved ' by the Nazis. That socialism would prevail was ' proved ' when the Russians occupied Berlin. That the German Democratic Republic would succeed has been proved by its belated international recognition, and so on.

Erich Honecker should thank his erstwhile friend. The book is not unfavourable to the SED First Secretary. Lippmann concludes: ' Honecker . . . grew with and through the tasks he performed. He is living proof that a worker who had little opportunity for education in his youth is quite capable of carrying great responsibility, even in a completely industrialised society ', (p. 238).

Herr Lippmann gives us some interesting comments on Frau Honecker, the GDR's minister of education, on communist tactics in the early post-war period, and on the working of the Politburo (at least in the 1950s). On the negative side, he does not really explain how Ulbricht held office for so long, and he has little to tell us on the vital question of Honecker's relations with Herr Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and number two in state and party. Stoph is mentioned for the first time on page 212! Rightly, Lippmann is cautious about predicting what is likely to be the future of the GDR under Honecker. As the reviewer vaguely remembers him from an interview in the early 1950s, Honecker is a proud German. He is also a Soviet patriot. Ulbricht, it is now generally agreed, got the push for being, among other things, a little too much of the former.

DAVID CHILDS

Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German minority problem and British appeasement policy. By J. W. Bruegel. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 334 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00. $4·95.*

THIS analysis of Czech-German relations from the creation of the Czechoslovak state until the Munich drama was first published in German in 1967 as *Tschechen und Deutsche 1918–1938.*[1] For the English edition Dr. Bruegel has deleted about half the text of mainly German interest, incorporating instead much newly available material from British Cabinet papers and Foreign Office files. The result is a book of considerable historical interest, documenting German, and especially Hitler's, deceitful tactics, the shortsighted British appeasement policy, and in part Benes's foolish belief that the territorially expanding German Reich would—at a price—tolerate Czechoslovak independence.

Dr. Bruegel rightly points out that the disintegration of Austria-Hungary was not due to the influence of Czech *émigré* politicians on the Allied governments but 'because the historical development, which bypassed the Habsburg state, had been recognised'—a circumlocutory phrase meaning that out of the eight nationalities of this worn-out dynastic structure six had had enough of German or Magyar domination.

The idea of a Czechoslovak state was just. To be economically viable this state had to obtain the historic frontiers of Bohemia in spite of the inauspicious fact that there were only 6,700,000 Czechs and 3,000,000 Germans. It was impossible to treat the Germans as second-class citizens, but it was also difficult to consider all of them as loyal compatriots. In 1926, when German Agrarians and Social Christians decided to join the Czechoslovak government, they asked—Dr. Bruegel tells us—for Stresemann's approval in order to counter the charge of 'betrayal'.

At Locarno, however, Stresemann refused to guarantee the German-Czech frontier. He probably explained to Benes that if he did he could not refuse to recognise the German-Polish frontier, which he was determined to revise. That was the fragile basis of the 'correct' and 'friendly' relations between Prague and Berlin until March 1931 when Curtius, Stresemann's successor, produced the plan of an economic *Anschluss* with Austria.

Hitler's seizure of power did not open Benes's eyes to the *réalites des choses.* On March 13, 1933, making *bonne mine au mauvais jeu,* he told Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon in Geneva that he had no serious fears as regards Germany, and that he was against an alliance with Poland because 'it would be very dangerous to give Germany a clear cause for fearing encirclement' (p. 103). Not for a moment, until the final tragedy, did Benes sense that total destruction of *die Tschechei* was Hitler's aim. In this respect Dr. Bruegel unearthed painful documents showing that even Sir Robert (later Lord) Vansittart trusted Hitler's stooge Henlein as a 'moderate, honest and clearsighted' man who was 'speaking the truth'.

It seems that when preparing the English edition of his book Dr. Bruegel did not use the Czechoslovak diplomatic documents which, after having been seized in Prague by the Nazis in March 1939 and translated into German, fell in 1945 into Allied hands. These Prague files are in London and they thoroughly illustrate Benes's tortuous but unreal diplo-

[1] Munich: Nymphenburger. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs,* April 1969, p. 352.

macy. During the night of September 21/22, 1938, Benes agreed, under Franco-British pressure, to cede the so-called *Sudetenland* to Germany. On September 23, the Czechoslovak army commanders asked the President not to surrender and to accept the German challenge. Benes replied that that was impossible because the Czechoslovak army would have to fight alone. He deliberately ignored the Polish offer to fight Nazi Germany together. Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, told the present reviewer in Warsaw on May 8, 1939: ' What a pity that Benes declined to defend the Czech territory, that he did not grasp our hand. Together we had at that time a superiority of two to one over the German army '.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

The Slovak Dilemma. By Eugen Steiner. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and Politics. 1973. 229 pp. Bibliog. Maps. Index. (International Studies Series, Vol. 2.) £4·40. $13·95.*

THE Slovak-Czech issue was of crucial significance in the evolution of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. The elephantine convolutions of Novotny, the challenge posed by the intellectuals in Prague and Bratislava, the chronic imbalances of the Czechoslovak economy and the underlying instability of the country's political system can only be understood if the full extent of Slovak disillusion and discontent is realised. An examination of the Slovak problem, with special emphasis on the years since 1963, has long been overdue, and the Centre for International Studies at the LSE is to be congratulated on enabling Dr. Steiner to undertake this task. He has done so in a scholarly manner, with erudite attention to his sources, and yet this is a committed book, written by a scholar whose personal involvement with the causes and events he discusses has sharpened his perception and enlarged his understanding. The historical chapters, which deal with the origins of the Czech-Slovak relationship, show that Dr. Steiner has a thorough grasp of the relevant literature, but some of his conclusions appear to underestimate the full extent and range of Slovak grievances. The ' first ' Czechoslovak Republic of Thomas Masaryk and Benes did not give Slovakia its due, and the mistrust among the Slovaks, who felt that they had been outsmarted by clever politicians in Prague, was one of the prime causes of the instability of the Czechoslovak state in all its manifestations—liberal democratic, people's democratic, Stalinist and post-Stalinist.

Slovak dissatisfaction turned into furious contempt when the politicians in Prague ceased to be clever and merely came to rely on the exercise of centralised power in the crude and clumsy manner of Novotny. An over-simplified analysis of the Czechoslovak crisis would claim that the Slovaks were opposed to the Novotny regime, not because it was repressive, but because it represented the worst aspects of Prague centralism. Dr. Steiner shows that, to their great credit, progressive intellectuals in Slovakia were not prepared to sacrifice the democratisation of public life in exchange for the federalisation of the Czechoslovak state.

Perhaps the main shortcoming of the book is the author's failure to project the personalities of Dubcek and Husak, the two Slovaks who have played such an important role in the Czechoslovak crisis. Dubcek remains a

shadowy figure, and his relationship with Novotny is not really fully clarified. Husak is probably given less credit than later historians may give him for his policy of accepting the inevitable. It seems too early to judge him, but Kadar's reputation today is very different from the Judas-like image of 1956, and the hero of the Polish Spring soon turned into a rigid and obstinate Party bureaucrat in the old style. Still, it would be interesting to find out how Dr. Steiner knows that a few weeks before he replaced Dubcek, Husak 'coveted not so much his post as First Secretary of the Party as his place in the hearts of the Czech and Slovak people' (p. 205).

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed in May, 1935, not in 1936. (p. 45). It is hard to believe that Marshal Foch was sent hurriedly to Slovakia in 1918 (p. 20); he must have been very busy elsewhere. The Commander of the Czechoslovak Army was the French General Pellé; he directed the campaign against Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic and its ally, the 'Slovak Soviet Republic' in 1919. An account of this episode would have been interesting. But these are minor criticisms. Dr. Steiner has made a valuable and important contribution to the understanding of politics in Czechoslovakia today.

OTTO PICK

The Pattern of Reform in Hungary: A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis. By William F. Robinson. *New York. Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 467 pp. Tables. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £9·00.*

SINCE the cataclysmic upheavals of the uprising seventeen years ago Hungary has been, to outward view, a model of communist stability. There have been no dramatic purges of leading figures, no riots in the streets with aggrieved workers demanding a living wage, no spectacular policy innovations incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union. But although Hungary has slipped quietly from the headlines of the world's press, this in no way means that the country has been stagnating. In the mid-1960s it embarked on what is perhaps the most significant economic reform yet undertaken by a communist state. It is significant, not merely because of what it is designed to achieve, but because Hungary's leaders determined that it would be carried out in a way that did not provoke the Soviet Union to impede its implementation, and equally important, that it would win the acceptance of the Hungarian people. In *The Pattern of Reform in Hungary* William Robinson examines the inception of that reform—the New Economic Mechanism—and its progress to date.

Mr. Robinson gives an interesting and comprehensive account of post-revolution Hungary. His book is especially welcome because Hungary, perhaps because of its difficult language, is not a popular subject of study among Western scholars, and Mr. Robinson draws heavily on Hungarian sources—journals, newspapers, television interviews. He also provides a number of very useful appendices, which are of immense help to the non-specialist.

He examines in detail the new departures in economic policy, and the problems and successes that have so far resulted. The hero of the reform, according to Mr. Robinson, is party boss Janos Kadar. Since he became First Secretary in the wake of the revolution, Kadar's goals have been the modernisation of the economy and a steady rise in the people's living

standard. This, he realised, could not be attained without fundamental reform, and to this end he has been prepared to jettison orthodox communist economic doctrine, and rely instead on encouraging individual initiative. He has introduced the profit motive into industry; given greater independence to enterprise managers; improved the lot of the peasant and the private craftsman. More than anything else Kadar has striven to legitimise his regime, to win the people's acceptance and support. The nature of the New Economic Mechanism is bound up with this desire. His 'main thesis centred on reconciliation with the people and utilisation of talent, expertise and leadership skill from all corners and crevices of Hungarian society' (p. 349).

Changes in the political sphere, however, have been limited, and Mr. Robinson considers the many areas where improvements have been contemplated but have failed to materialise in full. This is disappointing, but Kadar can never ignore the watchful Soviet Union or the dogmatists within his own ranks who are suspicious of reform. From the start he appreciated what the Czechoslovak reformers learnt to their cost—that it is unwise to go too far too fast. Nevertheless, Mr. Robinson does not paint a gloomy picture of Hungary. Disagreements and shortcomings are freely debated, and interested groups voice the views and needs of their constituents. Although Mr. Robinson does not attempt to predict what direction the Hungarian reform will take in either the political or economic spheres, he leaves an impression of a lively society, openly struggling with its problems.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945–1953. By A. Ross Johnson. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press for the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972. 269 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution (formerly 'Studies in International Communism'), No. 18; Gen. Ed.: William E. Griffith.) $15·00.*

DR. ROSS JOHNSON'S book is a study of the development of Yugoslav communist ideology from the end of the war until the death of Stalin in 1953. He accepts the definition of ideology proposed by Zbigniew Brzezinski: 'Modern revolutionary ideology is essentially an action program derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the nature of reality and expressed through certain stated . . . assertions about the inadequacy of the past or present state of societal affairs . . .' (Introduction, p. 1).

Even within the terms of this definition he is occasionally in difficulty in distinguishing 'ideology' from *ex post facto* justifications of policies adopted under pressure of external events. For example, the collectivisation drive which began in 1949 was clearly motivated by 'ideological' considerations. Its abandonment in 1953 was made inevitable by the droughts of 1950 and 1952. Tito put the position with blunt pragmatism in May, 1953: 'That which we wanted to attain, to have more bread, more agricultural products, we did not achieve. Instead we had less . . .' (p. 186).

The result was the acceptance of an inconsistent position, and the absence of 'a coherent doctrine of the socialisation of agriculture' (p. 190). Although the dispute with the Cominform was clearly the most important influence in transforming Yugoslav communist ideology, the author demon-

strates that a distinctively Yugoslav position was discernible long before 1948. The Yugoslavs differed from the Russians in maintaining that Yugoslavia accomplished its socialist revolution during the liberation struggle. In Kardelj's words: 'We were victorious in a socialist revolution . . . our people's democracy was a democracy of the Soviet type' (p. 58, n. 90).

After 1948 the Yugoslavs began to talk of the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat during their first postwar years. The Soviet view at this time was that Yugoslavia was no different from the other people's democracies. Liberation by the Red Army (in itself a sore point with the Yugoslavs) did not in itself constitute a socialist revolution. Ironically, Dr. Johnson has found a quotation from Rakosi which supports the Yugoslav view. In 1945 the Hungarian 'muscovite' stated: 'Had we freed ourselves, as, say, our Yugoslav neighbours did, with a revolution, there would have been an inner strength to Hungarian democracy . . .' (pp. 21–22, n. 25).

Dr. Johnson quotes a speech by Vukmanović-Tempo, in December 1947, in which the Yugoslav position is clearly stated: '. . . without a fundamental knowledge of the political, economic, geographical and historical conditions in our country, without a fundamental study of our wartime experiences . . . neither Marxism-Leninism nor Soviet military science can be understood and applied . . .' (p. 34).

After 1948 the Yugoslavs were able to develop their own ideological standpoints without the necessity of paying lip-service to Stalinist dogmas. They went back to the Marxist classics, and discovered in them concepts about the mass participation of the workers in the building of socialism which had been ignored by the defenders of the Soviet bureaucratic state. Dr. Johnson gives a well-documented analysis of the main ideological trends which emerged in Yugoslavia after 1949. The major components were 'the doctrine of the withering away of the state, workers' self-management, and the new conception of the Party's leading role' (p. 229). Each of these elements is examined in detail, and throughout the book there is an awareness of the importance of relating ideology to practice. The Yugoslav theoreticians were also men of action, directing the economic and political life of their country while evolving their revisionist theories.

It is a pity that the author decided to end his study with the death of Stalin. The Ljubljana Congress of 1958 would have been a better terminal point, as it was there that the theoretical implications of the experiences of the previous decade were spelled out in some detail. The 1952 Congress, which Tito now says was conducted in a 'euphoria of democratisation', was ideologically confused on several major issues—for example, on the role in society of the renamed League of Communists, and of the Socialist Alliance.

Dr. Johnson's book is of topical value in view of the present ideological ferment in Yugoslavia. He has provided a well-written and scholarly guide to an interesting period in Yugoslavia's political development. It is to be hoped that he now turns his attention to the equally fascinating ideological transformation which Yugoslav communist ideology has undergone as 'market socialism' has developed during the last decade.

F. B. SINGLETON

MIDDLE EAST

Whose Jerusalem? The Conflicts of Israel. By Ronald Segal. *London: Jonathan Cape. 1973. 284 pp. Index. £3·50.*

At first glance, this book's title is inapposite. For Jerusalem is Israel's, made so by conquest, by a girdle of concrete flats with loopholes for windows, and by the high-rise buildings that obliterate the contours of the Judaean hills. Israelis in a hurry have transformed it into an increasingly commonplace town, dwarfed its shrines and turned its old city into a cross between a museum and a bazaar.

But closer reading shows that Mr. Segal is inquiring what kind of Israelis will dominate it. He is an experienced and impressive analyst who has already dissected society not only in his native South Africa (from which he is an anti-apartheid exile) but in India and the United States. By comparison, Israel is a miniature, but one no less complex in its make-up owing to the Jews' unique past and the Israelis' peculiar present, insulated from neighbours whom they claim to fear but simultaneously disdain.

From the time of the main in-gathering (1948–51), all observers have known that Israeli society is fragmented as to origins, religious habits, political affiliations and opinions about how to handle hostile neighbours. Also well known is the role that the spectre of war, whether real or conjured up, has played in unifying these disparate elements. Israel's arch-unifier is the army; it has but to ask and civilians pay up.

Less well known, and here set out in the best book lately published about a country that has never yet idled in neutral gear, are the strains that such a life imposes on the men and women who lead it. 'We do not belong to Western civilisation', proclaims one sage (p. 146) and many would rather not, but the premium that Israelis have had to place on talent in order to survive converts them willy-nilly into a Western society. It has destroyed the original Zionist conception of egalitarian living, and instead produced a mini-United States, offering *protexia* and privilege to its most useful sons, urging them by advertisement and window display to get ahead of their fellows, leaving them discontented by the aesthetic and sociological ravages of hasty economic growth, and casting forth drop-outs and delinquents as they climb. As in America, the local 'coloureds'—Arabs and oriental Jews—are, with relatively few exceptions, seen as fit to learn only and offering no culture that is worth trying to assimilate. Here is a society that concedes equal rights to all Jews but which (owing to striving for an ever-larger gross national product, and to its conflict with the Arabs) cannot offer all equal opportunities. Some interesting opinion-poll figures show rising discontent with this internal imbalance. Meanwhile, no wonder that Arabs see Israel as a minor component of a Western society on the make.

In Mr. Segal's opinion, a once complacent leadership (for which public opinion polls still show overwhelming support) is nowadays losing its grip on a society much more complex and less docile than any it expected to handle. It takes refuge in increasing authoritarianism. And this seems unlikely to taper off because, if Israel continues to profess democratic principles, it must in time cease to deny political rights to Arab inhabitants whom it aims to educate, but who will not cease to harbour a grudge. Here are the ingredients of Nihilism, the answer to which will be increasingly authoritarian handling.

On the international front, Mr. Segal sees a leadership living on the

moral capital that it banked during centuries of suffering and oppression. He exposes some of its favourite arguments as false, notably that Soviet aid to Arabs is in another class altogether from American aid to Israel. Both powers, out for their own ends, 'want a settlement as soon as possible'.

He examines Arab society with equal candour in the hope of providing 'prisoners in separate cells' with a little help in understanding one another. For the present, contending nationalisms drive him to despair. Yet, peering ahead, he believes that in the Israelis the force of faith in revolutionary possibilities born in the Diaspora is only dormant, and that the Palestinian Arab diaspora is capable of developing the same belief in a 'society of creative and cultural experiment' that might transcend the nationalist passions of today (p. 187).

ELIZABETH MONROE

Power Play: The Tumultuous World of Middle East Oil 1890–1973. By Leonard Mosley. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 374 pp. Maps. Index. £3·75.*

MR. LEONARD MOSLEY is a specialist in dramatic subjects—the life of Orde Wingate, stories of the *blitz* on London or the Lion of Judah's recovery of his throne. His book on the oil industry in the Middle East leaps from gusher to overnight fortune to explosion to sabotage with so few good words to say in between for oil tycoons, whether Western or Arab, that one is left with the impression that only Howard Page of Standard of New Jersey ever took the trouble to see the Arabs' point of view, and that only Ahmed Zaki Yamani of Saudi Arabia ever soberly appraised the West. A long interview with Yamani on participation is the best passage in a book which paints too many scenes in poster colours, and too few in finer shades. It is more necessary with every month that passes to use the latter in order to depict Middle Eastern sophistication about subjects such as the world monetary system and overseas investment of surplus funds.

ELIZABETH MONROE

AFRICA

South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945–1970. By James Barber. *London, New York, Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 1973. 325 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

THIS book is lucidly written and in substance, too, it is rather better than most of the works which have preceded it in the field of South Africa's external relations. Nevertheless, its shortcomings are quite considerable.

Dr. Barber observes, engagingly, that he has looked only at a 'fraction' of the evidence. It was a small fraction. No evidence seems to have been sought in the main countries to which South African policy was directed. Although some South African white politicians were interviewed, the book reveals only one mildly interesting discovery that emerged from one such interview (p. 93). Also, a fair amount of the material used in the earlier chapters was the subject of a paper read to the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies in January 1971, to which no reference is made here.

The book incorporates, with very little criticism and discrimination, lengthy quotations and summaries of opinions from articles and books which add little to its main discussion. On the other hand, very little is said on very important aspects of South African foreign policy which have not already been covered elsewhere, like, for example, the development of South Africa's policy towards, specifically, the United States, France, West Germany, and Italy. Even the British connection is conventionally treated. South Africa's relations with Nato get reasonable though still inadequate treatment in Chapter 7 (incidentally, the only original and truly satisfying chapter). Very little research seems to have been done into defence and counter-insurgency collaboration in the 1960s. Relations with major Western financial and monetary institutions, particularly the IMF and the World Bank, do not seem to have been investigated. Policy towards Latin American countries is merely mentioned, not analysed, while Australia and New Zealand hardly appear at all in this accounting. Nor are these omissions compensated for by discussion of the making or implementation of policy or even satisfactory discussion of the relationship between domestic and external politics. That relationship tends to be an excuse for padding the discussion with not very relevant, highly unoriginal, material. At the same time very important linkages tend to be missed. For example, the maundering discussion of the Bantustans fails to grasp the *ideological* unity between these and the outward policy; it also ignores American and British encouragement of the Bantustan idea; considerable energy is expended by American personnel in southern Africa in the furtherance of this policy. This would have been worth discussing. Political concepts tend to be used in unclear and misleading ways, as, for example, when ' the state ' is seen as ' the geographical area over which the government claims sovereignty '.

Dr. Barber's book may still be useful as an introduction to its subject. It may, however, also have the effect of discouraging further work. That would be a pity.

SAM C. NOLUTSHUNGU

The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid. By Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney. *London: Temple Smith 1972. 352 pp. Index. £3·50. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1973. 352 pp. Indexes. (Penguin African Library: Ed.: Ronald Segal.) £0·60. A$2.10. NZ$2.10. $2.50.*

THIS book argues that Britain and other Western nations should reduce their economic connections with the Republic of South Africa, and should support the ' freedom struggle ' against the current regime. The authors do not, however, appear optimistic that business firms and governments will be persuaded. Perhaps for this reason much of the book is devoted (as a sort of historical ' indictment ') to the listing and description of the links between South Africa and Britain (also the United States, Japan, France and West Germany) in the fields of investment, trade and migration, and to the identification of the (guilty) men, firms, and pressure groups primarily responsible for maintaining those links. An attempt is also made to examine the record of some individual overseas firms in South Africa in relation to wages, conditions, discriminations of various kinds and general co-operative relations with the South African government. In this context there is a sceptical discussion of ' liberal ' thinking and experiments by businessmen—especially Mr. Harry Oppenheimer.

It is convenient to have much of this material collected together and the authors deserve credit for attempting a critical discussion of issues in this area before the recent upsurge of newspaper and parliamentary interest in them. Taken as a whole, however, the book is highly unsatisfactory. As developed here, the argument against investment in, and trade with, South Africa has several strands. (1) In the background is the theory that apartheid is essentially a device for exploiting black labour. Capitalist economic growth and the racial system are mutually supportive: the former will not erode the latter. (2) The alleged facts show that 'exploitation' in this system is peculiarly vicious (Chapter 3). The living standards of the average black are low in relation to subsistence requirements (and declining), are low by comparison with white standards (and increasingly so), and are below those in the more prosperous African countries (contrary to widespread belief in South Africa). The spread of semi-skilled and skilled work to blacks in recent years is discounted (in an interesting Chapter 4) on the grounds that wages and status have not risen concomitantly. (3) But higher real wages anyway would lead to increased mechanisation and consequent unemployment. (4) It follows—apparently—that *the system* must be 'overturned'.

There is a lot wrong (or at least questionable) with this mixed bag of arguments. The capitalist-exploitation theory of apartheid raises some sharp questions but misses the ambiguities in the relation between capitalist interests and the South African socio-political system. The discussion of black poverty and of the consequences of wage increases makes out a clearer (and more pessimistic) case than the current state of knowledge justifies. The data is not available for a *systematic* study of the inter-racial distribution of income in South Africa. We do not have a *comprehensive* study of how non-white real incomes have moved over time. We do not know with certainty whether (or by how much) large wage increases would slow the rate of growth of employment. It is to be hoped that forthcoming work will make possible more convincing, technically satisfactory and theoretically well-founded answers to some of the questions raised by First, Steele and Gurney than they provide themselves.

No findings in this area would by themselves of course establish the case for 'withdrawal' and 'revolutionary liberation'. That would require a lengthy look at alternative strategies, probable outcomes, the nature and distribution of costs and benefits and a much more critical examination than is commonly undertaken (or provided in this book) of what social objectives are appropriate in a society as awkwardly constituted as South Africa is.

N. BROMBERGER

Nyerere of Tanzania. By William Edgett Smith. *London: Gollancz. 1973. 207 pp. Illus. £2·50.*

A Theory of Ideology. The Tanzanian Example. By John R. Nellis. *Nairobi, London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1972. 217 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £3·00.*

MR. SMITH, in his biographical sketch of President Julius Nyerere, makes no claim to be a dispassionate observer. His admiration for Nyerere and Nyerere's ideology stands out in a study in which some sections outline Nyerere's ideas while others report presidential conversations with the

author and with others. Yet for all his admiration, Smith reaches the gloomy conclusion towards the end of the book that 'It is hard to believe that the fight [*i.e.* Nyerere's] against the growth of the elite will not be lost' (p. 202). He gives lively accounts of such recent events in Tanzania's political development as the successful revolution in Zanzibar and the abortive military coup on the mainland in 1964. He also succeeds in building up a clear and attractive picture of Julius Nyerere himself. But in doing this he accepts Tanzania and its President at their face value. He has no penetrating insights, because he asks no penetrating questions. Smith never pretends to reach beneath the surface of events or beneath the ideology as articulated by Nyerere.

John Nellis has very different aims and so produces a very different book. In explicitly setting out to penetrate beneath the surface, he has written a challenging, stimulating study. Nellis builds up a model based upon economic determinants to explain political behaviour, with particular reference to the role of ideology. The model is developed from Samuel Huntingdon's thesis that political instability is generated by the lag between economic and socio-political change. Unlike many model builders, Nellis attempts to apply it in a given situation—'the Tanzanian example'. In broad terms, the assumption is that African governments like Tanzania face chronic instability. They continually have to seek support by redistributing resources, but the resources are always inadequate for this purpose. It is a gloomy view, with revolution just around the corner and the government able only to delay, not eliminate, the problem. In the model the roles of personality and ideology become subordinate. Nellis, although himself an admirer of Nyerere, writes: 'If political analysis is ultimately to extend beyond some hero-villain interpretation of events, then personalities—no matter how seemingly central to political affairs—must be down-played in favour of the examination of social structure and social process' (p. 190). Ideology is also subordinated. It is seen as a delaying tactic used by the government to counter pressures, rather than a spearhead which can reshape society. While previous studies have usually concentrated on 'what the leaders expected their fledgling ideologies to do *to* their citizens', Nellis examines 'what the new leaders expected the emerging ideologies to do *for* themselves and their regimes' (his italics, p. 181).

Among the virtues of Dr. Nellis's book are that he writes clearly, he identifies what he intends to do, he appreciates many of his limitations and he very largely avoids the jargon which surrounds model builders. This is therefore a very useful contribution to the study of political behaviour in Tanzania, but, as Dr. Nellis would recognise, there are substantial weaknesses and problems. He could easily have avoided some of these by combining his own criticism of the analysis with the chapter on the model itself. Again, while any model must be a simplification, the assumptions on which it is built should be reasonably sound; some of Dr. Nellis's are not. For example, he assumes that all individuals in the system are equal in 'power', so that provided the government can keep contented a simple majority, it can retain power. This plainly is nonsense, and can be measured against the statement in Smith's book about the army mutiny: 'the Tanganyikan mutiny had been started by no more than forty men and was put down by sixty British marines' (p. 117). This brings up another major problem for Nellis's model—the role of the military in Africa. In concentrating on Tanzania he is testing a model which he hopes can be applied to

'some of the political systems in sub-Saharan Africa' (p. 41). But is Tanzania a good test-case? Nellis mentions in passing the military coups that have taken place in some African states, but he never examines them further to ask whether the model has relevance when the military are in power. For many African states it seems that power comes out of the barrel of the gun and not through the distribution of economic resources.

Dr. Nellis's book is certainly stimulating but it will probably stimulate as much criticism as approval.

JAMES BARBER

ASIA

Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. Edited by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1973. 465 pp. $15.00. £6·45.*

THIS book deserves to be read widely. It has been published at the instigation of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars—a body whose views are all too rarely heard by students of international affairs. Kathleen Gough, her co-editor, Hari Sharma, and the other contributors to the symposium of essays are 'united both in approaching social problems from within the Marxist tradition and in their commitment to revolutionary social change' (pp. vii-viii). There is not the same agreement among them when it comes to interpreting the present state of affairs and to deciding on the tactics to be applied in any future revolutionary struggles. Of the fifteen contributors, twelve got their academic training at such distinguished centres of learning as Oxford, Cambridge, London, Paris, Seattle and UCLA. Two authors, operating in Bengal and Ceylon respectively, publish under pen names. The essays had mostly been published previously in journals, such as the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, the *Monthly Review*, the *New Left Review*, *Frontier* (Calcutta) and *Pakistan Forum*. They are now dedicated to Saghir Ahmad, the 'beloved comrade and colleague', who met a fatal accident before the symposium was published.

The volume makes sad reading. Its publication was to be expected when not only the 'imperialist' and 'social imperialist' rulers of the United States and the Soviet Union came to a certain *modus vivendi* in Asia, but when even China 'shamefully betrayed the revolutionary militants of Ceylon' (p. 393) and, of course, of Bangladesh. The volume thus reflects the New Left's deep disappointment with the state of their cause in Asia. It includes studies on the historical background and impact of imperialism and capitalism (Part I); on the roots of the struggle in the villages (Part II); on the rise of revolutionary movements (Part III); and on Bangladesh (Part IV). Much of what the authors have to say has been said, equally well or better, elsewhere. Some of what their essays reveal, for example, about the Kisan Sabha peasant movement, the role of the Harijans, or the growing disparity of wealth and income in the villages of south Asia, does not lose its validity merely on account of being said by authors dedicated to the cause of revolution and thus antagonised by any mention of reform as a possible alternative. However, when every act of government, be it capitalist or communist, becomes suspect in the eyes of the authors or, say, the conflict in Pakistan becomes 'a synergetic product of U.S. foreign policy operating

within Pakistan's social structure' (p. 419), concern seems to have taken over from scholarship. The outcome is a mixture of fact and fiction, which is likely to lose this sad group of concerned people what sympathy they might otherwise be able to arouse. This is not to say that the possibility of revolutions in south Asia can be dismissed out of hand. If they occur, they are likely to be led by the leaders of mass movements rather than by those of sectarian groups, however great their concern.

W. KLATT

Communism in Indian Politics. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 455 pp. Index. £7·00.*

IN this penetrating study of the three Communist Parties which exist in India today, Bhabani Sen Gupta is concerned with their major problems of legitimacy, independence and identification—issues which any party has to face. In the author's view they have succeeded in solving these problems. The Indian Communist Party became a legal organisation only after Hitler's invasion of Russia. Unlike the Congress Party, the CPI supported the Allied war effort. It thus enjoyed the freedom of movement denied to the Congress. This helped its growth, but when independence came, the CPI appeared even more subservient to Moscow's lead than other communist organisations in Asia. This dependence became most manifest when Moscow's concept of the outside world changed to one which permitted peaceful co-existence and co-operation with the national bourgeoisie of India. The first split within the ranks of the CPI came shortly before Nehru's death in 1964, when some of the party's activists formed the CPI(M)—the left-wing Marxist deviation from right-wing revisionism. Five years later a still more militant group split from the CPI(M) and formed the Marxist-Leninist CPI(M-L), which had been responsible for the violent uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal in the spring of 1967. Foreigners tend to attribute the splits on the left of the Indian political scene primarily to the dispute between the two communist super-powers. In fact, the Indo-Chinese border conflict of 1962 caused greater strain on the unity of the Communist Party than the Sino-Soviet dispute. But in essence the splits resulted from disagreements over internal rather than external matters. The main point at issue was then—as it is now—the choice of working with or against the bourgeoisie which has ruled India since the British left.

After the splits the Communist Parties remained what they had been before: regional phenomena without the political *lingua franca* which the Congress Party had been able to create in their national struggle against British colonial rule. West Bengal and Kerala were governed by the CPI and the CPI(M), at times in co-operation with the local Congress Parties and at other times in United Front coalitions of the left against the ruling Congress at the Centre and its local supporters. Besides, the communists exercised their influence among some sections of the electorate in Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere. Secular inroads into Hindu and Islamic beliefs and 'sanskritisation' of the low castes enhanced the process of polarisation from which the Communist Parties tended to gain political benefits.

The mid-term elections of 1971 brought the ruling Congress Party a landslide victory of 350 out of 515 parliamentary seats. Of the votes cast the Congress won 44 per cent., but as only 55 per cent. of the electorate went to the polls, in fact less than a quarter of it gave the ruling party its active

ort. At the same time, the CPI and the CPI(M) each collected close on per cent. of the votes cast. In spite of their setbacks in Kerala and West gal, the communists thus remained a political force second only to the gress Party. While the CPI continues to be guided by Russian interests, CPI(M) is the only communist group in Asia which has 'adopted a ce independent of Moscow and Peking' (p. 391). As a result of drastic ce action, the Naxalites have been driven underground.

The story of the successes and failures of communist policies in India been told before. Sen Gupta has an edge over previous studies in this re when he recounts the change from the industrial base to the mobilisa- and radicalisation of the rural poor. The brain behind this change of political concept was Harekrishna Konar. As a leader in the All-India n Sabha, the peasant movement, he formulated a militant land policy, as the CPI(M) land revenue minister in the United Front government Vest Bengal in 1967 he put his programme into effect, stopping evictions enants, recovering land appropriated in defiance of land reform legis- n, distributing land to poor peasants and providing landless labourers plots for a homestead. As a result, the agrarian question became a ral issue of Indian politics at the time when the 'green revolution' was nsifying the polarisation in the villages in any case. The author expects r and Andhra Pradesh to be the communists' next targets. At present Congress Party seems to be still fully in control at the Centre and in t of the states of the Indian Union. However, its failure to implement ctively agrarian reforms, often promised and long overdue, may yet the Communist Parties—co-operating or competing with each other– e opportunities, otherwise beyond their reach, of dislodging, if not king, India's strained system of one-party dominance.

W. KLATT

istan's Crisis in Leadership. By Fazal Muqeem Khan. *Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore: National Book Foundation. 1973. 286 pp. Maps Index. Rs. 25.00.*

olitical Study of Pakistan. By Safdar Mahmood. *Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf. 1972. 395 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 20.00.*

L MUQEEM KHAN'S *Pakistan's Crisis In Leadership* gives the author's unt of the civil war in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. full of the author's distress over the tragic events which led to Pakistan's memberment and humiliating defeat in its war with India in 1971. The or, a retired major-general of the Pakistan army, provides some valuable le accounts of the developments leading to the Pakistan army's action in . Bengal on the night of March 25, 1971; the activities of the Bengali *ti Bahini* (liberation forces), the Indian involvement in training and pping the Bengali forces and finally the Indo-Pakistan war which began November/December 1971.

The title of the book is misleading—it should have been entitled 'The l War in Pakistan' or 'Pakistan's War with India', which the author ribes in full detail. But when he tries to examine or analyse what he s the 'crisis in leadership' he betrays either his lack of knowledge of subject or gives a distorted and polemical version of his own views. The dealing with political dynamics and realities in Pakistan is poor and ppointing. The author conveniently puts all the blame on the fallen

victim—Yahya Khan. It has been always a sad tendency in Pakistan, as in some other Afro-Asian countries, to salute the man in power and to malign the same person when he is replaced. Fazal Muqeem does this very obviously; President Z. A. Bhutto, who—according to many important observers—bears more responsibility than anybody else for Pakistan's sad dismemberment, escapes all blame; he is even praised for his so-called 'patriotic performance' at the UN Security Council in December 1971 which in fact caused amusement and ridicule. The author also describes with seeming delight Bhutto's march to the presidential palace on December 20; he could have also pointed out that Bhutto and his followers' jubilation came so soon after the country's most humiliating defeat and dismemberment.

'Yahya and his advisers', who no doubt bear some responsibility for the tragic events of 1971, are not the only villains. Yahya at least made a sincere attempt to solve the country's most complicated problem—the East and West Pakistanis' differences—by offering a genuine federal or even a confederal solution. It is the two political leaders, Mujib and Bhutto, who were most uncompromising: the former had decided on the creation of Bangladesh and the latter was more interested in getting 21-gun salutes at the presidential palace.

The production of this book is poor; editing and printing are equally bad.

Safdar Mahmood's *A Political Study of Pakistan* can serve as a textbook for undergraduate students in Pakistan. It provides a descriptive account of major political happenings in Pakistan from its creation in 1947 to 1971 when it was dismembered, which the author terms 'a study of mistrust'. The book is based mainly on secondary sources and lacks any analytical depth. But it should serve as a good reference book for the general reader on Pakistan politics, written from the standpoint of an average Pakistani.

G. W. CHOUDHURY

American-East Asian Relations: A Survey. Edited by Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972. London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 425 pp. Index. (Harvard Studies in American-East Asian Relations, 1.) £7·50.*

THIS volume is the first in a new series, Harvard Studies in American-East Asian Relations, launched, in the words of the dustjacket, 'to examine analyse, and ultimately understand the political, economic and cultural relationships between America and Asia'. It appears, appropriately enough at a time when those relationships are passing through a period of decisive change, and the series hopes to reflect this change. In order to map out the academic terrain, seventeen scholars were commissioned to prepare bibliographical surveys, showing what had been said about relations since 1783 illustrating the main trends in historical writing and making suggestions as to what should be done in future.

The results vary, as one would expect. Professor Liu's contribution comes close to being a detailed history of Sino-American relations in the second half of the 19th century. Dr. Halperin, who contrives to be both flat and thin at the same time, ends his piece on the Eisenhower years with the unhelpful statement that 'additional studies are needed of particular aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations and on the overall relations' (p. 389). Dr. Young's

item, 'The Quest for Empire', is all too highly coloured by the experience of Vietnam. But these points are negligible set against the value of the sum total. This reviewer believed that he had drawn up the perfect bibliography on Sino-American relations since 1931, but five of the last seven contributors showed him just how wrong he was, and this is true of the book as a whole. Most of it will stand up to extremely close scrutiny, and it gives us an immensely useful picture of the state of historiographical play in this area as of 1971.

Looking to the future, the theme of the volume is that research must break away from the previous concentration (in the United States, at least) on diplomatic history written usually from an American point of view and based, if not exclusively on State Department records, then on English-language sources alone. Professor May thus urges much more work on the actions of Americans outside government and on the reactions of Asians themselves to the American presence, and time and again one comes across the call for work that is variegated, multi-archival, multi-disciplinary, multi-lingual and supranational in its approach. Let us hope that graduates with the necessary cosmopolitan vision and polymathic range of techniques will be readily forthcoming. At the moment, there is a long way to go, in more ways than one. The Chinese archives are still tight shut and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, and without them no serious multi-archival work on China can be done. Another difficulty is revealed by the list of contributors: only three have Asian ancestry—to judge by their names—and all of them are working in American universities. One would like to have seen Asian scholars, living and working in Asia, represented, and one would also like to have heard from someone who is neither American nor Asian, and who may be capable of asking different questions and seeing fresh possibilities. Perhaps this will come in time. Meanwhile, we are deeply indebted to the writers who have made up this volume for pointing the way ahead. Success to the project they have inaugurated!

JOHN MAJOR

Elections in South Vietnam. By Howard R. Penniman. *Stanford: Hoover Institution for the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 1972. 246 pp. Index. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 4; Hoover Institution Studies 38.) $3·50.*

THERE are, of course, two heads under which a book with this title is of interest—in the general literature on parliamentary elections and in the political history of contemporary Vietnam. Under the first, Professor Penniman's credentials have few equals, and his professional approach to his inquiry is manifest on every page; under the second head, the information he offers the reader makes a novel contribution to debates about political legitimacy in South Vietnam, which hitherto have been informed by journalists' stories alone.

The scope of the book does not extend to local government and, although there are summaries of earlier parliamentary elections—summaries which highlight the conflicting reports to be gleaned from the polemical literature about Vietnam—the main interest focuses on the current South Vietnamese constitution and the elections held under it in 1967 and 1970–71. The whole electoral process is described in detail, together with the campaigns for the

presidency and the bicameral legislature, both before and after nomination—and, indeed, one ought to add, in view of the unfailing charges of malpractice which defeated candidates bring each time, after the elections as well. Professor Penniman was present himself at both presidential elections (the more recent being the notorious one which ended up with only one candidate), and his observations are invaluable documents, quite apart from his cogently argued analysis. But if one may single out any one aspect of the book above others, it is the research he has done into the process by which some of the electoral provisions that have aroused distaste in the United States actually came to be enacted—and by whom—and also his accounts of the charges of malpractice heard by the Supreme Court; those in search of sticks with which to beat President Nguyen-van-Thieu will be disappointed.

There is other useful matter: a chapter on political parties within and outside 'the system', although the treatment of the latter (for practical purposes, confined to the communists) could have been based on more direct evidence than it is; another chapter on the status of the press; and, thirdly, a twenty-page appendix on elections in communist North Vietnam. The appendix contains many facts not found elsewhere in the literature; *it adds, for the benefit of both students and admirers of communist* constitutional procedures, a great deal to the knowledge available about the democratic process in a totalitarian state whose workings are hardly better known than those of North Korea or Outer Mongolia.

Just how authoritarian *is* the Saigon regime in practice? It emerges here as one in which a strong critic of the President can get elected Chief Justice by the lower house of the legislature. And how liberal is the only alternative on offer to the South Vietnamese people—the 'Provisional Revolutionary Government' of ministry-less foreign minister Madame Nguyen-thi-Binh? We cannot really say because it appears never to have held an election.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

Communism in Korea: Part I: The Movement; Part II: The Society. By Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press for The Center for Japanese and Korean Studies. 1972. 1491 pp. Index. Maps. Bibliog. Part I: $25.00. £11·25. Part II: $30.00. £13·50.*

NORTH KOREA is an obvious candidate for the dubious honour of being the state with the world's most tightly controlled political system. Partly because of the rather repellent nature of this distinction, partly because of formidable linguistic problems, and partly because of difficulties of access, it is also a country about which relatively little of real value has been published in Western languages.

The validity of this statement has been significantly reduced, however, by the publication of the massive work under review, which in fact comes very close, and perhaps goes all the way, to being the definitive work on the subject. It also has the defect of its virtue, which is that it says more about the subject, at greater length, than all but a dedicated handful are likely to want to know. On the other hand, there are many who are concerned with such fields as Korean studies, the comparative or inter-

national politics of the Far East, comparative communism, and the politic of developing countries and who will benefit greatly from reading th chapters of greatest relevance to their interests. For the reviewer's taste, th most rewarding chapters are the one on the foundation of the regim under Soviet tutelage (V), the one on the evolution of North Korea sinc the achievement of uncontested personal leadership by Kim Il-song i 1956–58 (VIII), and the conclusion (XV).

The authors are distinguished American academic specialists on th politics of north-east Asia, who have devoted many years of intensive wor to the preparation of this study. Their sources of information include no only published works and archival materials in several languages bu interviews with defectors and other qualified informants. They provid the reader with a formidable scholarly apparatus in the form of footnotes tables, documents, and bibliographies. Their work would accordingly b extremely useful simply as a research guide even if their analysis were no of much value, which is not the case.

One of the most interesting and innovative features of Scalapino's an Lee's study is their comparisons of various aspects of the North Korea regime and its policies with their Soviet and Chinese analogues. Althoug these comparisons are necessarily brief and somewhat tentative, they ar as well done as the current level of development of comparative communis studies permits. The culmination of the effort at comparison is the las chapter, where some cogent remarks are offered on the general nature o communist political systems and the place of North Korea among them There is an impressive list of the 'strengths' (really advantages and achieve ments) and 'weaknesses' (really failures and drawbacks) of the Nort Korean political system, which for convenience can be labelled as mor 'Stalinist' than 'Maoist'. One of the latter that is omitted here, althoug it is discussed elsewhere in the study, is the systematic treatment of truth by the North Korean as well as other communist regimes, as somethin that is almost wholly malleable by party fiat. In earlier chapters, th treatment of Kim Il-song's purges shows how outrageously the victor ha defamed his victims and reminds us how little reliance can be placed o the winner's official accounts of such affairs, including the version of Li Piao's fall that has been promulgated in Peking. Another example is th communist propaganda campaign alleging, falsely, that the United State waged 'germ warfare' against North Korea and in Manchuria in 1952 this campaign, which is well treated by Scalapino and Lee, is of particula interest to the reviewer because he was at Cambridge University at th time and was amazed and depressed by the credence that many of hi British colleagues, notably physical scientists, accorded to the 'gern warfare' charges.

The reviewer's confidence in the authors' analysis, which cuts acros many aspects of Korean communism that he has never examined, i increased by their treatment of one that he has. The account of the initia Soviet occupation of North Korea corresponds closely with his recollectio of the evidence that he was able to see while a military historian in Sout Korea at that time.

By way of a concluding encomium, the reviewer is favourably impresse with Scalapino's and Lee's tendency, even while presenting a very critica interpretation of the North Korean regime on the basis of the availabl evidence, to avoid injecting too much of themselves and their particula

views into their analysis. In this way they have avoided the excessiv subjective approaches that have marred a number of otherwise importa books on communism, and on Chinese communism in particular.

HAROLD C. HINTON

The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politi 1927–71. By William W. Whitson with Chen-hsia Huang. Forew by Lucian W. Pye. *New York, Washington: Praeger; Lond Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 638 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Indexes. £10·*

THIS is a really outstanding work, of the greatest political relevance present-day China. In a book of over 600 pages, difficult enough to revi in as many words, Colonel Dr. Whitson reveals himself in turn as a milit historian, political scientist and strategist of the highest class. His resea has extended over some sixteen years, some of which had already seen light in journals like *Asian Survey* and *China Quarterly*. His collabora in this venture, to whom he pays generous tribute, was Huang Chen-hs As Professor Lucien Pye says in the Foreword, this is a 'pathbreak study' and a 'landmark book'.

Always written clearly and intelligently, it is far more than anotl book on the Chinese army. Social and cultural factors are given due weig Dr. Whitson is well acquainted with some of the Chinese literary classi The focus of his research is biographical, a study of about 700 men China's top military formations, and their role and influence in that a of military-political leadership that is peculiarly Chinese, over the ye 1927–71. This national elite he divides broadly into three: the command the commissars, and the party and state bureaucrats. The 'Maoists' sees as a fourth grouping, drawn from the other three, and usually balanc the levers of power among them. At the same time, and here the autl is most original, there is rivalry and interaction among the various milit (field army) elites.

At once there arises the famous 'red and expert' equation, which gets at through the individual record of the men concerned on the l and tortuous road to power, and in subsequent campaigns and cri including the Cultural Revolution. To do this, he formulates the analyti concepts of military 'ethic' (the military in society, the authority of commander, and promotional criteria), and military 'style' (organisati strategy and tactics). Here he challenges what has probably been orthodox view in a number of respects. He finds, for instance, that from there being a neatly political cadre of officers, both 'red' 'expert', the separate and respective roles of commander and commis had hardened and set as long ago as 1931 in the Kiangsi Soviet. In tu this challenges the easy view that communist revolutionary success China was owed to Maoist military ethic and style, people's war and so Success was often achieved in spite of Mao, by professional command in opposition to him. The peasant 'model' competed at various ti with the Russian or warlord alternatives. True, they were all communi but the early history of men and formations tells us much about divisi in the Chinese leadership since 1949.

Dr. Whitson then turns directly to the political side of things in Par of his book. This will come, perhaps, as a relief to those who find bat

and campaign charts confusing. It is the contemporary and relevant application of all that has gone before. Obviously, the military elites play a very great role in Chinese politics, particularly since 1962 and in the Cultural Revolution. They have by no means responded to internal crisis or external threat in the way that Mao wished. It is not just that the military, in China as elsewhere, usually distrust or resent the politicians. There is no such precise distinction in China. How do military leaders behave when they are also in the national political leadership? Colonel Whitson's view, based on substantial evidence, is that they react as professional commanders, and that this, together with the imperatives of economic development and military technology, have been sufficient to inflict a definitive defeat on Maoist 'populism'. This judgment would appear to be confirmed by the events of the past six or seven years.

Of course, there is some overlap since the military is not monolithic, and it is not possible always to pin down personalities to consistent policies. For example, in the great strategic debate of 1965, Lin Piao expressed the Maoist position on 'people's war' (p. 529). But the naming of Lin Piao as Mao's successor, in 1969, symbolised 'the probable continuing predominance of professional military thought in China's policy process' (p. 536). The important political point here, though, is made in the Preface, that 'Chinese military leaders, when discussing matters of grave importance for China's political survival, have also been discussing, by implication, their own political survival as key figures in an active political elite'. This is, essentially, a kind of federalism rather than tight central control, with the regions and military districts as the constituencies. That is why, in sum, 'this book is ultimately an effort to clarify the reasons for the focus of China's military leaders on the internal problem of equitable distribution of political wealth'. Read all about it.

VICTOR FUNNELL

Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China 1919-1972. By Christopher Howe. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 171 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions; Gen. Ed.: Patrick Hanan and Denis Twitchett.) £3·95.*

DR. HOWE'S book sets out to deal with the level and structure of wages in Chinese industry between 1919 and 1972, but the main body of data available is related to the period 1949-58. Dr. Howe tells us that 'there are no satisfactory national data that can be used to ascertain the structure of industrial wages in the pre-Communist period' (p. 16). The analysis is here principally confined to data for Shanghai and Manchuria. For the post-1949 period, he points out that the popular mystique about the lack and low quality of Chinese economic data is ill-founded, and that, on the contrary, 'by comparison with the standards of other low-income countries, the range and even the quality of wage statistics relating to the years before 1958 are quite good' (p. 28). However, he acknowledges that 'the statistical blackout of the 1960's, in contrast, presents real problems since it has only been relieved by a few isolated flashes of information'.

The main line of argument on the post-1949 period is that the attempt to utilise a Soviet-style wage system, emphasising the role of wage structure differentials to obtain greater efficiency in resource allocation, was only partially successful. Inter-industry differentials, which involved only a

few simple indicators, were reasonably susceptible to control, but the manipulation of the occupational, inter-sectoral, and inter-area wage structure proved difficult. Dr. Howe argues that this system's 'essentially individualistic basis was somewhat alien to the Chinese scene', and 'much more important than this, the system was premature in terms of the economic, technological, and administrative capacity of the Chinese economy' (p. 143). In consequence of this loss of control, the average real wage of workers and staff grew at the 'unacceptable and unplanned' rate of 6 per cent. per annum between 1952 and 1957; by 1957 this 'was creating an intolerable strain on the demand for wage goods, especially food, and was widening the inter-sectoral differential to the point where control of rural-urban migration was lost' (p. 115). From 1957–58 onwards, therefore, overriding priority was given to the control of the average wage, and in fact real wages of workers and staff fell by 2·3 per cent. per annum between 1957 and 1963, and only rose at 1·9 per cent. per annum between 1963 and 1972 (p. 34).

Dr. Howe draws some interesting implications out of these developments in relation to changes in factory management during the Cultural Revolution. Given that the principal aim of wages policy in the post-1957–58 period was to limit the rate of growth of average wages, the experience of the 1950s implied that this could only be achieved with a decline in the utilisation of differentials in the wage structure. At the factory level, Dr. Howe argues, this meant that an alternative form of motivation for workers was needed; this is at least part of the explanation for the increased use of 'internal incentives' in the Cultural Revolution, involving 'democracy, creativity, and unstructured organisation' in the factories (p. 147). While extreme forms of 'anarchy' in the factories did not apparently last long, Dr. Howe nevertheless appears to lean in the direction of technological determinism in speculating that in the future 'the incentive system . . . must be flexible enough to adapt to the requirements of an economy that will be characterised by increasing capital intensity, specialisation and interdependence', and 'in such an economy, flexible and creative work performance will be less important than discipline and predictability' (p. 150).

Dr. Howe's book serves as a corrective to those who analyse the Chinese wage system without due consideration of the issues of economic efficiency involved. As such, it helps us to have a better understanding of the totality of influences on developments in a sector that is of central importance in any society.

PETER NOLAN

The Long Revolution. By Edgar Snow. *London: Hutchinson. 1973. 269 pp. Illus. Index. £3·50.*

Daily Life in Revolutionary China. By Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. Trans. by Kathy Brown et al. *New York, London: The Monthly Review Press. 1972. 506 pp. $15.00. £5·85.*

IN 1938, early in his career as a journalist, the late Edgar Snow wrote *Red Star over China*,[1] probably the most influential book ever published on the Chinese communists. It explained Chinese communism, as Snow saw it in Yennan, to a generation of Chinese, many of whom read it in illegal

[1] London: Gollancz. 1937.

translations, as well as to Westerners. It is still an important source for the early history of the Chinese Communist Party; and it secured Snow, as soon as it became possible for him to visit China again, privileged access to his old friends, now the rulers of the mainland.

The Long Revolution is about Snow's visit to China in 1970, with references back to his earlier visit in 1965. Snow died last year before he had had time to revise his book and document it. The unrevised result is a scrap book of interviews and impressions with its tone set by Snow's opening paragraph.

> It was a perfect October day in Peking for the twenty-first anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic.
> Seated unsuspectingly on the crowded balcony of T'ien Ab Men (Heavenly Peace Gate), I felt a tug at my sleeve and turned to see Premier Chou En-lai there. He quickly led me and my wife, Lois, to stand beside Chairman Mao.

Snow had several lengthier interviews with his two old friends, Chou En-lai and Mao. The main points of these interviews have already been published in Snow's newspaper accounts of his visits and have been overtaken by later events, such as Nixon's visit to China. But Snow's detailed account does confirm the thoroughness of Chou En-lai's grip on the Chinese administration. The interviews Snow had in a Peking hospital about the use of acupuncture in abortions had to wait for Chou En-lai's personal clearance before Snow could use them in newspaper accounts. Not surprisingly, he also reports that Chou, at 72, appears to be able to work with almost no sleep.

In his interviews with Mao, Snow notes the Chairman's concern over the exaggerations of his own personality cult. Mao would himself, he said like to drop from 'The Four Greats' by which he is now lauded in China the titles of Great Leader, Great Supreme Commander and Great Helmsman, leaving himself only the title of Great Teacher. He had always been a schoolteacher, Mao told Snow, and always would be one.

Signora Macciocchi's *Daily Life in Revolutionary China* is also a book of impressions and interviews during a visit a year later than Snow's. Signora Macciocchi is a senior member of the Italian Communist Party and a member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Her avowed aim was to find out how close Chinese communism came to Marxist-Leninist ideals, and many pages of her fairly long book are taken up by ideological discussion. Her impressions of China are almost entirely favourable down to 'the beautiful and well balanced' heads and 'the shining eyes and hair' of the women she interviewed.

LOIS MITCHISON

La Rentrée en Scène du Japon. La Politique Japonaise Face aux États-Unis depuis 1945. By Pierre Fistié. *Paris: Armand Colin for La Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 1972. 168 pp. (Travaux et Recherches de Science Politique, No. 21.) 29.00F.*

Black Star Over Japan: Rising Forces of Militarism. By Albert Axelbank. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 240 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

Japanese Imperialism Today: 'Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia'. By Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1973. 279 pp. Maps. Tables. Index. (A Pelican Original.) 50p. A$1·70. C$2·15.*

American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Era. By Robert A. Scalapino. *Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies in association with the Library Press, New York. 1972. (Distributed by Sage Publications, London and Beverly Hill, Calif.) 127 pp. Map endpaper. (The Washington Papers 2.) $2·50.*

The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and Japanese Security Policies in Transition. By Robert E. Osgood. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972. 95 pp. (Studies in International Affairs No. 16.) £2·25. Paperback: £0·90.*

Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Hiroshi Kitamura. Introduction by Edwin O. Reischauer. *Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971. 46 pp. Tables. (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 28.)*

JAPAN'S rise from ruin to the status of an economic giant has produced an avalanche of literature to explain the inner workings of the miracle. Now a new wave is shaping up in the form of nipponology. The kremlinologists and the pekinologists, even if they had to marshal facts and intuition to penetrate the iron and bamboo curtains, have been probing relatively predictable entities: large, backward countries apt to change their tactics but basically preoccupied with their all-absorbing uphill struggle to improve the material conditions of their masses. Not so in the case of today's unpredictable Japan.

With fateful options piling up before them, the choices of the Japanese will have greater impact on Asia's and the world's future than any conceivable event short of war. Moreover, more than once in their history, the Japanese have changed course abruptly because of a complex mix of emotional, cultural and economic components. Will Japan opt for a Sino-Soviet-Japanese balance of power in Asia with the United States in a peripheral role only, or will it prefer to preserve the bipolar relationship under the United States's protective umbrella? will it rearm? and if so, will it go nuclear? Or, again, have the opposition parties any chance of replacing the present conservative establishment with a coalition government? Or will the reactionary-militarist-nationalist trinity strike once it considers that the leftward slide has gone far enough? Such and similar questions preoccupy the nipponologists and one may safely predict that they have some interesting and fertile years ahead of them.

Each practitioner of this new art, however, tends to specialise on one particular aspect of the unfolding story and so exaggerate its importance. Among the books reviewed here, the only exception is that of Pierre Fistié, partly because most of it traces the transition from bipolar American-Japanese relations to the beginnings of multipolarism, and partly because it was completed before the Nixon visit to Peking and so the more challenging developments since that date are dealt with only in a short postscript. Nevertheless, students will find this a reliable and useful summary of the 1945-71 period of Japan's external relations, especially with the United States.

With *Black Star over Japan* and *Japanese Imperialism Today* we join the military and expansionist branches of nipponology. Mr. Axelbank's book is the product of over a decade of journalistic experience in the Far East, particularly in Japan. With a lively style it ranges over a variety of

subjects combined to show the growing importance of the emerging military-industrial establishment. Interesting chapters are devoted to the new military, to the re-emergence of an organised extreme-right complete with its fascist lunatic fringe and nostalgic for the Co-Prosperity Sphere, or to the deep emotional echoes of ideas and acts personified by the late Yukio Mishima. They are richly documented. In fact, with the world's attention focused on the economic scene it may be useful to have a corrective. Yet the message would only have gained in force if the disparate elements had not been concentrated and discussed to prove a point so completely out of context. No doubt the danger is real but at least some attention to rival countervailing forces would have helped better to assess its true dimensions.

The aim of the authors of *Japanese Imperialism Today* is declared to be limited 'to provide the basic economic and political information on Japan's relationship with the South-East Asian area . . . in the context of Japan's relationship with the dominant imperialist power, the United States' (p. xvii). It is 'not a primarily theoretical work' and, according to the dustjacket, it is 'a lively and convincing Marxist study of Japan's new economic empire in Asia, detailing the new forms of dependency and control built into its relations with the region'. It is fairly lively indeed but only those who are ready to accept the Marxist approach and jargon with its abusive generalisations will find it convincing. The structural characteristics of the Japanese ruling elite and the guidelines and continuity of its actions are competently analysed. Some details—as, for example, the elaborate hierarchical structures now being established in some of the mammoth enterprises, linking management, supervisory staff and labour—are both new and revealing. Yet, although on a more academic level than Mr. Axelbank's, this too is a picture in black and white with no shades in between. It suffers from doctrinal preselection and thus fails to convey the complex interdependence of human, cultural and material components, which rarely fit into rigid ideological preconceptions.

With Osgood's and Scalapino's booklets we are back to the Nippo-American branch of future-gazing. The first believes that '. . . fears of Japanese military expansion and nuclear adventurism are overblown. . . .' (p. 84) and that '. . . with the moderation of U.S.-Chinese relations and the emergence of a powerful Japan no longer under American tutelage, a new era of American Far Eastern policy has begun. . . . [and] they are likely to develop in a less emotional climate of opinion . . .' (p. 95). Scalapino too reaches the conclusion that '. . . under present conditions, the odds are strongly against large-scale rearmament in Japan, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the assumption of military responsibilities beyond Japan's home territory . . .' (p. 111). But his conclusions are somewhat more prudent: '. . . nothing can be taken for granted concerning American-Japanese relations in the future . . . continued deterioration is possible . . . [and] it would be subjective feelings as much or more than objective differences that would cause such deterioration . . .' (p. 116).

How important the 'emotional climate' and the 'subjective feelings' could be is sensitively discussed in the shortest but most interesting of these volumes by Hiroshi Kitamura, a Japanese scholar with extensive experience of the United States. With simplicity but with penetration he deals with the psychological problems influencing relations between the two countries and, by implication, between Japan and the Western world as a whole. He analyses the cultural and racial causes of misunderstandings and draws

attention to Japanese concepts, values and priorities which decisively shape public attitudes in his country. Then, with tact and diplomacy, he contrasts them with corresponding American reactions. His forty-four pages ought to convince aspiring nipponologists that of all the shafts to be explored this one is the most neglected and the most likely to yield material helpful to understanding.

TIBOR MENDE

The Okinawa Problem. A chapter in Japan-U.S. relations. By Akio Watanabe. *Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 1970. (Distrib. in UK by International Scholarly Book Services London.) 220 pp. Map. Tables. Bibliog. Index. $9·60. £4·50.*

WHOEVER controls Okinawa may be said to control the south-west Pacific. From 1879 to 1945 its island group formed part of the Japanese Empire; in 1945 it fell to the United States. Since then Okinawa has acted as a touchstone of Japanese-American relations, and Dr. Watanabe's short but useful study explains how. His book is in two parts: a historical account of the issue from 1945 until the Nixon-Sato agreement of 1969; and a political analysis of the reactions to it within Japan. Throughout this period both Americans and Japanese have been fully aware of the significance of Okinawa, since it has provided such an accurate measure of the relative status of the two powers. At the moment, there can be no doubt that the United States is still in command of the situation. Japan secured reversion in 1972, but at the price of allowing America to retain absolute authority over the use of the military base areas. How much longer this can last is a matter for conjecture, and it is a pity that Dr. Watanabe's conclusion does not probe the future more searchingly. In particular, one would have liked to have known more about Chinese attitudes in the light of the long-standing Chinese claim to surzerainty over the Ryukyus, but these are only briefly touched on. Even so, this is a helpful and dispassionate survey of the Okinawa problem, and one which adds appreciably to our understanding of post-war Japanese and American behaviour in the Far East.

JOHN MAJOR

Japanese Diplomacy In A Dilemma: New Light On Japan's China Policy, 1924–1929. By Nobuya Bamba. *Kyoto: Minerva Press. 1972. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1973. 440 pp. Maps. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $10·50.*

LOADED with footnotes and often repetitive, this book may make heavy-going for the general reader; but for anyone seeking to understand the whys and wherefores of Japanese foreign policy in the 1920s and its bearing on developments leading to the eventual outbreak of the Pacific war this scholarly study should be of real value.

Primarily a detailed analysis of the contrasting views and methods of Baron Shidehara and General Tanaka during their respective terms of office as foreign minister, it shows how each based his policy on what he considered to be Japan's best interests; but their views on what those interests were and how to serve them were diametrically opposed. Shidehara, a professional diplomat with liberal views, acted on the principle of 'live and let live' and frequently summed this up as meaning 'co-existence and co-prosperity', a term which in later years was to convey a more sinister

meaning. A strong believer in peaceful co-operation with the West and China, he was always ready to compromise and make concessions in the cause of world peace. Tanaka, on the contrary, regarded compromise as equivalent to submission and concessions as an admission of defeat, two unendurable fates in the eyes of one brought up on traditionalist *samurai* ideas.

As stressed in these pages, Shidehara was, in effect, a spiritual descendant of those who, when Perry demanded the opening of Japan's doors to foreign intercourse, realised that the best policy was to open them voluntarily and overcome Japanese deficiencies by learning from the West. Tanaka, on the other hand, represented those who had opposed the opening of the country and had sought to reject foreign influences. As a nationalist 'hawk', he was determined that Japan should never again be subservient to anyone, but should snap its fingers at the Western world and set the pace by what the author calls 'autonomous diplomacy'.

The drawing of these comparisons between Shidehara and Tanaka is shown in the context of the main domestic and international developments from the mid-19th century onwards, and more particularly in the 1920s when China became the burning question for Japan. The tragedy was that Shidehara's policy failed, whereas Tanaka's paved the way for the upsurge of ultra-nationalism in the 1930s and all that followed. The reasons for this are closely examined and skilfully described by the author of this interesting work.

MALCOLM D. KENNEDY

NORTH AMERICA

Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration. By Robert E. Osgood et al. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press in collaboration with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 1973. 350 pp. Index. (America and the World, Vol. II) £6·90. $14.50. Paperback: £1·90.*

THIS, the second volume in the 'America and the World' series, seeks like its predecessor to answer the question 'What will the future of American foreign policy be?' by examining the course which it has taken during the immediately preceding presidential administration. It finds an essential continuity between the aims of the Nixon administration and its predecessor; they both sought retrenchment without disengagement, hoping thereby to establish and maintain stability in the great power relationships. But the Nixon policy makes certain departures too—a reduced anxiety about the communist threat to the Third World, a reduced devotion to the domino theory and a desire to reduce the United States' own interests in the Third World.

Individual contributors explore the various facets of this. Robert Tucker, relating it to the attitudes of Americans at home, finds this compatible with the public mood in the short run but is less confident about the longer haul. Francis Rourke, in a contribution which Watergate has only made more pertinent, emphasises how much the whole Nixonian strategy (like that of his immediate predecessor indeed) provoked and depended

upon a dominant role for the President. 'The first casualty of every large-scale retreat on the part of the United States from international politics would be the presidency itself' (p. 104). Should this now be read in reverse? Herbert Dinerstein looks at it the other way round—the view from Moscow. He concludes that Soviet interests point basically to a retrenchment American-style, but that ideology is likely to delay the acceptance by the Kremlin of such a policy.

Lawrence Martin, the only non-American contributor, explores the strategic dimension and concludes, hearteningly, that the arrival of 'parity' between the Soviet Union and the United States need not spell the dissolution of the alliance system. Robert Osgood explores the potential clash, in the search for American favour, of Europe and the new 'special relation', Japan. David Calleo examines the economic implication, in particular, of the new Europe and warns against a too easy confidence that European unity necessarily makes for good economic relationships. Benjamin Rowland writes on Latin America and George Liska, opaquely, on 'Regional Systems and Global Order'. The word Canada occurs at no point either in the text or in the index.

H. G. NICHOLAS

American Foreign Policy: Response To A Sense of Threat. By Henry T. Nash. *Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press; Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey Ltd. 1973. 247 pp. Index. (The Dorsey Series in Political Science.) $4.95.*

Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment. By Herbert K. Tillema. *New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co.; Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside. 1973. 260 pp. Index. Bibliog.*

American Defense and Détente. Readings in National Security Policy. Edited by Eugene J. Rosi. *New York, Toronto: Dodd, Mead. 1973. 532 pp. $10.50.*

THE first two studies address themselves to similar matters in contrasting ways. Both are concerned with analysing United States perceptions of international threats since 1945, Nash emphasising organisational changes and responses, Tillema the rationale behind decisions to intervene or not to intervene militarily in the internal conflicts of other countries. Both are implicitly post-Vietnam in context, viewing the period 1945-1968 as dominated by a particular set of attitudes and criteria towards foreign policy, and assuming that in the 1970s the bases of foreign policy-making and patterns of American military intervention will change (the latter more slowly than the former).

Professor Nash examines the hypothesis that since 1945 American foreign policy has been fundamentally a response to the sense of threat posed by communism. This is seen in terms of the foreign policy role of the President and the influence exercised by specific executive agencies assisting the President to perform his decision-making responsibilities. He does a sound job of outlining the events which shaped policy for over two decades, the policy itself and its effect on government organisations responsible for foreign affairs. He illustrates the changing role of the military, intelligence organisations, the State Department and the presidential advisory system in the White House, and provides a valuable case study

of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1969–72 as an example of the interaction of these elements as the basic sense of threat began to change. He speculates about the new directions of American foreign policy in the 1970s, seeing in the generalisations and contradictions of the Nixon doctrine 'indications of the caution and uncertainty that accompany the process of beginning to act on a different set of perceptions' (p. 198). His catalogue of developments necessary to avoid relapses into cold war forms of behaviour seem optimistic, and indicate the practical complexities of achieving a new foreign policy orientation.

Professor Tillema develops a theory of post-1945 overt American military intervention in terms of the perceptions by policy-makers of the nature of the threat to the United States of external events, seeking to explain why open military action is taken at certain times and places, but not others, and the restraints built into the decision-making process. By careful analysis of the four examples of open military intervention—Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—he tests his major hypothesis that the United States will intervene only when its leaders perceive a threat of communist government, and also the validity of a set of restraints which may have prevented intervention in other conflicts, or were absent when intervention took place. Such restraints are seen as forming an operational code applied by foreign policy decision-makers, and he indicates similarities in the process and situations out of which decisions to intervene were made in the above four instances—all were group decisions, military intervention was never the first response to the crisis, but none of the crucial restraints operated. Tillema speculates on whether this post-1945 pattern of military intervention will continue, and believes that while some changes are likely they will not come quickly or easily. This is a stimulating study, which, while it may not commend itself to devotees of more unidimensional explanations, deserves more careful evaluation than is possible here.

Professor Rosi provides a balanced and extensive range of material, meticulously chosen, designed to help students to think rigorously about the complexities of American national security policy in an era of detente. Unhappily, in its hardcover form its expense may provide a major deterrent to the achievement of this goal.

JOHN D. LEES

The Modern Supreme Court. By Robert G. McCloskey. Foreword by Martin Shapiro. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1972. 376 pp. Index. £6·50.*

ROBERT MCCLOSKEY of Harvard, historian, lawyer and political scientist, who died young in 1969, was among the most distinguished and thoughtful scholarly experts on that very peculiar institution, the Supreme Court of the United States. His little book on *The American Supreme Court*[1] is still by far the best introduction to the Court's role in American history. This far more detailed posthumous work would, if completed, have provided a much fuller account of the gradual process by which the Court emerged as the active champion within the governmental system of civil rights and civil liberties. A general introduction and two long chapters were finished by

[1] Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960.

the author before his death and show the Court, up to 1953, gradually edging towards its new role—hesitating to challenge Senator Joe McCarthy, but developing more liberal attitudes in cases which did not deal with the problem of subversion, and laying the precedents for a more active role in the future even in those cases. The two later chapters consist of seven previously published articles, mostly very detailed and written shortly after the events they describe—though McCloskey's forte was perspective, and his cautious inferences about likely future developments proved strikingly shrewd. Four of these seven articles emphasise civil liberties (including the rights of blacks, and of criminal defendants); one deals with re-apportionment, and another with the position of the churches; the last briefly surveys the Warren Court up to 1964.

For the student who is not a specialist on the Court, the last two of these seven essays are much the most significant part of the book. The church cases provoke a brilliantly illuminating essay on the criteria for evaluating its work; legal craftsmanship, ethical values, but also realism about how far Americans will tolerate unpopular judge-made policies. McCloskey, a very cautious and moderate liberal, always urged the justices to practise prudence and restraint; but in the final essay, written in 1965, he conceded that the Court had succeeded in changing the climate of opinion and so enlarged its own room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless his warnings had been pertinent, and anti-Court resentment helped Nixon and Wallace together to win 70 per cent of the vote in 1968. (Long before Watergate, those who saw no difference between Nixon and Humphrey should have reflected that a President's Court appointments can prolong his political influence for a generation after his own term of office.)

The book as a whole, then, is for Court specialists: a considered survey of the period 1940–53, followed by a series of careful contemporary snapshots of certain later years, always sophisticated, judicious and fair-minded, though with a clearly marked point of view. But the two final essays, particularly that on 'Principles, Powers and Values', are well worth pondering by anyone seriously interested in how the United States is governed.

P. M. WILLIAMS

John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his Times. By Michael A. Guhin. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1972. 404 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £6·00. $12·95.*

THE standard interpretation of John Foster Dulles as an inflexible anti-communist policy-maker is challenged by Michael A. Guhin in this perceptive and carefully researched book, which developed from a doctoral dissertation in political science at the London School of Economics. Guhin has made an important contribution to our understanding of Dulles and American foreign policy in the 1950s, and his book should be a standard reference in any bibliography of the period.

Guhin cogently argues that Dulles is often misunderstood because of limited research about him, a failure to distinguish between his rhetoric and his policies, and a lack of understanding of the constraints imposed on him by foreign-policy pressures and the political context of the times. Guhin contends that Dulles was a pragmatic statesman, which can be demonstrated by a close analysis of his published work, speeches and

policy pronouncements. Dulles was a realist, not an idealist. In fact, he favoured an anti-moralistic approach to American recognition policy as early as 1917. Indeed, he even supported American recognition of communist China and its place at the UN as early as 1950, provided that the Peking regime could demonstrate its ability to govern.

In his book Guhin examines five case studies of Dulles's policies as Secretary of State in order to demonstrate that Dulles was pragmatic and was often misunderstood. Guhin's observations on these cases may be briefly summarised. 'Agonising reappraisal', a phrase used by Dulles to threaten Western nations into ratifying the European Defence Community treaty, was not, according to Guhin, counter-productive to American interests. 'Massive retaliation' did not mean that the United States would abandon alternative military means to nuclear warfare. Dulles's 'loud stage-whispers' at the Geneva conference of 1954 were designed, Guhin explains, to create ambiguity about American foreign policy which would forestall Ho Chi Minh's attempt to control the whole of Vietnam. Dulles did not believe that neutralism was immoral; he chose to condemn neutralism in order 'to accentuate advantages of partnership and collective security' (p. 253). The Suez crisis, Guhin contends, may have been more a reflection of differing interests and perceptions among the Western allies, combined with a bungled military operation, than misunderstandings brought about by Dulles's faulty diplomacy.

Guhin indicates that Dulles himself was partly responsible for his image as an intransigent cold war warrior. Particularly in the period between 1949 and 1953 (before Dulles was Secretary of State), he used evangelical rhetoric, speaking of the 'black plague of Soviet Communism' with its 'slimy octopus-like tentacles'. He also made references to 'atheistic, materialistic communism'. According to Guhin, Dulles used this kind of rhetoric because in America 'at mid-century, a firm anti-communist image was requisite to function as an effective political agent' (p. 131). Dulles was also motivated by a desire to reconcile the moderate Eisenhower Republicans with the party's right wing.

The book clearly demonstrates that Dulles was also human and subject to error. The weight of Guhin's argument, however, attributes too much to 'the times'. Dulles had the support of a popular President, who despite the times, could negotiate with communists.

Guhin's reinterpretation of Dulles is a welcome addition to the literature of the period, but the author may have overstated his case. Dulles probably missed opportunities for detente with the Soviet Union immediately after Stalin's death, when the new Soviet leadership made serious overtures for an accommodation with the West. Dulles did not do much to determine the significance of these probes. Whatever softening his position may have undergone during the second Eisenhower administration, Dulles's stern anti-communist ideology contributed to missed opportunities, although that ideology was not as rigid as has been previously believed.

HERBERT M. LEVINE

Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. By Robert Presthus. *Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada. 1973. 372 pp. Index. $16.50. £6·20.*

THIS is not a book about the luxurious character of the offices in the Canadian Parliament, nor about the palaces of the Canadian aristocracy. The title is sociologese for compromise and agreement among Canadian leaders. Since roughly 1759 Canadians have been practising compromise and finding agreements among themselves in some form or other, and for roughly fifty years scholars like Trotter, Lower, Creighton, Seigfried, Brown, Underhill and Morton, to name a few, have made this central to their work. And so there is nothing new in looking at the focal point of the Canadian political process as Professor Presthus has done. But there are some new things in his book, and his devotion to counting, measuring and comparing leaves the student of Canadian politics on firmer ground than is often achieved by institutional description or historical narrative.

Canada belongs to a class of democratic nations which, like Switzerland, are divided into socio-economic classes and lack religious, racial and linguistic homogeneity. Theoretically, nations of this class should not exist, but they do, and political scientists and sociologists are seeking an explanation. Professor Presthus is not satisfied with the notion that the constitutional arrangements for political participation give rise to party systems which establish a market place, a debating hall and a decision-making process, and that these arrangements are a sufficient explanation in themselves. Nor is he satisfied with the notion that underlying the differences among Canadians, such as regional and class interests, religion, language, and race, there is a compelling substratum of human solidarity and understanding which enables Canadians to live together. The first notion is too obvious and begs too many questions, and the second is too nebulous to have any explanatory value.

And so Professor Presthus gets down to cases, and this is the value of his book. He allows that there is something of a common political culture which leans towards deference and hierarchic social values among French and English-speaking Canadians, and that there exists in Canada a widespread and historically-evolved inclination to rely on the public authorities for the organisation of economic and social life. Operationally, however, he finds that Canadians are joiners; even more so than Americans, 64 per cent of Canadians belong to at least one interest group and 36 per cent to two or more, and 18 per cent to three or more. Starting here, Professor Presthus takes the reader through a painstaking and detailed analysis of how these pressure groups are organised, how they are financed, how they affect decisions and what are the cumulative consequences. As a consequence of 'elite accommodation', which means 'if you scratch my back I'll scratch yours', the governmental hierarchy becomes ever larger, and overall policy changes ever more difficult. Everything can be arranged and nothing can be planned. The leaders of the sub-groups of Canadian society have more in common as leaders than their followers, who go on inhabiting their separate solitudes. Thus social peace is maintained in spite of social differences. There is nothing novel about this final insight, but in arriving at it Professor Presthus has produced some extremely illuminating information. What Porter did for the study of Canadian society, Presthus has done for the study of Canadian politics.

H. S. FERNS

LATIN AMERICA

The Shadow: Latin America faces the Seventies. By Sven Lindqvist. Translated by Keith Bradfield with an Editorial Foreword by Richard Gott. *Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1972. 291 pp. Illus. Bibliog. (The Penguin Latin American Library; Gen. Ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·55.*

The Other Side of the Pacific: Problems of Latin America. By Gilbert J. Butland. *Sydney, London: Angus and Robertson with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 110 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Australian Institute of International Affairs Countries Series; Gen. Ed.: Derek Whitelock.) £1·75.*

Latin American Prospects for the 1970s. What Kinds of Revolutions? Edited by David H. Pollock and Arch R. M. Ritter. Foreword by Jerome I. Levinson. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 334 pp. Tables. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £7·75.*

For a variety of reasons the vast majority of books in English about Latin America are written by Americans and published in the United States. It comes as a surprise, therefore, to review three books by non-American authors all at the same time.

The most interesting of the three is *The Shadow: Latin America faces the Seventies* by Sven Lindqvist, the Swedish journalist better known for his work on China. It is readable, critical and based on far more independent research than most other journalistic treatments of the area. His starting and finishing point is the Lima suburb of Chorrillos; and two sets of interviews with some of its inhabitants serve as introduction and conclusion to his analyses of the problems facing the subcontinent at large and Peru in particular. His findings are pessimistic. He discovers menacing and uncontrolled population explosions, a continuing and damaging dependence upon the United States, rampant militarism, growing and debilitating unemployment and, above all, well-entrenched conservative elites. He is also doubtful about the current agents for change. International aid, military nationalism *à la* Velasco, the 'new' church and the reformist capacities of the middle classes are all examined and found wanting. As for many other people, the only exception in the prevailing gloom seems to be the Cuban revolution, but even here Lindqvist has some words of warning about the dangers of *personalismo* and of dependence upon the new Soviet *patron*. In fact it comes as something of a surprise to hear that it is not a 'hopeless' continent and that 'its present paralysis is artificial'. Given the quality of much of his critique it is also surprising that his solution for the ills of the area involves the application of that old chestnut 'a minimum of common sense'. Nevertheless the book is a well-written and argumentative contribution to the much maligned Penguin Latin American Library, the dropping of which is to be regretted.

The title of Gilbert Butland's book *The Other Side of the Pacific: Problems of Latin America* might produce a certain degree of geographic disorientation in Britain. In fact it is a short introduction to Latin America written for what seems to be an Australian pre-university audience. The organisation of the book is more conventional than is that of Lindqvist's book and its conclusions more optimistic. Although agreeing on the chronic under-utilisation of resources, Butland has more faith in the agents of change than the Swede. As befits a geographer perhaps, he also seems to have great faith in maps, even to the extent of bravely offering one on

the political complexion of Latin America circa 1970, in which Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba are grouped together as 'major social revolutions' and Colombia is classed as having a 'democratic tradition now interrupted by dictatorship'.

To classify the volume of essays *Latin American Prospects for the 1970s: What Kinds of Revolutions?* as non-American is cheating a little. Although edited by two Canadians from papers read at a conference held in Canada, several of the contributors are American and the book itself is part of the impossibly expensive Praeger Special Studies series.

As is often the case, collections of conference papers like this present as many difficulties for the editors as for the reviewers. Conference 'themes' are notoriously vague and the papers presented often of varying quality. The editorial response to the first of these problems is an untidy introductory chapter headed 'Revolution in Latin America: An Overview'. In its attempt to define the subject and tie together the subsequent articles it sets an unfortunate and, at times, contradictory tone. The first sentence, for example, begins with the words: 'For many decades but in particular since 1930 [sic] Latin America has been in the throes of economic, social and political change of a "revolutionary" dimension.'. By page 6, however, they are suggesting that a regime is 'revolutionary' if it is '. . . not only capable of re-writing the rules of the political game but also can use its monopoly of the instruments of coercion [the military and police] . . . to overcome opposition and implement the desired changes'. One wonders which revolutions they had in mind in their first sentence, and why they chose to ignore much of the evidence presented by their contributors.

The papers themselves are arranged in three sections: 'Key Policy Areas in the Seventies', which includes a short piece by Rosenstein-Rodan on planning for full employment; a sceptical evaluation of Latin American planning processes by Harold Wood; and a characteristic fragment of anti-school rhetoric from Ivan Illyich. The second section—'Key Prospective Actors'—contains a discussion of the emergence of a new common style of militarism in Brazil and Peru, which, curiously, insists on *not* analysing the policies pursued by the two regimes; an assessment of the changing role of the Peruvian Catholic Church by Carlos Astiz; a thankfully brief critique of guerrillas; and a thoughtful look at the growing practice of political kidnapping. Of the final section—headed 'Case Studies'—the analysis of the Peruvian military by Astiz and the institutional critique of recent Cuban economic performance by Ritter are the most noteworthy.

The book is disappointing not only in its organisation and uneven content, but also in what it leaves out. It seems strange that a volume devoted to understanding Latin America in the 1970s could completely ignore recent developments in Chile and Argentina. At £7·75, one expects better than this.

DAVID E. STANSFIELD

Latin American Political Parties. By Robert J. Alexander. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 537 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £12·00.*

ALL students of current affairs in Latin America, and future historians, will owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Alexander for this massive and

comprehensive compilation. The bewildering number and variety of parties, past and present, presents a vast canvas of such complexity that the most erudite and well-informed student can all too easily lose his way. Professor Alexander has reduced it all to order; and a very sensible order it is. He deals in turn with the personalist and traditional parties, socialist parties, national revolutionary parties, christian democratic parties and totalitarian parties; even these groupings cannot cover them all and there is a sixth section for miscellaneous parties, which covers the wide range of parties in Brazil and the complexity of *Peronista* parties in Argentina.

Inescapably, there is a great deal of overlapping. Thus, for example, the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* rightly figures among the socialist parties as well as among the revolutionary parties. On the other hand the *Peronista* parties might well have been included among the personalist parties. Professor Alexander has concentrated more on the reality of what parties have done, whether in office or opposition, rather than on the political philosophy that inspires, or has inspired them. Thus where dealing with the *Aprista* party in Peru during the presidency of Bustamante, he quotes a summary of its policies by Harry Kantor which says that, among many other purposes, it wished to 'create a National Economic Congress to bring about the overall planning of Peru' (p. 186). Haya de la Torre in fact went much further: he wanted to recognise capital, both domestic and foreign, as a fourth estate on the grounds that the only way to control capital, and make it operate for the benefit of the nation as a whole, was to organise its participation in government. Clearly, however, it would have been impossible to include all such ideas without making the book unwieldy.

This is not a book that can be read from cover to cover. Rather it is a first-class reference book and accordingly the contents and index are of great importance. The contents are comprehensively and clearly drawn up, but there has been some carelessness in setting up the index, where pages 528 and 529 have been transposed. In so large a volume it would have been useful to have listed the parties, full name and the initials by which they are frequently better known, grouped under countries. But it would be wrong to cavil about minor faults in so valuable a study. The bibliography reveals a wide range of sources, including interviews with over fifty Latin American politicians.

J. A. Camacho

1938: Terrorismo em Campo Verde. (O Ciclo de Vargas—Vol. X.) By Hélio Silva. *Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 1971. 421 pp. Illus. Index. (Coleção Documentos da História Contemporânea. Vol. 11-I.)*

1939: Véspera de Guerra. (O Ciclo de Vargas—Vol. XI.) By Hélio Silva. With the collaboration of Maria Cecília Ribas Carneiro. *Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 1972. 469 pp. Illus. Index. (Coleção Documentos da História Contemporánea. Vol. 11-J.)*

1942: Guerra no Continente. (O Ciclo de Vargas—Vol. XII.) By Hélio Silva. With the collaboration of Maria Cecília Ribas Carneiro. *Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 1972. 448 pp. Maps. Illus. Index. (Coleção Documentos da História Contemporânea. Vol. 11-K.)*

These volumes in Hélio Silva's massive documentation of the Vargas period in Brazil brings the record closer to events remembered by his readers and

the years which saw the country involved directly in the mainstream of world affairs for the first time in its history.

Volumes I to IX covered the successive stages in the transformation from the 'Old Republic' dominated by rural plantation interests to the 'New Republic' and the emergence of a political establishment containing elements of a new urban and industrial middle class, and the beginning of participation by popular forces later to be represented by President Goulart. Parallel with all this was the process of political centralisation which Vargas's *Estado Novo* regime helped to consolidate and which in turn has proved to be the prelude to the phenomenal economic growth during the 1960s and early 1970s.

For these reasons alone the series, the quality of which has improved with each successive volume, constitutes an important contribution to historical research. Significantly, it also marks a more mature approach to this particular field of study by Brazilian writers. The facts that Hélio Silva is himself a Brazilian, working with a young and enthusiastic team of local assistants, is an effective counter to the oft-made charge that the nation's history is being researched and written by foreigners. This may have been true at one time, but today Sr. Silva's research assistants are pursuing their studies into Brazil's role in the war in the archives of Washington and European capitals, while foreign scholars go to Rio to learn from him about the internal forces at work in this period in his country. At the same time there is a steady growth of interest in the outside world in the affairs of Brazil, which accounts for the fact that the early volumes of this series have long been out of print.

The three volumes reviewed here cover the events preceding Brazil's entry into the Second World War and its declaration of war against the Axis powers in 1942. *1938: Terrorismo em Campo Verde* documents the spread of local fascism and the growth of the *Integralista* movement under Plinio Salgado. It was the clashes between the latter's green-shirt followers and the already established Brazilian Communist Party of Prestes that led President Vargas to impose authoritarian rule in order to prevent the conflict between two imported ideologies from escalating into civil war. Although Vargas was able to restore order and keep the peace by severe police measures and Press censorship, his country was drawn almost inevitably into the war in Europe by the American involvement, despite widespread sympathy for the Axis powers within the armed forces. This is the theme of *1939: Véspera da Guerra*, which publishes for the first time a number of important documents about fifth-column activities on the home front and the prolonged negotiations between the Brazilian and American governments. Among them are documents dealing with the complex negotiations which led to the transfer of the British-held concession for the exploitation of the huge Itabira iron ore deposits to American hands, which were in a better position to develop them in the interests of the common war effort.

Pearl Harbour forced a reluctant Brazil to cast in its lot with the Allies. The decision was made easier for President Vargas by the action of German submarines in sinking Brazilian merchant vessels off Brazil's Atlantic seaboard with heavy loss of life. The choice made, Brazil played a leading role in establishing continental solidarity on the Allied side. And by sending an expeditionary force to fight under Field Marshal Alexander in Italy, Vargas was instrumental in placing his country within the camp of the 'Christian West' where it firmly remains to this day. The prelim-

inary diplomatic exchanges between Rio and Washington which led to this fateful orientation in the internal and foreign policies of Latin America's largest and most powerful nation are documented in *1942: Guerra no Continente*.

The course of events from 1943 to the end of the hostilities and the fall of Vargas shortly afterwards will be covered in three more volumes, which Sr. Hélio Silva is now preparing, to complete the series. In all his volumes the author refrains from drawing too many conclusions. He clearly regards his primary task as that of documenting the history of the Vargas era. Other historians will pronounce definitive interpretations; for them Sr. Silva's monumental series constitutes an important source of primary research material.

ROBERT DERVEL EVANS

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

1939: The Making of the Second World War. By Sidney Aster. *London: Andre Deutsch. 1973. 456 pp. Illus. Index. £3·95.*

The French and the Phoney War 1939–40. By François Fonvieille-Alquier. Translation and Introduction by Edward Ashcroft. *London: Tom Stacey. 1973. 218 pp. Illus. Map. Index. £2·95.*

MR. ASTER'S book is a valuable addition to the voluminous literature on the origins of the Second World War, based as it is on official papers, printed sources and personal interviews. The account is well written and accurate.

His theme is that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was a major turning point in British policy. Chamberlain's initial response may have been somewhat muted, but thereafter he had no doubt that the time had come to make a stand. The question before the Cabinet was simply how best to deal with the situation. How immediate was the danger? Which country was next on the list? What resources were available? Mr. Aster deals with these matters *seriatim*, but comprehensively, throwing new light on old issues as he goes. His picture of the Cabinet is far removed from the 'Guilty Men' of past accounts. Hoare, for example, is shown as a forceful man who did less than justice to himself in his own memoir.

As the summer of 1939 developed, relations with Russia became of crucial importance. The author's account is clear and illuminating. The obstacles in the way of an alliance are fairly stated: at the same time, the growth of a pro-alliance faction in the Cabinet is traced. For a long time, Chamberlain remained unconvinced, and even when he changed his mind he could hardly be said to have rushed his fences. The story is told soberly and dispassionately, though this does not lessen the force of implied criticism. Despite hints of what was afoot, the Prime Minister seemed to believe that he still had time on his hands. It could be said, however, that Stalin's own behaviour in these months is still far from clear. In addition, British diplomacy was handicapped, perhaps crippled, by a leak of top secret information to the Germans, which allowed them to shape their actions accordingly.

Throughout these months, Mr. Aster sees Chamberlain as a man still determined to avoid war if possible, yet at the same time resolved to go to

war if Hitler refused to stop. It was a dual concern which almost invited misunderstanding. Hence the delicacy of the Polish situation, where Chamberlain did not want to see the Poles use the guarantee 'provocatively'. Hence the Wilson/Wohlthat talks—though Mr. Aster is not inclined to give them any sinister significance. Throughout these pages, it is quite clear that Chamberlain is the dominant figure. Yet, at the last, a strong body of the Prime Minister's own colleagues would brook no further delay in declaring war. The old man in a hurry was hurried on.

The only serious criticism that can be made of the book is that it totally neglects the Far East as it affected general policy throughout 1939. Just as the last stage of the Danzig crisis was beginning, on August 2, Halifax told his Cabinet colleagues that 'the position in the Far East was now causing him more anxiety than the position in any other part of the world'. It is a remark which a reader of this book would fail to understand.

M. Fonvieille-Alquier begins where Mr. Aster ends, with the onset of the Phoney War. His impressions of his fellow-countrymen possess occasional interest, but are not very substantial. His book passes to and fro between high politics and the views of many men in many streets. He has embellished his own recollections with subsequent reading, but tells us little new. Almost as an acknowledgement of this fact, the book strangely concludes with extracts from Marc Bloch's *Strange Defeat.*[1]

Edward Ashcroft, who translates the work and provides a substantial introduction, knows something about France but is shaky on the international history of the period. In his view, Hitler sent his troops into Prague in the autumn of 1938 (p. 14), having already raped Austria in 1937 (p. 29).

K. G. Robbins

The New Internationalism: Allied Policy and the European Peace 1939–1945. By F. P. King. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles Archon Books. 1973. 230 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Library of Politics and Society, Gen. Ed.: Michael Hurst.) £4·95.*

Mr. King has taken an MA thesis he wrote for Keele University and converted it into a book. Ostensibly, it is an account of Anglo-Soviet-American relations during their alliance in the Second World War, beginning with their altercations over the Second Front in Europe and ending with the Yalta conference in February 1945. Between these two events the negotiation of armistices with the five lesser ex-enemy states is described, together with the early stages of the long wrangles over Austria and Germany. Although King has faithfully served his time in the Public Record Office, nothing essentially new emerges and one is left wondering why these events have been raked up at all.

It cannot be because of the author's own judgments on events, which are controversial, to say the least. One is that the wartime great-power dealings were a 'new internationalism', a term which is not explained except on the dust jacket, where it is described as having been 'wrought and experienced by President Franklin Roosevelt—from the eve of American entry into the war until the end of the Yalta conference', and that is all. Mr. King says of Yalta, as though it opened up a new, Rooseveltian era,

1 London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1949, p. 524.

that 'the most important guidelines had been drawn and the reactionary period of the 1930s had been put to rest' (p. 186).

Another of Mr. King's judgments is in line with the fashionable revisionism which argues that Stalin was more a victim of the cold war than its originator. Harking back to the 1930s, he contends that the British and French were responsible for the failure of the negotiations with Russia in 1939 on the simple ground that 'they were staked to the barren middle ground of irreconcilable interests where the UK was mainly concerned in not antagonising Germany, Poland and Romania, and less interested in building good relations with the USSR' (p. 64). It was because the Baltic states were 'patently incapable of bringing about internal reforms consonant with external realities' that they were swallowed up in the Soviet Union in August 1940. Later, at Yalta, 'constructive discussions of practical problems' took the place of statements of principle. 'The Declaration on Liberated Europe . . . was the only noteworthy exception. . . . It contained nothing new but provided a useful tool in the Roosevelt administration's public relations efforts' (p. 183). With that comment on the 'new internationalism' one can see why Mr. King describes Yalta as the 'starter's flag for a new thrust in twentieth-century political affairs' (p. 185).

But apart from all this there are assessments of events throughout this book which can evoke nothing but bewilderment. Mr. King, for example, chooses to distinguish between the different kinds of peace made with the lesser ex-enemy states— the 'contracted peace' with Romania, the 'residual peace' with the Baltic states and so on. The significance of these designations is left undiscussed. Why the 'peace' in Poland in 1945 should be a 'negotiated' peace and the 'peace' with Germany and Austria in the same year—even if they were 'peaces' at all—should be a 'diplomats' peace' is not made clear. Mr. King in his next book should really try to think out what he is saying.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Volume III: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. By Richard H. Ullman. *Princeton, N.J., London: Princeton University Press. 1972. 509 pp. Index. Illus. £7·00.*

PROFESSOR ULLMAN firmly established his reputation as a leading authority on Anglo-Soviet relations during the first years of Lenin's government with his earlier volumes in the series, dealing respectively with *Intervention and the War*[1] and *Britain and the Russian Civil War*.[2] This volume, which many may find the most interesting of the three, completes a very impressive trilogy. It is devoted to the tortuous, often baffling, negotiations with the Bolsheviks and the dissension within the Whitehall establishment which preceded the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 1921 and Britain's original efforts to come to terms with the strange new revolutionary government in Moscow. This agreement, which was the first move among the major powers to end Russia's diplomatic isolation since the Revolution, coincided with a critical event in Soviet history, being signed only hours after the rebellious sailors at Kronstadt had been crushed by Soviet guns.

Lloyd George's dogged but devious manoeuvring among his colleagues,

[1] 1961. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1962, p. 566.
[2] 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 490.

with the aim of reopening trade with Russia against the implacable opposition of Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill, is recorded in great detail. But this maze of detail is effectively mustered in a well-written narrative which is a pleasure to read and which holds the reader's attention throughout. The history of this important episode in Anglo-Soviet relations is based on the author's assiduous research into the contemporary British archive materials and a wide range of other English and Russian documentation, including the private papers, published and unpublished, of the main British participants in these negotiations. The only relevant private collection of papers not used by Professor Ullman was that of Sir Winston Churchill, which was not accessible to him at the time of writing. In the course of his research into the Lloyd George papers he made the exciting discovery (not hitherto generally known) that the secret Soviet telegraphic codes had been cracked by British Intelligence during the actual trade negotiations. The British government was thus able to follow the messages exchanged between the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Chicherin, in Moscow, Litvinov in Paris and the two Soviet emissaries, Krasin and Kamemev, in London. In this way, London became aware of Soviet prevarication on issues agreed or being negotiated, and in the first place on the Soviet engagements with regard to 'propaganda' in Britain and the colonies. The use of these decoded telegrams for the first time adds a new dimension to this section of Professor Ullman's text.

Though both Lloyd George and Cabinet opponents of his proposed Russian policy were united in their distaste for the 'odious regime' newly installed in Moscow, they were sharply divided about how best to deal with a government which made no secret of its hostility to all democratic institutions. Lloyd George's attitude was motivated by the beneficial results that would flow from bringing Russia back into the community of nations and an incorrigible belief in the efficacy of trade as a means of 'civilising' Bolshevism through contacts with a more humane, democratic world. As Professor Ullman sagely concludes, he never really understood the gulf between the new rulers of Russia and the rest of the world. Neither Curzon, then in charge of the Foreign Office, nor Churchill as Secretary of State at the War Office, were under any such illusions. But, given the state of postwar weariness in the country and of public opinion about Russia in the Labour Party and working class circles, there was no future for their more drastic plans for eliminating the Bolshevik spectre.

After prolonged discussion of the issues involved, Lloyd George finally got the Cabinet's uneasy assent to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, although Curzon and Churchill maintained their dissent to the end. Lloyd George's optimistic anticipations about the outcome of this agreement soon proved to be entirely hollow and unrealistic. No era of harmony and co-operation ensued between Soviet Russia and Great Britain and there was 'precious little trade' emanating from Russia to pick up. Nor were Soviet engagements about terminating subversive activities observed. 'Soviet propaganda directed under the cloak of the Communist International against the institutions of the United Kingdom and the British Empire did not appreciably slacken.'

Lloyd George's illusions about the Bolsheviks did not, however, extend to his views about the state of opinion in the country about Lenin's Russia. Here he showed himself to be much shrewder than either Churchill

or Curzon. He grasped the significance of the 'Hands off Russia' and Councils of Action movements which sprang up in protest against the idea of British military intervention to aid the Poles against the Red Army. He rightly divined that any such intervention would not have the country's support and would be interpreted by large sections of the British working class as a move against a government of peasants and workmen disliked by the governing classes of Europe because of its composition and not because of the misdeeds of the Bolsheviks.

The 'Hands off Russia' approach to Soviet affairs is still with us and so is the still more or less insoluble problem of how to co-exist successfully with a basically hostile government in Moscow. The record of the original discussions of these issues has therefore a considerable contemporary as well as a great historical interest.

Notwithstanding his illusions about the future of Anglo-Soviet relations and of trade as a means of reforming Bolshevism, Lloyd George emerges as the hero of Professor Ullman's book. 'Despite his flaws, he was the best of his contemporaries', he concludes, and his statecraft should not be underestimated 'because he did not succeed in laying the foundation for the international order of compromise and appeasement which he instinctively sought'. The verdict will scarcely be acceptable to the many critics of the 'wily Welshman', but it does not take from the overall value of the fine study of the problems besetting the initiation of Anglo-Soviet relations in 1921.

VIOLET CONOLLY

Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal. Edited by Penderel Moon. *London, Delhi, Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1973. 528 pp. Illus. Index. £8·00.*

IN a mood of depression just before the end of his Viceroyalty, Wavell confessed that he had had an unhappy year, and he went on to remark that 'it is a great strain on a small man to do a job which is too big for him if he feels it too big'. Nobody who knew Wavell would accept his estimate of himself as a small man. He was indeed a remarkable man, put into a job for which he was not fitted by temperament and confronted with the impossible task of reconciling the Congress and the Muslim League. This journal, with its frank day-to-day account of the reactions of those concerned with that conflict, will go a long way to help future historians to understand why partition was inevitable.

As the editor of the journal remarks, Wavell suffered from a disharmony between himself and two successive British governments. In the first phase of that conflict, a clash of personalities between Wavell and Churchill—who had only appointed him Viceroy in order to avoid making him Supreme Commander in East Asia—magnified the difficulties resulting from a profound disagreement over policy. After the failure of the Cripps Mission, the general view of the British government was that it would be dangerous to make another attempt at a constitutional settlement in India during the war. India was producing all that was required of it in the way of manpower and munitions and *quieta non movere* seemed to be the prudent course to follow. Wavell, on the other hand, considered it essential to find a solution before the end of the war, since Britain's position would otherwise then become untenable. The Viceroy and the government were

thus continually at loggerheads—and Churchill's rather malevolent attitude towards India did not help matters.

Even greater disharmony prevailed when the Labour government made up its mind that India must become self-governing without delay, and sent out the Cabinet Mission. Wavell's comments on the personalities of the Mission are instructive. He found Lord Pethick-Lawrence woolly-minded and far too deferential to Indian politicians; he liked and understood Mr. A. V. Alexander; but Sir Stafford Cripps was his *bête noire*. Here one is bound to sympathise with Wavell's feeling that Cripps was far too clever and, politically speaking, not very scrupulous. Cripps's obvious partiality for the Congress had a corresponding reaction on the Muslim League, but this might not have mattered much but for the vagueness of the Cabinet Mission's two main statements. Jinnah justifiably took the first of these to mean that if either the Congress or the Muslim League refused to co-operate in an interim government, the other party would be allowed to form that government. When the Congress rejected the proposal for an interim government, Jinnah naturally assumed that he would be asked to do so, and was indignant when he was not. Wavell had raised this question of interpretation when the first statement was drafted, but he was 'outsmarted' by the politicians of the Mission.

Even greater trouble befell Wavell when it became clear that the Congress and the Muslim League were irreconcilable and he put forward a breakdown plan, which would have involved handing over some provinces to the Congress Working Committee. It would be 'easy' to criticise that plan, but the real trouble was that the British government simply would not make up its mind what to do in case of deadlock. From a politician's point of view this may have been wise, but it was not acceptable to the soldierly mind of Wavell. The British Cabinet took the easiest way out and dismissed Wavell, rather ungraciously.

The story of these events is clearly and frankly told in this journal and the value of the diary is enhanced by its scholarly editing. Sir Penderel Moon, besides being a scholar of distinction, was present at the scene of action during this period. His clear factual notes, together with an excellent epilogue, in which he takes a more favourable view of Wavell's Viceroyalty than others have done, will be of great value to students of this period.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

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Correction. On pages 431 and 434 of the July 1973 issue of *International Affairs* the title of the book by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband should have been *Word Politics*, not *World Politics*.

BOOKS REVIEWED, JANUARY 1974

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: THREE OPTIONS FOR REFORM

*Hans O. Schmitt**

ON August 15, 1971, the United States ceased to buy and sell gold for the settlement of international transactions. The proximate reason was that American expenditures abroad for current services and the purchase of assets had come to require larger amounts of foreign exchange than the United States could readily earn or borrow abroad. The difference would have had to be settled in gold—later supplemented by special drawing rights on the International Monetary Fund—under arrangements agreed upon at Bretton Woods in 1944. The system broke down when the United States judged its gold stock no longer sufficient to serve the monetary functions then assigned to it.

Once the old order had collapsed, there was in the American view 'probably no need for a general stampede back into Bretton Woods or some similar growth of forest'.[1] The system would have to be reformed in ways that remained to be negotiated. The critical issue seemed to be 'whether the United States, Europe, and Japan will form a cohesive, cooperative partnership or whether they will split into rival economic blocs'.[2] The main forum for the discussion on reform has been a committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund known as the Committee of Twenty. It intends to complete its work in time for a final meeting on June 13, 1974.

There are in essence three alternatives to which any choice of a new system is restricted. The first option is to restore the *de facto* dollar standard of the postwar period. The second basic option would be to accept floating exchange rates on a permanent basis. The third option is to introduce a new reserve standard. This paper attempts to show why none of these alternatives has proved to be acceptable in its pure form. Thus a new order will have to represent some compromise among them. As limiting cases, nevertheless, the three basic options define the

* The International Monetary Fund, which employs the author, is not responsible for his views. Also absolved are David Calleo, Andrew Crockett, Isaiah Frank, Anthony Lanyi, Edward Morse, Robert Triffin, David Walker, and John Williamson, whose helpful comments are gratefully acknowledged.

1 U.S. Treasury Under Secretary Paul Volcker in Congressional testimony, *The Journal of Commerce*, New York, September 14, 1972, p. 4.

2 Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Nobuhiko Ushiba, quoted in Leonard Silk, 'Is a New Crisis Possible?', *The New York Times*, July 19, 1972, p. 53.

substantive issues on which a compromise will turn, and in terms of which the final outcome will have to be interpreted.

I A dollar standard

As a holding action ten major industrial countries, meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, agreed on December 18, 1971 to an immediate revaluation of the leading currencies against the dollar in exchange for a formal devaluation of the dollar against gold. The United States did not, however, give any undertaking to resume sales of gold at any level. It would continue to decide whether or not to allow a deficit on its balance of payments without having to redeem any of the dollars that would accumulate abroad as a result. Thus, while the Smithsonian Agreement lasted, the world was placed on an inconvertible dollar standard, with agreed exchange rates but without payments constraint on the United States.

The dollar standard did not come upon the world all at once; its evolution dates back to the first efforts to give effect to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. The terms of that agreement required members to declare a par value for their currencies, such par values to remain fixed except where the International Monetary Fund could be persuaded that a fundamental disequilibrium required their adjustment.[3] Otherwise a country would finance temporary deficits in its balance of payments from its reserves, supplemented as needed by medium-term credits drawn from the Fund.[4] Together these resources were thought to be adequate to permit a country to ride out temporary deficits, and to allow time for corrective policies other than exchange rate adjustments to work themselves through.

At the close of the Second World War, far and away the most important component of international reserves was gold of which, by 1947, the United States held more than 70 per cent. Under the circumstances, only the United States assumed the obligation officially to buy and sell gold for domestic currency at a fixed price.[5] Other countries, equally committed to keep their exchange rates within narrow margins around par, adopted the method of holding their exchange rates with the dollar within the prescribed margins by buying and selling dollars against local currency. For day to day intervention in the exchange markets, therefore, countries needed to keep at least working balances in dollars; it was then convenient to retain foreign exchange reserves generally in this form as well.

As long as other countries chose their exchange rates with respect

[3] Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
[4] Article V.
[5] Switzerland also did so but was not a member of the Fund.

to the dollar, the United States could not fix the dollar at any other rate. As long as other countries intervened in their exchange markets with dollars in support of their own currencies, no need remained for the United States to intervene in support of the dollar either. Thus the United States, standing at the centre of the system, felt peculiarly limited in its power to change its exchange rate. An apparent incapacity to adjust their balance of payments in this way tended to diminish the discipline of the balance of payments on American policy-makers, though they continued to invoke that discipline to promote measures needed for domestic reasons as well as for international ones.[6]

To be sure, when the United States first experienced a major payments deficit in 1958, it reacted much like any other country. The severe tightening of monetary and fiscal policies in 1959, which led to the recession of 1960 and 1961, can in part be attributed to concern about the balance of payments.[7] When for domestic reasons this gave way to reflationary measures after 1961, balance-of-payments considerations led the authorities to seek to limit the foreign content of government programmes, to place restrictions in the way of private capital outflows, and generally to promote exports, travel to the United States, and the purchase of American securities abroad. Domestic reflation was also accompanied by wage-price guideposts backed by the purchasing power of the federal government.

Nevertheless, although balance-of-payments pressures were felt, they were considerably less acute than might have been expected from the size and duration of the deficits.[8] Despite persistent deficits, the rise in business activity that began early in 1961 ran uninterruptedly for a record 105 months. The unusual length of the 1961–69 business expansion, which lifted most major measures of activity far above their normal trends, was the result of a combination of fiscal and monetary stimuli, including the massive income tax reduction of 1964, the incentives to capital spending from the tax investment credit and accelerated depreciation and, particularly after 1965, the huge rise in military expenditures for the war in South-east Asia.[9]

Perhaps a very large country like the United States could not have served the world better than by tailoring its monetary policies to an expanding domestic market open to suppliers at home and abroad, leaving other countries to shape their monetary policies to preserve

[6] Henry C. Wallich, 'Whatever Became of the Balance of Payments? ', *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1970, p. 266.

[7] Richard N. Cooper, 'The Dollar in the World Economy', in Kermit Gordon, ed., *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 491.

[8] Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York, Toronto, London, Sydney: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968), p. 41.

[9] J. Roger Wallace in *The Journal of Commerce*, New York, July 27, 1972, p. 1.

balance-of-payments equilibrium or accumulate dollar balances in their reserves. Any deficit in the American balance of payments would not then be something to be corrected; it would merely register that part of monetary expansion in the United States that the rest of the world chooses to add to its balances.[10] The American authorities can determine the rate at which their money supply expands, but not the fraction of it that is taken up by monetary institutions in the rest of the world.

Perhaps the American payments deficit should not have been called a deficit at all. To the extent that the United States provided the world with liquid dollar claims by long-term capital outflows and aid exceeding its current account surplus, it could no more be said to be in deficit than is a bank when it makes a loan and enters the deposit on its books.[11] As a financial intermediary, the United States bridged the gap between enterprises abroad which have to pay more domestically to borrow long-term money, or cannot get the amounts they want at any price, and asset holders abroad who receive less for placing their short-term deposits at home. If this link is cut, in the interests of correcting an American deficit, investment and growth abroad might well be cut with it.

In any case, large American deficits meant that other countries taken as a group experienced corresponding surpluses. The build-up in their external balances permitted most industrial countries to go ahead in 1958 with a large-scale dismantling of exchange restrictions, not only on current transactions as had been envisaged at Bretton Woods, but on capital account as well. The higher degree of convertibility of currencies permitted foreign corporations and individuals to acquire and hold dollar balances; the consequent development of the Euro-dollar and Euro-bond markets reflected the convenience of having a single currency in which to denominate international transactions, even those not directly associated with the United States.[12]

Nevertheless, there were drawbacks. Exempting the United States from any balance-of-payments discipline would not have left other countries with a satisfactory protection in case the United States pursued an excessively inflationary or deflationary policy.[13] Presumably the United States would tailor its policies to balance price stability against full employment in a way that would command general support at home.

[10] Robert A. Mundell, 'The Collapse of the Gold Exchange Standard', Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Joint Economic Committee) *Next Steps in International Monetary Reform* (Washington, September 9, 1968), p. 42.

[11] Emile Despres, Charles P. Kindleberger, and Walter S. Salant, 'The Dollar and World Liquidity', in Lawrence H. Officer and Thomas D. Willett, eds., *The International Monetary System: Problems and Proposals* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 42–45.

[12] Ronald I. McKinnon, 'Private and Official International Money: the Case for the Dollar', *Essays in International Finance* No. 74, Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, April 1969.

[13] Mundell, 'A Plan for a World Currency' (as in footnote 10), p. 21.

Other countries either had to accept the American rate of inflation, whatever their own judgment on the appropriate trade-off might have been, or else accumulate inconvertible dollars in the reserves. In effect, therefore, the central bank of one country was placed in a supra-national role, exerting a large influence on monetary conditions in other countries without necessarily being responsive to their needs.

Exempting the United States from balance-of-payments discipline would also require other countries to accept whatever capital and other transfers the United States might choose to disburse abroad, for whatever purposes, and either accumulate inconvertible dollars again, or inflate sufficiently to allow American producers to earn them back. The implicit underwriting of American investment in Europe and of the large increase in overseas expenditures associated with the Vietnam war proved particularly difficult to accept. 'The first gave rise to the charge that the United States was buying up Europe and that the purchase was being financed by European central banks; the second to the charge that the Europeans were financing an American military adventure about which they were not consulted and of which a great many of them disapproved.' [14]

As long as the dollar remained convertible, other countries could, by converting unwanted dollars into gold, attempt to exert pressure for measures to reduce the American deficit. By the end of 1965, the gold holdings of the United States had declined to about one-third of the total official holdings; at the same time, external liabilities to central banks and governments had begun to exceed the remaining stock of monetary gold in the United States. The vulnerability of the United States to reserve pressure was therefore increasing steadily. To safeguard its freedom of movement, the United States would either have had to raise the price of gold or simply refuse to sell it, and either possibility sufficed to fuel speculation that became increasingly difficult to contain.

An increase in the price of gold was generally, though not universally, thought undesirable, not least for the risk of a general run on the dollar that it entailed. Instead, the United States first sought to engage the gold holdings of other trading nations in support of the gold market, and in 1961 joined six of them in a 'gold pool' managed for this purpose by the Bank of England, with gains and losses distributed among members in proportion to their initial contributions.[15] When the arrangement broke down under a wave of speculation in early 1968, the participating countries agreed in Washington no longer to sell or buy gold at all in private markets, allowing the price there to be freely determined by

[14] Cooper (as in footnote 7), p. 485.

[15] Apart from the United States, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland participated; France soon withdrew.

supply and demand, but to continue the traditional fixed price in official transactions among themselves.

The ' two-tier ' gold price removed private speculation as a drain on official gold reserves; it virtually blocked any increase in their total as well.[16] However, at the Rio de Janeiro meetings of the International Monetary Fund late in 1967, agreement had already been reached on the periodic creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) on the Fund as a supplement to gold in national reserves. The value of the new asset was rigidly linked to the official price of gold, hence a steady flow of it could be expected to substitute in part for withdrawals of American gold that might otherwise have occurred.[17] Concurrent allocations to the United States would at the same time bolster its ability to convert official dollar holdings should some need persist.

Negotiating this arrangement proved difficult. To be sure, a domestic ' credit crunch ' had moved the American balance of payments into temporary surplus in 1966. The possibility that the net flow of dollars abroad might permanently dry up reinforced the case for the new reserve asset to substitute for dollars as well as for gold, but this point failed to persuade the Europeans. The deadlock was broken only, and then rather suddenly, after the United States, early in 1967, had threatened unilaterally to cut the dollar free from gold.[18] The asset that finally emerged was given pointedly gold-like characteristics: it earned virtually no interest and would therefore be a poor replacement for dollar balances.[19]

Briefly once more the SDR could in 1969 be presented as the major source of future increases in international reserves. Though the basic deficit in the American balance of payments reached record proportions that year, exceptionally high interest rates in the United States nevertheless succeeded in drawing dollars out of foreign central banks, and provided a fleeting justification for three allocations of SDRs to take their place over a first basic period. However, when credit was again relaxed in the United States soon after, the underlying deficit in the American balance of payments surfaced once more, sending dollars abroad in unprecedented proportions.[20] Despite increased holdings of SDRs, central banks soon sought to convert dollars again, precipitating the final break with gold.

[16] As a matter of policy, the IMF continued to buy gold from South Africa under specified conditions.

[17] See Robert Triffin, ' Neither Gold nor the Dollar ', in Officer and Willett, eds., *The International Monetary System* (as in footnote 11), p. 6.

[18] Robert Triffin, *Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 118.

[19] Fred Hirsch, ' SDRs and the Working of the Gold Exchange Standard ', *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*, July 1971, pp. 244–245.

[20] Fred Hirsch, ' The Development and Functioning of the Postwar International Monetary System ' *Finance and Development*, June 1972, p. 51.

II. Floating exchange rates

The suspension of dollar convertibility on August 15, 1971, was accompanied by the imposition of a surcharge on all imports into the United States; the offer was made soon after to withdraw the surcharge if other governments would 'allow market realities freely to determine exchange rates for a transitional period'.[21] The Canadian dollar had been allowed to float since 1970. Under heavy speculative pressure, the German and Dutch authorities had also, since May 1971, suspended their commitment to maintain fixed exchange rates; they were joined by most other industrial countries in August. All of them, however, concurrently intensified capital controls, reduced interest rates, intervened in exchange markets, or in other ways sought to minimise the appreciation of their currencies in terms of dollars.

By imposing the surcharge, the American authorities served notice that they themselves would no longer be satisfied to have their balance-of-payments deficits financed by monetary authorities abroad. Most countries had shown themselves reluctant in the past to avoid dollar accumulations by accelerating domestic inflation. Without that, however, the surplus in the American external current account, after reaching a high of $7.7 billion [22] in 1964, declined to $2.2 billion in 1970 and was on its way to a $0.8 billion deficit in 1971.[23] A programme of stiff wage and price controls introduced with the suspension of dollar convertibility was not thought adequate to reverse the trend. Floating exchange rates might most easily achieve a dollar devaluation that would.

In principle, floating exchange rates should permit different countries to maintain differing rates of inflation without unsettling reserve accumulations or decumulations.[24] They would also, however, make it easier for American producers to expand at the expense of others whenever increased American transfers abroad, of any kind, required financing. The Americans themselves calculated that, with no restrictions on capital and other transfers, a turnaround of some $13 billion in the external current account of the United States was necessary to restore overall payments equilibrium.[25] The fact that the American authorities no longer welcomed foreign dollar accumulations as an alternative, showed that such a turnaround had become a policy objective in its own right.

[21] U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally speaking at the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund. See 'The Retreat from Bretton Woods: The Story So Far', *Midland Bank Review*, November 1971, p. 18.

[22] Thoughout this article the term 'billion' represents 1,000 million.

[23] These figures refer to the balance on goods, services, and private transfers.

[24] Harry Johnson considers this 'the main argument for flexible exchange rates'. See his 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969', in George N. Halm, ed., *Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 97.

[25] U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally to a meeting of the Group of Ten in London. See *The New York Times*, September 16, 1971, p. 1.

Other countries were quick to challenge the American target as excessive in view of their own balance-of-payments objectives. An attempt to consolidate the current account targets of most industrialised countries came up with a figure of $20–24 billion, double the amount of $11–12 billion that they would in fact realise in the course of 1971.[26] Thus any turnaround in the current account deficit of the United States would have had to be superimposed on the surpluses of its major trading partners, which its own transfers to third countries had helped to finance in the past, and which they were not now prepared to forfeit without a fight. As a compromise, they agreed at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington to trade a discrete devaluation of the dollar for a removal of the surcharge. The point had been made that a market equilibrium in the overall balance of payments need not be a political equilibrium if the current account balances associated with it are found unacceptable. There are at least three reasons why current balances may be a legitimate source of concern.

The first is a question of markets. The potential pay-off from expenditures on applied research and product development will be larger, the larger is the overall size of the market to which it can be applied with profit.[27] Scale economies can be brought within reach of smaller countries through specialisation for export: specialisation increases the average size of market for a country's products and hence promotes technical change. However, if a balance on current account is to be maintained, exports will be limited by the exchange rate at which the balance is struck. Any further expansion of exports, and hence inducement to technical progress, requires that a current account surplus be allowed to emerge.

A current account surplus implies an exchange rate that not only permits maximum penetration of foreign markets but protects domestic markets as well. By making imports more expensive in home markets, and exports cheaper abroad, such an exchange rate will draw resources from the production of non-tradeable to tradeable goods, that is, from products with strictly local markets to those marketable on a global scale.[28] A current account deficit by contrast implies an exchange rate that discourages exports as it promotes imports. It fosters the production of non-tradeable goods, therefore, whose markets are narrow and offer minimal incentives to technical change.

Some of the damage resulting from current account deficits can be remedied by raising barriers to imports. These will divert some additional

[26] As reported in *The Economist*, London, October 23, 1971, p. 73.

[27] Harry Johnson, *Comparative Cost and Commercial Policy Theory for a Developing World Economy* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968), p. 26, where the argument is not carried to its logical conclusion.

[28] Charles P. Kindleberger, *International Economics* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 300, where the same principle is mentioned in a different context.

resources from the production of exportables and are therefore inferior to a correction of the exchange rate. Tariffs will also, however, draw back into the production of import substitutes some of the resources that would otherwise have been producing non-tradeable goods. This helps to explain why countries that have to accept current account deficits tend to be more protectionist, in the sense of being disposed to raise tariffs, than countries with current account surpluses. Surpluses are apparently needed to support liberal trade policies, by making tariffs redundant.[29]

A second reason for sensitivity to the current balance may lie in its effect on capital flows. By the end of 1967, the value of American private long-term assets in Western Europe was reported as $22·6 billion; that of European assets in the United States as $20·2 billion, or about the same. The composition of these assets, however, showed a striking difference. About $17·9 billion of American holdings in Europe, but only $7·0 billion of European holdings in the United States, were classed as direct investment. The remainder was on portfolio account. American holdings in Europe were heavily concentrated in sectors of the economy most technologically advanced, most adaptable to change, and with the highest growth rates.[30] On this basis it was said that American capital was in process of displacing European enterprise in Europe.

A faster rate of technical progress tends to make firms in larger markets more profitable than those in narrower markets. This difference in profitability must affect the character of capital flows between them. A country with high returns to capital will attract mainly portfolio investment: savers are likely to place their funds with the most successful enterprise whose prospects are favourable and whose pay-off is high. Countries with low returns by contrast attract primarily direct investment, as outside firms buy out their less successful competitors to secure their markets and raw materials base. For the larger country to run current account surpluses in trade with smaller ones should accelerate both movements by intensifying the initial discrepancy in market size.

Successful innovation abroad implies the destruction of capital values associated with obsolete techniques at home. The loss of capital values reduces the financial base for successful imitation by local firms. This affects the manner in which technical innovations, once established abroad, are likely to be transferred across national boundaries. The prospect is not for local firms to catch up, but rather for them to be bought out by foreign enterprises.[31] This tends to undermine efforts to

29 At least the first part of this sentence is confirmed in Wallich (as in footnote 6), p. 267 and elsewhere.

30 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 12.

31 This aspect is by-passed entirely in Raymond Vernon, 'International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May

build rival industrial and intellectual complexes on which technologically creative societies depend. A possible disappearance of separate centres of civilisation can perhaps be welcomed as part of a global integration process; nevertheless, the concomitant concentration of political power must probably be regarded as a cost.

The defence of threatened societies lies in a depreciation of their currency to a rate that will widen markets by producing a current account surplus. When an initially narrow market develops a current account surplus, its potential profitability will improve. The initial impact may be perverse: while local firms will need time to respond to improved profit opportunities, firms abroad can use past accumulations of resources to expand in the devaluing country. Over time, however, the pattern of inward and outward investment should reverse itself, as rising profits permit outward direct investment to expand while attracting inflows of capital on portfolio account.

Until the American current account began seriously to deteriorate, European firms, if they invested abroad at all, invested largely outside the United States in markets which they found easier to penetrate.[32] It was there that they 'gained the experience, created the organisational structure, and perhaps most important of all, gained the extra financial strength' that permitted them to capitalise on other opportunities when they arose.[33] Then in 1969, Western Europe directly invested $550 million in the United States, more than twice the amount committed two years before. However, with only a dozen of the 500 largest corporations in the United States owned and controlled from abroad,[34] the trend could hardly have been described as more than incipient; sufficiently adverse exchange rate developments should arrest it in time.

A third reason for placing a positive value on a current account surplus may be directly political. There are reasons why governments may wish to transfer funds that would not move on commercial principles alone, but which appear to be fully justified on other grounds, including aid, economic or otherwise, to less developed countries. However, if there are any benefits to developed countries from running current account surpluses, these at least must be lost to less developed countries running deficits. In fact, the receipt of foreign exchange in excess of

1966; it is central, however, to Stephen Hymer's celebrated thesis on direct investment as summarised in Charles P. Kindleberger, *American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 15–16.

32 Rainer Hellmann, 'The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation', *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Spring 1971, p. 79.

33 Stephen Hymer and Robert Rowthorn, 'Multinational Corporations and International Oligopoly: the Non-American Challenge', in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation: A Symposium* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970), p. 80.

34 Richard Howe, 'The European Challenge', *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1971, p. 345.

liquidity requirements will tend to lower exchange rates and turn an economy inwards to the production of non-traded goods with limited incentives to technical and social change.[35]

A recognition that the economic costs of running current account deficits may be heavy, does not necessarily dry up the demand for foreign aid. Aid may still be found a useful escape from the political hazards of mobilising domestic resources for development, or for more general purposes, and has in fact been found associated with a lower domestic savings effort in some cases.[36] A political elite that does not need to raise its resources domestically, even to maintain the current expenditure of government, is of course less likely to be responsive to domestic interests than one that does. This may be a desired effect: a broadening of its constituency to include external interests has been at least part of the rationale for extending aid from the start.

If it is to make a net contribution to development, however, any increase in aid must be carefully justified in terms of the offsetting gains it can, item by item, be shown to yield. The tendency has been for direct investment from the richest countries to flow mainly to the next-most-advanced countries where it could expect the highest returns, and from them in turn to the poorer ones in progressively diminishing volume, with portfolio capital tending in the opposite direction. To reverse this pattern, aid has to be aimed primarily at the transfer of technology to national enterprises, so as to raise the productivity of capital in the receiving country, rather than at a simple transfer of resources. While attempting to maximise the former, effective aid should in fact seek to minimise the latter.

For reasons such as these, and perhaps others, a market equilibrium in the overall balance of payments will not be a political equilibrium once the current account balances associated with it are found unacceptable. Any discrepancy will be reflected in conflict over exchange rates.

At the end of 1971, open conflict was averted by the realignment of exchange rates agreed at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. However, the United States had accepted that realignment only in the expectation that significant trade concessions would follow to permit the targeted turnaround in its external current account still to be achieved. Other countries by contrast felt that they had done their part in trade matters through a revaluation of their currencies, and expected in turn that dollar convertibility would soon be restored to ensure that domestic policies in the United States would support rather than conflict with

35 Irma Adelman and Hollis B. Chenery, 'Foreign Aid and Economic Development: the Case of Greece', *Review of Economics and Statistics*, February 1966, p. 12.

36 See for example Hollis B. Chenery, 'Trade, Aid, and Economic Development', in Stephen H. Robock and Leo M. Solomon, eds., *International Development 1965* (Dobbs Ferry N.Y.: Oceana. 1966), p. 187.

the pattern of exchange rates agreed upon.[37] Under the circumstances, confidence in the new structure of fixed exchange rates necessarily remained fragile.

It was clear of course that deficits in the American current account would continue for a while. Some repatriation of the huge 1970 and 1971 outflows of speculative capital might have bridged much of the gap until the benefits of the new rate structure could work themselves through. Except for a brief period in the spring of 1972, however, the rise in American interest rates fell far short of advances in European money market rates, and yield incentives continued to draw funds out of rather than into the United States. Speculative flows were added by the abrupt scuttling of American wage and price controls at the start of 1973, and by the impression this seemed to confirm of American indifference to the defence of agreed parities.

It had also been clear that, with the normal deterioration in the terms of trade following a currency depreciation, the gap in the American current account would very likely get worse before it got better. There was some hope, nevertheless, that the United States 'would leave the currency issue aside until the effects of the parity settlement on the international competitive position of the United States would become evident'.[38] But when the actual deterioration proved to have been much greater in 1972 than had been anticipated—the current account deficit reached $5·8 billion—the American authorities came under heavy pressure to strengthen their negotiating position by threatening to impose fresh surcharges on imports, specifically on those from countries that continued to accumulate dollars.[39]

There was little disposition, therefore, to tailor foreign or domestic policy to any agreed structure of exchange rates, as long as conflicts of interest among nations could more freely be fought out with exchange rates floating.[40] Thus a hastily negotiated second dollar devaluation in February 1973 was not supported by any domestic stabilisation measures in the United States. Instead, new trade legislation was to provide for increased tariff protection if other nations failed to liberalise theirs, and restrictions on portfolio and direct investment outflows, in effect since the early 1960s, were to be phased out by the end of 1974. Under a wave of new speculation in March, the last co-operative efforts were

[37] Gabriel Hauge, 'We Have Time to Take Time', *The Smithsonian Agreement and its Aftermath: Several Views* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), p. 70.

[38] Samuel Brittan, 'The Non-Crisis of the U.S. Dollar', *Financial Times*, London, February 10, 1972, p. 17.

[39] Notably through U.S. Congressman Henry Reuss, as reported in *The Washington Post*, February 7, 1973, p. A.1.

[40] Such conflicts are abstracted from in Johnson's 'main argument for flexible exchange rates'. See his 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969' (as in footnote 24), p. 97.

swept away, as countries scrambled for every control over capital movements that lay to hand.

III. A reserve standard

Despite the collapse of the Smithsonian Accord on March 2, 1973, some confidence in the future of international monetary co-operation remained. To be sure, only six out of the nine members of the European Community, later joined by Sweden and Norway, continued to link the values of their currencies within specified margins of each other in a joint float against the dollar. But stable exchange relations in Europe, originally conceived as a first step towards monetary union, could also for a while be looked upon as a possible starting point for the restoration of 'an organized and controlled world system based on fixed but adjustable parities, a system where the weakest are protected against the strongest, and stability is preferred to anarchy,[41]

With a vital political interest in the domestic economy, few governments would leave the foreign sector entirely to free market forces.[42] Smaller countries find it difficult to effect capital and other transfers abroad comparable in absolute size and relative impact to those of a larger country. Though they may forgo the effort entirely, they are not for that reason any more keen to find their own producers damaged whenever the foreign operations of more powerful countries cause floating exchange rates to move against them. Both to reduce the vulnerability of their domestic economies, therefore, and to increase their combined leverage abroad, smaller countries have an interest in joining together in rival economic blocs.

Their direct political interest in external transactions would make it necessary to negotiate a political truce among blocs if stable exchange relations are to be restored.[43] Such a truce need not oblige governments to maintain exchange rates inconsistent with market forces; rather, it should commit them so to regulate their affairs at home and abroad that markets will normally support exchange rates multilaterally agreed upon. Placing the necessary limits on national policies—regarding foreign investment, or domestic credit, or transfers abroad—does involve at least a partial constraint on national sovereignty. Such constraint is unlikely to be acceptable except on a strictly reciprocal basis.

[41] French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to the Ministers of the Committee of Twenty in Washington. See *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1973, p. D.9.

[42] To do so would require 'an unworldly detachment' on the part of governments. See Robert Roosa, 'Currency Parities in the Second Decade of Convertibility', Halm, ed., *Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates* (as in footnote 24).

[43] An 'armed truce' was identified as the basis for a fixed rate system by Robert Roosa in Milton Friedman and Robert Roosa, *The Balance of Payments: Free Versus Fixed Exchange Rates* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1967), p. 50.

A reserve standard would ensure symmetry by requiring all countries, including the United States, to settle payments deficits in primary reserve assets or by negotiating credits. In principle, departures of market exchange rates from agreed parities could serve as well as reserve movements to signal a need for corrective action.[44] Changes in market rates do not exert the same pressure, however; correctives can be postponed while exchange markets continue to clear. A country can unilaterally expand its operations at home and abroad, then, without noticeable deterrent until more fundamental conflicts break to the surface. Reserve losses following from obligatory support operations in the exchange market can force a lesser crisis in better time.

Of course, as long as dollar liabilities qualify as reserve assets abroad, other countries will go on financing at least some portion of American deficits by accumulating them. Thus, restoring dollar convertibility on the same basis as prevailed before its suspension in August 1971 would not be enough. The dollar must not only be made convertible; it has to be converted, in fact, into primary reserve assets, before symmetry can be achieved.[45] Working balances need not be excepted: to support an agreed structure of exchange rates, it would be sufficient for each country never to sell but only to buy foreign exchange, for immediate conversion, whenever the market price threatens to fall below its agreed floor.

Even then, as long as other countries continue to choose their exchange rates with respect to the dollar, the United States would still be unable to fix the dollar at any other rate.[46] Once exchange rates are set by implicit or explicit bargaining among trading partners, it must of course be inappropriate to rely exclusively on parity changes for adjustment. Only when governments have exhausted the domestic measures realistically available to them can a fundamental disequilibrium be said to exist, but adjustment of the exchange rate should then follow promptly.[47] To give the United States a symmetrical facility as a last resort, all countries alike have to express the value of their currencies in terms of an independent standard.

A return to dollar convertibility was not to be risked in any form,

[44] Harry Johnson argues that they would serve better; see his 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969' (as in footnote 24), p. 105.

[45] Robert Triffin first insisted on this point in his *Gold and Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility* (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1960), p. 111.

[46] For the full implications of this problem, see John H. Williamson, 'The Choice of a Pivot for Parities', *Essays in International Finance*, No. 90 (Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, November 1971).

[47] This may be the most frankly pragmatic interpretation of fundamental disequilibrium. For alternative interpretations, see Board of Directors, *The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International Payments* (Washington: International Monetary Fund. 1970).

however, so long as the dollars subject to conversion exceeded the American capacity to convert as greatly as they appeared to do. The American reserve stock at the beginning of 1973 covered only just over a fifth of dollar claims held by monetary authorities abroad; there were in addition the temporarily reduced but still very large private foreign dollar balances. A second devaluation, barely a year after the first, undermined confidence in the dollar as an international store of value.[48] In the absence of conversion facilities, the overhang depressed exchange rates for the dollar well below levels that were officially regarded as defensible on current payments grounds alone.

Adequate reserves for a return to dollar convertibility may have been available; they were concealed, however, by the practice of valuing monetary gold at a fraction of its market price.[49] The Smithsonian Accord restored the principle of a variable monetary price for gold by raising it marginally. It would have had to be raised by considerably more if gold were once again to become the sole reserve asset without loss of overall liquidity.[50] Reliance on gold as an international reserve asset was opposed, however, on the grounds that its supply at any given price depends on 'absurd and irrelevant hazards', including sporadic shifts in technology, discovery, and the sales policies of the producing countries.[51]

Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) on the International Monetary Fund are free of these. It was widely proposed, therefore, to consolidate all reserve currency holdings, and perhaps gold, into a special issue of SDRs.[52] Reserve centres would assume long-term or indefinite liabilities to the Fund against which they would make regular service payments, redeeming only fresh accruals of their currencies in central bank reserves abroad. But the SDR suffers for its part from the difficulty of finding objective criteria for the amounts of it that need to be created over time.[53] Its supply will accordingly depend on the chance compromises that can be struck from time to time not least on their distribution among countries. For the present the supply of SDRs had dried up altogether.

Meanwhile no central bank would part with gold at less than half its market value. Nearly a quarter of all official reserves was effectively

48 U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns in Congressional testimony, as reported in *The Times*, London, March 8, 1973, p. 19.

49 As has consistently been emphasised by Jacques Rueff, for example in his 'Blueprint for Monetary Survival', *The Guardian*, May 26, 1973, p. 14.

50 The legal basis for a uniform proportionate increase in the price of gold already exists; it would not require a reform, only an activation, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.

51 Triffin, 'An Agreed International Monetary Standard', Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Joint Economic Committee) (as in footnote 10), p. 151.

52 See, for example, Board of Directors, *Reform of the International Monetary System* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1972), p. 32.

53 Former IMF Managing Director Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Arthur K. Salmon Lecture, December 5, 1967.

frozen as a result. As a compromise, the official price of gold might have been abolished outright, leaving SDRs as the point of reference for the value of currencies, but enabling central banks to manage the value of their gold stock by buying and selling at market prices.[54] They would be free to phase out their holdings to make room for larger and larger SDR allocations. They could as easily build them up instead, if in a world of conflicting national interests a commodity money such as gold were to offer the safer store of value.[55]

Without such a compromise, the American dollar remained inconvertible. Its disproportionate devaluation under the weight of the overhang could still be expected to restore the dollar as the dominant transactions currency in international trade. Once the greatest part of dollar holdings is either earned back or reabsorbed into active use abroad, it will be difficult to forestall a revival of the dollar as an official reserve currency also. There will once more be an active market in Euro-dollar bonds and deposits abroad, that can supply international liquidity flexibly and in the requisite amounts. Gold as a commodity money will then have been superseded to be sure, but by a national rather than an international credit currency.

A convertible dollar might in any case have remained vulnerable to destabilising capital movements. An agreed set of currency values should be endorsed by the market as long as government policies are consistent with it, for an expectation that small deviations from agreed exchange rates will be temporary induces speculative capital movements to be stabilising. However, as exchange rates remain the outcome of a bargaining process among nations, and speculation will thus have to be on the balance of political as much as of economic forces, destabilising capital movements can never be entirely ruled out. They remain as an irreducible element of disorder that cannot perhaps be dealt with in an entirely satisfactory way among independent nation states.

Some of the impact on reserves of destabilising capital movements can be offset, for example, by a network of swap arrangements for mutual short-term financial assistance among central banks. Such arrangements should have been adequate to cope with crises that, within the system, provide signals for corrective action. Resources large enough to cover speculative movements of the size they have attained in the recent past, however, would in their absence tend to be too ample to maintain

54 The 1968 accord, barring central banks from private gold markets altogether, was rescinded in November 1973: however, the IMF Articles still outlaw buying gold above the official price, as much as selling it below that price.

55 William Fellner thinks that most central bankers would opt for gold if given the choice. See his 'The Dollar's Place in the International Monetary System: Suggested Criteria for the Appraisal of Emerging Views', *Journal of Economic Literature*, September 1972, p. 747.

normal balance-of-payments discipline.[56] For they may include in addition to movements of privately held offshore funds, movements also from domestic economies the wealth and income of which can be considerable compared with their normal foreign transactions.

To discourage crises within the system from turning into crises of the system, a reserve standard would require some degree of fragmentation of financial markets among countries, to be achieved if necessary by direct controls on movement of capital. From this point of view, the partial revival of such controls in response to the inconvertibility of the dollar, represented a belated recognition that exchange stability cannot always be achieved without them.[57] A joint policy for the control of capital movements might have insured that payments for current transactions remain unaffected, as stipulated at Bretton Woods. Agreement on such a policy remains unlikely, however, as long as there is no consensus on the structure of exchange rates that it is meant to support.

Even the most comprehensive controls are still subject to evasion under stress, and may be relatively ineffective against ' leads and lags ' in payments for current transactions. Allowing speculative flows to be taken on the exchange rate would be self-defeating, however. For the farther market rates are permitted to deviate from agreed parities, the more questionable the commitment of governments to their support is likely to become.[58] Without a high degree of certainty concerning the intentions of governments a crisis of the system is difficult to avoid, as little warrant remains for expecting movements in exchange rates to be necessarily reversible, and no firm basis, therefore, for capital flows to be stabilising.

Strains of this kind would have been present in the best of circumstances. They were intensified by the reluctance of governments to make any commitments at all while major adjustments in trade flows were still coming through; in the light of past performance, moreover, it is doubtful whether fresh commitments would soon have carried much conviction in the market. As the likelihood of a truce among the industrial countries receded, however, other compromises on which the stability of economic relations had rested in the past, were also beginning to come unstuck. In the end the turmoil in exchange markets, precipitated by a rapid four-fold increase in petroleum prices, threatened to make exchange stability even within Europe impossible to maintain.

[56] Fellner, 'The Dollar's Place in the International Monetary System' (as in footnote 55), p. 737.

[57] Some observers derided this trend as a 'retreat towards Bretton Woods'. See 'The Year of the Barriers', *The Economist*, London, January 27, 1973, *Survey*, p. 9.

[58] Johnson, 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969' (as in footnote 24), p. 99, recognises that the stability of the floating exchange rates depends as much on governmental policies as on other 'underlying conditions'.

IV. Crossroads

This paper has outlined three fundamental ways in which international co-operation in the monetary field can conceivably be organised. Each alternative exacts its own peculiar costs, however. Accepting the dollar's increasing use as the world's international medium of exchange would place the central bank of one country in a supra-national role above the others. Alternatively, floating exchange rates may offer a 'continuous invitation to economic warfare as countries manoeuvre their exchange rates against each other.'[59] There would be costs in introducing a reserve standard, too, as it would probably require a greater surrender of national sovereignty than major countries seem prepared to contemplate.

A new structure of co-operation will thus have to be built on a compromise. As each basic option touches vital national interests, striking a balance among them is a political more than an intellectual problem, to be resolved not so much by persuasion as by negotiation. The task has proved to be an arduous one. As a progress report, a First Outline of Reform was transmitted to the Board of Governors at the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Nairobi, on September 24, 1973.[60] Despite an expressed consensus that the SDR should become the principal reserve asset in a reformed system based upon stable but adjustable par values, a wide range of disagreement still remained on how it might operate in practice.

The Governors fixed a deadline of July 31, 1974, for settling the main issues of reform, though the process of institutional adaptation is expected to take some time beyond that. The stakes are high. In a real sense 'the world monetary crisis is basically about what economic, military, and political role the United States should play in the world.'[61] It would be difficult to restrict a disintegrative process to economic relations alone; by the same token, of course, co-operative economic relations cannot be preserved in isolation either. There is little basis under the circumstances for predicting what final shape the monetary system is likely to take, or to support an abstract preference for one particular outcome over another.

[59] Roosa in Friedman and Roosa (as in footnote 43), p. 50.

[60] *IMF Survey: Annual Meetings Issue Supplement*, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1973, pp. 305–308.

[61] *The New York Times*, September 16, 1971, p. 34.

THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIALISM*

John Hicks

MANY years ago, when I had hardly more than begun my studies in economics, I attended a public lecture by a famous economist from another country (now long deceased). I had considerable respect for some of his work, but he chose on this occasion to pontificate on the state of the world. I walked away from the lecture in company with a non-economist, a very perceptive person. ' He is bogus, isn't he? ' said my friend; and I found some difficulty in defending him.

The subject with which I am to deal is expressed in such big words that I am very much afraid of exposing myself to the same condemnation. I must begin, if I am to have a chance of avoiding it, by deciding exactly what I am to mean.

What does one mean by ' industrialism '? One thinks of it, of course, as the state of society that was brought into being by the Industrial Revolution. As an historical description, that will do; but if we are to say anything about its future, we need something more than the starting point of an historical epoch. Will that epoch terminate, or is it already terminating? Before such questions can even be considered, we need a different kind of definition. We have to make up our minds what it was that started in the Industrial Revolution; or, more strictly, which of the things that then started we are to regard as the main thing.

A recent paper by Professor Kuznetz[1] is of considerable help for this purpose. He defines not industrialism but what he calls ' modern economic growth '; this, however, is near enough to our ' industrialism ' to give us something from which to begin. He defines his ' modern growth ' by six characteristics, which, in brief and inadequate summary, are the following: (1) rapid increase in production and in population; (2) rapid increase in productivity—output relatively to input; (3) structural change, as exemplified by movement of population away from agriculture; (4) social change—urbanisation and secularisation; (5) revolution in transport and communication, making the world ' one world ' as it was not before; (6) unequal growth between countries, so that some are ' advanced ' while others are left behind.

* The text of the Twenty-second Stevenson Memorial Lecture delivered at Chatham House on November 20, 1973.

1 S. Kuznetz, ' Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections ' (Nobel lecture 1971) reprinted in *American Economic Review*, June 1973.

There is nothing in Kuznetz's list, it will be noticed, about ' capitalism '. That I am sure, is right; it is right for his purpose, and will be for ours. Socialist countries industrialise, like ' capitalist ' and 'semi-capitalist ' countries; it is a world-wide phenomenon, not just one of the ' first ', ' second ' or ' third ' world. So I have deliberately put industrialism into my title, not capitalism. Although there are many things which work differently in the two types of organisation, the things which will most concern us are much the same.

These six characteristics of Kuznetz will have to be borne in mind; but they still leave us short of a unifying principle. What is the driving force behind these vast changes? Kuznetz's answer is, in his own words, ' the emergence of modern science as the basis of an advancing technology '. This looks like being the principle for which we are seeking; and in these days explanation in terms of science-based technical progress makes obvious sense.

Can we apply it, however, to the whole history of industrialism since, say, 1800? The science available in 1800 was of course quite rudimentary. Although one can trace a scientific element in most of the major 19th-century inventions, it is not surprising that that element should be less conspicuous than it is today. There were indeed long periods in the general history of industrialism when technical progress did not seem to be very striking; so economists, looking for the causes of economic growth, felt that they had to explain it in other ways. One has only to go back to the 1930s to find a time when the importance of technical progress did not seem at all obvious. Few economists would then have given it the priority which now seems so natural. Neither to the traditionalists (now called neo-classics) nor to the Keynesians, in the beginnings of Keynesianism, did technical progress, in which they had little confidence, seem at all a sufficient explanation. It was mentioned, but it took a fairly subordinate place.

To the traditionalists, I think one may say, the driving force was accumulation of capital. By capital they meant physical goods, factories and machines. Since they took it for granted that what was saved would be invested, the way to get more machines was by saving; so they attributed the rise of industrialism to the rise of a saving class. ' Every frugal man a public benefactor ' had said Adam Smith. The explanation of historians, in terms of a ' Protestant Ethic ', clearly fits in.

The Keynesians, of course, held that that was all wrong. It is not true, they said, that saving leads to investment: investment leads to saving. They had therefore to find their driving force in things which keep up the inducement to invest. These, in capitalist conditions, would be things which keep up the expected profitability of investment—the marginal efficiency of capital, as Keynes called it. His own list of the things which, he held, kept up the marginal efficiency of capital during

the 19th century was: 'the growth of population and invention, the opening-up of new lands, the state of confidence and the frequency of war over the average of (say) each decade.'[2] Invention does appear, but it is secondary; the growth of population actually comes first.

Why was it thought, at this stage, that the growth of population is favourable to economic growth, in a broader sense? In a review which I wrote of the *General Theory*, on its first appearance, I tried to rationalise Keynes's contention. 'It does become very evident', I said, 'when one thinks of it, that the expectation of a continually expanding market, made possible by increasing population, is a fine thing for keeping up the spirits of entrepreneurs. With increasing population, investment can go roaring ahead, even if investment is rather stupid; increasing population is therefore actually favourable to employment. It is actually easier to employ an expanding population than a contracting one, whatever arithmetic might suggest—at least that is so when the expansion or contraction is expected, as we may suppose to be the case.'[3] So, with increasing population, expansion can proceed fairly easily.[4]

But today the population-induced expansion, envisaged at that time by Keynesians, looks much less appealing. For we look at it through the spectacles of the steady-state model, which in the economics of the 1950s and 1960s has become so familiar—a model in which there is just enough saving (and investment) to keep the expansion of equipment in line with the expansion of population, so that an increasing labour force works with a constant amount of equipment per head. One can see that in a steady state of that sort, the planning of production would be rather easy; so there would be no danger of a Keynesian loss of confidence, for everyone would know what had to be done in order that business ventures should come out right. That may be granted. But more than that is needed to explain what has happened; for a steady state expansion, in which capital per head was constant and there was no technical progress, would show no gain in productivity. The expanded population would be absorbed, but that would be all. In such a steady state there would be no rise in real incomes and no rise in real wages.

But in this steady state theory is there not an important element which is being neglected? Is it not the case that expansion as such, even population-based expansion, is favourable to productivity? 'The

[2] *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: Macmillan. 1936), p. 307.

[3] *Economic Journal*, June 1936, p. 252.

[4] I was less cautious on another occasion, when I suggested that 'the whole Industrial Revolution of the last two hundred years has perhaps been nothing else but a vast secular boom, largely induced by the unparalleled rise in population' (*Value and Capital: an inquiry into some fundamental principles of economic theory*. Oxford: OUP. 1939, p. 302). I quote from my own writings, as being nearest to hand; but it would not be hard to make similar quotations from what was written, at that time, by many authors.

division of labour ', we should have learnt from Adam Smith, ' is limited by the extent of the market.' By no subsequent economist has this been denied. In every work on economic principles there has been a section on increasing returns, or economies of scale, although in so much of our work it seems to take a back seat. For the moment there are just two things to be said about it.

First, what matters is the extent of the *market*. This is not a matter of the number of buyers; it is a matter of their purchasing power, their *real* purchasing power. An increase in population does not necessarily expand the demand for the sorts of goods in the production of which there are significant scale economies. An increase in the Indian population from 500 million to 800 million—which is what we are told may actually happen by the year 2000—would not necessarily, or even probably, make possible, in itself, significant scale economies in Indian industry. Nor does it seem likely that the increase in the British population, in the first half, say, of the 19th century, can have had an appreciable effect in engendering scale economies. It does not of course follow that scale economies are unimportant; but we must beware of driving them too hard.

Secondly, we must not be misled by Adam Smith's (essentially pre-industrial) pin-making example—his association of scale economies with specialisation of labour. That is always one element; but is it not a characteristic of industrialism that it ceases to be the most important element? Labour, indeed, is potentially rather unspecialised; man, as a producer, has this enduring advantage over the machine, that he can do, or can learn to do, many different things. It is equipment—not all equipment, but most equipment—which is firmly specialised, being made to perform a particular job. So it is that there are short-run economies of scale in operating plant nearer to capacity; while long-run economies of scale usually imply new plant, adapted to the larger output. There is better adaptation of plant, which improves productivity.

These scale economies are embodied in plant; but are not the other improvements—those more directly due to ' advancing technology '—similarly embodied? It may be possible to find examples of science-based improvements which do not have to be embodied in physical equipment; but nowadays they are not at all easy to find, if the consequences of the improvement are looked at inclusively. The embodiment may be quite indirect. Not much in the way of industrial equipment is needed to produce the improved seed, which appears to be the operative agent in the ' Green Revolution '; but then we are told that its successful application needs concomitant use of extra fertiliser. So the improvement, as a whole, does require fixed equipment. The fertiliser factory is a part of the technical change.

Thus there is a rather central element in industrialism—or in ' modern

economic growth '—of which we have not so far taken account. 'Science-based technology' certainly, but not just that; technology which needs for its application embodiment in physical equipment, or (in a very broad sense) in 'machines'. It has been obvious from the beginning that the machine is characteristic of industrialism; but it may not be so obvious that it is necessary for a definition.

There is, however, a further point. What drives the machines? For the first century of industrialism, the answer was coal; for the second century coal and oil, with a few other relatively minor fuels. This strict dependence upon a small number of particular natural resources, available at some points of the earth's surface but hardly at all at others, must surely be added as a key characteristic. One may dream of an industrialism which has cut itself free from this limitation; but it is hardly, as yet, even in sight. Economists, in their growth models, have tended to ignore this aspect; but their example can hardly be followed nowadays. Nevertheless, we will begin by considering the consequences of the embodiment in machines, a matter that is conveniently dealt with by simple economic analysis, and leave the question of power supplies to be dealt with later.

I shall now attempt to show some of the consequences which follow when industrialism is defined as 'science-based technical progress embodied in physical equipment'. Consider the story of some particular improvement, some particular technological 'advance'. There must clearly be three stages. First, a stage of research, the working out of the idea. Secondly, a stage of construction, the construction of the equipment, the building of the 'machine'. Thirdly, a stage of utilisation, in which the new productive power comes into operation.

In our day, during the last thirty years, the first stage, research and development, has become a major activity. But for most of the history of industrialism, this can hardly be said to have been so. Ideas dropped from Heaven; or, in less figurative language, they appeared as by-products of other activities undertaken for other reasons. They had little identifiable social cost; their economic effects could therefore be studied as if they came in from outside.

I shall begin by supposing that the idea does come in from outside, and that it is not too quickly followed by other comparable ideas, so that the effects of the single idea can be studied separately. There is indeed one example in history which more or less meets this requirement—the railway, that major 19th-century invention, so much more important, in its great days, than any other that was independent of it. The constructional stage and the utilisational stage, in the case of the individual railway, can be clearly distinguished; but for the railways as a whole the two of course overlapped. It took quite a long time to build a railway, but it took much longer to build all the railways. Why?

The most obvious explanation is that the resources available for railway building were limited. Any big constructional programme runs into bottlenecks—shortages of skilled labour and of materials, of which we may take as an example steel. These will slow up the programme at the outset; but as time goes on, they can be relieved. Labour can be trained and new steel mills can be set up, so that more steel can be produced. Thus while such constraints must be important at the outset, the time will come (and should come fairly soon) when they cease to be so important. They cannot sufficiently explain why the time to make *all* the new equipment should be so spread out. There must be other obstacles.

A possible obstacle is shortage of labour—labour in general, not specifically trained. In a particular country that may well be important; but for the world as a whole (and railway-building went on over the whole world) it does not look like being so important. Another is a monetary constraint; but that is a matter of particular institutions, and Keynes has taught us that it can be wished away. There still remains a further constraint, of which older economists were well aware; it is one which we have learnt from our own experience cannot be overlooked. It is the main reason why the application of a major improvement, such as the railway, is so long drawn out.

Let us suppose that the constraint of full employment is not operative; there are still some unemployed who could be set to work if opportunity offered. It is a pretty firm rule that if these unemployed are to be drawn into the productive process, they will have to be given wages which are greater than whatever it was they had been getting when they were unemployed. That must be so under any economic system, except in the case of slave labour; and it may be that even slave labour is no more than an apparent exception. Additional goods, on which these wages can be spent, will have to be provided; and who is to provide them? The goods that are currently available are the result of past production. (This is particularly obvious in the case of food.) Though more labour could be applied to producing more of these goods (since we are taking it that there is unemployed labour), it would take time before the goods were ready. So *at any particular time* the goods that are available for current consumption are fairly fixed in amount and are not very quickly extensible. The goods that are needed for consumption, out of the additional wages, must therefore in the short run be provided by someone else.

They might be provided by those who were previously saving doing more saving; but though this is a possible source, it cannot in general be counted on as a sufficient one. If it does not suffice, while employment is still pressed ahead, the goods will have to come from the real wages

of other people. The ways in which that happens, if it has to happen, are well known. Under capitalism, there is a rise in prices relatively to wages. Both may rise in money terms, but wages lag behind prices. Under socialism, there is rationing, or there are queues or there is 'procurement'. Thus if voluntary saving does not suffice, there is involuntary saving. But the extent to which this is tolerable may be limited. It is likely to encounter resistance—in a poor country from farmers, who cannot easily be made to make involuntary savings; in a rich country from trade unions. In this sense there is a savings obstacle, which limits the possible rate of investment at any particular time.

It has been necessary to enlarge upon this obstacle partly because in the Keynesian teaching, on which the present generation has so largely been brought up, it is almost entirely missing. Keynes himself, writing at the time when he did, was probably justified in playing it down. For when one is dealing with recovery from a depression—the particular problem of the 1930s—it is not an important matter; for production during a depression is much below capacity and there are ample stocks of materials which can be quickly worked up into many sorts of consumption goods. Recovery therefore requires no more than a little involuntary saving. It is fairly safe, in that application, to leave it out of account. But this is just one of the ways in which Keynes's was *not* a *General Theory*.

The other is that I need it, very badly need it, for the elucidation of the more long-run changes with which we are here concerned. Let us return, for instance, to the question of population. It is in some of the poorest countries of the world that population is now increasing most rapidly. We are perhaps a little less worried than we were about the Malthusian peril—the problem of feeding the hundreds of millions of new mouths which demographers tell us will so soon be upon us. It is far from certain that we are right to be so complacent; but suppose we are right. We are still left with the problem of finding the savings in order to employ, in a 'modern' manner, even that fraction of the population of, say, India which is now employed in a 'modern' manner—a fraction which, with a larger population, will comprise many more people.

England, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, was not, by the standards of that time, a poor country; and the same is true, as Kuznetz reminds us, of each of the other countries that have successfully industrialised. (He is inclined to regard Japan as an exception; I much doubt if, in the required sense, it is.) The necessary savings could therefore be secured fairly easily; and a rapid increase in population could after a fashion be accommodated. But it cannot be doubted that, in the English case at least, it was a strain. Do we not see a monument to that strain in the houses then put up in our industrial cities? If the ex-

panding population kept up the spirits of businessmen, there were horrid things to be set on the other side.

I have been talking about the black side of the savings constraint; but there is a brighter side too. Although it sets a limit on the rate of expansion of investment that is possible *at the moment,* this is a limit which as time goes on should be progressively relaxed. For more and more of the new 'machines' will reach their utilisational stage. If, as we are supposing, the new technique is genuinely superior, genuinely more productive than what it replaces, the availability of the new equipment will enable production to be increased. Out of the larger production it will be easier to make savings. Thus at some time after first introduction, the ceiling which had been hitherto imposed will gradually lift. Even a single major invention, as it is carried through, will (so it appears) lift a hitherto stagnant economy into 'self-sustained growth'.

This is so (subject to the qualifications—the same qualifications—to which we shall be coming) whatever the organisation of the economy. In the 'capitalist' model, familiar in economic textbooks, the improvement in productivity raises profits, and from the larger profits it is easy to make larger savings. Under socialism, the profits accrue to public bodies; but here again, if the new technique has proved productive, public profits will be increased, and from their larger profits the public bodies will find it easier to finance new investment. They may not do so, and the capitalists may not do so; but in either case there is some presumption that they will.

Obviously, in a limited world, the expansion that is due to a single improvement cannot go on for ever. If railway-building, for example, went on for ever, the world would in the end become cluttered up with railways. The profitability, or productivity, of a railway depends on its location; the time must come when a new railway project which will yield any surplus over cost, must be hard to find. For unlimited expansion, of a particular kind, such as that induced by a particular invention, there is not enough space.

Space, however, is not the only issue. Any indefinite expansion must encounter scarcities. Some, such as the bottlenecks previously discussed, are removable; in time they can be overcome. Others—either by necessity, or in the world as it is and has been—are irremovable. It is by irremovable scarcities that expansions, such as we have been discussing, are brought to a stop.[5]

The first economist to see this at all clearly was Ricardo. Since, however, he worked it out only for a particular case (and not, as it

[5] There is also the important class of scarcities which *in the end* are removable, but which take so long to remove that they impose a temporary check. These may well be an important reason for the fluctuations which in historical experience have accompanied industrial growth.

proved, a very realistic one) it was many years before the significance of what he had shown was fully understood. He supposed that the supply of labour was indefinitely extensible; it would increase without limit, so long as subsistence for the increasing labour force could be provided; so his operative scarcity was scarcity of agricultural land. This was responsible for his 'declining rate of profit'. Because of the scarcity of land, provision of an unchanged subsistence for an increasing labour force would become more expensive from the point of view of the employer, even though there was no rise in the real consumption of the labourer himself. With labour costs rising, the rate of profit would fall.

In Ricardo's pure model, technology is unchanging; and this has caused much confusion. For he had not shown how it could be that the rate of profit initially would be so high that it was able to fall. If we start the story a little further back, with some major improvement that has lifted the rate of profit, what he said becomes much more intelligible. What he was showing was that if there is no further improvement in technology, the rate of return on the spreading of the original improvement must decline over time.

Scarcity of land for food production may have this effect; so may scarcity of land as a source of minerals, or of power, or for many other purposes. And so, it is of the greatest importance to notice, may scarcity of labour. It would make a great deal of difference—in the rather old-fashioned capitalist economy which Ricardo was of course assuming —whether the operative scarcity (or the main operative scarcity) was shortage of land or shortage of labour. In the former case (Ricardo's) scarcity of land would raise rents; but in the latter, the shortage of labour would raise wages. It is possible that in a socialist economy there would be less difference. If the rents accrued to the state, they could be channelled to labour in some form of social benefit. But it would still be true, even in the socialist economy, that irremovable scarcity (of land or of labour) would cause the rate of return on the spreading of the original improvement to diminish. In either case the *Impulse* of the original improvement would in time peter out.[6]

When it is so interpreted (or generalised), the Ricardian theory still holds; and I maintain that it is rather fundamental. It is perfectly true that in our day the flow of fresh improvements (' advances in technology ') is incessant; but that does not mean that the Ricardian theory has lost its importance. Current improvements (the ' latest improvements ') make for the moment little contribution to growth in current production; that mainly comes from the unexhausted Impulses of past improvements.

[6] There is a theoretical examination of the Impulse concept in my *Capital and Time: a neo-Austrian theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), ch. 10; and one (which is nearer to the use made of it in the present paper) in my Nobel lecture 'The Mainspring of Economic Growth ', published in the *Swedish Economic Journal* Vol. 75 (1973).

Thus if technical progress were to come to a standstill and the flow of new improvements were to dry up, the growth in productivity would ultimately come to a stop, but not immediately; for the impulses which were unexhausted at the time the technical progress stopped would remain to be worked out. In the growing phase of the economy, such exhaustion (though a continual threat to expansion) is continually warded off by new discovery, generating new Impulses.

The individual Impulse has two dimensions, since it is spread out over time. Its size and its time-scale depend partly upon the nature of the improvement which has initiated it, partly on the characteristics of the economy in which it is carried through. Consider the case of an Impulse which is ultimately to be finished off by labour shortage. It is perfectly possible for such an Impulse to have a first part in which it is labour-saving; expansion can then proceed for some considerable time before any shortage of labour (due to this Impulse) makes itself felt. At that stage, before the labour shortage sets in, the rate of expansion will depend upon the characteristics of those who get the profits; the readier they are to save and invest the profits which are made, the faster the expansion will be. Later on, when the shortage begins to take effect, this unfettered expansion is cramped and held back; its pace will still be affected, as before, by entrepreneurial push, but the effectiveness of the push will depend upon the extent to which it proves possible to find ways of overcoming the shortage. These themselves are technical changes, but they follow from the original change; they are ' induced inventions '.

It may well be useful to think of the original advance as having a progeny of technical changes following from it. We can distinguish at least three kinds. First, there are those of a purely technical, non-economic, character; as the original improvement is carried through and embodied in the equipment that belongs to it, opportunities for further improvements present themselves—' learning by doing '. Secondly, there are those which come in as economies of scale; the expansion of production, in itself, offers opportunities for technical changes. Our ' induced inventions ' come in as a third kind.

In relation to my theme these induced inventions are of particular importance. For consider again the case of an Impulse where the operative scarcity is shortage of labour. In the course of the Impulse, wages rise; real wages rise; whether the rise takes the form of a rise in money wages, or of a fall in prices with little change in money wages, is a monetary matter with which I am not here concerned. At the conclusion of the Impulse, when its expansionary power has been in the end exhausted by the rise in wages, the rise in wages remains. If there was no further Impulse, and no induced inventions, the economy would settle down to a steady state, with production ceasing to rise, or rising no more than proportionately to such increase in labour supply as was

occurring. The economy would have attained what Adam Smith called its 'full complement of riches'; but the higher real wages, which had followed from the now exhausted Impulse, would remain.

Suppose, however, that there were induced inventions, induced (as in this case they would be) by the rise in real wages, by the rise in wages relatively to product prices (as a whole). Such technical changes would be directed towards economising in labour costs, and thus to reducing the scarcity of labour. They would therefore tend to slow up the rise in wages. But their other effect would be to prolong the life of the Impulse, postponing its exhaustion. The rise in wages, which would otherwise have ended earlier, could continue longer; and the wage that would be attained in the end would be higher than that which would have been attained at the earlier demise. This can be shown in several ways; the easiest is simply to observe that the individual worker would in the end have more capital equipment to work with when the process of accumulation continued longer.

We have here, I do not need to emphasise, a basic opposition. It appears as an opposition between capital and labour; but more deeply considered it is an opposition between the short-run and longer-run interests of labour itself. It is another way in which industrialisation is liable to inflict involuntary saving upon labour; less damaging than the other kind, since its cause is rising real wages—it cannot occur except as a consequence of rising real wages—but serious enough, and damaging enough.

There is one more general point that needs to be made. Suppose that, for whatever reason, there is a slowing-up of the rate of growth, what will happen? Those who have been brought up on Keynesian economics will take a very pessimistic view. Investment will decline, relatively to saving (voluntary investment relatively to voluntary saving); and such a fall must lead to unemployment. That is how it appeared in the Keynesian 1930s; but with longer experience we must take a different view. Admittedly, there are countries where it would not be surprising to find a Keynes-type reaction. Japan, for example, has got organised on the basis of a very high rate of saving; so a decline in the rate of voluntary investment there might well have the regular Keynes effect. In most Western countries, however, it is saving that is deficient; a decline in investment might require some readjustments, but on the whole it would make things in that direction easier. What would not become easier is the behaviour of wages. There is a good deal of evidence that a slowing of growth, leading to a slower rise in real wages than had become customary, has a powerful effect in causing wage-inflation. A rise in money wages does not give what was expected from it, since prices rise too; so the pressure is repeated. The case of Italy, after 1962, is perhaps the most striking; but analysis of the British

:ase appears to give the same answer.[7] It is, on the long view, a ransitional phenomenon; but it is a formidable corner to be got round.

I am now at last in a position to talk about the future. I cannot go ar in penetrating the 'mists of futurity'; but I can at least break the ubject up. I shall discuss it under four heads: (1) technology; (2) conomics of scale; (3) land; and (4) labour.

i) Technology—science-based technology

You will not expect me to have anything useful to say about the rospects for the advancement of science. I know very little about cience; indeed, when one thinks of my myriad departments into which cience is now divided, it is doubtful whether anyone exists who is competent to judge of the opportunities which may present themselves all long the line. But out question is not just one of the advancement of cience; it is a question of the transmutation of science into technology—conomically productive technology. On that there may perhaps be a ittle more to be said.

At the stage when ideas 'dropped from Heaven', the appearance of economically productive ideas must have been almost random. Yet one can understand why it was that there seems to have been a rising rend. Science, at that stage, was a luxury; it was pursued as an amusement, or as a cultural activity in which some gifted people were privileged o pass their time. Like other luxuries, it was income-elastic; with ncreasing wealth, the proportion of income that was spent upon it ncreased. Thus it was an expanding activity, and the stream of ideas that lowed from it expanded with it.

At that stage, ideas were growing wild, like wild plants; but the time came (as had happened with other wild plants) when it was realised that it paid to cultivate them. Large resources were then turned into 'research and development' with the object of finding new, economically productive, techniques. In capitalist countries the profit motive applied; and socialist countries were not slow to follow the example. The effect of this change in direction has, in the last thirty years, been spectacular. It has given what might be described as a second-order Impulse, an impulse to breed Impulses. Yet, when we look at it in that light, we are bound to contemplate the possibility of its exhaustion. Even a second-order Impulse is an Impulse like other Impulses; like other Impulses, may it not peter out?

There are some signs that it may; and some reasons why it may. The consumption goods, which we ordinarily think of as the end-products

[7] See, for instance, Johnston and Timbrell, 'Empirical Tests of a Bargaining Theory of Wage Determination' (Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, June 1973).

of the productive process, are themselves means to an end, or ends—the satisfaction of basic human wants. There are not very many of these—food, clothing, housing and (in a rich society) entertainment. (Entertainment which may be of low, or very high, cultural value.) The wants of most people for these things are very far from being fully satisfied. But it is easier to see those wants being satisfied by an extension of production, by the stretching out of old Impulses (prolonged, as this implies, by induced invention directed to overcoming scarcities) than by the starting of altogether new Impulses—the invention, for instance, of altogether new consumption goods. Seen in this light, the contribution of organised research and development to the satisfaction of basic wants seems, in relation to its cost, rather doubtfully proportionate. Should we not therefore do well to keep open in our minds the possibility that what we have been experiencing is a boom—an exceptional Impulse, which will ultimately relapse into something more moderate—instead of taking it for granted that it must go on for ever.

(ii) Economies of Scale

I have already distinguished between the two kinds of economies of scale. There is the Adam Smith kind, the specialisation of labour; and the characteristically industrial kind, the large plant, the large ' machine '. Each, in formal terms, gives the same advantage; one man devoting his whole time to pin-making (or to car-repairing) produces more than do forty men, each devoting one-fortieth of his time to it; the plant which cost forty times as much produces more than forty times the output. But the optimum size, in the former case, cannot be greater than the whole time of one man; in the latter it is vastly larger.

It may be fully accepted that the latter economy is a major element in industrial productivity; the economies that are to-day to be associated with size of plant extend to a point that was undreamt of by Adam Smith. Yet the fact that these latter economies are different in kind, as well as in extent, from the former is of major importance. Specialisation of labour increases human skills; and it is a good rule that the more skilled a person is, the more satisfaction he is likely to get from his work. The large scale of industrial production, being dictated by non-human factors, has no such tendency. It does indeed require a very high level of skill from some people; but from most of those who work the machines it makes no such demands. The ' semi-skilled ' worker in industry is often less skilled—in the sense that he has to meet fewer calls upon his capacity—than the agricultural labourer. Growth in production, attained in that way, is dearly bought in terms of human happiness. We need look no further to find one of the main causes of industrial unrest.

Add to this the other well-known consequence of the elephantiasis

of the machine—monopoly. This first appeared in the form of the monopoly power of large corporations, directed against the consumer or (in various forms of industrial strife) against each other. There were obvious ways of dealing with that—by public ownership, or by public control. But these, we have learnt from bitter experience, are no more than surface remedies; they do not affect the concentration of power. Those who work the great ' machines '—the electricity grid and telephone network are leading examples—have power in their hands. It is much the same power, whether exercised by managers, or by technicians or by (unionised) labour.

There was a stage in the history of industrialism when the large machine, involving large capital investment, was found to give a much improved opportunity for labour to bring pressure upon employers, since the profits that would be lost by interruption of work had become much more considerable. At that stage the large machine was a major factor, perhaps the key factor, in the growth of trade unionism. Its struggle could then be presented as a class war, a struggle of labour against capital. Now, whether under socialism, or under what is left of capitalism, labour and capital are on the same side; labour and technocrats are on the same side; but the struggle persists, as a sectional struggle of each industry against the rest. It is not just a struggle for a fair share in the social product; its effects go deeper even than that. Technical progress itself is threatened, or twisted. Instead of being directed to the increase of production in general, it is directed to the sectional advantage of those engaged in each single industry. It is inevitable that technical progress, when so biased, must be slowed up.

If this is, as some say, the ' English sickness ', it is a sickness which other countries appear to be catching. But when we look at the issue in this manner, we may discern a hope—admittedly a faint one—that the two defects of large-scale industrial production which I have been describing may in future to some extent offset one another. If technical changes, devised in the interests of those employed in single industries, should nevertheless be directed towards raising the levels of skill required in those industries, towards improving the quality of work and the conditions of work, so much would be gained that ' monopoly losses ' might be a cheap price to pay. It would indeed be a new kind of industrialism; but perhaps there are some faint signs that we are moving towards it.

(iii) *Land*

I shall say very little about the general question of the scarcity of natural resources, since this is a topic which, long forgotten or wished out of sight, is now being discussed so widely by others. This is very natural, in view of current shortages—which, it will be remembered, had become

acute at least a year before their recent aggravation. Exponential growth is going out of fashion; some economists are even beginning to concern themselves with the problem of reducing the Western world to a stationary state. The shortage of land has come back with a vengeance.

The general shortage of materials is serious; but most particular shortages affect no more than a limited number of industries. The most serious shortage of all, for industrialism, is shortage of power. Already, at the height of the Coal Age, Jevons [8] was predicting the exhaustion of coal supplies; not that the coal would give out, but that it would become harder to get—as it has. Oil came to the rescue; but coal and oil share the common characteristic that their sources are localised, so that their providers, if they get together, can hold the world to ransom. Thus not only the large machine, but also the localisation of power supplies, expose industrialism to this sort of challenge.

Such challenges, whether natural or artificial, may in the end be overcome. Induced invention can come to the rescue. But whether directed towards economising in power, or to the discovery of substitutes, it will have to work very hard—much harder than it seemed to have to work in the time of plenty.

(iv) Labour

Hitherto we have been discussing labour in general without making much distinction between kinds of labour. Something must now be said about the distribution of labour between occupations, and about the larger question of distribution between countries.

The theory of the Impulse can be applied in two ways—to a particular country, or to the world as a whole. The former, in the way we are in the habit of thinking, and in the way our facts are presented to us, is the more natural; but if we are to use the theory in that way, it needs some amendment. We must allow for the particular country's external relations. Ideas may come in from abroad; capital, in the sense of saving, may come from abroad or may itself go abroad; natural scarcities may reveal themselves, not directly by what happens within the country, but by a movement of its terms of trade. But what I now want to emphasise in relation to the particular country application, is something different. It concerns the process by which real wages rise. I have represented this as a matter of labour scarcity; but we should look at it more closely. Take for the moment the case of an 'advanced' country, one of those in which there has been beyond question a great rise in real wages. Can we attribute that rise to labour scarcity, when it has not (as on the whole it has not) been attended by zero unemployment? When we remember that labour is not homogeneous, I think we can.

[8] W. S. Jevons, *The Coal Question* (1865).

We can see, in the first place, that a general expansion must be attended by *particular* labour shortages; some kinds of labour, at least, will prove to be in short supply. Their wages will rise, by the operation of market forces, very strong market forces; for in capitalist countries, unionised or non-unionised, and in socialist countries so long as they give any freedom to the worker, much the same thing happens.

But this is not the end. For there are two ways in which the rise in wages gets spread. One is purely economic. Shortages of particular skills can be overcome. They may be overcome by inventing means of economising in the scarce labour, using cheaper labour instead, or by training other workers to acquire the necessary skills. The demand for labour is thus shifted from one group to another; both the scarcity and the rise in wages is spread. Even though it does not go so far as to absorb the whole labour supply, of whatever sort, a sufficient expansion will lead to a rise in most wages, implying a substantial rise on the average.

Something of this kind can often, perhaps usually, be traced; but it is not the only way in which spreading occurs. In addition to this economic spreading, there is what we may call social spreading. There are social forces, directed against the upsetting of established differentials (much reinforced by trade unionism, but by no means dependent upon it) which cause the initial, sectional, rise to be spread. ' We are giving more to these people, so we shall have to give more to the others also.' It works like that within the single business; and in a country with some degree of social unity it works to some extent even more widely. This is another reason why the whole labour market does not have to be ' tight '—it is enough that some large parts of it are ' tight '—for there to be a fairly general rise in wages.

I fully grant (to my fellow-economists) that such ' social ' spreading is not economically optimum; but economic spreading, as it occurs in practice, itself falls far short of satisfying economic criteria. If the labour market worked like a commodity market, with wages responding directly and quickly to the pressures of supply and demand, what would follow? There might, possibly, be less unemployment; but the ups *and downs* of particular wages would be bound to be considerable. The wages that rose in the initial shortage would have to come down when the shortage was relieved—not indeed to where they were originally, but to a lower level than they had reached at the peak. The fall would of course be resisted. Efforts would be made, and would be attended with some success, to make the temporary advantage permanent.

These things do happen; but it makes for social order that they should not happen too often. So there is something to be said for some degree of social spreading. But it is necessary for social spreading, or for any wide extension of it, that the country should possess some degree

of social unity, that most people should regard their fellows as having some at least of the same rights as themselves. It is not much; but in the countries of the world, as at present defined, even this is by no means universal. And almost everywhere it is under threat; from inflation, which brings too much supply and demand into the labour market, setting group against group in a desperate endeavour to defend what they think to be due to them, and from the preachers of discord, for whom these divisions are fair game.

That, however, is not the note on which to conclude. I would rather look up from the case of the single country to the world as a whole. In the world economy, as contrasted with the single country, the sense of social unity is almost entirely lacking. All we have in the way of social spreading are the operations of international bodies, and the grants that are given as aid. In relation to the size of the task, they do not amount to much. But why is more not done by economic spreading? That is the question to which I finally turn.

Let us look at it in the light of the things listed above. We shall find that there is a part of the explanation under each head. Others, no doubt, could usefully be brought in, but let us see how far our four heads will take us.

First, then, let us consider technology. It is not difficult to see why it is in the advanced countries that the main advances in technology are made. So it is from them that the spreading has to occur. Since theirs is the setting in which the advance is made, it is biased towards their needs, rather than towards those of others. Besides, the sheer speed of technical developments causes savings to be diverted towards the exploitation of new opportunities at the expense of the further exploitation of old ones; yet it is the latter which (one would think) would be more to the advantage of the ' under-developed ' world. A slowing-down of the boom in technology might, from this point of view, be a help.

Secondly, economies of scale. This is an even more obvious way in which the advanced countries have an advantage. It is hard to achieve great economies in cost unless one can achieve a large size of output; but one cannot *begin* with a large size. Although one may protect an ' infant industry ', even the whole of a protected home market is often insufficient for competitiveness. And how often does a protected industry fail to achieve the economies of which, on paper, it ought to be capable! If it should happen that in future industry becomes less dependent on large-scale economies, this barrier would be reduced; so far, however, it has probably been rising.

Thirdly, land. The countries of the world are very unequally provided with natural resources. Some have reliable rainfall, others do not; some sit on mineral deposits, others do not. There were great inequalities, in the days before industrialism, for this reason alone. There are still

great inequalities between non-industrialised and lightly industrialised countries, for this reason alone. Some have become rich because of their ample provision with natural resources; they can industrialise if they choose, although other things are against them, and often they will do so for political rather than economic reasons. It is the others, less well provided, who do not have the wherewithal with which to begin.

Finally, labour. Part of the trouble, surely, is that the strains which, as we have seen, arise in *economic* spreading within the single country, repeat themselves, with even greater intensity, upon the world scale. We have seen how pure economic forces, untempered in their working by social considerations, will almost inevitably cause shortages of particular kinds of labour, and relative rises in the wages of those kinds of labour, but that these advantages will be threatened as time goes on; they will begin to be eroded by the competition of other groups. We have seen that those who are so threatened will look for means of defence. They will defend themselves by trade union action and by various pressures upon their national government. When we project the same issue on the world scale, it is the labour of the advanced countries, as a whole, which is in the threatened position. Although the threat is not so severe, because of the handicaps (some of which I have been listing) imposed upon the potential competitors, the power of resistance exercised through the nation-state is much greater. For while within the nation the pressure of one group may be counterbalanced by pressure from another, a national government, with all that is at its command, cannot resist a pressure that is exercised by its people as a whole.

I am anxious not to suggest that this last reason (a neo-Marxist one, I suppose it might be called) is the principal cause of retarded development. One has only to point to the case of Japan to show that in favourable circumstances it can be overcome. The others which I have been listing (and others, such as population, which are mentioned earlier in this paper) are in my view more deep-rooted. It is one of the things which must not be forgotten, but no more.

I have found myself trespassing, in these last paragraphs, on matters that are only marginally within the province of the economist. Although I have tried to keep my eyes on the long view, I have inevitably been influenced to some extent by the special problems of the time in which we are living. The strike, which began as a purely economic confrontation between workers and employers, has a different complexion when it is directed, as many now are, against government, against one's own government. And a different complexion again when it is directed against other governments, in pursuit of gains which may be economic, but may be quite non-economic. This, however, is not the place in which to consider these things further. I would only like to conclude by pointing out that it is the development of industrialism which has made them possible.

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES—I

J. D. B. Miller

SINCE the Australian Labor Party took office in Australia in December 1972, after twenty-three years in opposition, its foreign policies have been watched with interest by other countries, especially those with close connections with Australia. The Prime Minister, E. G. Whitlam, who was his own Foreign Minister for the first year, made clear from the start that he wanted his policy to be sharply differentiated from that of his predecessors, which he considered had given Australia a racist and militarist image. In several respects his approach differed markedly from theirs. Whereas they had given strong support to the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia, Mr. Whitlam cut off military aid to those countries. His predecessors had failed to find a means of establishing diplomatic relations with China, because of their attachment to Taiwan; he came to terms with China a month after taking office. Their determination to retain a permanent garrison in Singapore, under the ANZUK arrangements, was replaced by his policy of removing all combat units from that location. Their temporising attitude towards racism in South Africa gave way to his outright condemnation of it and his party's refusal to allow segregated South African sporting teams to visit Australia. Above all, their adulatory approach to the United States in all security matters contrasted with his reproach to President Nixon for the bombing of North Vietnam in January 1973.

Such contrasts suggest a clean break with the past; but one must also recognise that in a number of important respects Mr. Whitlam's policy did not diverge from established practice. For example, there has been no discernible difference between the Labor government's approach to Japan and that of the former Liberal-Country Party coalition. Japan is Australia's biggest customer and the outstanding economic influence in the area in which Australia is situated; yet Mr. Whitlam's general line has been just as friendly as his predecessors', except to the extent that, while they did not interfere in the negotiation of contracts for the export of minerals to Japan, his government has been active in this respect. Again, in relation to Indonesia, Australia's nearest Asian neighbour and the most important state in South-east Asia, there seems

to be no difference at all between the present and former governments. Co-operation with Indonesia in trade, aid and military assistance is proceeding with even greater momentum; the repressive aspects of President Suharto's government do not seem to have worried the Labor ministers. The general policy of seeking goodwill in South-east Asia, which was followed by successive Liberal-Country Party administrations, has continued to be adhered to. So has the policy of neutrality in Middle East conflicts. The policy of self-government and subsequent independence for Papua New Guinea, rapidly developed in the later years by the previous government, has been somewhat accelerated by Labor but remains recognisably the same. Towards Western Europe and the EEC, and towards international monetary and trade problems, there is no indication of movement away from established policies, or at any rate of significant changes. The immigration policy of the Labor government, while rather more cautious and more concerned about the fate of migrants once they reach Australia, does not differ markedly from that of its predecessors, who had already opened the door to permanent settlement by non-Europeans.

Thus there are both continuity and change in Australian foreign policy, in spite of the sense of a new start which the coming of the Whitlam government provided. Clearly, that government, like any other, was faced by constraints as well as opportunities. In both respects, domestic and foreign influences have been at work. In this and a subsequent article I shall discuss these influences, taking the domestic first.

The domestic Australian scene included a number of factors favourable to change at the end of 1972. There was first the considerable public reaction against the long period of Liberal-Country Party government, a reaction exploited by the Labor election slogan, 'It's Time!' While in no sense confined to foreign policy, this reaction was often especially sharp in that field. Next, there was the personal approach to foreign policy of the Labor Party leader: Mr. Whitlam had given special attention to such questions as China, Vietnam and racism, and his personal stamp would be found on much of what a new government did. Thirdly, there were the special policy concerns of the Australian Labor Party. I shall deal with these three factors in turn.

While one cannot quantify the degree of boredom, annoyance and exasperation felt by the Australian electorate towards a government which had been in office for twenty-three years, I have no doubt that it was high. From a Canberra vantage-point, most of the ministers looked self-satisfied and worn-out, a combination fatal to initiative and to public esteem. There were exceptions, such as Messrs. Fraser and Peacock amongst the Liberals, and Anthony and Sinclair from the Country Party, but the main impression was of men who were either too limited for their work or who, once having been equal to it, had ceased

to worry about originality or even application. Very few were actively running their departments; most were run by them. This did not mean bad government, since the Australian Public Service is of high quality and can provide both ideas and execution. It did mean, however, that the sense of precedent hung heavily over the whole business of government. The element of continuity was strong. Policies which had been set in motion years before, often in the days of Sir Robert Menzies (who ceased to be Prime Minister in 1966), continued to roll forward but with decreasing momentum. In general, the government was non-ideological and broadly pragmatic; it was unfortunate that its closest approximation to the ideology with which Menzies had achieved power in 1949 related to foreign affairs.

This ideology, in its crudest form, was expressed by Mr. William McMahon, the last of the Liberal prime ministers, when he took over from the deposed Mr. John Gorton in 1971. He said that his would be an anti-communist government at home and abroad. Such a belief had been the core of Menzies's appeal in 1949, and had lain behind the unsuccessful attempts of his first government to ban the Communist Party of Australia. In fact, anti-communism at home had been greatly diluted since the 1950s, the Communists' teeth having been drawn by increased prosperity and by the disinclination of the radical young to take notice of them. Communist trade union officials had been largely undisturbed for some time. Their former disruptive influence in the mines, docks and steel works seemed no longer to operate. The governments of Mr. McMahon and his predecessors had some trouble with radical demonstrations, especially during the Vietnam war, but they had largely given up their pursuit of the Communist Party, leaving this kind of activity to the Democratic Labour Party (which is discussed below). Twenty years of largely successful diplomacy with the trade unions had produced a state of pragmatic coexistence. In any case, the Communist Party had split itself into three parties, which now spend much of their time attacking one another.

The situation was different abroad. In its interpretation of world affairs, the Liberal-Country Party government remained wedded to the simple-minded anti-communism which had been so acceptable at the height of the Cold War and which, as late as the general elections of 1966, had proved highly successful with the voters. With some ministers this way of thinking was so ingrained that they remained unconvinced, in the 1970s, that there was any real conflict between the Soviet Union and China, preferring to believe that the apparent clash was part of a centralised communist plot. While this was a minority view, it was not so extreme as to seem nonsensical to all the other ministers. Most of them had found the Dulles doctrines of the 1950s so congenial that they did not think of abandoning them; often it seemed to this observer that

any awkward change in circumstances caused them to blame the facts for confounding the doctrines, rather than examine the doctrines to see if they would fit the facts. Their natural tendency to simplify world affairs on a communist versus anti-communist basis was accentuated by the belief that this was electorally advantageous.

Anti-communism a depreciating asset

Broadly speaking, the doctrines to which the Liberal-Country Party governments clung were those of communism as a unified force in the world, of the domino theory, and of forward defence. The three interlocked. The first made it possible to identify every communist movement in Asia with either the Soviet Union or China, with the Soviet Union until 1962 or so, and with China thereafter, though without any perceptible difference in terms of policy in Asia. The second, the domino theory, made it imperative that all foreign communist movements should be resisted or at least discouraged, since the success of one would lead to the success of the rest, especially in South-east Asia. The third, that of forward defence, identified the best form of resistance to communism in South-east Asia as that of a major external power such as Britain or the United States (or preferably both), which would engage communist forces in Asia itself. Australia's task would be to assist this major partner, not to initiate resistance on its own account. As Britain moved slowly away from an 'east of Suez' policy in the later 1960s, the Australian government clung more closely to the United States. The interlocking of the three elements was given its most powerful expression in the Vietnam war: Australia's commitment of ground troops at the same time as the United States in 1965 meant that it and New Zealand were the only non-Asian allies of the United States to take part in the war, and the only allies of any kind to pay their own way. Such a commitment was honourable in intention and in execution. Although small, the Australian contribution was efficient. But the commitment was so absolute that it left the Liberal-Country Party government no way of independently assessing the course of the war or of escaping the opprobrium which settled on the United States. The kind of thinking which led to the commitment was clearly attractive to the Australian electorate in 1963, when Sir Robert Menzies won an election by propounding it in the abstract; it was more attractive in 1966, when his successor, Harold Holt, won even more decisively with Vietnam as the central issue of the campaign. By 1969, however, it was in decline, so that the government's majority shrank, though Vietnam was not given the same prominence in its campaign as before. At the 1972 elections, which Labor won, Vietnam was almost in the discard, though Mr. McMahon retained the same framework of assumptions about it as his

predecessors. Clearly, the government's asset of anti-communism abroad had been depreciated in value.

The reasons for this depreciation were largely external in origin, and as such will be considered at length in the second part of this study. Domestically, however, the American retreat from Vietnam had the effect of weakening the government's credibility. The same was true of its attitude towards China. It had remained stuck fast in the belief that recognition of China could be delayed indefinitely, since Australia's principal associates, such as the United States, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia, were not prepared to accord recognition, even if Canada and France were. This belief was dealt a body-blow by the Nixon *rapprochement* with China and by China's acceptance in the United Nations. The Nixon visit to Peking followed one by Mr. Whitlam; the obloquy which Mr. McMahon and his ministers heaped on Mr. Whitlam could hardly be transferred a few months later to Mr. Nixon, yet logically it should have been. Since logic is impregnable, the premises must have been faulty. Such a lesson was not lost on the Australian press or on the numerous opponents of the government in academic life.

A third sphere in which the Liberal-Country Party government lost credibility because it appeared to lag behind other countries was that of racism. As will be indicated below, Australia is an ambiguous country in terms of ideas about race, and the government's policies had been, if anything, ahead of public opinion if by that is meant the opinion of the man in the street; but its long refusal to condemn South African racial policies at the UN (motivated more by excessive legalism and an obsession about the domestic jurisdiction provisions of the UN Charter than by any special love for South Africa) alienated many intellectuals who were opposed to racism in the same way as an earlier generation had been against aggression. Moreover, steadily throughout the 1960s a special aspect of anti-racism developed amongst Australians, in the form of intense shame about Australia's treatment of its aborigines and determination to make amends. Although the Liberal-Country Party government took considerable steps towards better treatment of the aborigines—far more considerable than any previous governments, including those of the Australian Labor Party—these were not sufficient for people who wanted a wholesale denunciation of the past and a completely new start.

To sum up the reaction against the governments of the 1950s and 1960s, one can say that, while their general approach to foreign policy had been broadly acceptable for a long time, it came increasingly under fire in the late 1960s because of its increasing irrelevance to what seemed to many to be either the important issues or the way events were moving. On the whole, government officials were aware of this growing sense of irrelevance and did their best to persuade ministers that there was point

to it. Often they were successful, but in other cases they could make no headway against ministers' prejudices or ministers' conviction that electoral advantage lay in pursuing the policies of the past. Consequently, in foreign policy the record of the Gorton and McMahon governments was patchy: at times their approach seemed to be one of real insight (although in the cases of Indonesia, Bangladesh and Cambodia before the deposition of Sihanouk, this owed more to officials' special knowledge and influence than to ministerial wisdom); at others it was blinkered and dogmatic, derived more from fixed principles than from a genuine understanding of the situation (although it is fair to say that in Vietnam, in particular, official opinion sometimes reinforced the existing stereotypes which ministers carried in their heads). In judging the ministries' patchy record, one must bear in mind the lack of a long tradition of independent foreign policy in Australia, the prevailing sense of obligation to a senior partner ultimately responsible for defence, and the primacy of domestic considerations for ministers most of the time. The reaction against their foreign policies was partly a matter of lack of credibility over Vietnam and China, and partly of a general feeling that it was time for them to go. By the elections of December 1972, it was difficult to find an articulate Australian with access to the mass media who wholeheartedly supported the McMahon government, although some were prepared to give it qualified support because of fear that Labor's left wing would be worse. There was hardly any positive enthusiasm for a government widely regarded as a spent force.

This has particular application to the second of the domestic factors working for change, that of the personality of the Labor Party leader, Mr. Whitlam, especially as revealed in the 1972 election campaign. As in so many domestic spheres, particularly urban problems, his ideas on foreign policy looked much fresher and more interesting than those of Mr. McMahon, who had, in addition, the unfortunate capacity to make even a sensible statement sound an absurdity. Mr. Whitlam called for a new start in Australian foreign policy in such matters as racism and militarism; he was as deeply concerned about human rights in South Africa as about those of the Australian aborigines; he had consistently called for recognition of China; he was not anti-American (my guess is that he knew more about the United States, when taking office, than any previous Australian prime minister except perhaps Alfred Deakin), but he was not prepared to approve every American policy without examination. He kept saying that the end of external intervention in Vietnam would enable a fresh start to be made in South-east Asia. He did not go into his policies in great detail, but it was evident that he would give a new tone and temper to the conduct of foreign policy. Within a month of taking office, in addition to rebuking President Nixon and negotiating diplomatic relations with China, Mr. Whitlam had

changed the thrust of Australian voting in the UN General Assembly so as to align it more with Third World attitudes, ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, recognised East Germany and begun negotiations for the recognition of North Vietnam. No doubt some of his predecessors had wanted to do some of these things, and no doubt the Liberals would have done most of them in time, if they had retained office; but Mr. Whitlam's whirlwind revisionism meant that they were done in such rapid succession as to give the impression of wholesale change.

Although the Whitlam stamp was unmistakable on these decisions, one must recognise its particular suitability in the 1970s for the Australian Labor Party, while also recognising that the party retains many of its older attitudes and characteristics. It is a party with continuous membership in Australian parliaments since 1891, although it has been only three times in office in the federal parliament since 1916, the longest being eight years from 1941 to 1949. Like the British and New Zealand Labour Parties, it is solidly rooted in the trade unions and provides the main vehicle for radical intellectuals who reject revolutionary parties and are prepared to put up with the gradualism of social democracy. Until the Second World War, one could say that it had only two significant approaches to foreign affairs; one was opposition to military service beyond Australia (derived largely from the split in the party over conscription in the First World War), the other a firm belief in the need for a White Australia Policy (derived from the objections of white workers to Chinese, Japanese and Pacific island immigration in the late 19th century). Its period of office during and after the Second World War gave it a broader sense of the needs of foreign policy, leading it to embrace the alliance with the United States, the need for internationalist bodies such as the UN, and the desirability of coming to terms with the new states of South and South-east Asia. Anti-militarism and opposition to coloured immigration remained, however, as basic attitudes amongst many of the party's supporters and M.P.'s. Mr. A. A. Calwell, Mr. Whitlam's predecessor, who led the party from 1960 to 1967, epitomised both of them. It was largely the feeling that he represented the Labor past, rather than a possible future, that led a majority of Labor parliamentarians to replace him by Mr. Whitlam in 1967. This did not mean, however, that the old attitudes had disappeared. Anti-militarism lay behind much of the Labor opposition to Australia's participation in the Vietnam war, especially since that participation was carried out mainly by young men conscripted into the regular army on a lottery system. Fear of coloured immigration remained so significant that Mr. Whitlam, when Leader of the Opposition, had to shift Mr. Daly, his shadow minister for immigration, to another shadow portfolio because of Mr. Daly's reluctance to move with the times.

It was clear before Labor won the 1972 election, and is still clear,

that the party embraces a number of divergent points of view, and that some of these apply in foreign policy. Sometimes the difference is caused by a generation gap: this is particularly so on immigration, where the older members are the more likely to raise objections to a wider choice of immigrants. There is also the familiar Left-Right-Centre divergence over issues involving the communist countries, though this is somewhat modified in comparison with the situation in Britain, for at least two reasons. One is that the party suffered a grievous split in 1955, when it expelled its extreme Catholic right wing, which thereafter became the Democratic Labor Party and a thorn in Labor's side because of Australia's complicated system of counting votes. (Even now, Labor does not have a majority in the Senate, where the balance of power is held by the DLP.) The other is that the Vietnam war polarised opinion between government and opposition to a greater extent than any foreign issue for many years; this meant that the Labor Party took up a more sceptical attitude towards American policy, and an attitude of greater acceptance of China and North Vietnam, than would probably have otherwise been the case. These two reasons help to explain why Labor looked more leftist in its later years in opposition than it had earlier, although one must also recognise that any labour party, denied office for a long time, becomes a haven for the discontented and extreme; these it usually loses when it comes to power, because its gradualism reasserts itself and disappoints the militant few.

Even so, one must recognise that there has been a leftist touch to some of Labor's actions, notably the rapid recognition of North Vietnam, the denial of further military aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the re-negotiation of the agreement with the United States on American installations in Australia (to which more attention will be given in the subsequent article). To say this, however, is to introduce an element of ambiguity. These were leftist policies in the sense that the left wing campaigned for them; but they were also policies approved by more moderate members of the party, and carried out in a moderate manner. In recognising North Vietnam, Mr. Whitlam's government neither ceased to recognise the government of South Vietnam, nor recognised the regime of the NLF; in denying military aid to Indo-China, it did not cease to provide civilian aid; and in re-negotiating the agreements with the United States it followed a nationalist, not a pro-communist line, and found the American government willing to go much of the way with it. The long-delayed ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the first exchange of envoys with the Vatican, and the policy of letting the Australian dollar fluctuate with the US dollar, not with sterling, can all be put on the other side of the ledger. The party was happy with a pragmatic policy which followed a leftist line only when that had become part of received Labor opinion. The fact that

Mr. Whitlam managed to retain a studied neutrality in the Middle East war, in spite of pressures from both sides (from Mr. R. J. Hawke, the president of the Australian Council of Trades Unions, for support of Israel, and from left-wing elements for support of the Arabs), reinforces this view. Australia did not need to take sides, since it was well away from the transport routes leading to the Middle East, and provided nearly all its own oil supplies from domestic sources; but a governing party which was strongly ideological in character would have taken sides none the less.

How Australians look at the world

The combination of widespread reaction against the previous government, Mr. Whitlam's own personal ascendancy, and the general satisfaction of the Labor Party with the policies he has pursued, gave him opportunities in foreign policy which he took with energy. Yet there were also constraints. Some of these were reflected in his own party; all were the consequence of the particular characteristics of the Australian people in their approach to the outside world. Some of the characteristics which matter in this connection are that Australians are an immigrant people, a European people, a people living at a high economic standard, and a people aware of their contiguity to Asia, a continent whose inhabitants have quite different backgrounds.

Immigrant communities are continually renewed in spirit and outlook, especially if the immigrants come from a variety of sources, as those to Australia do. In addition, however, immigrant communities are very much concerned with practical success, with getting on. British and European migrants to Australia, like their predecessors and like Indian and Chinese migrants in Africa and Asia, characteristically work very hard to establish themselves, and look to politics, not for ideological support or for immediate benefits, but for security and the opportunity to make money. Broadly speaking, the political effect of postwar migration to Australia has been to enhance the more conservative side of politics (which is not to say, by any means, that all the migrant votes have gone to the Liberals). To some extent, amongst the Greeks and Yugoslavs, home politics have been brought in with the migrants' baggage and caused disunity within the ethnic group; also those earlier migrants who came from communist-occupied countries have been a source of testimony against attitudes and policies which seemed to favour the communist powers. The net effect, however, has been to strengthen existing policies of alliance with the United States and general association with the Western powers which previous generations of British migrants had approved. Those policies had been endorsed—and sometimes effected—by previous Labor governments; it would have

been strange if the Whitlam government had departed entirely from them. What it has done, instead, is to acquiesce in them generally while diverging on specific points, such as all-out support for American policy in Vietnam, and tolerance of French nuclear tests in the Pacific.

The fact that the Australian community is not only immigrant but also European in origins is important in respect of general association with the Western powers, but mainly in relation to the other two characteristics mentioned above—its high standard of living and its awareness of the closeness of Asia. In spite of the fact that all governments since the Second World War have stressed Australia's close links with Asia and the need to assist and accept as equals the new states of South-east Asia—a stress which has expressed itself in effective diplomacy and technical assistance, as well as in bringing to Australia many thousands of Asian students—there is still a traditional sense of apprehension about what Asia might do to Australia if it put its mind to it. One can argue at great length about the incapacity of Asian states to invade Australia, without extirpating the basic sense of insecurity which comes to the surface in Australians when they consider their future relations with Asian countries. The kind of unease which was vindicated by Japan's southward move in 1941 is still present, although it has been mostly focused since the Second World War upon China and Indonesia. Stories of the resurgence of Japanese militarism and of a resurrection of the South-east Asia Co-prosperity Sphere find surprisingly ready acceptance in Australia, in spite of the conviction of those with first-hand knowledge of Japan that such an outcome is most unlikely. The basis of public support for the interlocking beliefs expressed for so long by the Liberal-Country Party governments was probably not anti-communism so much as a sense of insecurity about Asia. Mr. Calwell, it may be noted, was one of the foremost opponents of Indonesian ambitions in West Irian (West New Guinea), seeing in these evidence of Indonesian imperialism which might extend further.

The kind of apprehension to which I am referring was responsible for much of the Liberal-Country Party's attitude towards defence, and may well prove to be more influential with the Labor Party than the first year of Labor government may have suggested. If there is a basic Labor attitude, reflecting the basic unease which has operated for so long in Australia, it is either that Australia should make itself strong enough to withstand any attack from Asia, and otherwise keep out of Asian conflicts, or that Australia should ensure that it has the help of a major protector if danger should threaten. Across this basic sentiment runs the feeling of the newer, younger Labor man that Australia should either make common cause with the 'progressive' elements in Asian countries or keep itself severely to itself, especially in respect of the American alliance, which is held to be likely to draw Australia into

war through the presence on Australian soil of American installations which may be of use in nuclear warfare and would therefore constitute nuclear targets. If this analysis is correct, then both the Australian community and the Australian Labor Party are likely to be permeated by contradictory impulses towards isolationism and alliance, and towards co-operation and caution so far as Asian states are concerned.

Such impulses normally lead governments towards compromises. Some of the patchiness of the former governments' record can charitably be ascribed to this process, as can much of the apparent contradiction between continuity and change in the Whitlam government's record. Australia is the kind of Western democracy in which either side in politics can normally count on support from something like 45 per cent. of the voters, leaving 10 per cent. or so to decide, at any given election, which sort of government will be elected. Mr. Whitlam and his front-bench colleagues were aware that at the 1963 and 1966 elections Labor had been defeated largely because its opponents were able to present themselves as more likely to provide the country with better defence. While this aspect had been of less importance in 1969, it obviously still had some force in it. At the 1972 elections the Labor Party said that, in spite of its feelings about Vietnam, it would retain membership of ANZUS and ANZUK and, while seeking a change in the functions of SEATO, would not desert that moribund relic of John Foster Dulles's mania for pacts.

Australia's special characteristic of a high standard of living, which it shares with New Zealand, has particular application when one is asking how the nature of the population at large affects the policy of a new government such as Mr. Whitlam's. That high standard is based partly upon the high level of education and technology in the community, partly upon the frequent injection of funds from abroad (traditionally from Britain, but in recent years increasingly from the United States, Japan and Western Europe), partly (though to only a slight extent in the 1970s) upon a favoured position in British markets, and partly upon the exploitation of the special resources of the Australian continent, whether in its capacity to grow wool, wheat and beef, or in its underlying deposits of iron ore, copper, bauxite, coal, uranium, gold and oil. In a relatively short time Australia has grown from a country dependent very largely upon exports to pay for consumer goods and capital goods to one which, while making much the greater part of its own consumer goods and a considerable proportion of the capital goods which it needs, still has an increasing appetite for sophisticated consumer goods and a disinclination to use its savings for major new ventures which require heavy capital expenditure, such as exploration for oil and metals, and the transport of bulk goods for export abroad. It is thus a high-standard economy which is not content

to live off its own resources but requires others to provide a significant part of the capital which will release more resources. Marxists would say that it was still in a neo-colonialist stage in spite of its political independence and high standard of living. They link this with the political dependence upon the United States which Australia displayed throughout the twenty-three years of Liberal-Country Party government. No doubt there is something in this correlation, even though it is usually pressed harder than the facts warrant. But one can say with certainty that the Australian community at large would be acutely disturbed if any government attempted to cut all or most of the country's ties with North America, Western Europe and Japan. These, after all, are indisputably Australia's closest and biggest trading partners, and only the most thoroughgoing revision of the Australian economy would enable the country to do without them. Even a cessation in their investment in Australian enterprises would involve, after a while, a slowing down of Australia's rate of economic growth.

Such considerations do not deny the possibility that Australia might, under either a Labor or a Liberal-Country Party government, rebel against the full control of some of its resources by overseas interests. There are three distinct areas of economic control in which there were stirrings of revolt under the previous government, and in which the Labor government has shown itself ready to go further than its predecessors. These are the takeovers of Australian companies by foreign firms, especially multinationals; the transport of Australian exports in foreign-owned ships; and the conclusion of contracts for Australian mineral exports, notably iron ore, without the intervention of the Australian government. Mr. McMahon's government, like Mr. Gorton's, had shown itself sensitive on the first two of these; it had intervened in certain takeovers and allowed the national shipping line, originally confined to coastal shipping, to carry cargoes to Japan. The Whitlam government wishes to go further in both respects, and has already intervened in the negotiation of iron ore contracts. One can say that domestic influences had been moving towards a stronger assertion of Australian regulation or control of international transactions in all three instances. The motivation was essentially nationalistic; and the Australian Labor Party has traditionally seen itself as the head and front of Australian nationalism. One would expect it, therefore, to be sympathetic towards such domestic influences and to do its best to satisfy them by going further than governments of a different political colour might go. But it would also be constrained by the fact that it was the caretaker for the livelihoods of large numbers of Australians, either directly or through the medium of the balance of payments. These are primarily workers and shareholders in private industry. Bashing the foreigner is one thing for a social democratic government, so long as he can be clearly identified

as foreign; bashing his employees and dependents in one's own country is another thing altogether. We may thus expect an uneasy compromise between the preservation of Australian interests and the exploitation of those which can be identified as foreign and assaulted without local damage. In such circumstances there may not be much difference, at the end of the day, between the performance of different kinds of government. Indeed, the accident of personalities, rather than the imposition of inflexible policies, may be the deciding factor.

If one is to look for constraints and opportunities in foreign policy, as these are dictated by the domestic circumstances of Australia itself, then the constraints will be found largely in the circumstances arising from the varied but special nature of the Australian population, and the opportunities in the new situation arising from the termination of twenty-three years of increasingly unimaginative government by Liberal-Country Party ministries. In the end, these did not even merit Disraeli's description of a Liberal front bench as a row of extinct volcanoes, but looked like a row of extinct *plastic* volcanoes. Any new government, whether headed on the one hand by a Whitlam or on the other by a Fraser or Peacock, would have been bound to strive for a new look, and to make some sort of break with the past. In the nature of things, a Labor government's break looked more ideological and was cleaner, because of its own party background and the special circumstances of its leader's interests and the issues, such as Vietnam, which had fired the feelings of its members in recent years. At the same time, the constraints were those of a relatively homogeneous population which was apprehensive about its place in the world, because of its relatively small size, the large and apparently empty area in which it lived, its remarkably high standard of comfort, and the presence nearby of many millions of Asians living at much lower standards. Adherence by a new government to the comparative assurance of the American alliance is understandable in these terms; so is its determination to be on as good terms as possible with Asian countries, whatever the nature of their regimes.

Even so, very little change could have been instituted by Mr. Whitlam's government if the external environment had not been favourable. It will be the contention of the second part of this study that the government was fortunate in finding such a favourable environment, but that, even in such a happy situation, it has still found difficulties in persuading other countries that certain of its views should be accepted. Constraints and opportunities operate from outside as well as within.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND INTEGRATION

J. E. S. Fawcett

WHAT part can the Council of Europe play in European integration? In the last quarter of a century European countries have made common cause in many fields and in different combinations. The range is shown by their varying participation in Western European Union (WEU), Nato and the Warsaw Pact; in Benelux, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Euratom, EEC, EFTA and Comecon; in GATT, OECD and the UN system, including ECE; in the Nordic Council; in the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) and the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN); in the European Space Conference, Intelsat and Intersputnik; in the systematised intergovernmental conferences on civil aviation, transport, and posts and telecommunications; and in the Council of Europe itself. But it is only through the European Communities that a clear line of advance has been seen to integration in Europe. The contribution that many of the other combinations make can only be slight or indirect, limited as they are in membership or specialised interests or by mutual hostility. So at a time when the whole advance of the Communities, always slower at some points of the front than hoped or predicted, is faltering, it may be worth asking what help another combination can give in the integration of Western Europe.

The Council of Europe is a combination that does not suffer from some of the limitations described, or suffers from them to a lesser degree than the rest. For whatever may be set as the precise geographical bounds of Western Europe, it would be agreed that at its heart is the Rhine basin, joining Switzerland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. Around this heartland there is a ring of more or less close neighbours: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Austria, Liechtenstein, and Italy; and on the outer margin lie Iceland, Finland, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Spain and Portugal. Of these twenty-three countries only six [1] are not members of the Council of Europe, so that it is geographically the most comprehensive of any of the intergovernmental institutions centred in Western Europe. But in a comparison of the membership of the European Communities and of the

[1] Finland, German Democratic Republic, Liechtenstein, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Council of Europe, which will now be called for convenience the Community and the Council, a political aspect must be noticed. Each has found ways of enlarging its field of activity in Europe. The Community has concluded association agreements with Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, while the Council has secured the collaboration in certain fields of Finland, Spain, Portugal and also Liechtenstein; Greece too, though politically excluded, remains a party to fourteen Council conventions. Further, the Soviet Union and other East European countries have on occasion participated in the Council's work through observers. There is thus a difference between the Community and the Council, in that the Council has, at least at the present time, fewer political obstacles to meet than the Community in achieving closer functional association in Europe by securing the collaboration of East European countries, Austria, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal.

The integration of states, however, goes far beyond their association or collaboration. There will be many factors at work in the process—political, functional and structural—and they will have, at any given time, differing velocities, as it were, or rates at which they move the group of states in the direction of integration. A system may disintegrate by a similar but inverse process. Thus the British Empire was before 1914 an integrated system. Its translation into the Commonwealth has been a process largely of disintegration, but with some reintegration in the later stage. The disintegration has been political, in the emergence of independent members and the consequential divergence of national policies, and in the withdrawal of some countries; it has also been structural, in the declining role of the Crown and the progressive abandonment of the legislative authority of Westminster. In contrast, functional factors—economic, cultural and technical—have rather increased in force since 1945, bringing a measure of structural integration in the establishment of a Commonwealth secretariat.

Unlike the Commonwealth, the Community has a specific objective, in ' the ever closer union among the European peoples ', and has already advanced a long way towards structural integration, in the creation of executive organs, and towards functional integration, in the ' interiorisation ' of Community rules and standards in particular fields of commerce, industry, agriculture and establishment. But the advance to political integration has been visibly so slow as to be insignificant.

The Council of Europe does not aim directly at political integration, but rather ' to achieve a greater unity between its members. . . by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, cultural, scientific, legal and administration matters, and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms ' (*Statute* (*1941*), *Article 1* (*a*) *and* (*b*)). The EEC Treaty defines the task, however, as the promotion throughout the

Community of 'harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations between the Member States belonging to it' (*Article 2*). Further, unlike the EEC Treaty, the Statute does not in any degree elaborate the aims of the institution which it has set up. The Statute is in fact concerned only with the structure, not transnational but internal, necessary to support the activities of the Council. In contrast, the aims of the Community are extensively elaborated in the Rome Treaty, which also builds a large executive structure, both transnational and internal, for its implementation. Matters relating to national defence are expressly excluded from the scope of the Council, and are not dealt with in the EEC Treaty. To compare, then, the fields of operation of the Community and Council, those of the Council are at once wider but less well defined—social and cultural programmes rather than issues for political judgment and decision—and its instruments are weaker and more indirect.

Promoting functional collaboration

In sum, then, the Council is a forum rather than an executive, and its object is functional collaboration rather than political integration. Two important differences thus stand out between the Community and the Council in regard to European integration. On the one hand, the promotion of functional and administrative collaboration in Europe is engaged in over a wider area through the Council than in the Community, and indeed the 'six', and now the 'nine', have come to depend on a number of Council, as distinct from Community, arrangements. On the other hand, the Council has not the instruments, which the Community has to hand, to implement common arrangements. The Community may by regulations or directives establish common rules or standards, which become, or must be made, part of domestic law or administration in the member states. The Council, having no such power, must rely almost exclusively on intergovernmental agreements or conferences to further its work. These agreements and conferences are then an indicator of the measure of functional integration in Europe which the Council is able to achieve; but it must be kept in mind that the fact that Council activities have to be seen primarily as factors in the functional integration of Europe does not mean that these activities do not raise many political issues, both European and national; and this the records of the Consultative Assembly and Committee of Ministers show.

Over seventy international agreements have been concluded under the aegis of the Council since 1949. If we exclude the Statute of the Council itself and its amendments (1949–1961), and other agreements dealing with internal matters of the Council, 67 were concluded up to

June 1973 although not all are yet in force. It is worth looking at the fields covered by a selected number of conventions, and also at the extent of the participation of countries in them, in order that some assessment may be attempted of their contribution to European integration.

The conventions may be roughly grouped as follows, according to the fields covered by them, the year in brackets being that of entry into force:

Human Rights, Social Welfare and Public Health:

- European Convention on Human Rights (1953)
  - First Protocol (1954)
  - Fourth Protocol (1968)
- Interim Agreement on Social Security Schemes for Old Age, Invalids and Survivors (1954)
- Interim Agreement on other Social Security Schemes (1954)
- Code of Social Security (1968)
- European Social Charter (1965)
- Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (1954)
- Agreements on:
  - Exchange of Therapeutic Substances of Human Origin (1959)
  - Duty-free Importation of Medical, Surgical and Laboratory Equipment on Loan (1960)
  - Mutual Assistance in Special Medical Treatments and Climatic Facilities (1962)
  - Exchanges of Blood-grouping Reagents (1962)
  - Means of Repair of Orthopaedic Appliances for War-disabled (1963)
  - Instruction and Education of Nurses (1969)

Cultural, Education and Broadcasting:

- European Cultural Convention (1954)
- Conventions on:
  - Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (1970)
  - Equivalence of Diplomas for University Admission (1954) Protocol (1964)
  - Equivalence of Periods of University Study (1957)
  - Academic Recognition of University Qualifications (1961)
  - Continued Payment of Scholarships for Study Abroad (1971)
  - TV Film Exchanges (1961)
  - Protection of TV Broadcasts (1961): Protocol (1965)
  - Prevention of Broadcasts from outside National Territories (1967)

Establishment and movement of individuals:

- European Convention on Establishment (1965)
- Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality (1968)
- Regulations governing Movement of Persons (1958)
- Abolition of Visas for Refugees (1960)
- Travel of Young Persons on Collective Passports (1962)
- 'Au pair' Placement (1971)
- Hotel-keepers' Liability (1967)
- Compulsory Insurance for Civil Liability for Motor Vehicles (1969)
- Punishment of Road Traffic Offences (1972)

Commercial:
Formalities required for Patent Applications (1955)
International Classification of Patents (1955–1961)
Application of Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1965)

Administration of Justice:
European Extradition Convention (1960)
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1962)
Information on Foreign Law (1969)

Animals:
Protection of Animals during International Transport (1971)

The Council of Europe also has links with a number of standing conferences at ministerial or administrative level. The European Conference of Ministers of Education, composed of twenty countries including Finland, uses the Council of Cultural Co-operation, an organ of the Council of Europe, and its three permanent committees, to study and report on key problems of common interest. These committees are concerned with Higher Education and Research; General and Technical Education; and Out-of-School Education and Youth, the first being composed of both government and university representatives. The European Conference of Ministers of Justice meets biennially, and is serviced by the Council secretariat. The Council has also established a Conference of Deans of European Law Faculties from Council countries and also from Finland, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia. More closely linked to the Council as an 'advisory and technical organ' is the European Conference of Local Authorities, which has moved into the area of regional planning. In the fields of communications the European Conference on Postal and Telecommunications Services, based on the European Postal Union (1951), the European Civil Aviation Conference and the European Conference of Ministers of Transport report regularly to the Council.

If we look at the agreements first, two features stand out. In the first place, it is obvious from their descriptive titles alone that they vary greatly in scale and area of operation and therefore in their potential social impact and usefulness. Further, their particular provisions range widely from specific rules through declared standards to bare declarations of policy or intent. In order, then, to begin to assess their potential usefulness and integrative effect, it would be necessary to 'weight' each agreement, according to its scale and area of operation in social terms, and according to whether its various provisions are rule-making, standard-setting or hortatory only. So the weighting of, for example, the two agreements on exchanges of Therapeutic Substances of Human Origin, and of Blood Grouping Reagents, would have to take account of several factors. The organisation through a Council sub-committee of

haematologists, drawn from the fifteen participating countries, of a common blood transfusion service, of the standardisation of blood products, and of training courses and research, is effective and expanding. On the other hand, it could be said that the field of operation is highly technical and relatively limited. Again, the comparative efficacy in international instruments of rule-making, standard-setting and reasoned recommendations is not easy to assess and may often be a matter of dispute. The Convention on Human Rights is essentially rule-making, while the Cultural Convention can hardly in the nature of things contain more than recommendations supported by certain undertakings. The Social Charter lies somewhere between, and in fact many of the European conventions contain some of all three elements.

Agreements and conventions can thus serve as indicators of integration because their scope and area, and the particular term given to them, can reflect choices and priorities of the governments that conclude them and of the peoples those governments represent.[2] If those choices or priorities are well served by such intergovernmental agreements, then the process of integration will be that much advanced. But assessment of their integrative effect would have also to take account of their actual implementation, that is, the number of countries involved and the social or administrative impact of the agreements. While it is not possible here to take account, in regard to the agreements and conventions listed above, of the second factor, some inferences can be drawn from the first.

The bare numbers of ratifications by Council countries of the 42 agreements and conventions selected above themselves yield a not uninteresting graph. There are two quite separate curves, one ranging from 38 down to 27 ratifications, and including all the 'nine'; and the other ranging from 19 to 15. In detail the figures are: Denmark 38; Norway, Sweden 34; United Kingdom 33; Belgium, France 31; Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland 30; Italy, Luxembourg 28; Netherlands 27. In the second curve are Turkey 19; Cyprus 18; Austria, Iceland 17; Malta 16; Switzerland 15. Greece with 14 may be added although it left the Council in 1970. If the agreements and conventions are then taken as divided into the first three groups above, the essential pattern does not change: for the extent of participation of the 'nine' is still consistently greater in each group than that of other Council countries. So in the first group (human rights, social welfare and public health), the 'nine', led by Denmark and Ireland, yield 15 down to 10 ratifications of the 16 conventions. In the second group of 11 conventions (culture and educa-

[2] For a quantified analysis of choices and priorities of six European countries in relation to integration, see R. Inglehart, 'Changing value priorities and European integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. X, No. 1 (September 1971). He distinguishes 'acquisitive' and 'post-acquisitive' choices, the former being confined to sustenance and safety.

tion) all have been ratified by the United Kingdom, and 8–10 by the remainder of the ' nine ', with the exception of Ireland (7) and Italy (5). In the third group (establishment and movement) the ' nine ' have ratified from 4 to 8 of the 9 conventions. In all three groups Norway and Sweden are near the maximum number of ratifications. In contrast, the other Council countries have consistently fewer ratifications, Austria and Switzerland being notably at, or near, the end of the list.[3] While extended inferences cannot of course be drawn from these various figures, they justify the conclusion that there is a higher measure of collaboration among the ' nine ' than among Council countries taken as a whole.[4] The tentative conclusion may also be drawn that collaboration in the areas of the first two groups is more desired or compelling than in the third, perhaps because it is an area where Community activities are involved.

This leads to another question about these agreements and conventions, more revealing for the judgment of their usefulness and particularly their integrative effect, and that is in how many countries a particular agreement or convention is operative. Out of the total of 42, only 17 have secured more than 75 per cent of the total of ratifications by Council countries, and 11 have secured less than 50 per cent. Here the 17 most widely adopted include the Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols; certain of the agreements on medical exchanges, and on the equivalences of diplomas and university study; on the conventions on the abolition of visas for refugees and on collective passports for the young. The Social Charter (1965), Extradition Convention (1960), and Cultural Convention (1954) each secured 10 ratifications, while in the field of administration of justice, that on Information on Foreign Law (1969) has 11 and that on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1962) has 9. But the Convention on Compulsory Insurance for Civil Liability for Motor Vehicles (1969) has so far been ratified by only 5 countries; and it must be noted that the conventions on certain consular functions; on the establishment across frontiers of companies; on a uniform law of arbitration; and on foreign money liabilities, although concluded 1966–1967, have not yet entered into force, having secured only two ratifications between them. It may be added that apart from the Convention on Information on Foreign Law (1969), attempts at collaboration through agreements on the administration of justice have so far had no great success. So conventions on Supervision of Conditionally-released Offenders (1964), on Stops on Bearer Securities (1970) and on International Validity of Criminal Judgements (1970) are not in force, none having

[3] Austria 8/16, 3/11 and 2/9: Switzerland 5/16, 2/11 and 3/9.

[4] The Convention on the Elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia (1964) is not yet in force, but was from its conclusion provisionally implemented by the 'six', United Kingdom and Switzerland.

secured more than 7 signatures or 2 ratifications. A group of four legal conventions adopted at Basle in May 1972 have so far attracted only 8 signatures or less and no ratifications. These figures support the tentative conclusion, suggested above, that it is in the areas of the first two groups of conventions that effective collaboration through the Council is most likely.

The EcoSoc of Europe

How far, then, can collaboration, initiated by the Council through intergovernmental agreements and conferences, contribute to the integration of Europe? To answer this, further enquiry would be needed into the actual implementation and effect of conventions and conference recommendations, and such enquiry is always difficult and uncertain. But perhaps enough has been said here to suggest that the future prime role of the Council should be that of the EcoSoc [5] of Europe: in other words, it should be a centre of enquiry, promotion and co-ordination, and a forum for discussion in the areas of culture and education, social welfare and public health, and human rights.

An agreement between the Community and the Council could then be envisaged, analogous in part to the agreements between the UN and specialised agencies and an extension of the arrangement made between the Community and the Council in August 1959.[6] It would be based on the assumptions that it is the Community that must be the vehicle for any advance towards political integration in Europe, that the traditional role of the consultative Assembly can hardly be long maintained alongside a burgeoning European Parliament, but that the Council has already the long secretariat experience and some of the instruments that can contribute to functional integration. Such an agreement would recognise the special role of the Council in the fields indicated above, assign to it certain functions under the EEC Treaty, and provide for 'the elimination of all undesirable duplication' of work [7] between the Community and the Council. The Council would then effectively replace the Economic and Social Committee,[8] which at present has little impact or influence, if only for its unmanageable size—only Parkinson's Law would create a 'Committee' of 150 or more. Functions assignable under the EEC Treaty could include extending collaboration in basic and advanced

[5] Compare UN Charter, Articles 62–64, which assign functions to the Economic and Social Council of (1) initiating 'studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters', (2) preparing conventions, (3) calling conferences, (4) co-ordinating the work of the specialised agencies.

[6] Under EEC Treaty, Article 230: 'The Community shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the Council of Europe'.

[7] A principle expressed in agreements between the UN and the specialised agencies.

[8] EEC Treaty, Articles 193–198.

vocational training, social security, the movement of labour, and rights of establishment.[9] The Council has already engaged in studies, and initiated intergovernmental agreements, on all these matters; and the fact that many migrant workers in the Community come from countries which are members of the Council, or are associated with it, makes the Council a natural centre of action. Since the ' nine ' are all members of the Council, there would be no technical difficulties in the conclusion of such an agreement between Community and Council, or in any necessary amendments to the EEC Treaty following upon it.

The future of the European Convention on Human Rights also comes into question in the relations between the Community and the Council. Now that France is ratifying the Convention, all the 'nine' will be parties to it. So does the Convention form in some sense a part of Community Law, of which the Luxembourg Court may or must take account? If so, would there be overlaps between that Court and the Commission, and Court, of Human Rights in Strasbourg?

Another development, that could affect, although in differing degrees, the functioning of all three bodies, is the extension in European countries of the ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner system. The Council has summoned a conference to consider the forms that this extension is taking, and may in the future take.

In sum, the time has plainly come for the Community and the Council to work out a functional division of labour between them, based on the recognised capabilities of each.

[9] EEC Treaty, Articles 51, 54 and 118.

THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY IN BRITAIN*

William Wallace

ANY remaining illusions that foreign economic policy was a less vital concern to the British government than the 'high policy' issues of national security and national defence must finally have been dispelled during 1973. Throughout the last twelve months the front pages of newspapers in Britain and abroad have been filled with reports of prime ministers and presidents discussing trade and the international monetary system, of foreign ministers bargaining over funds for regional development, of cabinet ministers dashing abroad to barter exports for oil. The turmoil into which successful Arab actions to restrict the supply of oil and sharply to raise its price have thrown international economic relations, already shaken by a succession of upheavals over the previous two or three years, has made it evident to all that economic issues will be at the heart of foreign policy in the next few years.

Yet for some twenty years after the Second World War international economic relations were relatively insulated from high foreign policy by the success of postwar arrangements in establishing a stable international monetary system and an acceptable set of rules for international trade, and by the continued support provided by the United States, the dominant economic power. Most successfully in the ten years from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, international monetary management was confined to a select group of national and international officials, with ministers of finance and governors of central banks playing a supervisory role. A similar club of international officials, with its own private language and its own set of shared assumptions, was responsible for the conduct of successive tariff and trade negotiations.[1] This insulation of economic

* An earlier draft of this article was presented to a seminar, held in December 1973 at Chatham House by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on the management of foreign economic policy in Britain. The author is grateful for the comments made then and separately by academics, officials and business representatives. The research on which it is based forms part of a larger study, under the auspices of Chatham House, on foreign policy-making in Britain, to be published in 1975.

[1] The continuity of the British officials involved was as remarkable as that of their colleagues from other countries and goes some way to belie the oft-repeated charge that Whitehall practice does not allow civil servants to develop a particular expertise. One of the senior British officials engaged in trade negotiations at the end of the 1960s had begun his career as private secretary to the leader of the British delegation to the Ottawa Conference in 1931.

issues in international negotiation was reflected in a high degree of compartmentalisation in the management of policy within Whitehall. The Foreign Office was not actively involved in either monetary or trade negotiations during much of the 1950s. In March 1953 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary spent five days on the *Queen Elizabeth* on their way to see their American opposite numbers without apparently understanding each other's distinctive briefs.[2] For many years international economic questions and international trade and tariff questions were handled by separate Cabinet and official committees, chaired respectively by the Treasury and the Board of Trade.

To some extent this separation of economic questions from high policy was always artificial. For Britain in particular it reflected the subordination of economic aims, not always consciously, to the 'high policy' goals of great power status and international responsibility. For Britain and for many other industrialised countries it also reflected the underlying acceptance of American predominance in the international economic order, and of the general identification of American interests with those of a liberal international economic order. In the 1930s the overriding importance of economic questions to foreign policy had impressed itself upon the British government; the 1943 *Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign Service*, indeed, had drawn the conclusion that 'economics and finance have become inextricably interwoven with politics', and had thus transformed the business of diplomacy.[3] From the early 1960s onwards the conditions which had enabled this relative postwar insulation of international economic relations have been gradually undermined. The emergence of the European Economic Community, and in particular the development of the Common Agricultural Policy, the loss of American economic dominance and the gradual deepening of the American deficit, the economic strength of Japan, the expansion of economic relations with the state-trading countries of Eastern Europe, the growing discontent of the less developed countries with the rules governing international trade and monetary transactions, have all contributed to a more turbulent pattern of economic relations. All governments have adjusted their foreign policy-making machinery, and their interpretation of foreign policy priorities, in response to these developments; given the complexity of the field, few have been entirely satisfied with their response.[4] For Britain, several questions may be posed in assessing the effectiveness of

[2] '. . . each of us was preoccupied with the mission ahead, and whilst I did not fully realise what he [Anthony Eden] hoped to get out of the new President and Secretary of State, he scarcely began to understand my economic brief.' Lord Butler, *The Art of the Possible* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), p. 165.

[3] Cmd. 6420, January 1943, para. 4.

[4] Harald B. Malmgren sharply criticised the 'confusion' of the American machinery and 'the curious separation of security policy and economic policy' in Washington, in 'Managing Foreign Economic Policy', *Foreign Policy*, No. 6, Spring 1972, pp. 42–63.

the governmental response and the adequacy of the machinery for policy-making. First, what have been the most important obstacles to the integration of foreign economic policy with other areas of British external relations? Secondly, how well have economic questions in practice been integrated with considerations of overall foreign policy? Thirdly, how well have those concerned with the formulation and management of foreign economic policy handled the problems of choosing among conflicting goals within a wide and complex field? And lastly, what may be the further effect on Whitehall of developments in international economic relations in the immediate or medium-term future?

Clearly the largest obstacle to the pursuit of a 'coherent' foreign policy, in which political preferences and security objectives are integrated with economic goals, is the inseparability of foreign economic policy from domestic economic management. If from the perspective of a Foreign Office planner Britain's relations with, for instance, Japan or the United States form themselves into a pattern in which considerations of monetary policy, trade barriers, investment, security, attitudes towards third countries and shared views about the shape of the international political system all fall into place, the different perspectives of planners within the Treasury, the Bank of England, or the Department of Trade and Industry, which link international monetary policy with domestic monetary priorities and international trade policy with domestic industrial interests, are as compelling. The very success of the postwar international economic order in reducing the barriers between domestic economies has meant that very few aspects of domestic economic management do not now contain significant international implications, and conversely that alterations in the rules governing international economic co-operation carry direct domestic consequences, and are likely to arouse direct domestic protests.

Government's increasing economic role

The extension of government activity in the economy since the Second World War has contributed to the difficulty of disentangling domestic considerations from international ones. The last Labour government's effort to promote industrial mergers through the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) had amongst its major objectives both reduced dependence on foreign-owned suppliers and import substitution, and consequently on occasion aroused international reactions. Support for three new aluminium smelters, to be assisted by favourable long-term contracts for electricity supply, for instance, provoked protests from Canada and Scandinavia. Reorganisation of the British ball-bearing industry was intended to create a strong domestic counterweight to SKF, the Swedish-based engineering concern, and as such was hardly welcomed

by the Swedish government. The attraction of foreign investment to the less prosperous regions of Britain, backed up both by taxation incentives or investment grants and by ministerial tours abroad, is an established part of domestic economic policy—again, with international ramifications. Subsidies by foreign governments to such industries as shipbuilding force the British government to extend tax concessions and grants to domestic industries, even when such actions fit uneasily with declared government policy, in order to maintain employment and prevent an additional burden on the import bill.

Most directly, government promotion of exports and government assistance to British industry operating abroad extend the domestic relationship between government and industry onto the international plane. At the end of the 1960s the British government was spending between £20 million and £25 million a year on the promotion of exports and the provision of information on export opportunities to industry, as well as underwriting export risks through the Export Credits Guarantee Department. The extent to which the 'national interests' which the British government is promoting and defending abroad *are* those of British industry is evident also in the extent to which concern for the advantage and the contracts to be gained for British companies enters into considerations of joint military procurement programmes, and even occasionally into aid policy. The size of the short-term transactions across the exchanges of the largest British companies, most of all the oil companies, has been sufficient materially to affect the monthly figures, and to warrant discreet co-operation with the Bank of England. Much of what may appear to the student of international relations to be part of foreign economic policy is thus close to the heart of the relationship between government and industry; sharply distinguishing this field from security policy by the importance which governments must attach to private interests. British industrialists have complained that the willingness of successive governments to consult private industry on the overall direction of international economic policy has compared poorly with the close relationship between government and industry on major and minor questions of policy which they observe in the Netherlands and in West Germany, not to mention in France or, above all, in Japan. Nevertheless, the distinctiveness remains: in many aspects of foreign economic policy, unlike security policy, governmental success is assessed by its ability to promote and protect particular interests.

The pursuit of a coherent economic policy does not easily combine with the pursuit of a coherent foreign policy. Priorities, as well as perspectives, differ. Where international obligations conflict with domestic economic objectives, the former may well appear less binding, as in the imposition of the import quota in 1964, in breach of Britain's EFTA obligations, or in the postponement of British adherence to the monetary

arrangements of the European Community throughout 1973. Furthermore, economic management is at the centre of the domestic political debate. Governments win or lose elections by their success in managing the economy, in holding down the rate of inflation, in stimulating growth or in maintaining a low level of unemployment. It is one of the paradoxes of contemporary politics that national governments stand or fall by their performance in a sector over which they now exert only partial control: a paradox which pushes both the British and other governments towards contradictory international policies—towards both an insistence on the necessity of co-operative intergovernmental management of the international economy and a willingness to jettison international obligations and by-pass international machinery when domestic politics seem to demand it.

Problems of co-ordination in Whitehall

Institutional divisions in Whitehall present an unavoidable obstacle to the integration of foreign economic policy with overall foreign policy considerations. In an ideal world, all aspects of external relations would be handled in the round; but the necessary limitations of day-to-day management and of detailed negotiation and consultation, the distractions of competing problems, stand in the way. There is little new about the problem of how to provide both for overall co-ordination and for the separation of the management of policy into coherent sectors, nor about attempts to alleviate the problem by reorganisation within Whitehall. 'The principal problem of co-ordination' in the management of external relations 'in the inter-war years had been that created by the increasing role of economic questions in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. In departmental terms this was a question of the right relationship between the Foreign Office itself, the Treasury and the Board of Trade.'[5] Although by the 1960s other Whitehall departments, most of all the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, had been drawn into intergovernmental economic relations, these three departments retained the principal responsibility for the management of foreign economic policy.

The Treasury's close links with the Bank of England in the field of international monetary policy have given it access to an information network independent of the FCO and of overseas missions, so helping to insulate monetary questions from the rest of Whitehall. The more generous staffing of the Bank's overseas department, the regular visits of its members to their 'parishes' abroad and the closeness of its

[5] Max Beloff, *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), p. 23. In the trade policy field this problem was tackled by the creation in 1917 of a separate Department of Overseas Trade, reporting both to the Foreign Secretary and to the President of the Board of Trade; it was reabsorbed into the Board of Trade in 1946. Relations between the Treasury and the Foreign Office in the 1930s were at times acrimonious.

contacts with other central banks, gave it a number of advantages over the Treasury's small Finance Group in the collection and assessment of information about international developments; until the late 1960s, embassy economic reporting was little respected in the Treasury. The exclusiveness of the Bank-Treasury relationship was reinforced by a continuing distance in relations between the Treasury and the Foreign Office, described by one former diplomat as 'at its worst a dialogue of the deaf'. As during the last decade questions both of British external monetary arrangements and of reforms in the international monetary system have become more sharply political, communications between the Treasury and the Foreign Office have grown closer, and the Bank has been drawn rather more fully into relations with other Whitehall departments and into the structure of foreign economic policy-making. If the bilateral relationship between the Treasury and the Bank, which formerly determined international financial policy, has now become a triangular relationship with the FCO, contacts between the FCO and the Bank, however, still represent the weakest link in the triangle.

The difficulty of handling the increasing complexities and time-consuming discussions of international finance, while at the same time relating British policy to domestic objectives, has been reflected in successive reorganisations within the Treasury. Some critics have attributed the subordination of domestic economic growth to the defence of sterling during the 1950s to the dominance of the Overseas Finance Division in the formulation of Treasury policy. In November 1962, Home Finance and Overseas Finance were reorganised into a single Finance Group, with the aim of more closely relating domestic and international considerations. The Labour government gave the newly-created Department of Economic Affairs a co-ordinating role in some aspects of international economic policy, although financial policy remained the responsibility of the Treasury, and the DEA's functions were ultimately reabsorbed, either into the Treasury or into the Cabinet Office. Early in 1973 Overseas Finance was again separated from Home Finance, the latter being drawn closer to the National Economy Group.

One of the arguments for the creation of the giant Department of Trade and Industry in 1970 was that by 'unifying this whole field of policy' it would avoid 'an unreal dichotomy between the "internal" and "international" aspects of commerce and industry, *i.e.* between the department responsible for export promotion and overseas commercial policy and the department responsible for the bulk of the Government's relations with industry'.[6] The succession of departmental reorganisations during the 1960s, which had left a rump Board of Trade responsible for little more than commercial relations and the promotion of exports, had

[6] *The Reorganisation of Central Government*, Cmnd. 4506, October 1970, para. 20.

certainly not proved satisfactory. The Foreign Office had been particularly unhappy about the Ministry of Technology's enthusiasm for pursuing technological agreements with East European governments without considering the overall context of economic and political relations; although paradoxically the Foreign Office itself was enthusiastic about promoting technological co-operation with West European governments, as a means of demonstrating our credentials as good Europeans, without fully considering their economic or industrial viability. The very size of the DTI, however, has created obstacles to the internal co-ordination of the responsibilities of its different divisions. The domestic and international implications of energy policy, for instance, were not easily brought together, in its first two years, below ministerial level. Both before and after the reorganisation of 1970, it is not clear that in the management of policy on foreign investment and on international mergers the Foreign Office interest has always been fully represented, or that the implications of decisions taken for bilateral intergovernmental relations have always been fully appreciated. The strength of the DTI in foreign economic policy, however, is that as the sponsoring department for the bulk of British industry it represents in Whitehall the ' interests ' which policy is intended to promote in a way which the Treasury and the FCO, with their much less direct links to particular domestic interests, can never claim to do.

Until the mid-1960s the level of Foreign Office involvement in most areas of foreign economic policy was low, as was its expertise and information in this field; this reflected the rather lower priority given to economic matters than to security questions and high diplomacy, as well as the reluctance of diplomats to venture into an unfamiliar field. Over the past ten years, however, both the attention given to international economic questions and the degree of expertise that the FCO can bring to bear on them have grown considerably, first in commercial policy and in export promotion, more recently in financial policy. The gradual realisation, from 1964 onwards, that an independent foreign policy was impossible without the backing of a viable economy, and the experience gained in the successive approaches to the European Communities, were reinforced by an appreciation among some Diplomatic Service officials that the FCO would increasingly lose out in Whitehall unless its members were able to contribute effectively to economic discussions. Members of the Diplomatic Service have in recent years been seconded to industry and to the City, to the Treasury and, from 1969, for short periods to the Bank of England; mid-career training in economics has spread.[7] The

[7] The first member of the Diplomatic Service to work in the Bank of England, in 1969, was very much an exceptional case; secondments of three months or so for training before going out to overseas posts did not become an accepted practice until 1972–73.

expansion of the number and activities of the functional departments of the FCO since the merger with the Commonwealth Office between 1965 and 1968 has raised the level of attention paid to the whole range of international economic and industrial concerns. Informal co-operation with the Treasury has been made easier by the siting of most of the FCO's economic departments in the same range of buildings as the Treasury. Since the completion of the merger with the Commonwealth Office the FCO has also contained a small Economists' Department.[8]

The desirability of the development within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of a range of functional departments shadowing the responsibilities of other Whitehall ministries, on finance, on trade policy, on industry, technological collaboration and energy, has, however, been questioned, not only within those other ministries but also within the FCO itself. What looks on occasion to other ministries like duplication of work looks to some members of the Diplomatic Service like a distraction of the FCO from its prime function in Whitehall, which is to represent the impact of foreign governments on British policy. The proliferation of economic departments within the FCO also threatens to destroy the informality and ease of policy-making which only a small department can achieve. Moreover, despite this accumulation of expertise and the accompanying reorientation of attitudes, the dominant FCO perspective on inter-governmental relations, perhaps necessarily, remains one which stresses the importance of political and security factors rather than of economic constraints.

The quality of embassy reporting on economic matters is said to have improved enormously in the last four or five years. The Plowden Committee's comment that in overseas posts 'economic and commercial work are two sides of the same coin', and that 'an officer reporting on economic developments in a country overseas can easily become academic without the realities of day-to-day commercial and business affairs to guide him' reflected the then prevailing view that the first priority of embassy economic sections was to promote exports.[9] Not unnaturally, information of use to economic policy-makers at home, as opposed to industrialists, was therefore rather thin. Economic reporting in the larger embassies in European capitals—the Washington Embassy of course already included a Treasury representative—was only recognised as an important part of the work of the post and separated from commercial work in the late 1960s. The financial counsellor in Paris in 1973,

[8] Some confusion is unavoidable in discussing the internal organisation of the FCO, since the internal divisions of this major Whitehall department are also called 'departments'. The main functional departments of the FCO concerned with economic policy, reorganised and in several instances renamed during 1973, were in December 1973: Financial Relations, Trade Relations and Exports, Economists, Energy, Science and Technology, and European Integration (Internal).

[9] *Report of the Committee on Representational Services Overseas*, Cmnd. 2276, February 1964, para. 234.

in contrast to many of his predecessors, had spent a year in the Treasury before taking up his post. His opposite number in Bonn had spent the first three months of 1973 in the Bank of England, before relieving someone who had been seconded to the Bonn Embassy from a merchant bank. Familiarity with economic issues has also been supplemented by detailed economic briefings from the Treasury for members of the more important embassies.

The structure of Whitehall, and the pattern of departmental perspectives on policy, reflect over a period the predominant perspectives of ministers at least as much as of officials. One of the obstacles to the integration of economic policy with foreign policy in Britain throughout the last thirty years has been the lack of interest in economic matters displayed by most Foreign Secretaries with the exception of Ernest Bevin and George Brown—and the willingness of many Chancellors of the Exchequer to accept a compartmentalisation of issues into 'high policy' and 'economic policy'. There was little incentive for Foreign Office staff to put up papers on economic aspects of foreign policy when their political masters were not enormously interested in them; nor was it easy for the Foreign Office to gain a firm footing in inter-departmental economic discussions without the backing of its ministers in Cabinet and Cabinet committee. The relative lack of interest of Conservative Prime Ministers between 1951 and 1964 in international economic matters, as opposed to disarmament, security, and political summits, also inhibited the drawing together of the different strands of foreign policy at the centre. In this respect the active interest of both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Heath in economic policy has contributed a great deal to the integration of Whitehall policy-making in this field, and has led to a strengthening of the role of both Number 10 and the Cabinet Office machinery.

A number of other obstacles also intervene. The technical nature of many international economic discussions, most particularly in monetary policy, less severely in commercial negotiations, operates to a degree to exclude the technically unversed from participation in the formulation of policy. At its worst, this may lead to dismissal by the experts of representatives from other departments as unworthy of respect, and to suspicion on the part of those attempting to intervene that technical language is being used to baffle them; at best, it nevertheless represents a barrier to the exercise of influence on the direction of policy by the relatively non-expert. In spite of the recent growth of familiarity with the issues of economic policy within the Foreign Office, only a minority of its members would attract the respect of the Treasury in inter-departmental discussions, particularly at the senior levels, while Bank officials have remarked upon the continuing diffidence of Foreign Office contributions to discussions of international economic policy, even from the relatively well-informed.

The existence of a network of close and continuing international contacts independent of the FCO and of embassies, again most particularly in the monetary field, through common membership of a number of intergovernmental organisations and working parties, also operates to insulate foreign economic policy-making from other fields of foreign policy. The intensity of these consultations has grown remarkably during the last decade. British membership of the European Communities, continuing discussions on the future shape of the international monetary system, preparations for the 'Tokyo Round' negotiations on international trade, and now discussions on how to handle the rapidly rising funds of oil-producing states within a managed international monetary market, all contributed to a further sharp rise in the intensity of these talks during 1973. One senior Treasury official, indeed, spent half his working time during the first three months of 1973 out of the country, seeing more of his colleagues from other finance ministries than of his opposite numbers in other Whitehall departments. As the political sensitivity of these consultations to intergovernmental relations has become steadily more apparent, the Treasury has made greater efforts to keep the FCO and the economic sections of overseas posts informed about developments, and to expect feedback on their bilateral political implications; but the complexity of the problems with which they are dealing and the speed with which situations develop do not make coherent policy-making or full consultation easy. The floating of the pound in June 1972, a decision with wide political implications made necessary by rapidly moving international developments, was perhaps a good illustration of the extreme difficulty of combining effective management of policy with the desired consideration of wider interests in the monetary sphere.

A preliminary answer to the second question posed above, as to how well economic questions have in practice been integrated with considerations of overall foreign policy, might be that the necessity of such an integration has not always been self-evident. Mr. Eden's attempt, when Foreign Secretary in 1954, to solve the deadlock over German rearmament by pledging Britain to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force on the Continent for an indefinite period, was taken almost without reference to the future cost to the balance of payments; more than that, according to one of those involved, the proposal was not submitted to the Cabinet beforehand, for fear that Cabinet members would be uneasy about it. The implications for the balance of payments were again neglected in the negotiations which led to West Germany's admission to Nato in the following year, thus committing the British government to a succession of acrimonious negotiations with the Germans over offset payments during the next fifteen years. Treasury doubts about the east of Suez commitment do not appear to have extended beyond opposition

to major new expenditure until a very late stage; it might have been appropriate for the strategic rationale itself to have been questioned, on economic grounds, rather earlier.[10] The British government's handling of the Messina Conference in 1955–56 and the subsequent Free Trade Area negotiations reflected a similar failure to relate commercial policy to wider considerations. It is arguable that the management of the first negotiations for EEC entry from 1961–63, and the concluding juxtaposition of Rambouillet and Nassau, reflected a continuing failure. The Labour government, from 1964 on, was painfully aware of the link between American support for sterling and the general direction of British foreign policy, both on defence east of Suez and on support for the American position in Vietnam. But the evidence suggests that the differing strands in British foreign policy in the period between 1964 and 1968, above all the defence of sterling, the east of Suez commitment, and the Labour government's reorientation towards the European Communities, were not formally linked in any reconsideration of foreign policy priorities either at ministerial or at official level.

The critic may argue at this point that we are chasing the academic's dream and the practitioner's will-o'-the-wisp, a coherent overall strategy for foreign policy: an alluring concept from a comfortable armchair, but a practical impossibility for the policy-maker. From one perspective the conduct of British foreign economic relations for most of the period since the Second World War may be seen as the pursuit of a collection of separate departmental policies, only loosely co-ordinated within the pragmatic context of overall foreign policy-making. From another perspective, however, there remained from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s an implicit, never fully re-examined, set of assumptions about the general direction of British foreign policy which provided the framework linking the different compartments of economic policy to each other and to security policy, and which included an association of sterling with Britain's global status, and a belief in the identification of British interests with a liberal international economic order (and thus also for most purposes with American economic interests). These assumptions also included a subordination of national economic interests, when necessary, to considerations of international responsibility, to the obligations of a great power, and to the maintenance of good relations with the British Commonwealth. The one attempt to review Britain's whole international role, in the work of the Future Policy Committee between 1958 and 1960, ran into the sands of the Whitehall committee structure and of inter-

[10] Phillip Darby, in *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–68* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1973), p. 153, notes that 'the view that a military presence east of Suez safeguarded Britain's economic interests in the area was seldom publicly discussed' in the years between 1957 and 1964, 'in keeping with the view in Whitehall that economic considerations were a background factor rather than an immediate determinant of British policy in that area'.

departmental rivalry, and was finally submerged by the lukewarm interest of the Prime Minister and other Cabinet ministers in its compromise report.[11]

Improvements in the central structure of Whitehall during the course of the 1960s have made it easier to interrelate the different compartments of day-to-day policy-making on a more regular basis. In particular, the Cabinet Office has expanded, with the establishment within it of an Assessments Staff as a forum for the consideration of the whole range of international developments affecting British foreign relations (although not for the formulation of the British response to such developments). The marked improvement in co-operation among the departments responsible for different areas of foreign policy has also contributed to more regular co-ordination. So has the external pressure on Whitehall to concert the financial, commercial, security and political considerations exerted by such major international negotiations as the approach to the European Communities, the response to President Nixon's Initiative of August 1971, or the formulation of policy for the European Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE). But the secretary of the Whitehall process of policy-making, and the consequent absence of pressure from outside, most particularly from Parliament, on ministers to re-examine their working assumptions, militates against any regular re-assessment of the balance of departmental priorities. In its absence, the tradition that defence policy is closer to high diplomacy than economic policy, and the fact that a closer relationship has been established between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence than between the former and the Treasury, continue to exert a certain influence on policy-making in Whitehall. It is not clear, for instance, whether FCO planning papers receive as close attention in the Treasury as within the Ministry of Defence, despite the apparent shift of foreign policy priorities from security to economic concerns. Nor is it clear where, within Whitehall, a reconsideration of overall foreign policy priorities would be focused, unless within an inter-departmental committee serviced by the Cabinet Office secretariat, with all the drawbacks that would arise out of the tendency of such committees to damp down proposals for any major new departure into an acceptable inter-departmental compromise.

Choosing between long- and short-term aims

The problem of choosing among conflicting goals within the field of foreign economic policy, the third of the questions posed above, is complicated by the institutional divisions between departments responsible for different areas, and also by difficulties in defining what policy

[11] Darby, pp. 143–145, provides a tantalisingly brief account of the work and fate of this committee.

areas should be included. The defence of the sterling parity and the maintenance of the sterling area was accepted as a settled high policy objective from 1951 to 1967, and thus excluded from the range of economic options. Those critics who blame the Treasury as a body for the priority given to this objective, as against expansion of the domestic economy, fail to consider the several occasions on which Treasury officials put up proposals for a floating of sterling or a full devaluation, and were cut down by the weight of the Cabinet. The ' Robot ' proposal in 1952 attracted the Chancellor's support, but met with a hostile Cabinet.[12] Consideration of devaluation as an alternative in October 1964 and July 1966 was specifically ruled out by the Prime Minister.

Within the range of allowable options one recurring problem has been to find the right balance between short-term and long-term objectives, particularly between the long-term interests of the British economy and the short-term desirabilities which domestic political considerations or international obligations indicate. Policy towards inward and outward investment over the last ten years or more, for instance, would seem to represent an example of short-term advantages being preferred to long-term benefits. The settled attitude of the DTI (and its predecessor ministries) and of the Treasury towards the encouragement of foreign investment in Britain, not only of new investment but also of takeovers of established companies, has rested upon an acceptance both of their stimulating effect on competing British-owned enterprise and of their immediate beneficial impact on the balance of payments. The long-term effects—the potential economic and political disadvantages of allowing too large a proportion of British industry to pass into foreign ownership and the eventual drain of remitted profits on the balance of payments—have not attracted much public attention. Only in the prestigious case of Rolls-Royce was a political decision apparently taken to exclude foreign buyers. Curbs on outward investment under the last Labour government similarly represented the dominance of short-term investments over what the Reddaway Report argued were long-term advantages.[13] Some critics have suggested that recent official encouragement for public authorities to raise substantial loans abroad presents a further example of the neglect of potential long-term disadvantages in favour of the immediate gain to the reserves which these loans bring. But the short term is always more immediate, and the period up to the next general election attracts more weighty political attention than the following five or ten years. The prospect of North Sea oil in substantial quantities adds a further seductive

[12] Different accounts of ' Robot ' are given in Lord Butler, *The Art of the Possible* (as in footnote 2), pp. 157–160, and in Arthur Salter, *Slave of the Lamp* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1967), pp. 215–222.

[13] W. B. Reddaway and others, *Effects of UK Direct Investment Overseas—Final Report* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1968. Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Papers, No. 15).

argument in favour of the short term: if only we can finance our deficits over the next five years or so, it runs, our international economic problems will effectively be over.

In the ordering of international economic priorities, considerations of aid and development have consistently come low on the scale. This reflects more the low priority given to this area both by successive governments and in Parliament than the institutional weakness of the Overseas Development Administration. In an ideal development economist's world, the formulation of British commercial policy and of international monetary policy would form part of a strategy for promoting economic development in which development considerations would be given as much attention as other factors. But the political basis for such a reorientation is clearly lacking.

In inter-departmental discussions over policy priorities, the Treasury and the Bank of England maintain a certain advantage over other departments in the greater exactness they can bring to their arguments. The economic consequences of a particular line of policy, the future pattern of the balance of payments, can be quantified and tabulated. Foreign Office arguments on ' good relations ', ' political considerations ', ' showing ourselves good Europeans ', and so on are necessarily far less exact, and as such are liable to be dismissed as vague and uncertain. The arguments of the DTI on the interests of British industry may often be similarly unquantifiable, but they are backed by the political weight of the industrial interests which this ministry sponsors. It is not clear to an outside observer to what extent the Bank's position as representing the interests of the City in Whitehall policy-making rests upon unquantifiable assumptions about the impact of particular developments on the workings of the City and the pattern of invisible exports, backed up by the political weight of the financial world, or upon more exact statistics.

There have been a number of major changes in the context of British foreign economic policy over the last five or six years. The decision to withdraw from east of Suez, and the acceptance that Britain is now a ' power of the second rank ', have shifted the balance of foreign policy priorities from status and security towards economic considerations. The devaluation of sterling, successful multilateralisation of the sterling balances, the 1972 float and the accompanying ending of the advantages enjoyed by sterling area countries, have cumulatively shifted the balance of priorities within economic policy from the defence of sterling and the balance of payments towards the promotion of economic growth. Other developments—the Nixon Initiative of August 1971 and its consequences for Atlantic relationships, consultations among the Western allies about the different ' baskets ' of policy at stake in the European Security Conference, membership of the European Community, and most recently the Middle East oil crisis—have pushed Whitehall

towards more explicit co-ordination between different policy areas. Future progress towards greater economic and monetary integration within the European Community, however halting, is likely to raise further and more difficult choices between desired objectives in different areas.

The emergence of summits as the motor of European integration raises the problem of balancing economic and other objectives in a particularly acute form. The style of Community policy-making, in which national advantages are traded off against each other to assemble a package broadly acceptable to all member governments, has thus been expanded from policy sectors to national and Community policy as a whole. This necessarily focuses attention on the interconnection between foreign economic policy, political relations, and security considerations. The weight of preparatory discussions and briefings before summit meetings must be correspondingly heavy, and the problem of ministerial and prime ministerial absorption of the wealth of relevant detail correspondingly large. As against this, the Community practice of compartmentalising 'technical' discussions of policy into different sectors presents Whitehall with the problem of distinguishing, among the mass of bilateral and multilateral technical consultations, those topics, such as axle weights or methods of colour television transmission, which are likely to have the most significant political consequences. Similarly, the French government's insistence on maintaining carefully defined boundaries between the competence of the European Communities, Nato, and the Davignon procedures for political consultations among the Nine, creates difficulties for Whitehall in maintaining coherence between separate but related discussions. It would seem to require a much greater degree of centralisation within Whitehall, to ensure that the political pitfalls of a particular policy, or the chance to include in a summit package an item advantageous to the British government, are not missed through falling between the responsibilities of the major departments concerned. The need to pull together priorities, not only in preparation for European Community summits but also for Anglo-American, Anglo-Japanese, or Anglo-Soviet conversations on closely related subjects, implies that this is not something which can be handled easily within the present Cabinet Office machinery, which remains small and heavily dependent on inter-departmental committees.

The pursuit of departmental policies within relatively insulated compartments has therefore clearly become impracticable. In 1974, economic questions represent the most sensitive political issues in intergovernmental relations; the British government therefore requires an overall strategy. It seems unlikely that the Foreign Office will be able on its own to pull together the different economic, security and political strands. Certainly in some ways membership of the European

Community has enhanced the FCO's role in the economic field. It is the Foreign Secretary, for example, who negotiates with the Commission and the French and German governments on the size and composition of the European Regional Fund; it is the Foreign Secretary who in general meetings of the Council of Ministers leads the British case on trade policy, or on commercial policy towards the Mediterranean countries. On economic relations with Eastern Europe it is the FCO, again, which is primarily responsible for discussions on the European Security Conference, both within Nato and within the framework of political consultations among Community members (the 'Davignon' consultations). But there are limits to the FCO's capabilities. It lacks the economic expertise; it lacks the sensitivity to domestic political considerations necessary for any overall perspective on foreign economic policy; and its assumption of such a central role would be resisted by other Whitehall departments. The case for the FCO assuming a leading role in this field would be stronger if it were to maintain a dominant position in the formulation of British policy towards the European Community: but in view of the growing sensitivity of Community questions for domestic politics, one may question how far the FCO ought to maintain an active role on internal Community matters. But the Treasury, a possible alternative co-ordinating department, is not equipped to give as full consideration to commercial, industrial or security factors in overseas policy as it is to financial ones.[14]

Britain faces an increasing multilateralisation of its foreign economic relations, a rapid growth in the breadth of technical detail under multilateral discussion, to much of which other governments attach a different scale of political priorities from the British, and a trend towards large-scale trade-offs between different economic sectors and between the whole economic field and political and security considerations. The logic of this situation is that a further strengthening of the centre is necessary in Whitehall. A larger Cabinet Office, capable not only of co-ordinating the differing perspectives of the departments concerned but also of providing a degree of forward thinking, perhaps even of strategic policy planning, seems necessary. This would appear to carry with it, in the long run, a certain diminution in the role of the Foreign Office, and perhaps also of the Treasury.[15] Still further reorganisation of Whitehall

[14] The implications of Community membership for British foreign policy-making in general and for Whitehall as a whole are discussed in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 'The Impact of Community Membership on the British Machinery of Government', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, June 1973, pp. 243–262, and in William Wallace, 'British External Relations and the European Community: the changing context of Foreign Policy-Making', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, September 1973.

[15] More radical critics would also argue that a much closer integration of the Diplomatic Service with the Home Civil Service is required, with a substantial number of home civil servants expecting to spend at least one tour abroad during

will in itself, however, be insufficient to ensure that the interrelations between different issues and the difficult balance between economic and political priorities, between long-term and short-term considerations, are clearly perceived at ministerial level. Councils of Ministers, confidential ministerial discussions, above all, prime ministerial summits, have placed the power of multilateral decision-making very firmly in ministerial hands, sometimes without the presence of official advisers.[16] There are limits to how far briefings within Whitehall, the preparation of internal planning papers and the recommendations of inter-departmental committees can alert ministers to new problems and to the need for changing sets of priorities; of necessity they are too preoccupied with the pressure of business, with the prospect of parliamentary opposition to particular proposals, and with a whole range of other immediate concerns. The political context within which ministerial attention can be drawn towards less immediate considerations and overall priorities can only be provided by a less secretive process of policy-making: by the encouragement of a wider debate, within Parliament and outside, through the provision of fuller information on the alternatives facing the government and the problems with which it is concerned.

Postscript. Since this article was written, on January 8, 1974, the Conservative government hived off energy questions from the Department of Trade and Industry into a separate Department of Energy. In March 1974, the new Labour government completed the dismemberment of the DTI by splitting it into three separate Departments for Industry, Trade and Consumer Protection. It also turned the Overseas Aid Administration again into a Ministry.

their career, and most diplomats expecting to spend some time working in a home department.

[16] The comment of a German official responsible for Community matters may be apposite here: 'If heads of government will insist on meeting face-to-face with no one present to discuss highly technical questions, there is little we can do except clear up the mess afterwards'.

THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

Evan Luard

FOR four years now preparations have been going on for the Conference on the Law of the Sea that is to begin in Caracas this June. The total agenda is vast. It includes 25 major areas, including altogether about 90 sub-items, each of considerable complexity. These range from the law governing archaeological treasures to pirate radio; the law on pollution control to fishing limits; the breadth of the territorial sea to the law governing the continental shelf; the law governing islands to the law governing international straits. But by far the largest and probably most important issue will be the international 'regime' to be established for the deep sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, an area never previously covered by any form of international legislation.

With the partial exception of the territorial sea, there is little agreement about any of these issues at present. Few people think that it will be possible to come anywhere near agreement at one session of the conference, or even at two (a second session in Vienna is already envisaged for 1975). The difficulties are compounded by the fact that it has always been accepted that the issues represent a vast package. In particular there is a direct linkage between agreement on the strict law-of-the-sea issues, especially limits, and on the sea-bed regime: the Latin American countries only agreed to the conference on the basis that there would be no new agreement on limits unless there was also agreement on an international regime. But the complexities and disagreements that exist on the latter subject are if anything even greater than those surrounding the limits, which are themselves sufficiently large. So the probability is not of a short sharp conference ending with all signing on the dotted line; but of something like a decade of negotiations, manoeuvring and controversy over this vast range of issues.

It may, however, be worth attempting at this stage to survey the main issues to be discussed and considering the differences of interest and viewpoint which have emerged on them during the four years of negotiations preceding the conference.

Of the legal issues, perhaps the simplest, as well as that which is closest to agreement, concerns the breadth of the territorial sea. Since the two conferences in 1958 and 1960, there has been a general widening of claims to this area. The most extreme are those claiming a limit

of 200 miles from the coast, now adopted by more than a dozen countries, mainly in Latin America. But quite apart from these extremists, the majority of new states coming to independence since 1960 have adopted a 12-mile limit. A few countries with smaller limits have extended them to 12 miles. And many of the other narrow-limit countries have announced that they would be willing to accept a 12-mile limit if this were internationally agreed. So too would the 30 land-locked countries, knowing that this is the narrowest limit which is feasible today. This means that something like a hundred states would probably now accept a 12-mile limit, considerably more than the two-thirds majority required to pass a new convention. It is even possible that such a limit would be accepted by some of the 200-mile countries, provided that it was accompanied by some new provision assuring the coastal state of economic rights over a wider distance (see below).

Unfortunately, however, agreement on this point, even if achieved, would bring other difficulties in its train. If a 12-mile limit were generally adopted, it would have the effect of ' closing ' a large number of international straits less than 24 miles wide, including many of great importance for navigation, such as the Straits of Dover, Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb and others, which would then fall entirely within territorial waters. In theory this should not matter, since coastal states anyway have the obligation to allow ' innocent passage ' (whatever that means—a much disputed point) in such waters. But since it is generally agreed that the coastal state has the right to suspend or control innocent passage in certain circumstances—for example to protect its own security—a number of maritime countries, above all the United States and the Soviet Union (which share a common interest here), want a stronger safeguard. They want the right of passage, in international straits at least, to be reaffirmed in some more unchallengeable way. For this reason the United States has proposed a special provision binding coastal states to allow ' free transit ' through international straits, if necessary in a special corridor designated for this purpose. This proposal, which is generally thought to be designed to assist the free movement of the U.S. Navy, is widely resisted by many other states, especially developing countries, who feel no great concern to assist the United States in making its strategic dispositions, and who deny that free navigation for normal shipping would be threatened.

This raises in turn the question of the general right of *warships* to ' innocent passage '. International lawyers are by no means agreed how far warships enjoy an automatic right of navigation in the territorial sea of other countries. In the recent discussions many states (including, for example, Canada) have declared that they believe that a requirement for prior notification or even for authorisation of the passage of such ships is reasonable (Indonesia and Malaysia have actually demanded prior

authorisation of warships in the Straits of Malacca, though they do not yet seem to have enforced this). Quite apart from any general right of free transit for all shipping in international straits, therefore, the conference will have to consider whether there is a need for a separate clarification regarding the right of passage by warships, both in straits and in other territorial waters.

Then—moving outwards from the coast—there is the question of the 'contiguous' zone: the zone, beyond the territorial sea but less than 12 miles from the coast, where the coastal state may claim, not full sovereignty, but jurisdiction for certain purposes, such as security, sanitary regulations or immigration. If the territorial sea is extended to 12 miles, the question is raised whether such a zone is then no longer needed, or whether it too should be extended—perhaps for a further six miles beyond.

Another zone which has been claimed by some coastal states is that for the enforcement of regulations concerning pollution. Canada, for example, has claimed such rights to a distance of 100 miles from its shores. Here the real question is not so much whether action against pollution may be required in such areas—this is generally conceded—but whether it should be taken *unilaterally* by a coastal state enforcing its own standards. It is generally agreed that there should be adequate international standards in such matters (as in the two important recent agreements on the dumping of wastes (1972) and on pollution from ships by oil and other substances (1973)). The question is then whether the coastal state should have the right to enforce standards of its own over and above those demanded internationally. This is a matter on which Western countries are deeply divided, since both the United States and Britain, among others, do not feel that a concern for environmental standards, however admirable in itself, can justify action to interfere with traditional rights of navigation of the type recently taken by Canada. Such unilateral action is only likely to be prevented, however, by the adoption of new and more rigorous international standards. This the conference will be considering.

More important, perhaps, is the general problem of fishing rights, which has been the subject of a number of important disputes in recent years. Here too there has been a widespread tendency to a widening of jurisdiction over the last twenty years. Coastal countries have asserted claims either to exclusive rights for their own fishing, or to conservation zones where fishing may be restricted by the coastal state, to varying distances up to 200 miles from the coast. Such states argue, perhaps understandably, that if other countries reserve to themselves resources *underneath* the seas, at long distances from their coasts, why should they not claim resources *within* the waters to an equal distance: especially where, as off the west coast of South America, those waters are

especially rich in fish, while there are virtually no sea-bed resources to be taken. This argument has been explicitly used by Malta in its recent dispute with Britain, since it has extended its fishing limits roughly to the edge of its continental shelf. Even distant-water fishing nations, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, have over the last year or two gone a long way to concede these claims; both of them have accepted in their own proposals the right of a coastal state to reserve for itself all non-migratory stocks off its coasts to any distance so long as it is capable of fishing them with its own fishing fleets. Their complaint has been that many coastal states, especially in Latin America, are not capable of completely fishing their own stocks themselves, and that to allow such areas to go unfished is a selfish waste of valuable resources.

The exploitation of sea-bed resources

The argument on fisheries has in any case to a large extent been overtaken by a far wider dispute about the coastal states' rights to economic resources generally off their coasts. It is widely agreed that the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (which in any case has been ratified by less than a third of all states) is an unsatisfactory instrument, since it provides no clear boundary for sea-bed rights and is open to varying interpretations. There is now an increasing tendency to think in terms of a general economic zone, measured probably in distance from the coast and covering both the waters of the sea and sea-bed resources: here the coastal state could claim coastal rights for exploration and exploitation of the resources in both zones. The most widely demanded distance for this purpose is 200 miles, which has now been adopted by most African, as well as by nearly all Latin American states.[1] If such a limit were granted for economic purposes, it is held by some that the claim to a *territorial sea* of 200 miles, carrying with it full jurisdiction for all purposes, could be abandoned.

Even for economic purposes alone, this is a highly ambitious claim. It would effectively allow the coastal states to appropriate for themselves a considerable proportion of the available resources from the oceans: almost all fishing, and most oil and gas (since most of such resources that could be at all easily exploited are within these limits). The only valuable resources that would be excluded would be the mineral modules, of which the richest deposits lie in the deeper parts of the ocean. For this reason such wide claims are vigorously contested by the non-coastal states, the semi-coastal states (those with short coasts), the shelf-locked (that is, whose shelf abuts on that of

[1] Although not all Latin American states accept the 200-mile claim to general jurisdiction, almost all accept the claim to a 200-mile economic zone, or 'patrimonial sea', off their coasts.

other states) and a few internationalists. These would rather see a narrow economic limit, since this would maximise the area where an international regime would operate, and consequently the revenues available for distribution under such a regime.

Since it will determine the future allocation of a large part of the world's remaining resources, a decision on this point is obviously vital. It will probably be the last question in the package to be agreed, and at the end of this article we will consider what kind of compromise in relation to it might finally be possible.

Meanwhile it is worth noting that there are a number of wider questions of considerable importance to be decided, affecting all the different zones discussed above. For example, what entities can create their own dependent zones? Can a colonial territory, such as Saint Helena for example, control an economic zone stretching far out to sea, perhaps for 200 miles? And would this be claimed by Britain as the administering power, or are rules required to ensure that the benefits from the zone go only to its own inhabitants, however few? Are archipelagoes able to claim, as Indonesia and the Philippines assert, the entire area within the outermost points of their outermost islands as their own—to be exploited, or even navigated by other states, only with their consent? Can a state possessing islands close to the coast of another state, as Greece does in relation to Turkey, claim the continental shelf of those islands, even if geologically it is itself a part of the shelf of the opposite mainland? On what principle should the median line be drawn between them? Above all, do all islands claimed by a state, even if uninhabited rocks far distant from its shore, give the state the right to claim the resources within its continental shelf? Such a principle would give Brazil the right to claim a large part of the economic resources of the Atlantic, and to Britain the right to claim all the resources between Scotland and Rockall, and beyond, even though Rockall is merely a speck of rock that is half submerged by water for most of the time, and only claimed by Britain in the last twenty years. It could also give rise to innumerable contests to occupy uninhabited sandbanks all over the ocean, in order to ensure the benefit of the dependent sea-bed resources; the disputes between China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan over islands in the China Sea, and between China and the Vietnams over the Paracels and the Spratley Islands, are examples of the type of dispute which could become increasingly common all over the world.

There are a number of other more detailed issues upon which there are disagreements. One of these concerns scientific research: should scientists be free to undertake scientific research in all parts of the ocean, including the continental shelves of other states, provided they give full details of the research undertaken, as Western states claim; or should the coastal state retain complete control over such

activities, as most developing countries assert? Another question concerns the transfer of technology: if exploitation is undertaken shortly in the deep sea-bed by advanced Western countries, should this carry with it some obligation to transfer to the nationals of developing countries the techniques involved, so that they may play a larger share in the work in the future? Another issue concerns enclosed and semi-enclosed seas: should there be some special regime for such areas to the benefit of the coastal states? Yet another concerns regional regimes: should regions such as Africa or Latin America be free to establish their own system of sea-bed exploitation in the waters surrounding those regions, perhaps reserving all economic benefits to the countries of the region (including some perhaps for its land-locked countries) even if this is not in conformity with the general international system? Finally, should there be some provision for *preferential* areas, where fishing, or sea-bed exploitation is reserved for the coastal state in the area even beyond its zone of *exclusive* jurisdiction?

Thus, even in the area of traditional international law—that is, primarily the questions concerning the limits and nature of national jurisdiction in the seas—there are enough difficult questions to be settled. These alone could give rise to sufficient disagreements and conflict. But they are in many ways far less intractable than the disputes that surround the other major area to be covered by the conference: the regime to be established for deep-sea resources. And these too must be resolved, on the present understanding, for any agreement to become possible on the legal issues of the sort just described.

An international sea-bed authority?

When Malta first raised the issue of the sea-bed at the United Nations in 1967, it proposed the establishment of some system that would prevent the appropriation of the sea-bed or its resources by individual states, either by a simple extension of their continental shelves or on the basis of first-come-first-served. Malta called for a treaty that would ensure the demilitarisation of the area and its use for the benefit of all states, and demanded in particular a Declaration that the area's resources were the ' common heritage of mankind ', to be developed with the consent and for the benefit of all.

At first there was considerable resistance to the idea of a Declaration incorporating this admirable but somewhat vague concept, both by Western and by communist states. But as time went on the proposal gained increasing support from other states and the resistance gradually crumbled. In 1970, after three years of discussion, agreement was finally reached on the text of a Declaration concerning the use of the area beyond national jurisdiction. The Declaration included the controversial

phrase that the area and its resources were 'the common heritage of mankind'. But it went much further. For it spelt out in some detail what states could and could not do within the area. It was laid down, for example, that all exploration and exploitation within the area would be 'governed by the international regime to be established'. Moreover, states were to be responsible for ensuring that all activities in the area, 'whether undertaken by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities or persons under their jurisdiction' were carried out in conformity with that regime. The regime was not only to 'ensure the equitable sharing by states of the benefits derived from the area'. It was to provide 'expanding opportunities in the use' of the area by all states. Finally the regime was to include 'the appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions'. It is true that it was also provided that the regime should be 'agreed' among states. But the initial agreement in principle to all these points makes it considerably more difficult for any states to initiate, or even to condone, activities by their own companies within the sea-bed which are not in accordance with an agreed international regime, at least until all possibility of agreement has been clearly exhausted.

The Declaration was passed virtually unanimously, with no votes against and only a dozen abstentions. It is generally held that it has laid down the principles on which a more detailed treaty for the area will be based.

Within the United Nations Sea-bed Committee, first established in 1968 and since 1970 engaged in preparing for the forthcoming conference, the form which this international regime should take has been elaborated in rather greater detail. Certain features of the system to be established came to be generally accepted. It was widely agreed that a new international sea-bed authority would be created to administer the area. This would have an assembly, including all parties to the treaty, meeting every year or two to lay down general policy guidelines. There would be a council, of much more limited membership, meeting three or four times a year, to reach the more immediate decisions. There would be a secretariat, under a director-general, to undertake the day-to-day administration. Exploitation within the area would be controlled by the authority, probably through a system of licensing. Enterprises—whether private, national, regional or even international (as the Latin Americans especially wanted)—would apply for licences to explore and exploit particular areas for particular periods for particular resources, just as coastal states licence similar exploitation in their own continental shelves. In return they would pay a royalty to the international authority, most probably based on the rate of production. This would either be given to an international development agency, such as the IDA, or more probably be distributed directly to all member states, including rich

countries, on a progressive basis. (Interestingly, it is the developing countries, scorning ' charity ', which most favour the latter method, which of course more fully implements the ' common heritage ' principle.) The authority would also lay down international regulations governing pollution, safety, free navigation, and other features of the sea-bed system. A system of inspection might be needed to ensure that the international regulations were being complied with.

This is not an insignificant measure of consensus: it is certainly far greater than people would have thought possible five years ago when the discussion began. But at this point agreement ends (even this is not unanimously agreed by all states). And there remain in dispute a number of the most essential points. How high would the royalties be? Would licences be given to companies, or to states which would themselves license companies? Would there be a limit on the area which could be acquired by particular companies or nations? How would decisions be reached within the authority? How much detail would be contained in the treaty and how much left to the authority to decide? What would happen to the countries which refused to sign the treaty and their enterprises? These are only a few of the more obvious points of difference. It will be a long time before all of them have been resolved.

It may be worth looking at some of the main points of difference in greater detail. First, should the licences be given to states or to companies? At first sight it seems fairer to award them to states, so that every nation, even the poorest, even the landlocked, could acquire their own little bit of sea-bed. In fact, however, there would be obvious disadvantages. It would create a patchwork of differing jurisdictions right across the sea-bed. It would establish within man's last frontier, where a genuinely international system might well be obtainable, a new colonial system, which would give rise to the same rivalries and disputes as the colonial systems of the past. It would lead to bitter disputes between states, or between individual states and the authority, about sea-bed boundaries and rights of exploitation. And so on. But the real disadvantage of the system is less obvious. Whatever principles are adopted, the actual work of exploitation is likely to be done—at least at first—by a few major companies, mainly North American, which alone have the technological expertise to undertake it. The key question, therefore, concerns the conditions under which they operate, and the distribution of benefits between themselves and the regime. If licensing is to governments, about 140 governments will then have to compete to acquire the services of a small number of enterprises which will alone possess the technology to make their sea-bed plots valuable. The effect would be that the companies would be able to call the tune in negotiating contracts. If the licensing is to the companies, on the other hand, this bargaining position is reversed: the companies them-

selves would be competing with each other for licences, and would be obliged to agree to the contracts proposed to them if they were to get the sites. Obviously they would have to be allowed some margin of profit on their operations; but the authority would be able to ensure that competition between the companies reduced this to the minimum. It is this latter system which would, therefore, maximise returns to the regime and to the international community as a whole.

Secondly, how should decisions be reached? This has been much discussed in the sea-bed committee, with the United States and other large states demanding a heavily weighted voting system, and small countries demanding one-nation-one-vote, with two-thirds, or even simple, majorities only required. One thing that is absolutely certain is that the United States, the Soviet Union and other large states will never enter the system at all on the latter basis. For a decision that can be reached by a majority of very small states, representing a fraction of the world's population, could radically alter the system first set up in a way entirely contrary to the interests of the large states. These countries therefore require that the entire system should be laid down in considerable detail from the start, and that it should not be alterable except in ways acceptable to all major parties to the system; the Soviet Union has even called for decisions 'by agreement', that is by unanimous vote, and the United States has demanded that a majority of the six most industrially advanced states should agree. Many complicated voting systems have been proposed. But the best might be the simplest: one in which there was a representative council of, say, 30 delegates, with five from each region, and the super-powers permanently represented; and in which 25 votes would be required for any decision to be reached. This would maximise consensus without allowing individual countries a veto.

Thirdly, what would happen about states that did not become members of the system? Here the majority will certainly hold, quoting the Declaration, that not only should such nations themselves be unable to enjoy a share in the resources in the international zone, but that they have a duty to prevent their own companies from exploiting them. Large and powerful states such as the United States and the Soviet Union, however, may seek to argue that, while they have a duty under the Declaration to negotiate in good faith for an international system, if such a system is imposed against their will they cannot be compelled to join it, and would retain their existing rights in the area under international law. There is considerable disagreement on what these traditional rights are. But some international lawyers could almost certainly be produced to argue that they include the right to explore and exploit unused resources that are not under the national jurisdiction of any other state. This could lead to bitter disputes between states outside the

regime and those belonging to it. Indeed it is not impossible to envisage a situation in which American warships were sent to protect the activities of American companies, such as Deep-Sea Ventures or Howard Hughes, in the area, while the navy of China or other states came out to protect ' international ' resources against the depredations of these companies.

However, perhaps the most important single issue here is the same as the last we considered in examining the limits of national jurisdiction: what is the limit of national jurisdiction to economic resources off a state's coasts? For the end of national rights is of course the beginning of international rights. And where the limit lies can crucially determine the distribution of benefits between the coastal states on the one hand—especially those with long coast-lines, such as Brazil, the United States, Canada, South Africa, India and Australia—and the rest of mankind. If very wide coastal limits are accepted, then there will be little left for the international regime and for international distribution. Since many of the poorest states of the world are landlocked and would have no share in sea-bed riches except through the regime, there is obviously a strong case in equity for seeking to maximise the area which falls under the regime.

It is, however, utopian to suppose that arguments concerning equity will significantly influence the attitude of most of the coastal states. These states (including Britain) have shown that they are determined to maximise their own national interests: as indeed have most other states in the positions they have adopted. The most that can be hoped for, therefore, over this and the other issues that will arise, is perhaps that the conference can arrive at a *balance of interests*. This, indeed, has already been widely recognised in the discussions. But to achieve it will be no slight task. It is not easy to balance fairly the interests of rich countries and poor, of those with advanced sea-bed industries and those with none, of distant-water fishing countries and inland fishing countries, those with wide shelves and those with narrow shelves, above all those that are coastal and those that are non-coastal.

But it may perhaps be worth mentioning one possible solution to the problem of sea-bed limits, which might go some way to achieve a reasonable balance of interests. In the past we have been accustomed to thinking in terms of a relatively rigid line of division between areas that are within national jurisdiction, and those that are outside—(hitherto under no jurisdiction, but today increasingly governed by international rules). With the shrinking of the earth, it may become increasingly logical to think more in terms of a *sharing* of jurisdiction between national states and the international community in both areas, with a relatively hazy or broad line dividing the two zones. Under these circumstances, it would be more sensible to conceive of a *gradual* ending of coastal state jurisdiction over sea-bed resources. Thus instead of trying to

choose between a limit of economic jurisdiction 40 miles from the coast (as the non-coastal states demand), or 200 miles (as a large number of coastal states now claim), one might think in terms of full coastal state rights to these resources ending at 40 or 50 miles; an equal sharing between the coastal state and the international regime at 100 miles; at 150 miles the regime would take three-quarters of the royalties; and at 200 miles the regime would take all. The coastal state might be given the right to choose which enterprises could engage in exploitation throughout the zone, right out to 200 miles, and so to protect itself against threats to its security and reserve exploitation to its own companies.

Such a system would have the advantage, in logic, that it would recognise that a coastal state possesses rights in the resources immediately off its coasts, whether in the waters or beneath the sea-bed; *but* that it possesses these *in proportion to the distance from the coast.* Resources in the deeper parts of the ocean belong to the international community as a whole; but as the distance from the coast declines, the more these rights must be shared with the coastal state involved. A solution on these principles would conform with the judgment of common sense as well as of equity. And it would represent a reasonable compromise between the more extreme demands of both coastal and non-coastal states.

Certainly, unless some reasonable compromise of this kind is found, there is an acute danger of increasing conflict over the seas and their resources during the coming decade. One or two American companies expect to be actively operating in the deeper areas of the oceans within the next year or two. If they seek to go ahead before any agreed international system has been formulated, they will not only evoke a huge international outcry against the robbing of international resources: they could even raise the possibility of armed conflict among nations for these resources. It may soon, therefore, be time for Western governments to look around for acceptable compromise solutions, perhaps of the type here discussed, which might prevent such an alarming eventuality coming about, and so resolve the acute conflict of interest that surrounds the ownership of these valuable resources, which perhaps comprise a large proportion of those remaining on earth. They could at the same time in this process establish an important new source of assistance for developing countries, which could be produced at no real cost to the rich countries themselves.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Theory and World Politics. By Robert J. Lieber. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 166 pp. Index. (St. Antony's Publications No. 6.) £3·85. Paperback: £1·85.*

Theory and Explanation in International Politics. By Charles Reynolds. *London: Martin Robertson. 1973. 367 pp. Index. £5·50.*

International Relations: Peace or War? By Richard Rosecrance. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill. 1973. 334 pp. Index. £2·90.*

THE rapidly growing literature on the theory of International Relations is characterised by a rather frantic search for clear guidelines to the bewildering variety and change within the international environment and by the resulting confusion of theories and approaches; arguments range from the emulation of natural sciences in their striving to approximate 'truth' or 'reality', through attempts to organise an intuitive understanding of the latter, to normative endeavours to regulate international behaviour, especially to prevent war. No approach commands general acceptance and hence many writers increasingly turn to surveying the ideas of others and applying them to empirical material. However different in scope, all the three books under review reflect the general trend.

In the admirably concise and clear individual chapters of his *Theory and World Politics*, Professor R. J. Lieber authoritatively introduces the reader to the theories of games, integration, social communication, power and conflict, and systems analysis. His general approach is, however, inadequate for his normative purpose, that is, to improve the political values involved, for the simple reason that it is mainly systemic and takes insufficiently into account the fact that the crucial decisions are made within and by states. The book therefore only partly overlaps with the two recent brief general surveys published in this country which centre around the behaviour of states: Nigel Forward's much narrower, but also much more detailed, *The Field of Nations* [1] and this reviewer's somewhat broader *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States.* [2]

[1] London, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1971, p. 767.

[2] London: Oxford University Press 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1974, p. 93.

Theory and Explanation in International Politics by Charles Reynolds is the most ambitious of all the three books, since it combines a broad philosophical discussion of the issues of scientific and historical explanations with a treatment of four major empirical themes: the origins of the cold war, war and politics, international economics and international organisation, and their relations with international politics. In contrast to Professor Lieber's, Mr. Reynold's writing is discursive and occasionally his argument is rather hard to follow. Nevertheless, he comes firmly to grips with the perennial central issue of theorising about theory, *i.e.* the relationship between theory and empirical observation. He criticises the structural-functional theory and systems analysis for their inconsistencies and ambiguities and, most of all, for their lack of concrete empirical referents; he surveys the less ambitious middle-range theories and historical interpretations which, as he convincingly argues, do not fundamentally differ from one another. The lack of valid external objective criteria to judge the more limited explanations need not deter us, since we can nevertheless make sense in formulating coherent and objective knowledge. The author's argument becomes more dubious when applied to concrete issues, especially in the chapter on the origins of the cold war. He refutes a number of single factor or reductionist hypotheses, but is guilty of similar reductionism himself by attributing the cold war to Truman's motivations. Although quite subtle, his argument omits such essential elements as the difficulties of co-operation within the 'strange alliance' during the Second World War, the fact that, although the Americans were concerned with Soviet entry into the Far Eastern War, the Russians were equally interested and it was they who first proposed it; nor does he evaluate the Russians' feeling of insecurity, due to the American nuclear monopoly, which may have made an arrangement impossible quite apart from American actions. The author has little new to say on international organisation but has some interesting comments on the relationship between international politics and security and war as well as international economics.

International Relations: Peace or War? by Professor Richard Rosecrance is a comprehensive and down-to-earth treatment which combines systems analysis with history; at its moderate price of £2·90 for a hardback copy it is also very good value for money. After a refreshingly brief methodological introduction, the author outlines the historical evolution of international systems and the way such systems are structured and operate, and then discusses national objectives and national techniques. The book ends with an inventory of interesting but rather heterogeneous propositions arrived at in the course of the argument, and with an outline of two major polarities which are likely to govern the future—that between nationalism and internationalism and rewards and punishment.

These two major themes—which could be rephrased as the dialectics of centrifugal and centripetal forces and of conflict and co-operation—recur throughout the argument, but it is hard to escape the feeling that they are insufficiently used to integrate it. The treatment is 'scientific' in that, in Oakshott's terms, it is 'coherent', and it produces what can be readily identified as the objective knowledge which Popper calls 'world 3'—categories which play an important part in Mr. Reynolds's analysis.

JOSEPH FRANKEL

Defeat of an Ideal. A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations. By Shirley Hazzard. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 286 pp. £3·95.*

The United Nations System: An Analysis. By Mahdi Elmandjra. Foreword by Gunnar Myrdal. *London: Faber. 1973. 368 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in International Politics; Ed.: F. S Northedge.) £6·00.*

READERS of Shirley Hazzard's *People in Glass Houses* [1] will not be surprised that this less fictional study of the United Nations as it exists today is scarcely flattering. Indeed it is an almost uninterrupted denunciation of everything which that organisation has become. It is written from an insider's point of view, since Miss Hazzard worked for ten years as a UN staff member, though always, to her understandable chagrin, as a member of the non-established general service, rather than of the professional grade, and therefore was treated in many ways as an inferior creature while performing similar work. Much of her book, indeed, is about the trials and tribulations of service as a UN employee, and about the low and declining morale among its staff under a series of UN Secretaries-General who, for varying reasons, showed little inclination to concern themselves about the staff for whom they were ultimately responsible.

The problems of the sprawling UN bureaucracy, the personal and national rivalries within it, the caution in taking decisions, the absence of a clear-cut career structure, the frustrations of seeing the top jobs always taken by the political appointees, the inefficiency of equitable and geographical distribution and so on, have been amply recounted before (not least in the report of the UN Inspection Unit from which Miss Hazzard extensively quotes). The merit of this book is not only the fact that the criticisms here come from somebody with immediate personal experience and intimate knowledge of the organisation, but that they are illuminated by a liberal political outlook and an unqualified definition of the UN idea (as opposed to the UN as it is today). The criticism is not that of a long-confirmed implacable antagonist but of a disappointed lover. This no doubt is why it is so savage.

But this underlines the book's chief weakness, the naive political standpoint from which it is written. Miss Hazzard's enthusiasm for a strong UN, together with her intense antagonism to her former employers, lead her always to lay the blame for the UN's failings, not where it belongs, but on its own officials from the Secretary-General downwards. She explicitly rejects any attribution of blame to the governments which control it. Thus, for example, she looks back nostalgically to a golden age in the late Hammarskjöld period, when, under a gifted and imaginative leader, the UN was able to play a major (and partly independent) role on the world stage; yet she totally ignores the fact that this was only possible because a substantial proportion of the governments of the world at that time wished the Secretary-General to play this role—a situation which has not existed at other times. She readily condemns a UN report on the (admittedly mishandled) Bang-Jensen affair because it dares to suggest that a UN employee should conform to the policies laid down by the UN's political bodies. She even manages to blame the conspicuous consumption which takes place at Assembly cocktail parties on the UN officials rather than on the public-relations-minded governments which actually give them. And so on throughout the book. This unrealism is never more clearly shown than in

[1] London: Macmillan. 1967.

her final proposal that the UN should not be reformed but abolished ı replaced by a wholly new organisation.

This book contains a lot of shrewd and informed criticisms of the L But frustrated idealism does not perhaps make the best basis for balanced and serious judgments of policy which are necessary if the U performance is to be improved.

Mr. Elmandjra's book is also that of an insider: he worked for Une for a number of years as Assistant Director-General. This book, too, concerned with some of the problems which beset the UN system w increasing age and proliferation of activities. In style, however, it co scarcely be more different. It is a somewhat abstract and analyti account of the inter-relationships between the various bodies of the I system and especially of its procedures for co-ordination and financi The author brings out many of the illogicalities and inadequacies of th relationships at present, especially those arising from the increasing liance on voluntary programmes, such as the UN Development Programı which fall largely outside the control of the co-ordinating bodies. It is ı haps a pity that he has been so heavily influenced in his approach by systems analysis so much loved by American social scientists, so that book is copiously adorned with black boxes and tables full of arrows and stract nouns which usually tend to confuse rather than illuminate. If all ance is made for this harmless mannerism, however, the book provide well-informed and often penetrating account of many of the problems wh the growing size and complexity of the UN system have created for it.

EVAN LUAR

Corps Diplomatique. By Eric Clark. *London: Allen Lane. 1973. 276 Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

The New Diplomacy and its Apparatus. By Geoffrey McDermott. Forew by Lord Chalfont. *London: The Plume Press in association with W Lock Ltd. 1973. 208 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·95.*

Diplomatic Channels. By Humphrey Trevelyan. *London, Basingstc Macmillan. 1973. 157 pp. Index. £2·50.*

THE diplomatic services of the world attract more comment than home c servants, if only because of their vulnerability to demonstrations, hijack and other hostage-takers. Although it may now be conventional to reg them merely as government employees working abroad, rather than as manipulators of 'great events', they symbolise the policies of their gove ments and their very presence can provoke aggression. The diplom ghetto of any capital city represents the state of international relations much as the fort or the factory revealed the character of 17th cent trade.

All three books imply that the nature of 'work abroad' should still defined in terms of objectives of high diplomatic policy. Yet they all rec nise that top-level negotiation has really become a dangerously sepaı activity which may determine the whole compass of relationships cı vated by lower and middle ranks. Do governments still listen to their di mats? Dr. Kissinger's secret visits to China are discussed in these bo as if they confirm that civil servants working abroad are also vulnera to their own governments.

A common element in the discussion is the great diversification of dip matic work. Lord Trevelyan treats the subject sparingly and devotes o a few paragraphs to the 'tiresome subject' (p. 115) of intelligence a espionage to which the others give a whole chapter. Each book adopt different perspective. Mr. McDermott who has already attracted *Sunc Express* publicity for his indiscretions—his chapter on intelligence has be repaginated—is primarily interested in expounding the principles on wh he thinks future British policy should be based; Lord Trevelyan wishes demonstrate the value of ambassadorial work which lies between top-le negotiations and day-to-day routine; Mr. Clark attempts a general survey the whole field, drawing his examples largely from the United Stat Russia, Britain, Canada, and France.

The impression they all convey is that the new kind of civil serv working abroad must 'soldier on' because his very vulnerability is a p of diplomatic recognition. Nation states now require a whole range interconnections on which to build up the basis of mutual respect. these books are concerned with this 'fact of life', but it is not clear whom they are written. Lord Trevelyan's is the shortest and most pit and the author clearly believes that the area of confidence can be enlar by steady work in the middle rank. Mr. McDermott writes in a more p scriptive way about the probable shape and form of the British diploma service, and tends to overwork the word 'flexibility'. Mr. Clark is pretentious and his book is better constructed. Those in the profession diplomacy will probably enjoy the books by Lord Trevelyan and M McDermott, but I would myself recommend Mr. Clark as a better introd tion for the outsider.

J. M. Le

Building Peace. Reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Pe 1939–1972. 2 vols. Chairmen: James T. Shotwell, Arthur N. Holcom Clark M. Eichelberger, Louis B. Sohn. Introduction by Louis B. Sc *Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press. 1973. 959 pp. $22.50.*

This two-volume set makes available for the first time all of the signed rep of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace from the first published in 1940 to the twenty-second, 'The United Nations and the Hun Environment', issued in 1972.

An introduction by Professor Louis Sohn gives the origins and developm of the Commission and a list of members, 1939–1972. Also included are unnumbered statements issued during the early years of the Commission wh are judged to be of historical significance. A detailed table of contents has b provided.

United Nations Resolutions. Series I. Resolutions Adopted by the Gene Assembly. Vol. I.: 1946–1948. Compiled and edited by Dusan J. Djonovi *Foreword by Thomas M. Franck. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana. 19 505 pp. Index. $40.00.*

This work will be published in twelve to fifteen volumes and will consist four series of resolutions, supplementary documents and voting records of General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Trust ship Council. The arrangement is chronological with subject indexes and cro references. There is no doubt that it should be available in all major libra which contain United Nations documents.

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Arms and Strategy. An international survey of modern defence. By Laurence Martin. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 320 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £4·75.*

PROFESSOR Martin's new book could well be labelled the first coffee-table book in the field of war studies. But it is also, of course, more than that. Although liberally endowed with pictures, diagrams and maps, the textual element adequately fulfils the purpose of the book—to be an introduction and guide to the contemporary military scene. However, are all the pictures captioned correctly? (*e.g.* compare p. 130 and p. 138.) And although the diagrams are mostly ingenious and useful, some are confusing (*e.g.* p. 32) and some badly placed in relation to the text (*e.g.* on p. 24).

The fourteen chapters of the book are divided into four parts, beginning with an examination of 'The Nuclear Powers', both great and small, continuing with 'The Technology of Limited War', through 'Arenas of Conflict', to conclude with an examination of some current problems. There are, in addition, a very necessary glossary, and three appendices giving details of the centres of guerrilla training and assistance, the major arms control agreements, and the military balance—the latter an abbreviated form of the Autumn 1972 publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The author oscillates between two approaches. In some chapters he appears to take as his premise that Strategy is purely a matter of hardware, and in other chapters that the subject is an adjunct to International Politics, with all the political and psychological complexity that this involves. In consequence the volume is rather uneven in quality if examined from a consistent viewpoint. In the section on limited war, for example, there is, as one would expect, a strong 'international politics' chapter on 'The Maritime Battle', but the chapter on 'The Land Battle', deteriorates, in part, to something akin to an arms manufacturer's catalogue. One wonders what value there is in writing four chapters on the technology of limited war without a single coherent discussion of limited war theory to give credibility to the need for, and utility of, the technology under discussion. The occasional theoretical forays—as in the chapter on tactical nuclear weapons—are not a satisfactory substitute.

In Part III—'The Arenas of Conflict'—the chapter on the Middle East had the misfortune to be rendered largely obsolete within three months of publication. This must be an inherent problem in writing about contemporary conflict, but perhaps also underlines the need for a stronger conceptual element in discussions of this nature.

The major question that one is left asking is: who will read the volume? It is unsuited to academic students of defence, even as an introductory volume, by reason of its unevenness, and the lack of footnotes, references, and bibliography. And yet one feels that the plethora of acronyms, the jargon and at times—for example in Part IV—the academic nature of the argument, will deter the 'lay' reader for whom it appears to be designed. In general, despite its shortcomings, the book can be seen as an imaginative attempt to bring 'defence' to a wider audience. One wonders whether it will succeed.

ROGER CAREY

Security, Order and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in the Politics and Defence Planning of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Edited by Johan Jørgen Holst. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1972. 203 pp. Bibliog. Nkr. 48.00. $8.00.*

Weapons Technology and Arms Control. By W. F. Biddle. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1973. 355 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs.) £8·50.*

PROFESSOR Holst's book consists of papers presented to a 1971 conference on the significance of nuclear weapons in the politics and defence planning of non-nuclear weapon states. Holst suggested as a working assumption for the conference that no single measure could ever finally prevent horizontal proliferation. Its containment should accordingly be regarded as a task requiring continuous management, which would have to be based less on universal legal instruments (such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which comes up for review in 1975) than on assessments of the national perspectives of ' threshold ' countries. The key questions for effective management were why states which had a potential nuclear weapon capability should choose *not* to exercise it and what international incentives might influence their choice.

The papers examine some national policies which come within the broad range of ' non-nuclear adaptations to a nuclear security environment '. The special circumstances of the European balance make it possible for three non-nuclear weapon members of Nato (Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands) to accept the utility of the American deterrent, while pursuing actively the conclusion of effective measures of nuclear arms control. If the American umbrella were ever withdrawn, their reaction would probably be (as J. Henk Leurdijk suggests in the case of the Netherlands) to revert to neutrality rather than give support to a scheme for a European (Anglo-French) deterrent, *i.e.* to rely upon the goodwill of a powerful nuclear potential enemy rather than the protection of minor nuclear friends. Jan Prawitz explains the defence considerations which weigh against a Swedish bomb. Sweden's strategic goals require it to erect a barrier against those who would force a passage across its territory. If, in the course of a wider conflict, an invader were to use nuclear weapons to break through this barrier, he could expect a nuclear response from his main adversary. What this appears to mean is that the main difference between Swedish, Norwegian and Danish defence policies is that all rely ultimately on the American deterrent, but Sweden makes a greater conventional contribution to its own defence.

Uwe Nehrlich points to the way in which the Federal Republic of Germany has been a victim of the symbolism inherent in the nuclear debate. Considering that the settlement of Germany has been the central political issue in the European nuclear balance, it is hard to see how it could have been otherwise. The single Warsaw Pact contribution, by a Polish *apparatchik*, illustrates Nehrlich's point by making the customary comments about the danger of West German revanchism and the benefits of ' collective security ' and nuclear disengagement in Central Europe.

Without necessarily assuming that there could never be (or have been) another European nuclear power, one feels that these papers were offered more because that was what their authors knew about, than because they really saw Europe as a crucial area for proliferation. The management of incentives for non-proliferation may be more difficult in areas not permeated

by the institutions of bipolarity. Ryukichi Imai holds that nuclear weapons are 'costly and ineffective', but that political advantages accrue to a state which is generally believed to be within two years of acquiring them, and that the optimum policy for Japan will accordingly be to hold its capability at that level (he suggests that this level could be achieved by most industrial powers). (Imai also points to the growing threat posed by 'the single bomb' in the hands of terrorists.) Alan Dowty similarly stresses that Israel's optimum policy (in 1971) was to promote unresolved curiosity about its own nuclear status, and to use the ambiguity as a bargaining counter, rather than to 'go nuclear' which would only unite world opinion against it. Nuclear weapons (Dowty hints at other cheaper weapons of mass destruction) could only be used militarily as 'deterrence of last resort'. K. Subrahmanyam, on the other hand, argues that in view of the super-powers' tolerance of violence in the Third World, and their failure to make a no-first-use declaration or to offer effective guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states, India must look to itself and acquire nuclear weapons. As Holst observes, the Indian army would hardly welcome a development that would so cut into its conventional resources.

Malcolm Hoag warns against assuming that all arms control measures are mutually reinforcing. He argues that if the Americans and Russians were tied by strategic arms limitation agreements to a doctrine of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) and were to deny themselves weapons capable of use for Controlled Nuclear Response (CNR) the result might be to make them less able to offer guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states against nuclear attack or to resist blackmail themselves by small nuclear weapon states, and that this would provide incentives for non-nuclear weapon states to go nuclear.

Mr. Biddle's book provides technical information relevant to arms control. It should be of some value to arms controllers and students of their craft.

C. M. MASON

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Fact and Fancy in International Economic Relations. An Essay on International Monetary Reform. By Thomas Balogh in collaboration with Peter Balacs. *Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Braunschweig: Pergamon Press. 1973. 116 pp. Index. £2·50.*

Leading Issues in International Economic Policy. Essays in honour of George N. Halm. Edited by C. Fred Bergsten and William G. Tyler. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1973. 217 pp. Bibliog. of the writings of George N. Halm. Index. £5·20.*

READERS of Lord Balogh will welcome this 'little red book' of his thoughts on international economic relations. They will find good vintage Balogh in it: masterly intuition, biting style, and disregard for analytical precision. Fortunately for him, Lord Balogh's intellectual power is such that he can take the same stand on analytical precision as General de Gaulle was said to take on economic problems: '*l'intendance suivra*'.

What Lord Balogh wants to convey to his readers this time is, briefly, that 'orthodox global methods of maintaining international balance have failed'. They have failed because 'they have been based on the fallacious

assumption that international trade is conducted by atomistically organised units in a framework of perfect competition, and is characterised by sub-units alternately expanding and contracting by means of which the system as a whole is kept in overall balance'.

'In fact', he asserts, 'international economic relations have become typically oligopolistic, and that in two senses at least. In the first place, national policies . . . will affect, if not all, then at least a large number of firms actually trading within the country in which action is taken. Thus, the simple, direct, signals of the market to these units which cannot be affected by any single one of them are superseded, or at least very strongly modified, by the actions of (significant) members of the world economic trading system. Thus, most important trading nations must needs formulate policy in the light of policies followed by other important trading nations and on an assessment of how these in turn are themselves likely to react . . . The relative national strength . . . and the policies . . . that the dominant countries pursue, play an overwhelmingly important part in setting the tone and determine the outcome. The old Humean mechanism is no longer a realistic image of the behaviour of world trade and payments'.

In the second place, there is the increasing prominence of large, multinational firms. 'While these are open to direct pressure from strong countries, they are themselves capable of exerting pressure on weak countries. Their trading policies are not entirely, or even predominantly, motivated by the instantaneous maximization of profits in the short run. This factor profoundly alters the nature of international trade, payments and capital movements in a sense wholly ignored by conventional economics. The persistent failure to deal with the problem of cost inflation, which inevitably entails the same failure to analyse most international disturbances, is clearly a direct consequence of this refusal to accept the unalterable.' Of these tendencies of the world economy, he argues, the change that has overtaken the world monetary system since 1947 is the best illustration.

How professional economists have been able to stick to their perfect competition model when trying to explain a reality which was so oligopolistic in nature is what Lord Balogh wonders about in this book. And his style oscillates between puzzlement and wrath. Quite rightly so. He has been saying this for thirty years, but, unfortunately, his *intendance* has not followed him. Let us hope that, in the future, it will.

The *Festschrift* Fred Bergsten and William Tyler have gathered in honour of George Halm is good evidence of how badly the economic profession needs to reformulate its theoretical foundations, when dealing with international economic problems. This is very eloquently adumbrated by Paul Samuelson in his contribution to the *Festschrift*: just by changing one simple assumption, a whole set of neat results in pure trade theory go by the board. Coming from perhaps the highest priest of neo-classical economics, however, this is certainly too little and (hopefully not) too late. Other contributions to this volume tend to reflect the nature of most of their authors: sensible people, the majority of them, with their feet firmly on the ground; but they cannot help falling into the trap of using neo-classical analytical tools. The results are, therefore, highly schizophrenic. Whereas good sense abounds, the theory in which it is couched reminds one of Procuste and his bed: invariably it is good sense to be trimmed to the size and shape of the theoretical bed.

M. DE CECCO

A Guide to Banking in Britain. By Robin Pringle. Foreword by Lord Cromer. *London: Charles Knight. 1973. 185 pp. Index. £4·00.*

'BANKING is one thing the British are rather good at, like politics'. In spite of this patriotic opening, Robin Pringle proceeds in this book to give us a detailed, realistic, readable description of how the British banking system works today and of its main developments in the last decade. Criticisms traditionally levelled at the City are examined dispassionately, and the answer to them is given with facts rather than words. From the quantitative and qualitative data that Robin Pringle provides there emerges a clear-cut image of contemporary British banking as an eminently international set-up. A statistic to which he gives due relevance is that of the number of people employed in Britain by foreign banks. And, also quite relevantly, he underlines the close ties which link together, today even more than in the past, the various components of the British financial system.

To readers of Bagehot and, especially, of Hartley Withers, this description of contemporary British banking has a striking air of *déjà vu*—which is really saying something about continuity in history. The hallowed tradition of asking whether British banking is too international and denudes Britain of financial resources is respected by Mr. Pringle. But, again respectful of tradition, he does not explicitly jump off the fence. From his description of contemporary banking institutions and operations, however, a positive answer to that question can be inferred.

Notably absent from Mr. Pringle's treatment is the problem of how to integrate British financial institutions with those of the EEC countries. But, in view of the confident opening statement, perhaps he thinks that that will be no problem at all. Alternatively, since this book is intended for the educated, but not specialised, reader, perhaps Mr. Pringle decided not to discuss it 'in front of the children'.

M. DE CECCO

The Case for Development: Six Studies. By Max F. Millikan et al. Introduction by Philippe de Seynes. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1973. 304 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions of Development. By Robert S. McNamara. *Ney York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 140 pp. Paperback: £1·00.*

AT the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the General Assembly adopted the international development strategy for the second development decade. There is something rather odd about the world organisation's urge to devote years and decades to causes, as if under its patronage the history of nations had ceased to be a continuing process and had become the mere interlude between international birthday parties. The birthday in 1970 provided the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs with the opportunity of commissioning a symposium of six essays on development. Its price is beyond the reach of the countries for whom it has been written; neither do any of the contributors come from any of those countries. In introducing the authors, M. de Seynes reassures the reader that each of them treats his subject 'predominantly as a human being'. For the rest, 'the authors do not argue; they illuminate' (p. vii).

Some of the essays are better than the introduction. In 'A Strategy of Development', the late Professor Millikan of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. has contributed a brilliant exposé which ought to be declared obligatory reading for anybody engaged in macro-economic planning. Having been treated to a rigorous seminar on the economics of development, the reader will be relieved to find the author fully aware of such conflicting objectives as growth and equity or—to put it in political terms—as control and participation. Sir Arthur Lewis, best known for his classics on economic growth and planning, talks mainly of the 'nuts and bolts' used by the practitioner in development. As an advocate of 'balanced growth', he criticises the neglect of agriculture and stresses the need for institutional change and the importance of foreign trade as 'the origin of growth of less developed countries' (p. 61). Oddly, both authors give an identical bibliographical list of 15 UN publications, as if neither they nor anybody else had ever written about planning and development.

The Polish planner Pajestka is concerned with the 'social dimensions of development'. He is outspoken about the faults of colonialism, but he is less precise about the integration of the social and economic objectives of development, which 'can be mutually supportive, resulting in a feed-back most advantageous to overall progress' (p. 99). Of an altogether different kind is M. Domenach's treatise on moral involvement and on development as the imperative of human solidarity. He draws on Kant's concept of the 'social contract' in a *Voelkerstaat*. Returning to the more mundane aspects of the subject under discussion, Professor Wightman of Birmingham University, in a highly competent essay, deals with the effects of a changing pattern of trade and aid on the countries of the 'Third World'. Both forms of economic contact are clearly good business for the developed countries. 'Donor countries gain from tying when the aid is provided and from the receipt of convertible currency when debt service payments are due' (p. 23). Robin Clarke's chapter on the role of science and technology in development is the most exciting contribution to the symposium. With justification, this paper is being made available on its own in United Nations offices. Special praise ought to be given to the author's remarks on road transport and on family planning. With regard to this part, the reader may be struck with awe when he learns the cost of research and development and its application in underdeveloped countries. But at least he can put the symposium aside in the hope that not all is lost in the rapidly changing world of developing countries.

The reader should not be put off by the title of Robert McNamara's slim volume which unhappily makes it sound like one of those issued by United Nations agencies to the general boredom of the public. In fact, the book deserves to be widely read. Oddly, it seems to take its cue, though not its theme, from Paul Hoffman's pamphlet of 1960, which was entitled 'One hundred countries, one and a quarter billion people'. The world's population does grow fast, but surely not by 60 per cent. in 13 years.

McNamara's book contains extracts from statements he made in the first five years after becoming President of the World Bank. During this period he courageously dissociated himself from some of the strictly financial approaches of the bank, which once ranked among the most orthodox of international institutions. McNamara pleads for a shift from the bank's previous lending policy, measured mainly in terms of capital return and economic growth, to one determined by 'essential human needs' (p. 11).

If this change is to be more than one of a warm humanitarian appeal in place of cool banking criteria, it is bound to tread on developed and underdeveloped toes. The spheres to which McNamara has chiefly directed the attention of the bank's Board of Government and of other interested parties are population control, educational expansion and rural employment. None of these subjects ranks high among the conventional targets of moneylending and money-making institutions. On the other hand, each of them is bound to get into conflict with vested interests, such as those of church leaders of various denominations; of ruling elites jealous of their educational privileges; and of landowners mindful of any dangers to their position of social prestige and political power.

According to McNamara, in forty developing countries over half the average national product is earned by the wealthiest fifth of the population, whilst at the other end of the scale the poorest fifth disposes of a mere five per cent. of the national product. 'Increases in national income . . . have not reached the poor to any significant degree' (p. 102). In the face of such severe—and growing—social and economic disparities, McNamara sees revolt as the only alternative to reform. He clearly fears the former and pleads in favour of the latter. 'It is only a question of time before a decisive choice must be made between the political costs of reform and the political risks of rebellion' (p. 112). This cannot be said too often. As the author sees it, land, tax, credit and banking reforms are long overdue. If these and other urgent problems are not tackled, a time of troubles lies ahead, 'during which the forces of historical change [will] threaten our frail twentieth-century society with disintegration' (p. 51). McNamara has been more courageous than many others in offering his unsolicited comments to donors and recipients alike but, even in the World Bank, certain taboos regarding existing power structures or caste systems are strictly respected. Perhaps one day McNamara will give the general reader an account of individual banking projects and of the obstacles they meet, in the course of their implementation, from vested interests and cultural taboos. Such an account should be highly instructive to the practitioners of development.

W. Klatt

World Population Crisis: The United States Response. By Phyllis Tilson Piotrow. Foreword by George H. Bush, Jr. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 276 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development. Law and Population Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Law and Population Book Series No. 4.) £7·25.*

In December 1959, President Eisenhower declared that 'birth control . . . is not our business. I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility'. This quotation is the beginning of Dr. Piotrow's book. In August 1974, however, the governments of the world will be meeting in Bucharest under the auspices of the United Nations in the third World Population Conference convened by that body, and the first in which governmental representation will be preponderant. The government of the United States was one of the principal protagonists in persuading the United Nations to call this conference and to designate 1974 as World Population

Year. Dr. Piotrow in her book describes how this change in attitude on the part of the United States government came about.

The first major impetus to change came through the foreign assistance programme. The Draper Committee, set up to review foreign aid priorities in 1959, recommended that the United States should help countries, at their request, to formulate plans designed to deal with problems of rapid population growth, to increase assistance to maternity and child welfare programmes and to support research to meet the challenge posed by rapidly expanding populations. Although this report at first met with a somewhat muted reception, the 1960s saw a complete change in American public opinion on the population issue. In part this was due to pressures brought to bear by individuals such as General Draper, the Chairman of the Draper Committee, or by organisations such as the Population Council founded by John D. Rockefeller III in the early 1950s. They were able to persuade important figures in the legislative and executive branch of the United States government of the urgency of the issue, and a number of energetic and forceful individuals joined the Agency for International Development and were able to influence its policy in the population field. It may have helped that John F. Kennedy, the first Roman Catholic President, was not altogether averse to demonstrating that he did not necessarily accept the views of the Church on the birth control issue. A quantitative measure of the change is provided by the fact that between 1965 and 1972 the number of professionals appointed by AID to work in the population field rose from three to 149, and its expenditure in that area from $2 million to $125 million. The United States is at present the major power providing an international assistance programme in the population field and has made its influence felt in the UN Population Commission and in support of the UN Fund for Population Activities which provides the principal source of international aid in the finance of population assistance programmes.

Dr. Piotrow traces this development carefully in her book and assesses the contributions made by different individuals in the field. She has written what is primarily an administrative history of the subject and her book is none the worse for that. There is, however, one aspect which she does not deal with and which may well be worth considering. To what extent has the increase in assistance given by the United States in this field, much of which has been concentrated in south-east Asia and Latin America, been successful in achieving its objective?

On the credit side it would be possible to point to areas such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore, where fertility rates have recently fallen. More information has been made available about the nature of the population problem in developing areas, and the supply and distribution of contraceptive devices and contraceptive information has been improved. But there is also a debit side. Population policies have become an issue in the political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Communist doctrine either denies the existence of a population problem, or regards it as a temporary phenomenon which will vanish with the advent of socialism. American population policy can therefore be represented as an attempt to avoid the necessity of economic development and to perpetuate differences in living standards between the rich and the poor nations. As differences in population growth rates are largely co-terminous with ethnic and colour differences, such views are sometimes believed in the developing areas, however little justification they may have in reality. The zealous

advocacy of population control may cause resentment among those to whom it is addressed, and the existence of such resentment became evident, for instance, on the occasion of the African Population Conference which was held in Accra in 1971. To some extent, therefore, a vigorous and aggressive population policy may become counter-productive.

Population policy has never been a popular topic for politicians. In developed and democratic countries, governments have not been over-eager to adopt anti-natalist policies for their own peoples, and advocacy of population decline is not thought to be popular even in politically sophisticated societies. The appearance of objections in developing countries should not, therefore, come as a surprise.

An additional point needs to be borne in mind. There is a considerable degree of consensus among demographers that a programme which is limited to supplying contraceptive devices and information to a population is unlikely by itself to do much to reduce birth rates. A fundamental change in reproductive habits, such as would be necessary to reduce growth rates to near replacement levels, is unlikely to be achieved without considerable social and economic change. Freedman's work in Taiwan has related rates of population change to the general progress of modernisation in that island. Social, economic and demographic changes are interdependent. It is this which makes any assessment of the effectiveness of population policy so difficult. It is a pity that Dr. Piotrow, in an otherwise excellent book, does not attempt to answer these questions.

E. Grebenik

LAW

Satellite Broadcasting. By Abram Chayes et al. *London: Oxford University Press for the International Broadcast Institute and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 159 pp. Bibliog. £5·00.*

This study on the legal problems of direct television broadcasting by artificial earth satellites was sponsored by the International Broadcast Institute in 1970 in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and France, and Abram Chayes, James Fawcett, Masami Ito and Alexandre Kiss were appointed rapporteurs. They drew up a questionnaire, formed their national groups, and prepared the replies. In addition to the text of the questionnaire and the four separate replies, the book comprises an Introduction by Professor Chayes, which provides the necessary background information on direct broadcast satellites, an appendix of documents, a select bibliography, and a short list of technical terms in English, French and Spanish. The various parts were put together by Mr. Fawcett.

The questionnaire, in brief, asks how direct satellite broadcasts may promote freedom of information, especially in developing countries; in what way they should or need be controlled in order to protect the state, the public and the individual; whether, from the standpoint of intellectual and artistic property, there are special problems for authors, performers, producers, for the broadcasts as such, and for developing countries; and finally, from the technical point of view, how direct satellite broadcasting is to be correlated with other systems of satellite communications.

It was assumed that, for the moment, only regional broadcasts for educational and information purposes and directed at communal aerials and

receivers need be envisaged (p. 22). The various groups answered the questions primarily in the light of their own national experience in the field of radio and television broadcasts. The replies thus provide valuable information on, and insight into, the different national systems and outlooks in such matters. This study is timely; for the first experimental broadcasting satellite, the ATS-F, is due to be launched in 1974, and the United Nations is in the process of elaborating principles governing direct satellite broadcasting in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2916 (XXVII).

Occupying rather modestly a somewhat obscure place in the book, after the text of the questionnaire, is a highly useful, albeit brief, summary of certain suggestions and conclusions which are common to the four separate replies (pp. 22–23). But there appears to have been no opportunity for the rapporteurs to consider and discuss these replies together. The conclusions resulting from such a discussion would no doubt have added even further interest to this thoughtful and valuable study which can be read with profit, not only by those interested in satellite broadcasting, but also by all those in communications.

BIN CHENG

EEC Law. By Anthony Parry and Stephen Hardy. *London: Sweet & Maxwell; New York: Matthew Bender. 1973. 511 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·50. Paperback: £4·50.*

Common Market Law of Competition. By Christopher Bellamy and Graham D. Child. Consultant Editor: Jeremy Lever. *London: Sweet & Maxwell; New York: Matthew Bender. 1973. 361 pp. Index. £7·75.*

THE two books under review are welcome additions to the growing literature on European Community Law. A comprehensive work such as that by Messrs. Parry and Hardy is an essential tool for all concerned with this branch of the law in its application in and to the United Kingdom, while the more specialised work of Messrs. Bellamy and Child is of considerable value to commercial lawyers concerned with the ramifications of industrial property law in the wider sense.

The total impact of Community Law on this country is uncertain as yet, but it is already clear that it is likely to be far greater than was originally thought. Before the accession of this country to the Community, it was assumed that many branches of English law would remain wholly unaffected by it, but this assumption has proved to be erroneous, as recent developments of Community Law have shown. Hence the insistence by some on the creation of a parliamentary committee to scrutinise so-called secondary legislation.

References by national courts of preliminary questions to the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the Treaty have been comparatively rare, and it is too early to say whether occasion for such references is likely to arise with any frequency in proceedings before English courts. The procedure to be followed in the High Court is now contained in Order 114 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (as enacted by S.I. 1972/1898 and in force since January 1, 1973). It is likely that, if occasion does arise for such references, it will arise in connection with restrictive practices in the wider sense, viz. including licensing and know-how agreements. It is also conceivable that

it may arise in connection with the freedom of movement of workers (Article 48 of the Treaty and Reg. 1612/68) and other matters.

The Fair Trading Act, 1973, the whole of which came into force on November 1, 1973, makes further provision for the control of restrictive practices in this country, and the interplay between municipal legislation in this field and the Common Market Law of Competition will become increasingly important. Easy access to Community Law on the subject is therefore essential, and the work of Messrs. Bellamy and Child provides a valuable guide to this branch of Community Law.

F. Honig

Protection of Foreign Investment: A Study in International Law. By Zouhair A. Kronfol. *Leyden: Sijtoff. 1972. 176 pp. Bibliog. Fl. 29.50.*

This is a study of the question: how much and how little protection does international law afford to foreign investment? In particular, the emphasis is on the set of measures which (in the writer's view) are essential to ensure the flow of private capital to the developing countries. The measures the writer has in mind are ' legal guarantees given directly or indirectly by states to foreign investors assuring them of the safety of their investment insofar as the latter are affected by state action '.

These guarantees raise problems in international law and their discussion receives the main emphasis of this study. The writer is careful to remind us that there are economic and sociological aspects, but he then confines himself to the legal elements of the problems. This has an odd result, for he says ' that any isolated legal study is both impossible and meaningless . . . The relationship of international to the contemporaneous political, economic and social realities cannot be neglected '.

The study begins with a statement of the international law governing the treatment of aliens and their property. Next, the forms and substantive provisions of legal guarantees given to foreign investors are described. The main body of the study then follows—the analysis of the legal effects of these guarantees and an examination of the legal problems involved in compensation claims. The remedies available to the investor to settle investment disputes with foreign states conclude the analysis. The final section contains the writer's conclusions and his evaluations of the study.

These conclusions exclude the prospect of a multilateral investment convention, which neither the capital-exporting nor capital-importing countries favour; with regard to bilateral guarantee agreements, there are major problems which limit their scope though their functions may be extremely useful. Nationalisation creates problems even assuming that the international rule is that the property of aliens may be nationalised without unjustifiable discrimination, and on the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Once again, the question of quantifying compensation, and the reluctance of sovereign states to abide by the ruling of an independent tribunal, creates difficulties.

The study is a useful exposition of existing international law and the current problems in the field of foreign investment. The writer ventures on no new grounds and the limitation of his study to strictly legal problems severely truncates the work. International economic law deals with the economic problems of the international order and is, under current rapidly

changing conditions, evolving at a speed almost too great for proper supervision by interested lawyers. The field is enormous, and studies of this type fulfil a useful purpose by their survey of parts of it. However, essentially, the function of the lawyer is to draw valid inferences from existing international practice, involving a balanced survey of international relations, economic and social problems, as well as strict legal rules. In this respect Dr. Kronfol's study rests on too limited and superficial a plane.

LEONARD LAZAR

Foreign Development Lending—Legal Aspects. The Papers and Proceedings of a Conference of Legal Advisors of National and International Development Lending and Assistance Agencies. Sponsored by The American Society of International Law. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin. *Leyden: Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1971. 352 pp. Index. Fl. 52.00.*

THE papers and proceedings of a conference, held at Bellagio in August 1968, of legal advisers of national and international development lending and assistance agencies, have been collected here under the sponsorship of the American Society for International Law. A broad spectrum of the policies and work of these agencies with regard to current legal issues is thus presented.

The proceedings of the conference were divided into: national interest and development policies, constraints and restrictions, the legal nature of agreements, their enforcement and binding character, the legal problems and techniques concerning repayment, the achievement of loan purposes, the activities of assisting agencies, technical assistance and the joint and parallel operations of the various institutions.

Fourteen of these institutions, the multinational agencies, are described in a series of papers. There is in this collection raw material for research: a comparative survey of the various elements of these agencies—their activities, form and functions.

LEONARD LAZAR

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Community in the World. By Richard Bailey. *London: Hutchinson. 1973. 200 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50. Midway ed.: £1·95.*

Britain in Europe: Impact on the Third World. By Haruko Fukuda. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 194 pp. Index. £4·95.*

AN important characteristic of the lengthy debate on Britain's membership of the European Community is that it focused primarily on domestic issues, such as the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on food prices, employment problems, the social services, and dilution of the 'sovereignty' of Parliament, rather than on the role which the enlarged Community would play in external relations. Each of the works under review contributes significantly towards correcting that imbalance, since both authors have set out to assess present and future effects of the enlarged Community on international economic relations.

Mr. Bailey's study is the more ambitious of the two, covering as it does a wider spectrum of the EEC's external relations. There are incisive analyses

of the impact of British membership on the developed Commonwealth states, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and on the seven EFTA 'non-joiners', Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. In a terse chapter on United States-European Community relations, the author isolates two fundamental trade and monetary problems which hinder any rapid improvement in the climate of the relationship, namely, the conflict over agricultural trade, and sharply divergent monetary policies. Significantly, as Mr. Bailey points out, a solution to the agricultural issue not only involves reform of the Community's protectionist Common Agricultural Policy, but also necessitates reform of the American farm support system to remove anomalies (p. 122). Whether this will be possible remains an open question in the current GATT international trade negotiations in view of strong domestic political pressures in both the United States and within the European Community which have hitherto supported inward-looking policies. On monetary and trade relations, the author sees American recrimination as being especially virulent; the American standpoint is that the European Community has been largely responsible for the breakdown of world trading and monetary arrangements operated by the IMF and GATT; similarly, the United States has increasingly demonstrated its impatience with the EEC's inability to meet its obligations as the world's largest trading entity by not assuming greater responsibility for operating international trade and monetary arrangements. The dollar crisis, in particular, through its various stages from August 1971 to the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971 and devaluation in February 1973, evoked no clear initiatives from the European Community to secure a lasting solution to the international monetary chaos.

In a penetrating chapter on European Community-Comecon relations, the author sees a greater possibility now for expanded links since enlargement. Moreover, the relationship should become increasingly multilateral, since, from January 1973, all trade agreements have to be negotiated by the Community as a whole as part of its common commercial policy. Meanwhile, there is a strong case for recommending that the Community should continue to work through international bodies such as OECD, GATT and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, all of which have played an invaluable part in improving East-West relations.

One of the most problematic long-term aspects of the enlarged Community's external relations concerns present and future links with developing countries through a growing network of association and preferential trade agreements. As a result of British membership of the Community, the offer of association to twenty African Commonwealth states, with the exclusion of the Asian Commonwealth, has tended to reinforce the argument that the European Community is intent upon incorporating most of the African continent within its sphere of influence. Even if the EEC's generalised system of preferences for all developing countries is improved further, the Community is likely to grant more favourable treatment, or 'super-preferences', to its African associates. Clearly, as Mr. Bailey recognises, a reinforcement of such discriminatory international trade policies could result in regional economic war between the rapidly emerging series of North-South configurations: the United States-Latin America; the European Community-Africa and the Mediterranean; Japan-Pacific area. The appropriate way to avoid this eventuality is to return to the spirit and letter of multilateralism enshrined in GATT.

It is a pity that this stimulating and well-prepared book is impaired by a number of typographical errors and inconsistencies in spelling. Among those noted are: Gaboon (p. 34), but Gabon (p. 37); Tchad (p. 37), but Chad (p. 41); Yauonde (p. 37) should read Yaoundé; Organisation of African States should read Organisation of African Unity (p. 51); grandure (p. 131) should read grandeur.

Miss Fukuda's study sets out to analyse the sort of trading world there will be for developing countries when the enlarged European Community, encompassing Western Europe plus numerous associated countries in the Mediterranean basin and in Africa, is fully in operation. She concedes that the most notable development in international trade during the last decade has been the proliferation of regional and other discriminatory special trading agreements, many of which have been concluded with the European Community. The main concern in this respect is the continual erosion of the non-discrimination principle manifested in GATT's most-favoured-nation clause. Moreover, as more and more countries choose association with the Community, the spirit and the principle of multilateralism under GATT become further eroded (p. 146). The author is clearly sceptical of the overall aims of the Community's association agreements and, although she accepts that there may be short-term benefits in association, 'in the long-term it is questionable whether such heavy economic and political dependence on a single market (EEC) is beneficial or even desirable in terms of the progress of these nations themselves' (p. 148). This evaluation is reminiscent of the conclusions of the United Nations report on association which appeared in 1960. Since then, however, we have had the two Yaoundé conventions, the Arusha and Lagos agreements, and a host of preferential trade agreements with Mediterranean countries. With enlargement, the EEC has become an even stronger pole of attraction for developing countries. The paradox facing developing countries which have been offered association with the European Community would seem to lie in their limited options; there are few, if any, practicable alternatives to association for the African states, given the rudimentary state of development of most African economies which will continue for the foreseeable future to be competitive rather than complementary.

NICHOLAS HUTTON

Terms of Entry: Britain's Negotiations with the European Community, 1970–1972. By Simon Z. Young. *London: Heinemann. 1973. 220 pp. Index. £3·00.*

THOUGH disappointing in some ways, this is a useful handbook on Britain's negotiations during 1970–72 when the British government was 'plainly very anxious' to achieve membership of the European Economic Community. The book is restricted to an external account of the discussions and relies mainly on governmental documents and statements, issued to influence public opinion, and on newspapers. It must, therefore, be read carefully in association with more critical studies such as *Britain in the EEC,* edited by Douglas Evans. [1] While the book under review is excellent and fair in describing the arguments for and against British membership of the

[1] London: Gollancz. 1973.

Community, the author's determination to maintain a neutral stance on the wider aspects of the wisdom or unwisdom of the British government's decision produces a curious unevenness of analysis, vagueness and at some crucial times a lack of informed comment. The EEC is a customs union geared mainly to paying for the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP, but with ambitions to move into the fields of economic and monetary integration. Politically, the Community is relatively unstructured: a potential economic giant and a political pygmy. The effect of such a powerful unit on the international political economy is a major issue of the 1970s. In a book dealing with a subject of such importance, discussion of the value of joining such a European protective system (when increasingly the real problems in international relations—such as the need for a more equitable distribution of world resources between developed and less developed countries—need tackling on a global basis) was essential but is not given.

The book deals initially with the exchanges between Britain and the Six and then moves to a detailed discussion of the issues on which compromise was sought: the Community budget, agriculture, industry and problems relating to the Commonwealth and sterling. The phases of the discussions and the Community institutions at work, such as COREPER or the *Comité des Représentants Permanents,* are clearly set forth. Throughout the book two features of the negotiations stand out: the weakness of the British negotiating position and the tendency for important compromises between Britain and the Community to be made not on any substantive basis but in relation to some political turning point whose details were not available to the author or perhaps to anyone except the negotiators. The most notable example of this is in relation to the future of sterling (see p. 205). As the author concludes, and as the oil crisis and related problems such as the size of the Regional Development Fund have shown, Britain's future within the Community 'will depend upon the general conditions of international life in Western Europe and the world, and only in part upon the terms of entry'.

M. J. GRIEVE

A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community. Edited by Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 275 pp. Index. £5·95.*

IN spite of its title, this collection of essays from the European Community Institute for University Studies does not get very far in considering the problem of developing a common foreign policy for the European Community. Like a number of other recent essay collections, it catalogues the weaknesses and failures of the EEC's external relations without suggesting how this patchwork of 'external relations' could be realistically transformed into a 'foreign policy'.

Two introductory essays by François Duchêne, Wolfgang Hager and Theo Peeters, discuss the implications for the EEC of changes in the political and economic relationships which gave rise to European unity in the 1950s. In essence, the EEC's inward-looking, defensive posture must give way to a Community aware of its responsibility and contribution to the global management of international economic relations. The remaining essays echo this theme and criticism. Kervyn, Zeller and Gazzo argue that the EEC can no longer afford to offend, give second priority to, or ignore its relations with its industrialised trading partners. Hager, in his thoughtful

discussion of the EEC's relations with Mediterranean countries, amply and clearly demonstrates the political and economic dangers of the Community developing a too close, master-client, relationship with less developed countries, particularly in as sensitive a politico-strategic area as the Mediterranean.

The most perceptive essay in this collection, by Jack Hartshorn on the EEC's energy problems, stands up well when read in the present energy crisis. ('The Community's dependence on imported energy may become a factor in its foreign political relations, as well as in foreign economic policy'. p. 104). In solving its dependence on imported energy, the Community can choose between two alternatives—securing (relatively) cheap oil supplies by making, as a Community, an exclusive deal with the Arabs, or opting for collaboration with other countries in the search for alternative energy supplies. In the past the very regionalism of the Community itself has pushed the EEC in the direction of regionalising its external relations. The juxtaposition of the Middle East crisis with the energy crisis is presenting the Community with an opportunity to reconsider and refine this regional strategy in the light of pressures to play a part in the resolution of the Middle East conflict.

Is there a clue to a distinctive foreign policy strategy for the Community in the conclusion reached by several authors that 'the EEC is . . . essentially a civilian power' and its 'interest is, as far as possible, to domesticate relations between states'? (p. 19). According to Duchêne, the EEC's contribution to the international system lies in its sponsoring the observance of common rules in inter-state economic and political relations. This leaves doubts, however, as to a strategy for those in the EEC who interpret its role in much more traditional terms of exerting political influence in the international system. This is where this study fails to match up to its title. The consequences for foreign policy-making of the differences among member states over attitudes and policies to the energy problem, the United States, defence and East-West relations are nowhere drawn. Clearly we do not yet have a 'nation writ large'. What is needed here is an examination of the relations between the Commission's external relations departments and the work of the Davignon committee and, possibly in the future, the summit meetings. It is here, if anywhere, that the problems and possibilities of developing a more coherent and comprehensive foreign policy lie.

CAROLE WEBB

Europe 1980. The Future of Intra-European Relations. Reports presented at the Conference of Directors and Representatives of European Institutes of International Relations. [Varna, October 1972.] Foreword by Jacques Freymond: *Leyden: Sijthoff; Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. 1972. 301 pp. (Collection de Relations Internationales, 1). Text in English and French.*

IT seems a praiseworthy objective to encourage Institutes of International Relations in Europe to meet regularly to compare and contrast their analyses of intra-European relations and to speculate about the future of these relations, particularly in the light of the convening of the European Security and Co-operation Conference. Unfortunately this collection of the papers presented at a conference in Varna, Bulgaria, in October 1972, makes for rather tedious reading. This is especially true of the East European

Institutes' contributions which begin to take on the flavour of the United Nations General Assembly rostrum speeches and devote much of their time to outlining similar proposals for the European Security Conference. The Yugoslav and Romanian Institutes' papers, perhaps predictably, are much less constrained, the Romanian contribution being distinguished by its methodological analysis of the problems of explanation and forecasting in international relations.

The book thus offers a rather mixed fare and is best approached from two levels. In academic terms a number of the papers contain interesting insights into the close and delicate relationship between the global international system and the European sub-system together with its sub-regional systems. In political terms, not only in the immediate issues of the European Security Conference, but also in forecasting the future of Nato and the Warsaw Pact, EEC and Comecon within a more dense network of East-West relations, the optimism of the East European institutes contrasts with the caution of those of Bonn, Paris and London. The optimism of the Polish Institute of International Relations, indeed, is so great as to prompt it to include in its ' Charter for Europe ' reference to the need for agreement on ' certain principles for the composition of history and geography . . . textbooks containing information about European countries and their culture ' (p. 274). Harmonisation of education clearly does not end with the Janne report!

The most impressive analysis and one which deserves the widest reading is offered by Pierre Hassner, of the Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. He raises a number of questions of considerable academic and political significance, such as the capacity of integration movements like Comecon and the European Community to absorb political and social change taking place at differential rates within and between member states. This would be of great interest if taken up by one of the study groups whose creation was suggested at the Varna conference.

There is substantial agreement among all contributors to this volume that existing European organisations will continue to survive into the 1980s supplemented by some form of pan-European body created by the European Conference on Security and Co-operation. It is intended to re-examine this collective exercise in futurology in 1980. It would be comforting to know that at least some of its predictions held true.

CAROLE WEBB

The Government and Politics of France. Vol. II: Politics. By Dorothy Pickles. *London: Methuen. 1973. 500 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·00. University Paperback ed.: £2·00.*

THE first volume [1] of *The Government and Politics of France* was devoted to the institutions and political forces of the Fifth Republic. This one shows those institutions and parties at grips with the main political problems of the years 1958–73. It is both more than a straight political history and more than a collection of case studies. Necessarily, much of the ground Mrs. Pickles covers has been well trodden before: constitutional controver-

[1] Dorothy Pickles, *The Government and Politics of France.* Vol. I: Institutions and Parties. (London: Methuen, 1972.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1973, p. 112.

sies, the unravelling of the Algerian problem, electoral manoeuvrings, the struggle to reform the party system, regionalism, May 1968, the conduct and contradictions of Gaullist foreign policy, and finally the transition to Pompidolianism. While Mrs. Pickles's account is often more up to date than those of her predecessors, not surprisingly it follows largely familiar lines. Where she scores heavily is in the experience and wisdom which underlie her judgments. As one who has wrestled with much the same material as Mrs. Pickles, I read her account with pleasure for the multitude of subtle insights and the mature judgment which come through even more in this volume than in its predecessor. Mrs. Pickles writes well, she writes judiciously, and she writes serenely—more so than in the earlier volume where ill-temper at the antics of such *bêtes noires* as the *gauchistes* occasionally clouded her understanding. From this book one derives a very full sense of the complexities and ambiguities of de Gaulle's statecraft, and the ways in which, while Gaullism and Pompidolianism are continuing strands in the French political tradition, the Fifth Republic still wears a curiously impermanent air, even though it has outlived its predecessor.

Mrs. Pickles is unquestionably at her best as a political historian—most particularly in her weighing of the General's statecraft and in her stern but fair assessment of his legacy. In some ways this book represents a welcome broadening of her range: where her *The Fifth French Republic*[2] regrettably omitted pressure groups, these figured prominently in the first volume—though their role in the present case studies is considerably less prominent. Indeed, while Mrs. Pickles properly criticises the parochialism and restricted range of the political parties, she is—like the political class she criticises—rather prone to leave social and economic factors off-stage until the tension they engender erupts to compel belated reluctant attention. Mrs. Pickles is, of course, well aware of the nature of socio-economic change in France but she does not convey any adequate sense of it to her readers. Again, considering the title, local government is surely sadly underplayed here. But the most considerable and serious omission from two volumes totalling over nine hundred pages is the lack of any extended description or discussion of French central administration. Noting the omission of the administration from the first volume, I had assumed that it would at least be incorporated into the treatment of policy in the second. In the event, the civil service makes occasional anecdotal appearances but at no time is there a fully considered handling of its impact on the policy process or, eschewing jargon, the government and politics of France, which is Mrs. Pickles's stated theme. This is indeed Hamlet without the Prince.

MARTIN HARRISON

De Gaulle the Warrior. By Brian Crozier. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1973. 395 pp. Maps. Index. £7·00.*

THIS is the first volume of a life of Charles de Gaulle which the author completed at the beginning of February 1972. For reasons for which the publisher is presumably responsible (the author says that he regrets but accepts them) the second volume was not published until some months later.

This division of the work inevitably creates a sense of frustration—more

[2] London: Methuen. 1966. 3rd ed. 1st ed. reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1961, p. 92.

so perhaps with this biography than with many others. A large part of the first volume is taken up with de Gaulle's wartime career when even less of his human personality could be allowed to show itself than at other periods of his life. De Gaulle hardly ever allowed himself to be 'off-stage' with his colleagues or his contemporaries; least of all when he was playing the role of 'High Constable of France' (an epithet which he attracted early in his life long before Churchill bestowed it on him) (p. 32). Brian Crozier's brief opening chapters and the account of de Gaulle's youth are sensitively done and contribute to an understanding of the man. But we must await the second volume for the end of the tale.

Meanwhile we have an account of the period up to January 1946 which is admirable in the balance of its judgment and the deft manner in which de Gaulle's life is described in the context of national and international events. It was completed too early for the author to make use of the documents in the Public Record Office which he believes (probably correctly) would not alter his judgment. Some parts of the work draw largely on new sources, particularly the account of the Muselier affairs drawn from the papers of Commander A. D. Lacy. For the rest, the author has mainly relied in a discriminating way on published sources reinforced with personal knowledge. The outstanding merit of the book is the dispassionate way in which Brian Crozier has demonstrated the Frenchness of this most extraordinary Frenchman who overrode the ambitions and rivalries of his countrymen while attracting support from so many diverse personalities who could see their own ideals embodied in him.

WILFRID KNAPP

Hitler. By Werner Maser. Translated by Peter and Betty Ross. *London: Allen Lane. 1973. 433 pp. Map. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler. By Robert Payne. *London: Jonathan Cape. 1973. 623 pp. Maps endpapers. Illus. Index. £3·95.*

FORTY years after Hitler's rise to power there is no end to the veritable industry producing one illustrated life of the Führer after another. Most of them enlarge our knowledge of one of the most powerful and destructive men in history, but in the last analysis none of the recent arrivals in English is particularly satisfactory. It is undoubtedly useful to obtain more data on Hitler's family and local background, his futile attempts to establish himself as an artist in prewar Vienna, his daring as a despatch rider in the First World War, the influence of the racialist Dietrich Eckhart on the budding agitator soon afterwards, on Hitler's odd relations with women etc., etc. Yet these curious details do not go very far towards explaining Hitler and Hitlerism as a phenomenon of their age.

At the beginning of his very readable book, Mr. Payne tells us with some pride that 'this is not a social or political history' (p. xiii). Dr. Maser, it is true, does quote a number of prominent military and political historians, both German and English, often disagreeing with them, but he has by no means succeeded in integrating biography and history. The problems of the multi-national Habsburg monarchy, for example, are not presented as background to Hitler's early approach to Pan-Germanism, nor is the reader given a convincing picture of the competing right-wing factions in Munich after 1918. Both authors mention the impact made by the lectures of Professor Karl Alexander von Müller on Hitler during an indoctrina-

tion course arranged by the *Reichswehr* at Munich University, but neither of them explains that this lively speaker belonged to the circle of the conserva- tive nationalist monthly *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* under Professor Cossmann the most ardent propagandist of the 'stab in the back' legend. The traumati impact of the inflation of 1922–23 on the German middle classes, and the of the big economic crisis of the early 1930s on all classes is practicall ignored in both books. Yet without them the success of Hitler's propa- ganda, of the uncanny tricks of this Western 'medicine man', cannot b properly understood. The widespread 'fear of freedom' (E. Fromm) which Hitler skilfully exploited was based on the economic and psychologica shocks suffered by millions of Germans at the time.

Mr. Payne is on safer ground with his refusal to describe the philosoph of National Socialism, believing as he does 'that it had no philosophy, o no more than one can expect in a system improvised from day to day i order to exalt the Führer' (p. xiii). Dr. Maser, on the other hand, tries i no less than 77 pages to explore the Führer's 'Intellectual Background' which, we are told, ranged from Plato to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche from Malthus to Darwin and Bölsche, not to mention a *Heimat* writer lik Peter Rosegger or that popular inventor of Wild West stories for Germa adolescents, Karl May. Surely it amounts to a caricature o *Geistesgeschichte* to try to establish an affinity between Hegel, Marx an Hitler by the solemn statement that these three Little Europeans, 'each i his own way, relegate Russia and America to a secondary position' (p. 130)

Equipped with a remarkably retentive memory, Hitler often succeede in passing off his studies and wide, though little organised, reading as th fruit of his own original thought. Over the years he acquired 'a vast fun of specialised knowledge which he was able to call on when necessity arose (Maser, p. 132). Hitler was singularly well-informed about military an naval details and also about motorcars and their engines. Yet he refuse to take an interest in nuclear physics or high frequency technology unti the beginning of 1945 and he began to acclaim the atomic bomb when i was too late for defeated Germany to use it.

By then Hitler was a very sick man. In his interesting chapter 'Th Ailing Führer', Dr. Maser throws light on the role of his persona physician, the dubious Dr. Theodor Morell. He also reproduces th formidable list of drugs Morell administered to his difficult patient betwee 1936 and 1945. The author sees evidence of the correlation betwee Hitler's physical disorders and the worsening situation on the various front during the last three years of the Second World War 'in his ever increasin tendency to extol the fanatical will and . . . to rate inflexible stubbornnes and dogged pertinacity more highly than brilliant strategic ideas and th acceptance of operational risks' (p. 277). Although Hitler's mind retaine its astute clarity and grasp to the end, after 1942 it lost much of it elasticity.

The two biographers conclude their surveys in different fashions. D Maser sees the spot where Hitler's body 'was drenched with petrol an burned by his trusties' as 'part of the frontier which, through his ow fault, has split Germany and the world into East and West' (p. 318). M Payne, on the other hand, makes the valid point that while Hitler is dead Hitlerism is not. 'The voice is seductive, and his logic, if his premises ar accepted, is unimpeachable'. Thirty years after the Hitler era, few will b willing to quarrel with Mr. Payne's final comment: 'The totalitarian wa

with all that it means in terms of extermination camps and the suppression of liberties, of bombing defenceless villages or pouring flaming napalm on them, is always tempting to politicians, who find the complexities of democracy painfully inefficient' (p. 573). Where the task of biographer ends, that of the political philosopher and moralist begins.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

The History of the Nazi Party: Vol. II. 1933–1945. By Dietrich Orlow. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles. 1973. 538 pp. Index. (Library of Politics and Society; Ed.: Michael Hurst.) £5·95.*

PROFESSOR Orlow's second volume puts scholars deeper in his debt. His careful research and analysis of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party) regime covers not only the operations of the party within the *Altreich*, but also its even more radical activities in occupied Europe, where the party, rather than the state, was heir to Hitler's conquests. Within the *Altreich* itself, it was not until the closing months of 1944, when the victim was dying, that the Nazi Party and the SS, like a cancer, finally achieved domination over the state and its military arm.

Professor Orlow has tackled his difficult task of disentangling the history of the Nazi Party from that of the Third Reich as a whole by concentrating on three main areas: the *Gauleiters;* the party treasurer, Schwarz, a previously rather neglected figure; and, above all, the political organisation and party chancellery, in which, even before the more ruthless Bormann took over from Hess, they had got the better of Ley. There is justification for this emphasis in the need to keep within limits the mass of available material; but the reader must bear in mind the importance of those aspects of Nazi power that are relatively neglected. Himmler and the SS are indeed touched on where their activities overlap, as they frequently do, with Professor Orlow's priority sectors. He explains in his preface that he has left out the Four Year Plan because 'for the history of the party it is important primarily because it prevented the party's initiatives in the field of economic policy' (p. ix). But this is to identify the party with its economic radicals, rather than with its Führer, on whose direct instructions Goering was acting in forcing the economy into the narrow path of autarky. Similarly, Goebbels' propaganda activities are largely omitted, presumably because he operated after 1933 through his ministry, rather than through party channels. He was, nonetheless, the instrument through which the German people was subjected to the mind control of the Nazi Party.

In concentrating on the egregious *Gauleiters* and the aberrations of the party machine, Professor Orlow gives added momentum to the recent tendency to stress the weakness of Nazism and its centrifugal character to the exclusion of its dynamic and totalitarian aspect, which preoccupied historians of Nazism after the war. It may be thought that the current corrective trend has now gone far enough. The achievements of Hitler and his party, coupled as they were to the efficient bureaucracy of the state, were indeed astonishing, even if of a negative kind. We must avoid the error ascribed to Sir Eric Phipps, whose despatches from Berlin made the leading Nazis look so absurd that the British Cabinet was disposed to underrate them. When this has been said, however, the value of Professor Orlow's contribution to scholarship remains.

R. CECIL

Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933–1939. By A. J. Sherman. *London: Elek. 1973. 291 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·80.*

ALTHOUGH war always brings in its wake that tide of human suffering, the refugee problem, Nazi Germany's internal policies produced a Jewish refugee problem of European and worldwide dimensions before its more general policies resulted in war. This book is an important study of Great Britain's reactions to that question in a period when, confronted by tremendous social and economic difficulties at home, the British government was faced with the prospect of thousands of German Jewish refugees wishing to enter the United Kingdom for permanent residence or for resettlement elsewhere. Using official papers, the author meticulously details the reactions in Whitehall and elsewhere in Britain to a question which raised as many issues of domestic politics as of foreign policy. The plethora of committees and sub-committees established between 1933 and 1939 had to decide two basic questions: whether or not the Aliens Order should be amended to admit more refugees from Germany and, if so, the likely consequences at home and abroad; and later on, the form that British co-operation with other countries and the League of Nations should take on this vexed question. The bulk of Dr. Sherman's book deals with the period 1938 and 1939 when the extent of the Jewish refugee problem changed dramatically with the *Anschluss*, Munich, *Kristallnacht* in Germany and Prague in March 1939.

The story which emerges shows that each of the government departments concerned worked within specific limits which determined individual policy attitudes towards the Jewish refugee question. The Foreign Office was concerned to do nothing that would further disturb the precarious nature of Britain's relations with Nazi Germany. Treasury thinking was determined by the notion that those Jews fortunate enough to be admitted to Britain should not become a charge upon the country. The Home Office was afraid that an influx of immigrants of 'alien character' would exacerbate Brtiain's unemployment problems and, more important, would intensify what latent anti-Semitic feeling was admitted to exist in the country already. Immigration into Palestine and Britain's relations with the Arab countries proved a continual headache for the Colonial Office, while relations within the Empire were often strained over the issue of which territories were, or were not, willing to accept German Jewish immigrants. More generally, and especially during 1938–1939, Britain was concerned to go no farther and no faster than other nations, who likewise adopted equally cautious and hesitant policies. The author also gives a good account of the attitudes adopted by sections of the British press, several MPs, and Jewish and other social and religious groups interested in the plight of the Jews from Germany.

In general, the author has done an excellent job in presenting new material and in describing these inter-related problems and debates as they affected the formulation and execution of British policy, although at times one might have expected to learn far more of the author's own interpretations and views of particular policy statements. Dr. Sherman's generally excellent account of British reactions has, however, led him to pay less attention to at least two sets of diplomatic relations which were of paramount importance for Britain's international handling of the problem, those with Nazi Germany and the United States. This is a pity since more detailed information on how the Jewish question was handled within the context o

Anglo-German relations, especially in the earlier part of the period covered by the book, would have contributed materially to that still lively question, the appeasement debate.

Britain's record in this unhappy story, before war broke out, is neither much better nor much worse than that of other countries with similar problems. But the attitudes and policies noted by the author hardly seem to justify his somewhat defensive conclusions, that 'the standard charges, based on a narrow view of the Palestine problem, of British Government lack of generosity or indeed of indifference to the fate of the refugees from the Nazi regime' are 'not proven', and that 'when a balance sheet is nevertheless drawn and Great Britain's refugee policy compared with that of other countries it emerges, in the context of the pre-war period, as comparatively compassionate, even generous' (pp. 264, 267).

Given many of the attitudes and policies of Whitehall that have been so carefully noted in this book, these conclusions seem to go too far in the wrong direction. On the Jewish refugee problem, as on other issues at the centre of which was Britain's relations with Nazi Germany, British policy too often seemed over-cautious and hesitant, and was often only shaken into more positive action by British public opinion and occasionally American diplomatic pressure.

Apart from these few points of criticism Dr. Sherman has produced a valuable study of Whitehall's handling of a totally unexpected problem. It is not surprising that it is a story from which few people emerge with much credit.

JOHN P. FOX

Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power. By Henner Hess. Translated by Ewald Osers. *Farnborough, London: Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1973. 232 pp. Index. Bibliog. £3·50.*

ASKED by the judge in a Palermo trial in 1883, 'Did you not belong to the Mafia?', the defendant answered, 'I don't know what that means'. His answer is revelatory, involving both *omertà*—the solidarity that requires him to disclaim all knowledge—and the implication that, in Sicilian eyes, the Mafia is not an organisation, something you 'belong to'. A judge today might frame his question more subtly but he could get much the same answer.

There has been, over the years, a vast literature about the Mafia, some of it serious (mostly by Italians), some of it, in recent times, purely sensational. Dr. Henner Hess, of the Institute of Criminology at Heidelberg University, adopts a different approach: he studies the Mafia as a sociological phenomenon, a behaviour pattern seen in relation to the society in which it developed. He even dislikes using the term 'the Mafia', for that might suggest endorsing the widely-accepted idea of it as a tightly-organised secret society with criminal aims. He prefers instead to speak of *mafiosi*—people with the characteristics of boldness, arrogance, *prepotenza*, who are linked in an elaborate but almost unavowed network of relationships based on self-protection, fostered by intimidation and threats of violent reprisal. The chronic weakness of the state from Bourbon times onwards, and its inability to repress crime, brigandage and cattle-thieving, encouraged the closely-knit Sicilian family to expand into a wider association—often still based on kinship—for purposes of self-help. In fact, Sicilians, with their

innate mistrust and dislike of the government, took the law into their own hands, accepting the 'sub-cultural norms' of the Mafia rather than the norms of conventional law-abiding society.

Some of Dr. Hess's most important source material is based on the archives of police reports and trial transcripts for the years 1880 to 1890—the latest of these documents accessible, and even these, he says (p. ix), had not been considered by any other author. They cover, however, the most interesting classical period of the *mafiosi*—a period which, as it happened, coincided with the mass emigrations of Sicilians to the United States, which were to bear fruit later in gangsterism both there and, with the return of Sicilian-Americans during and after the last war, in Sicily itself. That classical period reflected an agrarian society dominated by the *latifundia* of western Sicily (for Mafia has never had much hold in the eastern provinces). It lasted until the mid-1920s when Fascism, using its own methods of violence, repressed the Mafia—or drove it underground, to revive after the war in the new urban conditions of building speculation in Palermo and other cities and in its latest phase of drug-smuggling in association with French or American gangs. Dr. Hess is sceptical about the lasting effects of forcible repression—and indeed even the Fascist Prefect Mori wrote that 'the struggle must not be a police campaign . . . but a rebellion of the conscience, a revolt of the spirit, an action of the people' (p. 173). Mori also stressed the importance of rural education—herein showing himself an unexpected forerunner of Danilo Dolci.

This book, which is competently translated, will prove a most useful addition, from a new angle, to the Mafia literature. A word of explanation, both in the text and in the bibliography, as to exactly who are the Sicilians or Italians cited would have helped readers to know how much weight to attach to their evidence (some are conscientious critics, some *mafiosi* writing their own lives . . .). Incidentally, the titles of works by English authors (e.g. Mack Smith, Gavin Maxwell) should be given in English, not in German translation. The book deserves a better map, and far better proof-reading.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor 1919–1922. By Michael Llewellyn Smith. *London: Allen Lane. 1973. 401 pp. Maps. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

The Lions of Marash. Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief. 1919–1922. By Stanley E. Kerr. *New York: State University of New York Press. 1973. 318 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $15.00.*

Ionian Vision has a theme worthy of Thucydides. The mirage of a Greater Greece embracing the 'unredeemed' Greeks of Asia Minor; a Greek homeland torn by incurable schism; the doomed Greek expeditionary force cut off and routed in the wastes of Anatolia—the Smyrna disaster was as complete and final as the destruction of the Athenian army and navy at Syracuse. The summing-up is in lapidary terms (p. 311): 'Hellenic Smyrna was dead. Christian Smyrna, one of the great ancient Christian foundations of Asia Minor, was dead. The phoenix to rise from these ashes was a Turkish Izmir, purged of two thousand and more years of history.'

Mr. Llewellyn Smith has produced a fine, temperate and engrossing

study of those who saw the Ionian vision, those who distrusted it and those who suffered because of it. He traces the story from the Balkan wars, when Turkey was forced to relinquish its hold on the Christian populations of Europe, through the First World War with its deceptive promise of further territorial gains from a defeated Turkey, to the Greek army's ill-fated attempt, half-sanctioned by the Western Allies, to crush Kemal and resurgent Turkish nationalism. Like many modern historians, he sees it as a scholar's duty to quote his authorities verbatim, so that at times he sacrifices something of the broad narrative sweep which the nature of the subject invites, but he is fortunate in being able to draw on such masters of language as Arnold Toynbee for descriptions of the Anatolian campaign and Ernest Hemingway for eyewitness reporting of the tragic exodus of the Greek refugees. He has tapped many new sources, some of private letters and diaries, some, like the British official papers, only recently available; and thirty pages of 'notes and references' add to the value of the work for the student of the period.

The Lions of Marash is like a powerful microscope focused on just three lines of *Ionian Vision*, on page 120, where we read of 'a serious defeat of French troops in Cilicia by Turkish Nationalist forces and the massacre of some thousands of Armenians in the Marash area'. Professor Kerr, who was working for American Near East Relief in Marash at the time, has most vividly re-created this horrifying episode from his own experiences and the recollections of other participants and survivors. His book lends credibility to the Tolstoyan view of history, that the truth of historical events can only be represented if all the characters involved in them are included; Professor Kerr's characters are mostly of the humble of the earth compared with the politicians and commanders of Mr. Llewellyn Smith.

K. Matthews

Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. By Edward Weisband. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, New York University. 1973. 377 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in Peaceful Change.) £6·70. $14.50.*

Like that of the dog in the night time, Turkey's inactivity in the Second World War was in its way a curious incident which needs some serious explanation. The Turks had, after all, been involved in virtually every war in eastern Europe until 1918. During the Second World War all Turkey's neighbours were invaded by one side or the other and it was subjected to heavy pressure from the Allies to join the fray. Edward Weisband's book, which concentrates on Turkish foreign relations during the last three years of the war, provides a convincing exposition of Turkey's neutrality and points to some interesting conclusions about the degree of independence which a small state can preserve in a war between major powers.

In his Introduction, Professor Weisband outlines the basis of Turkey's wartime policy in terms of two principles in the 'operational code' of the Ankara government. The first was that the political ideology and achievements of Ataturk's regime left his country with everything to lose and nothing to gain from joining the war. The second was Turkey's natural preoccupation with the potential Russian threat to eastern Europe and its

conviction that a weakened Germany would open the floodgates for the Russians. Hence came its perturbed reaction to the doctrine of unconditional German surrender, announced by Roosevelt in January 1943.

The opening chapters describe the domestic framework within which Turkey's foreign policy was determined—the structure of the foreign ministry, relations between parliament and the executive, the state of the press and the impact of the war on the Turkish economy. Professor Weisband bases his discussion of these topics on a thorough examination of a large amount of published and unpublished material, both Turkish and foreign, as well as many interviews with those concerned on the Turkish side.

The second part of his book concentrates on Turkey's dealings with the Allies between the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 and the close of the war. It was clear by the beginning of this period that Germany would eventually be defeated. Turkey thus had to decide whether it should join the prospective victors. For their part the British were anxious to induce Turkey to attack Hitler from the south-east. The Turks were prepared to accede to this plan only if the British and Americans themselves invaded the Balkans. Without such assistance, they claimed, their principal cities would be defenceless against retaliatory German air raids. Without a balancing force from the Western allies they would be 'assisted' only by Soviet troops who would never leave Turkish soil. The Americans appreciated this point better than the British, and the Turks skilfully exploited this difference between the Anglo-Saxon powers. With the conclusion of the war, however, it was of little comfort to them to know that they had long predicted the Soviet dominance in eastern Europe which resulted. Professor Weisband's narrative thus ends where a new and equally dangerous period for Turkish security begins.

Granted the thoroughness of his research, it seems churlish to accuse the author of incompleteness. Some discussion of Turkey's contemporary military capacity and a fuller description of the strategic balance in the Balkans would, however, have proved a useful addition to his book. For example, were the Turks correct in presenting the British with such a gloomy picture of the state of their defences? Unfortunately, Professor Weisband leaves questions of this kind unanswered. WILLIAM HALE

The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland. By A. F. Upton with contributions by Peter P. Rohde and A. Sparring. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 422 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The History of Communism; Eds: F. W. Deakin and H. T. Willetts.) £6·00.*

THE Comintern and Stalin must bear the greatest share of the responsibility for the failure of the Communist Parties of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland to make any headway. When the problem was above all Fascism, as in Finland in the 1930s, the Comintern made the party concentrate on the principal 'class enemy', the Social Democrats, as in Germany. And in Finland, after all, as Mr. Upton brings out, the conditions were particularly favourable for communist success, and perhaps a communist victory. 'No matter what inconsistencies, idiocies and humiliations adherence to the international party line involved, no matter how much the Finnish Communist Party made itself appear to be a puppet organisation manipulated from Moscow, the loyal support of 20 per cent or more of the Finnish

electorate was unaffected' (p. 301). The reason was, of course, that the Finnish Communist Party was the only one to be consistently anti-establishment; and that the ordinary voter did not bother to study the party's programme or policy declarations. After the civil war in 1918, there was built into Finnish society a permanent opposition to the established order. This advantage, the Comintern and Stalin threw away with both hands.

Mr. Upton's account of the vicissitudes of the Communist Party of Finland is excellent. So are the other three reports on the Communist Parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, though they are in a sense mere appendages to the main essay in this book. In Norway, a revolutionary situation actually existed in the 1920s. It might have burst out into the open if the Russians, with their usual ham-fistedness, had not intervened. Mr. Rohde is perhaps less than fair to the opposition in Norway to the first Labour government in 1928. He says that this Labour government, which had a life of only 18 days, was forced out of office by a flight of capital arranged by the great financiers. True enough. But what precipitated the flight was the declaration by the government that it committed itself wholeheartedly to the creation of a socialist society in Norway. This was a relic of the programme from the old days when the party was subject to the Comintern, as it had been as recently as 1923. There was, then, some reason for the nervousness of the owners of capital and of the Bank of Norway.

As an example of the stupidities of the Russian leadership, it may be noted that the Swedish communist newspaper, *Ny Dag*, reported from Oslo on April 24, 1940 'that Norwegian workers and German soldiers were discussing the situation that had arisen in a fully comradely way in the beerhouses and on street corners'. This presupposes that the workers in Oslo spoke fluent German or alternatively that the German soldiers spoke Norwegian. The latter is the less unlikely, since some of the German soldiers had lived in Norway for a time as war orphans after the First World War. But their number cannot have been large.

THOMAS BARMAN

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Industrial Management in the Soviet Union. By William J. Conyngham. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1973. 378 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Hoover Institution Publication 116.) $9.50.*

THE main theme of this book has been noted with increasing frequency in the recent writings of Western economists, viz., that the extensive methods of economic growth applied under Stalin, with the aim of hurtling a backward agrarian society into the industrial age, are not only irrelevant, but actually inimical, to further growth in the changed conditions of a modernised economy. Dr. Conyngham's distinctive contribution is to shed light on the intractable difficulties, in Soviet conditions, of making the essential transition to intensive methods. He finds that neither the flamboyant and forceful Khrushchev, with whose incessant administrative reorganisations some two-thirds of the book are concerned, nor his more cautious and pragmatic successors, with their economic reforms based on 'scientific' methods and the primacy of economic factors, have succeeded in altering

in any fundamental way the basic elements of Stalin's command economy. They were held fast in what the author calls the ' power-efficiency dilemma ', which, he says, was ' in many ways more complex and difficult in 1970 than it was in 1953 ' (p. 264).

The reformers believed they could meet the needs of a complex and interdependent modern economy by expanding and intensifying the party's leading role as the main agent of industrialisation. But the massive party and state bureaucracies proved to be highly resistant to change. Conservative in outlook, addicted to routine working, centralised to a degree that slowed down decision-making and encouraged vertical at the expense of horizontal communications, they were also paper- and meetings-ridden to an extent that frustrated reforming efforts.

Mutual distrust between party officials and industrial managers, and disagreement within the party itself, added to the area of conflict. Officials did not believe that industrialists, left to themselves, would put the national interests before their own. If they tried to ensure conformity by close supervision and control of day-to-day operations, there were complaints from the managerial side of ' petty tutelage ', and resistance in the shape of simulation, ' localism ', the use of *tolkachi* to ensure supplies, and other familiar defensive devices. Party dogmatists feared that absorption in administrative matters would erode the ideological and political functions of party members and turn them into technocrats and economists.

Dr. Conyngham does not see any rapid solution to the power-efficiency dilemma, either by a forward swing to full market socialism, or backwards to a Stalinist system aided by computers. What he hopes for is a long, slow process of adjustment, with the adoption by the party of some new social and economic role in place of the out-dated preoccupation with industrial management (p. 287).

Since the study under review ended in 1970, the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings in 1972 and 1973 have arranged for large-scale trade deals, some of which are now coming into operation, as are similar long-term deals with other non-communist countries. These developments may well intensify the Soviet dilemma, by adding to the strains involved in modernisation, the further adjustments required to assimilate massive doses of up-to-date capitalist technology with the work habits and methods of a socialist economy.

It is an ironic twist of history that, by building up his country's industrial might in the way he did, as a means of combating capitalist enemies, Stalin should unwittingly have forged the very instrument that is driving his successors along the new path of international co-operation, with enemies transformed into badly-needed partners.

MARGARET MILLER

Soviet and American Society: A Comparison. By Paul Hollander. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 476 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·75.*

WITH the decline of ideological passions and the further exchange of ideas and information between the West and the Soviet Union, there is a growing need for a comparative analysis that goes beyond the clichés of the cold war and peaceful co-existence. Professor Hollander's study is the first comprehensive sociological survey of contemporary life in American and Soviet society in the 1960s and early 1970s, addressing itself to the basic

differences and similarities between the two countries. The author is well qualified to take such a perspective, having lived in Hungary under both nazism and communism until 1956 and moving, by way of the University of London, to the University of Massachusetts where he is now Associate Professor of Sociology. In this book he examines three major areas of life: political institutions and practices; social values and beliefs—and their influence on personal relationships and family life; and a wide range of social problems. He also explores the degree to which social realities diverge from the ideal in both societies, the gaps between theory and practice and the respective failures and achievements of the two social systems.

Professor Hollander's overall conclusion is that, despite the effects of industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation, the quality of life remains very different in the two societies, largely because of the interplay of social and historical forces. He offers cold comfort, then, to the 'convergence' theorists, since he highlights radical differences in terms of social and political values (individualism versus collectivism, private versus public property, consumption versus production, belief in God versus scientific atheism—p. 199), as well as of stability and the impact of popular expectations. Nonetheless, he provides information about an increasing number of similarities in the realm of social problems, the malfunctioning of institutions and some generalised values (patriotism, achievement, material abundance and comforts, equality of opportunity, optimistic orientation towards the future—which all have a common ancestry of beliefs associated with 18th century rationalism and the Enlightenment—p. 201).

While the book is in the best sociological tradition of concern for comparative data needed to develop sound generalisations, certain reservations need to be stated. First, the 'convergence' theorists might still argue that the basic dissimilarities stem from the different stages of industrial development in the two countries: the United States being at an advanced industrial, consumer-oriented stage, while the Soviet Union is only now, unevenly, approaching the stage of mature complex industrialisation. Second, the author surely overstates the case for the freedom and openness of American society. Is it really true, for example, that 'elites are *readily* available to influence by non-elites' (p. 37) in the United States? Wright Mills would have disagreed and Watergate casts doubt.

Like his previous volume, *American and Soviet Society: A Reader in Comparative Sociology and Perception*,[1] to which this new book makes a useful companion, Professor Hollander avoids the pitfalls of so much work on the Soviet Union which examines that society in the abstract and contrasts it with an ideal. By contrasting the two cultures, the author enhances understanding of both. The book's value is increased by 45 pages of notes and a 20-page bibliography.

JAMES RIORDAN

Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade: A Study of State Trade Discrimination. By Ryan C. Amacher. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1972. 185 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £5·75.*

YUGOSLAVIA operates a dual system in international trade. This book indicates that the state, in its negotiations with Comecon trade partners,

[1] Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 1969.

practises discrimination in that it is able to achieve higher prices for Yugoslavia's exports and lower prices for its imports than those achieved by individual enterprise traders on Western markets.

The argument is based on assumptions not all of which are justifiable, especially as regards the comparability of the traded goods on Eastern and Western markets and the methods of price fixing for individual commodities, which may tend to reduce the accuracy of the mathematical conclusions reached. These objections are realised by the author, as is the obvious criticism that this work is extremely limited in its applicability. The work relates to Yugoslavia alone, is based on three consecutive years' data, while even the data provided in an otherwise useful background section relate almost exclusively to the past decade.

The author states his case with commendable economy, and nowhere makes expansive claims for the applicability of his work. One merely feels that, at current prices, a textbook should contain more. The same model applied to a wider range of data could greatly have increased the value of the work at minimal extra effort. The argument and methods are plausible as far as they go; disappointingly they do not go far enough.

JOHN C. WALLER

MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East: Nations, Super-Powers and Wars. By Yair Evron. *London: Elek. 1973. 248 pp. Bibliog. Index. (International Relations Series, Vol. 5; Gen. Ed.: Philip Windsor.) £3·00.*

A FEW years ago there took place at Oxford an attempt to simulate the international situation in the Middle East. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), etc. were each represented by an individual who was supposed to react to the stimuli provided by the actions of the other participants in the model, in accordance with the principles of the academic discipline of International Relations. The experiment cast little light on the likely course of developments in the Middle Eastern conflict, because it ended prematurely in a personal slanging match between the player representing Egypt and the one representing Israel. It had not proved possible to eliminate the emotional aspects of the conflict.

This was not really surprising because the emotions behind the Middle Eastern struggle are really much more powerful than the need to balance power and interest. The state of Israel is the creation of an ideological movement, and although the creature state now dominates the creator movement, it retains the major characteristics of a movement rather than a state. Zionism is a movement which generates intense emotional commitment combining in itself the two most powerful springs of action, the emotions of religion and of nationalism. On the other side of the conflict there is comparable emotion, born of the outrage felt by Arab Muslims at a century and a half of Christian domination and finally defeat by a Jewish state. So even if the discipline of International Relations eventually succeeds in producing an abstract model which will adequately explain the international behaviour of states as different as, for example, the United States and Rwanda Urundi it will not be easy to apply it to the Middle East conflict, unless in the meantime Israel has managed to cut loose from the now essential support it enjoys from the Jewish Diaspora, and the Arab states have been able to limit

the large Islamic component which now helps to fuel the emotion of Arab nationalism.

For the present reviewer, who is a student of Middle Eastern history and of its current international relations, but knows next to nothing about International Relations, this book fails because, in its honourable attempt to exclude the emotional questions of historical right and wrong and to try to analyse the conflict in terms of power and interest alone, it excludes so much that serious distortion results. That said, there is much in Mr. Evron's study, which is primarily aimed at students of International Relations, to interest and instruct a wider readership. It provides a careful analysis of the probable calculations of the super-powers in their efforts to control or to profit from the conflict, and its account of the policy objectives and the mistakes of the contending parties achieves a remarkable measure of objectivity and impartiality. As Mr. Evron admits in his introduction, he has provided only one interpretation of the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it is one which will be useful to any student of the subject.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy. Edited by Willard A. Beling. *Albany: State University of New York Press. 1973. 347 pp. (Papers from a Conference entitled 'The Middle East in the 1970s', held Apr. 8–10, 1970 at the 47th Session of the Institute of World Affairs.) $15.00.*

THIS book consists of articles by various academics, largely from California, which grew out of a session of the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Southern California in 1970. It does not try to say what American policy should be but rather analyses the elements in the Middle East, the general international system and the United States which go into its formulation. Like many books of this kind the articles are rather uneven in quality and interest, but on the whole they are very good. The authors are rigorously objective and, as of the time they were writing, generally sound. Had the book appeared in 1972 or the first half of last year it would have been hard to fault it. But the October war has overturned so many assumptions, not least of Israeli invincibility and of Arab ineffectiveness, that the whole situation, which seemed frozen when the book was written, has now become much more fluid.

Nevertheless, many of the analyses are still valid. Malcolm Kerr, for example, has some valuable comments on Arab and Israeli images, almost myths, of themselves and each other, and he brings out interestingly the remarkable lack of curiosity among the Arabs about the real character of Israel, and among the Israelis about the Arabs. He saw no light at the end of the tunnel, and it is difficult to disagree. One can only hope that the October war has really shaken up the pieces so that some agreed settlement can emerge. Unless it has, the same appalling round will be repeated every five to ten years.

William Quandt, too, has some interesting observations on the way American Middle East policy is formed, and particularly on how Israeli influence is exercised, not so much by dictating specific policy decisions as much as by defining limits beyond which no American administration will step. This is very relevant to the Arab/Israeli peace negotiations and the

degree of pressure which Dr. Kissinger can be expected to exert on the Israelis.

One or two articles are based on quantitative analysis of the volume of actions taken between states or of comments made by certain newspapers. One's reaction to much of this is that although the mountains labour, only too often they produce the proverbial mouse in the shape of statements of the obvious. One wishes that American academics were not so addicted to cumbersome scientific-sounding jargon. Not all are at fault here, but phrases like 'perspective-engendering communities', whatever that may mean, tend only to confuse and irritate. Which is a pity because they distract one from the real merits of a serious and well-balanced collection of papers.

COLIN CROWE

Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: A Geographical Approach. Edited by J. I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher. *London: University of London Press. 1972. 432 pp. Maps. Index. £5·40.*

PROFESSORS Clarke and Fisher have produced an interesting work which comprises a series of geographical essays on population in the Middle East and North Africa. Each essay deals with one major, or a group of minor, countries within the area. The editors have unified the material presented by different authors around the concepts of area and space, though in effect the volume contains a series of mainly unrelated essays. The treatment of a number of countries is extremely technical from a demographic standpoint, as in the case of Algeria, while others represent purely geographical viewpoints, as for example, the Lebanon.

For all scholars working in the social sciences on the Middle East and the North African region the book is a useful and valuable reference work. Most of the essays are excellent in quality and cover new ground in a most professional way. By far the most outstanding contributions to the book come from A. G. Hill on the Gulf States, for which a thoroughgoing analysis of the problems deriving from petroleum development and population growth is presented, and from W. B. Fisher on Lebanon, which is covered by a fine and intuitive study.

Given the very wide geographical area under review by the editors, it is inevitable that some aims, including that 'to depict the patterns of population distribution, migrations, composition and growth . .' are far from achieved. Little sense of the special characteristics of either Algeria or Saudi Arabia really emerges, and one is left surveying a landscape without Arabs. At the same time, there is a more general confusion of area pervading the whole book. The Middle East and North Africa, and South West Asia and North Africa (see p. 33 and p. 34) are used without defining exactly what might be the difference between the two.

The editors have experienced some difficulty in balancing the contributions on individual countries to the detriment of the overall picture of the population dynamic within the region. Using population size as a criterion, there is a disproportionately long chapter on Libya, running to 24 pages, and a disproportionately short chapter covering Egypt of 17 pages. Yet the population of Libya numbers less than 2 million while Egypt's is more than 30 million. A similar discrepancy affects other countries contained in the book, notably Cyprus and Syria.

Possibly the gravest criticism of the book is that the statistical presentation is very uneven in quality and in its coverage of basic features of the populations of the area. Despite the enormous problems in assembling data on the Middle East, the editors would have served their readers better by providing statistics of comparable accuracy and date. Since data given in the book pertain only to the specific country involved and are in no way consistent, hardly anything can be said about the Middle East and North Africa as a whole, at least in statistical terms. The book cannot, therefore, pretend to be a study of the area: rather it is a collection of essays for specialist country reference.

The editors have, however, gathered together a most useful and informative study. Very little of the material contained in the book is available elsewhere, and it should be expected that this volume will join a select number of reference books available to students of the modern Middle East. Greater care by the editors in matters of statistical consistency and in transliteration of place-names to a uniform system would have further added to the value of this book.

K. S. McLachlan

Palestine or Israel: The untold story of why we failed, 1917–1923: 1967–1973. By Jon Kimche. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1973. 360 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·90.*

Mr. Kimche's aim has been to analyse the reasons why neither of two crucial events in the history of Palestine, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Six-Day War exactly half a century later, opened the way to an Arab-Jewish settlement. It might have been simpler to accept that the former created the problem and the latter exacerbated it, but Mr. Kimche is not given to simplification, and it must be admitted that in avoiding the obvious he has taken some interesting detours.

In the earlier period he presents the argument for considering Sir Gilbert Clayton to have been a more significant influence in shaping British policy than that disastrous amateur, Sir Mark Sykes. He illustrates Balfour's dilettantism with the record of a conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the French ambassador, in which the former spoke of his feeling 'that it would be an interesting experiment to reconstitute a Jewish kingdom. Cambon reminded him that a king of the Jews would be the end of the world. Balfour thinks that such a dénouement would be still more interesting'. And he shows us Weizmann writing privately of 'the Arab trash' and complaining to Balfour that the British system tended 'to level down the Jew politically to the status of a native'.

Mr. Kimche is no great admirer of Weizmann. He thinks even less of the two prime ministers who have led Israel through the second period to which he devotes his attention, the years 1967–73. Having no constructive policy towards the Arabs, they have merely added to the difficulties in the way of a settlement. General Dayan, like Ben Gurion before him, has shown more vision, but he is muzzled and restricted by the establishment. In any case, Israel and the Arabs have combined to forfeit their freedom of action by creating a situation in which the super-powers were bound to become involved.

Perhaps the most controversial passages in the book are those in which Mr. Kimche maintains that there was a 'curious duality' in the relations of

the United States with Israel during the months preceding the 1967 war. While the White House and the Department of State were 'officially' working for an international solution to the crisis, the Pentagon and the CIA were reaching an understanding with Israel's defence establishment 'which paved the way for the June 5 initiative'.

This is a dramatic assertion for which, as for many other statements in these later chapters, no evidence is provided. Writing of his sources for this period, Mr. Kimche points out that some of his informants 'remain in positions which make it impossible or undesirable to name them'. This is fair enough, but the present reviewer has reason to approach Mr. Kimche's unsupported statements with a measure of scepticism. For he finds himself referred to three times, each time as being, or claiming to be, one of the authors of Security Council Resolution No. 242. He would accept the compliment gladly if it accorded with the facts. But he was neither in New York nor in London while the resolution was being drafted and had nothing whatever to do with it.

HAROLD BEELEY

Israel's Parliament: The Law of the Knesset. By Eliahu S. Likhovski. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971. 236 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

NATIONAL constitutions fall into two broad categories: the moderately effective and the blatantly cosmetic. The first kind embodies a solemn codification of laws seeking to reconcile with tolerable fairness the conflicting interests which develop in any democratic society, whilst the second aim at providing regimes that have little time for the rule of law with a veneer of legal respectability.

In the Middle East, the Lebanon has been successful in implementing a *dustur* of the first kind while some of its neighbours have achieved some distinction in setting up constitutions of the second type. On the other hand, Israel is, constitutionally speaking, the odd man out in the Middle East—as it is the only country without a written constitution. This is due both to the profound influence of British jurisprudential thinking, and also to the early realisation of Israel's legislators that a rigid constitutional framework might be unsuitable for a modern state which had to take into account a very mixed legal inheritance: the Ottoman *mejelle* based on 99 maxims of Moslem jurisprudence, the procedural traditions and the idealism of Zionist congresses, rabbinical family laws, and last but not least British Mandate laws. The result is a body of Israeli constitutional doctrines and cases which provide the country with a formidable collection of 'fundamental laws'—very much in keeping with British constitutional traditions.

Dr. Eliahu Likhovski has now published a scholarly study setting out with the greatest clarity the central feature of his country's constitution: the role, function and procedures of its parliament, the Knesset. To a student of the British constitution, the form of the book is familiar in that it follows faithfully the presentation in our textbooks, starting with a comprehensive index of leading cases (English, Scottish, American and finally Israeli ones) followed by a chronological list of statutes. But if Israel has constructed and developed its own system of government largely on the Westminster model, it does not follow that it has not developed its own original constitutional conceptions. For instance, in the famous case of *Matana* (1962), it was decided that the President of Israel had the right

to grant a conditional pardon. This decision was subsequently incorporated into an important statute, but the judgment of *Acranat D. P.* makes rewarding reading because of the author's bold approach to the problem of the liberal interpretation of statutes.

Dr. Likhovski's textbook is already a classic on the fast-moving law of the Knesset. To those interested in the comparative study of institutions, it offers an excellent introduction to Israel's legal scene, where the British observer in particular can follow the evolution of many a familiar jurisprudential concept transplanted in a totally new setting, as well as the development of completely new ideas for solving universal problems.

LIONEL BLOCH

The Arab Lands of Western Asia. By Joseph J. Malone. *Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1973. 269 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective Series. Ed.: R. W. Winks.) £4·70. Paperback: £2·60.*

The United Arab Emirates. An Economic and Social Survey. By K. G. Fenelon. *London: Longman. 1973. 145 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

IF this reviewer were to be restricted to a single adjective for describing the first of these books the most apt word would be 'necessary', for what Professor Malone has done is to strip away much of the mythology and wishful thinking perpetrated by many current writers on the Middle East. The author treats the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula in such a way that the main currents of political activity are seen against an accurately-drawn and sharply relevant historical background. The fact that divisions between Alawite and Druze in Syria continue to mean far more than any superficial descriptions of allegiance to the left wing and right wing of the Baath party, and that the political future of the leaders of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen depends almost exclusively on continued Soviet support, are aspects of the Middle East scene which receive little analysis in the press—but they are the stuff of which politics is made. The state of Iraq is, for historical reasons, an ungovernable entity and Professor Malone minces no words in saying so. Similarly he expresses an all-too-rare, because realistic and therefore pessimistic, view of Saudi Arabia's political future. Kuwait's foreign aid programme is motivated by fear as well as by generosity and it is refreshing to read an author who does not shy away from using the phrase 'protection money' as a description for some aid projects.

Examples of these sensible and frank appraisals could be given for every country which the book covers, and one hopes that some at least of the more enthusiastically 'progressive' writers on Middle East affairs will take careful note of the words on p. 9: 'Proponents of reform can often count more victims than beneficiaries'. The reader certainly has to watch out for some factual errors—the Security Council resolution 242 did not call for Israeli withdrawal from *all* occupied territories: had it done so it would not have been accepted unanimously (footnote p. 29). The Omani oil port is Mina Al Fahal, not Mina Al Fahah (p. 221), and the Wadi referred to on p. 222 is called Jizi not Jisim. But these are minor flaws in an otherwise admirable book.

Dr. Fenelon's book covers a much smaller geographical area and provides useful information on the recent economic and social development of

the former Trucial States. The book collects in a convenient form much information that would otherwise be troublesome to locate, but accuracy has sometimes suffered. The first oil concessions signed by the rulers of Dubai and Sharjah were completed in 1937 not 1938 (p. 32) and the decision to move the British Political Residency from Bushire to Bahrein had been made in 1936, long before Indian independence was a factor in the equation (p. 15). The details on the British courts for the Trucial States on pp. 17 and 20 are also incomplete. The population of this area of Arabia has undoubtedly increased sharply in recent years but an estimate of 320,000 at the end of 1972 is surely too high when the 1968 census figure was only 180,000 (p. 6). To say that Ras al Khaimah 'deferred' its decision to join the federation in 1971 (p. 23) is to tell only a very small part of an intriguing tale!

R. M. BURRELL

Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath for The Center on International Race Relations. 1972. 446 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. (Race and Nations Series.) $15.00.*

Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. Edited by I. William Zartman. *London: Pall Mall. 1973. 531 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·25.*

THE painstaking work on North Africa which is being done by a number of distinguished scholars from a wide range of disciplines is dispersed in an equally wide range of journals. The editors of both these volumes have made substantial collections of articles on the problems of the modern Maghrib and its history, explaining the lines on which research is developing. They attempt to make comparisons and contrasts among the countries in the Maghrib, but in both volumes work on Morocco predominates.

Arabs and Berbers is perhaps the more successful of the two. It concentrates on the rich but manageable concept of 'ethnicity' in North Africa and examines both the myth and the reality of the relationship between Arab and Berber in the region. Edmund Burke III shows how the image of the Moroccan state in French ethnological literature, what he calls the 'Moroccan Vulgate', affected French policy in the colonial period. A number of writers see the usual division of the country into the *bled el-makhzan* (the area which central government controlled) and the *bled es-siba* (the country of dissidence) as an oversimplification. Ross E. Dunn puts forward the view that, 'according to the revised model, the Moroccan political community constituted three zones rather than two: a central core where the government exercised regular authority, a fluctuating belt where central control was intermittent and uncertain, and a third zone, mainly the high mountains and southern deserts, where it was hardly ever imposed. The tribes and towns of all three zones were politically united only in their recognition of the Sultan as leader of all Muslims. On the other hand, merchants, pilgrims, saintly mediators and transhumant nomads moved regularly between one zone and another, thus welding the country together through a network of commercial, political and social relationships' (pp. 106–7). But he feels that even this revised version is somewhat distorted. It assumes that resistance to the central authority was the sole contact between government and the tribes, whereas the relationship was in fact much more complex and dynamic.

Regional differences among the Berber groups are stressed in the first ction. David Hart and Ross Dunn discuss the control by the segmentary, ıcephalous' tribe, the Ait Atta, of vast territories and large populations. rnest Gellner considers the political and religious organisation of the ɛrbers in the Central High Atlas. The Saharan religious community of ɩe Mzab valley is analysed in an article by the late E. A. Alport. Kenneth rown writes on the impact of the *Dahir berbère* in Salé and William B. uandt on the Berbers in the Algerian political elite. Further sections deal ith ethnicity and social change and also its role in the coup of July 1971. ndré Adam touches interestingly on the question of colour racism. The lection of some of the topics treated in this book omits many others of ual interest, and does not do justice to the richness of the analyses which ake the collection such a rewarding one to read and re-read.

William Zartman's book has the strengths and weaknesses of other ılumes in this series. It covers a very wide range of subjects: values and titudes, leaders and personalities, elites and social groups, forces and stitutions, change and environment. Inevitably criticism can be made. For ample, in the section on leaders and personalities, where Maghribis are lowed to speak for themselves, only politicians who have gained power, ːe Bourguiba and Boumedienne, are represented. The voice of the opposiın is not heard. However, to approach the collection more positively, the itor has made a choice of articles well worth preserving on many of the emes in North African studies—Islam, party, army, urbanisation and onomic development. The book has a useful bibliography and statistical mmary.

Both books stress the importance of North Africa as an area of study ıd the ways in which its society differs from that of the Middle East. Both e valuable reference works for anyone interested in the Maghrib.

ANN WILLIAMS

AFRICA

ın-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900–1945. A Study in Ideology and Social Classes. By J. Ayodele Langley. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. 421 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs; Gen. Eds.: John D. Hargreaves and George Shepperson.) £6·50.*

ın-Africanism From Within. By Ras Makonnen as recorded and edited by Kenneth King. *Nairobi, London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. 293 pp. Illus. Index. £3·00. East Africa: 35 Shs.*

HE publication of Dr. Langley's doctoral dissertation, completed in 1968, akes a useful addition to the growing literature on the Pan-African moveent. On the roots of Pan-Negro thought in America, and on the progress the movement there and in Europe, it has little essentially new to offer to ose familiar with Dr. Geiss's brilliant survey [1] (which is cited though ıparently not used). It does, however, provide much the most compreːnsive and balanced account yet available in English.

More original is Dr. Langley's primary concern with the impact of Panfrican activities and propaganda on the development of nationalism in 'est Africa, which he has documented by extensive use of the archival

I. Geiss, *Panakfrikanismus.* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 1968.)

resources of the region. Due prominence is given to such hitherto neglected figures as the Reverend O. Faduma and E. F. Small, and there is some interesting new data on Chief Alfred Sam's Back-to-Africa enterprise. Dr. Langley has a clear appreciation of the complexities and diversities covered by the umbrella of Pan-Africanism: he is probably right in thinking that Garvey's brand of millenarian militancy was more influential than Dubois' elitism. In the wider field of West African politics, his grasp seems to be rather less sure. He demonstrates that the conservative approach of the 1920s persisted right through this period more strongly than has always been understood, but his treatment of the late 1930s is very patchy and seriously underplays the emergence of a real new radicalism. It is probably because of the nature of his subject matter that Dr. Langley's manner seems somewhat pedestrian. It is to his credit that he quotes extensively from his sources, but nothing makes duller reading than the oratory of protest.

When all such careful academic work is done, the documentation of Pan-Africanism must remain very difficult to evaluate. Its language is always the wilful optimism of the politically disinherited, and so many ephemeral organisations existed only on paper or even in the imagination of police spies. All the more important, therefore, are the personal recollections of the leading participants, and Dr. King has made an invaluable contribution in recording and editing the reminiscences of Ras Makonnen. These were bound to be of great interest, since Makonnen was for so long associated with the movement and its key figures, especially during the 1940s, and played an important part in organising the 1945 Manchester conference. They take the form of a series of conversation pieces devoted to successive phases of the speaker's life; his youth in Guyana, his early days as a YMCA organiser in Texas and as a student at Cornell, his association with Padmore in London, his experience of Nkrumah's Ghana. The manner is discursive, the chronology woolly; rather than detailed autobiography, we are given a series of impressionistic pictures of the many and varied social situations through which the narrator has passed. Naturally enough, but unhappily for the historian, his sharpest, liveliest recollections are of Guyana, at one end of his life, and Ghana at the other, while the account of the politically most significant period of his life, in Britain, remains disappointingly imprecise and generalised. He emerges as a fascinating talker, but essentially as a rather pathetic exile, who has never found the homeland for which he was always seeking. The happiest days of his life (and Padmore's?) were probably in the darkest days of the cause, insulting the imperialist to his face in Hyde Park.

D. H. Jones

South Africa's Political Alternatives. Report of the Political Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. *Johannesburg: SPRO-CAS Publications. 1973. 252 pp. Index. (SPRO-CAS Publication No. 10; Gen. Ed.: Peter Randall.)*

A Taste of Power. The Final, Co-ordinated SPRO-CAS Report. By Peter Randall. *Johannesburg: SPRO-CAS Publications. 1973. 225 pp. Index. (SPRO-CAS Publication No. 11.)*

South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict. By Jim Hoagland. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 428 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

THE publication of the report of the political commission of SPRO-CAS (The Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society), entitled *South Africa's Political Alternatives,* together with the final co-ordinated report entitled *A Taste of Power,* brings to an end a project unique in the history of South Africa and almost certainly in most other countries of the world. Inspired by the publication in September 1968, by the Theological Commission of the South African Council of Churches, of the assertion that Christianity and the system of *apartheid* were incompatible, SPRO-CAS was set up in February 1969. In little over four years, under the powerful direction of Peter Randall, the project has given rise to eleven major reports, innumerable working papers, background and discussion papers, study aids and several very impressive studies in a separate programme entitled SPRO-CAS 2. It is no exaggeration to say that this list of publications is a fundamental contribution to the analysis of South African society and cannot be ignored by anyone intent upon serious study of that society's problems.

The great strength of *South Africa's Political Alternatives* is the vital nexus drawn between the theoretical analysis and the particular problems of South African society. Dr. Dennis Worral, who signed a 'personal statement' at the end of the report, took the commission to task for straying from the path of explanation to the path of political action. One can only be profoundly grateful that it did just that. Apart from the impossibility of drawing a dividing line between explanation and proposals for action, especially in a place like South Africa—which Dr. Worral comes close to conceding—the purpose of attempting such an exercise is obscure. In the event, there now exists not only an immensely scholarly general analysis but also a statement of the relevance of that analysis to South Africa.

Much attention has been focused on the commission's rejection of the 'Westminster model' of representative government, and with it universal adult franchise, as the system most capable of resolving the conflicting pressures in South Africa. The commission preferred a society whose problems were solved by negotiation between groups. Disillusionment with the parliamentary system can be readily appreciated. But, in so far as the justification for 'corporate pluralism' offered is that it will enfranchise important groups which are prevented 'from access to the central system of parliamentary government', the commission commits the same error as that for which it justly criticises the Molteno Commission—namely, that the proposal represents elegant constitutional proposals with no possibility of acceptance. Permitting a black trade union to use its bargaining strength is as much anathema to the South African regime as granting universal adult suffrage. Furthermore, why should it be assumed that a fully enfranchised South African population would abuse its power as grotesquely as does the enfranchised minority at present? A strong case for corporate pluralism is made out on other grounds in the report, but Dr. Edgar Brookes's dissent makes the issue a very live one.

A Taste of Power draws heavily on the major SPRO-CAS reports but is as indispensable as all the other publications. It draws together the themes of the various reports, chronicles SPRO-CAS's short (but amazingly productive) history and reproduces a number of significant documents.

Will SPRO-CAS succeed in its avowed aim—to provide practical

assistance to help South Africa undergo the changes that are inevitable without untold bloodshed and violence? The only certain assertion that can be made is that if bloodshed and violence are avoided, SPRO-CAS will have played a vital role. Any country whose government has a rudimentary grasp of the resources at its disposal would be profoundly grateful for work of the calibre and relevance of that produced by these reports. If South Africa is to avoid disaster, it must cease to waste its manpower resources and, in particular, the intellectual resources which SPRO-CAS has put at its disposal.

Hoagland's work on South Africa, on the other hand, rarely rises above the level of descriptive journalism. Furthermore, the descriptions are all too often dripping with unnecessary and meaningless epithets and metaphors. The historical analysis is superficial and misleading in that it relies on a few selective and unconnected incidents. Finally, the contemporary reporting consists of a considerable amount of embarrassing and irrelevant quotations from conversations which the author had with various people in South Africa.

It would, however, be an injustice to this book not to point to a well argued chapter on the existing and potential American influence on Southern Africa and some interesting and concisely drawn conclusions. Like the SPRO-CAS political commission, Hoagland rejects both apartheid and multi-racialism as solutions to South Africa's ills. There is, however, something hollow in his suggestion for a programme for change—a federation of independent 'government bodies', each made up of different ethnic groups. This implies a sincere implementation of 'grand apartheid', together with the building-in of checks and balances guaranteeing 'rights for each of the ethnic groups'. The hollowness emerges because the solution suggested demands a government prepared to share power—something which Hoagland in nearly 400 preceding pages makes us see as unrealistic.

HARRY RAJAK

Politics in Ex-British Africa. By J. F. Maitland-Jones. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 236 pp. Index. (Modern Governments; Gen. Ed.: Max Beloff.) £4·00. Paperback: £1·75.*

THIS volume forms part of a series which aims to introduce students and general readers to the working of political institutions in different parts of the world. To attempt to do this for the whole of ex-British Africa (from the Cape to Kampala and Banjul) is a formidable assignment indeed, demanding encyclopaedic knowledge, sensitivity to a wide variety of extremely complex environments, and a capacity to compare and generalise without sententiousness. Miss Maitland-Jones presents some useful comparative data, and her judgments, generally cool and sensible, are sometimes perceptive—especially when her eyes are focused close to Kenya, where she now lives; but her work has clearly been too quickly undertaken to achieve complete success. It was an excellent idea to treat the problems of black- and white-ruled states within a common framework, and so to illuminate some convergent tendencies in governmental practice; but fully to explain these would require a deeper analysis of political sociology than she can attempt, and a more profound understanding of the colonial experience

than is provided by the scrappy notes which pass as 'historical background'. Her style of writing, full of generalisations too compressed to be meaningful and juxtapositions which beg great questions as to cause, will generate many misunderstandings among less well-informed readers. On top of this, there are many simple errors, the most profoundly disastrous of which is the assumption that the Fulani *jihad* in northern Nigeria (and so, by implication, the political aspirations of Northern Nigerians today) were manifestations of 'Arab nationalism' (pp. 9 and 206). On page 85 her comments on the British government's attempts to frustrate changes in the Rhodesian constitution blandly ignore the basic point that *only* in Rhodesia has the British government refused to recognise that conditions for a transfer of sovereignty have been achieved. But more or less serious mistakes of dating, nomenclature and fact abound. Persons 'required for official or business or cultural purposes' to visit Sierra Leone, for example, will run into difficulties if they believe the Prime Minister to be called J. J. Karema, and his party the *African* People's Congress (pp. 46–7). This series is said to be edited by Max Beloff, but there is little sign that this volume has been edited by anyone.

JOHN D. HARGREAVES

Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960–1966. By Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers. *London: Heinemann Educational Books. 1973. 248 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50. Paperback: £1·80.*

KENNETH Post's book *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* [1] was a masterly treatment of the complexities of Nigerian politics just before independence. In the work under review the authors argue that the 1964 federal polls were a turning point of a different kind, pointing the way towards the military coups of 1966. Such were the traumas caused by the disputed census, the massive coercion of opponents, the widespread electoral fraud and the abortive boycott of the polls by one of the two contesting alliances of parties, that they decided not to examine election results in detail, for, 'it is a comment upon the administrative problems which so largely vitiated the election that it scarcely seems worthwhile' (p. 183).

Instead we are given a broad panorama of political conflicts between 1960 and 1965 going over much the same ground as John Mackintosh's more compendious *Nigerian Government and Politics*,[2] though adding some interesting new details, particularly on the role of left-wing political movements. We are also provided with a conceptual model, though this is rather too obtrusively superimposed upon a very complex reality. Having made, for instance, a useful distinction between loyalty to kin groups and traditional authorities on the one hand and on the other to 'cultural sections' (or in less technical language 'tribes' or 'ethnic groups' like the Ibo or Hausa-Fulani), the authors surely go too far in claiming that only the latter can evoke 'a complete and transcendent loyalty' (p. 13) and that 'increasingly in looking at the period 1962–6 it becomes necessary to view Nigeria as a conglomeration of cultural sections which are mutually exclusive and also exhaustive, in the sense that every individual belongs

[1] London: Oxford University Press for Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. 1963.
[2] London: Allen & Unwin. 1966.

to one' (p. 17). True up to a point. But what of the interplay in the Western Region of over-arching Yoruba nationalism with the equally striking loyalties to individual Yoruba kingdoms or sub-groups? What of loyalty towards the North which was as much a territorial phenomenon as an affair of the Hausa-Fulani alone—the journalist Eje Agbo, whom the authors quote as representing the views of the new Northern intelligentsia, is, for instance, an Idoma from the Middle Belt. And although the systems model they borrow from Karl Deutsch allows for 'feedback' from the ethnic groups' environment, this way of putting it tends to obscure the fact that identities are as much a matter of definitions imposed by others as they are of self-definition: as Sartre puts it, it is the anti-Semite that makes the Jew; a statement that fits the situation of the Ibos in Nigeria equally well.

Against the gains in precision achieved from a model must be set the costs—those things it excludes—which in this case are high. The authors make a useful distinction between political and 'structural' elites (civil servants, judges, army officers etc.): but their terms of reference do not permit them to give an adequate account of the growing power of structural elites and their antagonism to politicians which were so important, both in the 1966 coups and in the ultimate survival of the federation. And they exclude (p. 6) detailed treatment of the relation of the conflict, not only to the international context, but also to newly-emerging patterns of class struggle, an omission that Post's use of a Marxist frame of reference in other writings makes all the more surprising.

ROBIN LUCKHAM

Revolt in Bussa: A Study of British 'Native Administration' in Nigerian Borgu, 1902–1935. By Michael Crowder. *London: Faber. 1973. 273 pp. Maps. Illus. Index. £5·00.*

PROFESSOR Crowder is an authority on the colonial period in West Africa, and what he and others have written on it is now usefully supplemented by a detailed case study, illustrating British rule in Borgu, a relatively obscure part of Northern Nigeria bordering on Dahomey.

Borgu was at that time so much of a 'backwater' of the Empire, as this account makes clear, that the application of indirect rule there was not typical of Northern Nigeria as a whole; but it did have parallels with other parts of Nigeria where the principle of indirect rule devised by Lugard with the Hausa-Fulani emirates in mind was applied less suitably to different regions. The Borgu people (Borgawa), non-Hausa and mainly non-Muslim before colonial rule, were then divided into five kingdoms, of which the most important, Nikki, was added to French Dahomey. The other kingdoms were added to Nigeria; among them, Bussa, whose ruler was styled an emir, had a sort of seniority.

The revolt mentioned in the title of the book took place in 1915. It was a very small affair, by comparison with many other anti-colonial risings, but it illustrated aspects of British colonial rule in an interesting way. The rising followed years of light-handed but thoughtless administration, leading to a reorganisation under which the Bussa emirate was abolished, the Bussa ruler, Kitoro Gani, dismissed, and a man of alien slave origin appointed to rule the Bussa area.

After the revolt, the administration tried to improve its relations with

Bussa; the damage was apparently due very much to one resident, which illustrates the importance of personalities in colonial rule. After a period of a few years, which ended in several scandals, the new ruler was dismissed, and in 1924 Kitoro Gani was restored; but he proved unsatisfactory to the British, and in 1935 they again dismissed him.

One lesson of the study is that, however the British Empire was acquired, its administration was marked by a fair amount of absent-mindedness. Another is that the application of indirect rule was often far from straightforward; though flexible, as the Bussa case shows, it also had a basic difficulty—the British needed to delegate local authority to the chiefs, but this led to corruption and misgovernment on many occasions and the colonial mind, while deploring this, apparently failed to see that colonialism itself made abuses by its African agents inevitable.

There is another lesson which emerges from the story but is inadequately treated—the only drawback to this well-written and excellently-documented account. That is the effect on ordinary Africans of British fiscal and forced labour policies. Taxation was very important in indirect rule and this account refers continually to tax assessment, evasion and enforcement. But Professor Crowder could usefully have examined closely the amount of hardship and suffering lying behind several acts of apparently serious oppression that he mentions: behind, for example, the complaint against tax collection before the harvest was in (p. 99), the opposition to conscription for forced labour for railway building (p. 83), and a political officer's efforts 'to estimate carefully the number of people in a particular district to make sure they paid tax to their maximum capacity' (p. 172). It is worth recalling how much of the empire-builder's time was taken up with the collection of taxes from colonial subjects, including the seizure of their cattle and even the occasional burning of a village which had not paid. Not, of course, that such things have stopped since independence in Africa.

J. M. Derrick

The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. Edited by Dunstan M. Wai. *London: Frank Cass. 1973. 255 pp. Index. (Cass Library of African Studies. General Studies, No. 152. Ed. Adviser: John Ralph Willis.) £3·75.*

This book was needed. In 1963, when I transferred to Khartoum after some years in West Africa, I was disturbed to discover how little understanding there was, inside or outside the Sudan, of the African dimension of Sudanese history. In Khartoum diplomats, businessmen, academics, news-reporters, all belonged to a Middle East circuit; and all loyally backed the loud assertions of the Khartoum government to the effect that the Sudan was an Arab country. Perhaps the most blinkered among the expatriates were the hyper-liberals, since their eagerness to show their sympathies with a post-colonial regime led them to swallow, with total gullibility, the official line with regard to the South Sudan. Nor was there any measure of understanding among the 'progressive forces' in North Sudanese society. When the Abboud military regime, in an attempt to remove the only foreign observers of its Arabising campaign in the South, denounced and deported Christian missionaries, the communist student society in the University of

Khartoum ran up billboards proclaiming (in English, presumably for th benefit of the handful of South Sudanese students) its enthusiastic support in this instance, for the right-wing government. A few months later, durin the euphoria resulting from the overthrow of the military regime, a Khar toum newspaper printed letters from South Sudanese which, for the firs time, made the point publicly that, if the wishes of the majority of the in habitants are to count, the Sudan must be reckoned an African and not a Arab country. Expression of this view was soon suppressed again i Khartoum; and world censorship of it continued. Hence accounts of war fare in the South Sudan appeared as sensational items in the penny pres in Britain long before the leading newspapers allowed them to appear a serious political reportage.

The volume under review is still almost the first book-length stud from the South Sudanese viewpoint to break through the world censorshi and as such, even though it is not a very good book, it is very welcom The editor, a South Sudanese student at Oxford, contributes two studer essays ('arguments against Regional Autonomy for the South are stupi exercises of the reactionary petty bourgeoisie politicians and are a thin of the past', p. 167); and he includes a hack-Marxist analysis by a Souther communist who was 'Minister of State for Southern Affairs until his execu tion in 1971'. The Vice-President of the Sudan, a Southern lawyer an judge, summarises with moderation the political devolution of the South u to 1970. A North Sudanese political scientist argues, with only limite special pleading, that Arabism and Africanism are not irreconcilable. Ugandan lawyer mildly discusses the international implications of 'civ war' in the South (noting that 'the state of affairs in the South is barel known even in the countries as close as Uganda, Kenya and the Congo' Professor Ali Mazrui, an East African of Afro-Arab extraction, agonise over Arab attitudes to black peoples, but prefers them to European att tudes, since more miscegenation occurs: 'the Sudan may be the fir modern nation in Africa to have creatively used a combination (socialism and sex for national integration' (p. 79). A South Africa briefly discusses the education of South Sudanese refugees. And in th hardest-hitting essay, two Canadian academics ask: can secession of th South be justified? Finally, there are sixty pages of documents, most (them the constitutional instruments relating to the revised policy towar the South announced by President Nimeiry in 1969.

The message of the book, despite its limitations, is clear and simp and also moderate. The South Sudan is not Arab, and does not wish t be Arab; but it cannot realistically seek to secede from the modern Suda The North cannot conquer the South without international complication Therefore North and South must jog along together, respecting each other cultural prejudices. The Southern contributors affect to believe that i President Nimeiry this commonsense solution has found a determined su porter. Although in parts of both North and South there is still spea sharpening nightly, they may just be right.

P. E. H. HAIR

ASIA

Asia and the Major Powers: Implications for the International Order. By Robert A. Scalapino. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution. 1972. 117 pp. $3.00.*

Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia. By Michael Leifer. *Singapore: Asia Pacific Press. 1972. 161 pp. Bibliog. Index. (An Asia Pacific World Library title.)*

World Powers in South and South-East Asia: The Politics of Super-Nationalism. By Zafar Imam. Foreword by S. L. Poplai. *New Delhi, Jullundur: Sterling Publishers (P) Ltd. for the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. 1972. 255 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 25.00.*

PROFESSOR SCALAPINO is well known for his writings on Asian politics and his latest book is a valuable contribution to the debate on what configuration of power is likely to replace bipolarity in Asia. With clarity and skill, he examines the broad policy alternatives that are likely to be open to the super-powers and major Asian states, such as Japan, India and Indonesia, in the 1970s. The advantages and disadvantages of such policy alternatives as neutralism, Gaullism and bilateral or multilateral alliance systems are considered for each country in turn. On the whole his forecasts of the choice each power is likely to make are convincing: Japan, whose course is surely the most difficult to chart, will persevere, he thinks, with its modified alliance with the United States; China will continue its independent and self-reliant stance; the Soviet Union will endorse and abet new communist uprisings, when it is suitable to do so, while in the meantime strengthening its economic and political links with a wide range of governments, and the United States will continue its modified alliance policy while forming the apex of two triangular relationships—a Tokyo-Washington-Western Europe economic axis and a Moscow-Peking-Washington military axis. Although the concept of a ' triangle ' is a useful one, international relations in Asia are far too complex to fit into any simple formula, and Professor Scalapino is fully aware of this fact. It is regrettable, nevertheless, that he does not speculate about the possibility of collusion between the antagonists who form the military axis.

With so little space at his disposal, it is rather pointless to complain that Professor Scalapino does not qualify some of his many generalisations. One must, however, express surprise at the strategic importance he attaches to Taiwan. In one paragraph he writes: ' The incorporation of Taiwan into the People's Republic would provide the justification, possibly the need, for a greatly expanded Chinese air and sea capacity ' (p. 84). Likewise, he is far too ready to assume that New Delhi will fall in with Moscow's strategic designs in Southern Asia. His conclusion, on the other hand, is realistic and difficult to gainsay: ' . . . most indications point to a slow, often painful period of negotiations—without war, but without massive decisive breakthroughs either ' (p. 94). Undergraduates and the general reader should welcome this thoughtful and all too brief book.

Although the geopolitical structure of South-east Asia has not changed since the departure of the colonial powers, the governments in the region have still to consolidate their control over their respective polities, and it is this fact that Michael Leifer examines in his short volume *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia.* His main thesis is that the primary need of

the countries of the region is political integration and that this cannot wait for the emergence of a widespread awareness of national solidarity.' Their main dilemma, as he sees it, is 'how to undertake the process of integration without inducing alienation' (p. 113).

Leifer begins by focusing attention upon the obstacles to the emergence of strong government. The disturbing influence of ethnic dissent and economic grievances are examined, as well as the way these and other divisive forces are inter-related. Political elites in the region have sought to consolidate the authority of the state by the projection of political leadership and by experimenting with different forms of political institutions. Leifer examines their record and concludes that, 'with the possible exception of Lee Kuan Yew, those politicians we have discussed have but touched the surface in promoting an enduring and stable political order' (p. 87). And his task, of course, was far easier than that of the other leaders, since he had only a city state to govern. The concluding chapters examine the sources of inter-state conflict in South-east Asia and the tentative steps that have been taken towards regional co-operation. Leifer concludes that the prospects for regional integration are limited, and he is justifiably sceptical of the one-time popular notion among Asian politicians that there are Asian solutions to Asian problems.

This somewhat depressing picture is well known to South-east Asian specialists: this little book is not really intended for them. Students, however, will find it an excellent introduction to the subject.

Zafar Imam deals competently enough in his book with the involvement of the great powers—including West Germany and Japan—in the economies of the countries of South and South-east Asia. Students will find his account of the aid policies of the Soviet Union particularly valuable. Unfortunately he throws little new light on the strategic and political policies of the major powers. The United Kingdom is blamed for neglecting the Commonwealth and for choosing to join Europe, while the United States is criticised for its slavish preoccupation with the domino theory. Imam's own leanings are quite apparent: he finds little that is wrong with the policies of the Soviet Union. There is no danger, apparently, in over-dependence upon Moscow for military supplies; Brezhnev's proposal for a security arrangement in South Asia was supposedly no more than a call for regional *economic* co-operation, and the Soviet Union's links with the indigenous communist movements in the region, particularly in India, Pakistan, Nepal and Ceylon, are not considered.

Dr. Imam needs to re-check some of his dates: the Suez adventure is said to have taken place in 1957. Some of his statements also are quite astonishing. For example, he claims that the object of Western Germany in Southern Asia is to become the only major European partner of the United States. Equally amazing is his assertion that 'there is hardly any "ignorance gap" about Asia found in the Soviet Union as in the case of the West . . .' (p. 152). The most incongruous thing of all about this book is that it does not have a separate chapter on China's involvement in the region. On balance, therefore, a disappointing work.

J. E. Williams

The Transfer of Power 1942–7. Vol. IV. The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty 15 June 1943–31 August 1944. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh with the assistance of E. W. R. Lumby. *London: H.M.S.O. 1973. 1295 pp. Illus. Map. Indexes. (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India.) £13·00.*

THIS volume in the series of documents on the constitutional relations between Britain and India covers the period from June 1943 to August 1944 and is thus concerned with the closing days of Lord Linlithgow's Viceroyalty and the first ten months of Lord Wavell's tenure of office. It fully maintains the high standard of objectivity which characterised the first three volumes[1] and its value is enhanced by a well-balanced introduction. As in the earlier volumes, the documents are arranged in chronological order, and are preceded by an index which groups them by subject in notional chapters. Thus, the Bengal famine is treated as Chapter 4 and since the relevant documents are scattered throughout the volume, the index to that chapter summarises their contents and indicates where in the volume they are to be found.

We can only mention a few of the many subjects covered and must begin with the Bengal famine of 1943. The facts are abundantly clear from these documents. The physical shortage of foodgrains was small in proportion to India's normal consumption, but the cultivator saw no reason to sell at a time of rising prices, the governments of the surplus provinces were understandably unwilling to help their neighbours and well-to-do merchants were happy to grind the faces of the poor. Matters were made worse by the ineptitude of the then Governor of Bengal and the inefficiency of his government, which failed to see the danger ahead and was incapable of taking adequate measures when the situation became serious. Linlithgow fought hard to secure a large volume of imports of foodgrains through the agency of the British government, and Wavell followed up this demand with equal vigour. The British government, however, had to weigh this need against other wartime requirements of cereals and shipping and perhaps also felt that, if distribution were properly organised, India would not starve. Many months were to pass before it was possible to meet India's demand, but fortunately before then Casey had taken over as Governor of Bengal and procurement and administration in that province had improved considerably.

The release of Gandhi and the connected constitutional issues naturally occupy a good deal of space in this volume. The differences between Wavell and the British government on this subject had not yet hardened, but they were beginning to appear, and Wavell was seriously disturbed at the forthright tone of the letter which the Cabinet directed him to send in reply to Gandhi's letter on the subject of constitutional advance.

The documents dealing with the Indian states are of particular interest. They show that the need for mergers of the small states—which were in fact effected after independence—was foreseen, but that not much progress was made during this period. They also show that in dealing with the future of the states, the British government and the Viceroy found them-

[1] Vol. I: The Cripps Mission January–April 1942. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1971, p. 202; Vol. II: 'Quit India' April 30–September 21, 1942. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1972, p. 152; Vol. III: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast, and the Succession to the Viceroyalty September 21, 1942–June 12, 1943. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1972, p. 359.

selves in a dilemma. It was clear in London and in Delhi that the promise of self-government was not compatible with the fulfilment of Britain's undertakings to the Princes—and yet any attempt to resolve the dilemma while the war was in progress would have been dangerous. It was necessary to temporise and accept the certainty that at a later stage, Britain would be accused of perfidy.

The problems arising from India's accumulation of sterling balances also figure in this book. They were only just beginning to become matters of serious discussion, but it is clear from these documents that even at this early stage the Secretary of State and the Viceroy insisted that Britain should honour its obligations—though they knew that Churchill took a different view as to what those obligations were.

In these volumes, Professor Mansergh and the late Mr. Lumby have laid future historians under a great obligation and it is a matter of much regret that Mr. Lumby has not lived to assist with the rest of the series.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

Afghanistan: Political Modernization of a Mountain Kingdom. By Balwant Bhaneja. *New Delhi: Spectra. 1973. 87 pp. Index. Bibliog. Rs 15.00.*

RECENT studies by Vartan Gregorian, Louis Dupree and R. S. Newell have given us valuable information on the modern political development of Afghanistan. Balwant Bhaneja does not aim to add to this stock of knowledge. Instead, he attempts to relate political changes in Afghanistan during the past half century to general theories of political development—notably those of David Apter, which he outlines in his first chapter. Subsequent pages summarise Afghanistan's political history since the reign of Amanullah, with particular emphasis on the 1960s. The relatively lengthy description of the constitutional changes introduced in 1964 has unfortunately been robbed of much of its usefulness by Daud Shah's coup of 1973 and the consequent demise of the constitutional monarchy. Daud's coup may also have undermined the three-stage theory of development which Mr. Bhaneja confidently advances in his final chapter.

These theoretical considerations aside, the book's 74 pages of text contain a depressing array of factual errors. Mahmud of Ghazni somehow gets transferred to the 19th century from the 11th where he properly belongs (p. 11), while the reigns of Amirs Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) and Habibullah (1901–1919) are wrongly represented as 1800–1901 and 1901–1910 respectively (pp. 12 and 14). Muhammad Yusuf first became premier in 1963, not 1964 (p. 26), and the new system of provincial government was introduced in 1964, not 1967 (p. 50). This is only a selection of the mistakes this reviewer noticed. It indicates some very careless proof-reading, at the very least.

WILLIAM HALE

Politics in War. The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam. By Allan E. Goodman. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 313 pp. Index. £6·25.*

CONTEMPORARY Chinese historians find a precursor for their revolution in the Taiping rebellion of the mid-19th century. Other historians see a direct continuity thanks to the militarisation of Chinese society which

began with the Taipings—militarisation not only of government authority but also of villages obliged to provide their own defence against marauders One can trace to this origin the war-lordism of China after 1911, th inability of the Nationalist Party of Sun Yat-sen to build a state apparatu save under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek's army, and the identification o party and army in the communist camp. The founding of the People' Republic was not followed by demilitarisation; the People's Army has out lived the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and even the overthrov of its commander-in-chief, as the principal organ of the Chinese state.

The Taiping contagion was transmitted to 19th-century Vietnam; onl the invasion by France arrested incipient chaos in Tonkin as villagers bega to look to their own defences. The Indochina Communist Party borrowe ideas and drew strength from earlier village militarisation, as well as fron both Chiang and Mao; it has clung continuously since 1946 to the Chines model of identity between party and army, and of peacekeeping througl village militias. The breakdown of French rural administration reinstate the self-defending village throughout Vietnam, and all young peasants hav borne arms since then. Only under Ngo-dinh-Diem was there a half-hearted shortlived, attempt to sever the army's hold over the state; military govern ment, and a militarised countryside, have become the norm.

Americans have never liked that. The realisation that the continuatio of American support, in weapons and money, depended on the approval o American public opinion was the main incentive for Vietnamese leaders t revive their abandoned efforts to adopt parliamentary democracy—to prac tise 'politics in war'. This book relates how Nguyen-van-Thieu, change from general to president, inaugurated a constitution, largely American i inspiration, which would transfer legislative powers, control of supply, an safeguards for the citizen against arbitrary administration to elected repre sentatives, at the same time as the people were 'mobilised' for 'politica participation'. The author does not rate success very high: party behaviour the sense of responsibility of deputies and senators, and the attitude of th executive itself, leave too much to be desired.

On the other hand, we in Britain might not pass some of Goodman' tests either—and he was writing, after all, before Watergate and Agnew! Some might judge that the evidence he has collected justifies greate optimism: the rectification under parliamentary pressure of much arbitrar detention, the re-establishment of civil courts over military, the acceptanc of Supreme Court rulings, and so on. His final complaint is that th Vietcong will find it hard, after peace, to fit into the 'political community as that exists in South Vietnam today; in that, he is ingenuous and betray infelicitous detachment from the recent history of Vietnam and of China.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization. By Joseph J. Zasloff *Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1973. 176 pp. Index. (A Rand Corpora tion Research Study.) $10.00.*

THE justification for this book is summed up in its last sentence: 'Th Pathet Lao movement, having grown in the past two decades from a smal insurgent organisation to a counter-government dominating more tha two thirds of the territory and one third of the population, will be a power ful competitor in the struggle for political domination of Laos' (p. 97). O

the principle of 'know your enemy', the author has set out to collect as much information as he could find and to piece together an analytical study of the history and organisation of the movement. His research, undertaken between 1967 and 1972, was centred upon a series of interviews with prisoners and defectors from the Pathet Lao in the former year, as well as a careful examination of radio broadcasts and a small amount of published information. The result is a straightforward, factual account which concentrates upon four major elements in the Pathet Lao movement: the overall leadership, the front organisation (*Neo Lao Hak Sat*), the People's Party of Laos and the Lao People's Liberation Army. A number of appendices include some additional biographical information and also some of the principal published documents of the organisation.

There can be no doubt that this is a very useful compilation, especially if read in conjunction with the earlier study undertaken by the same author in collaboration with P. F. Langer, which dealt specifically with the role of the North Vietnamese in Laos.[1] The two works summarise a good deal of information not available elsewhere for Western readers. It is inevitable that at present there is no other body of information on the subject which can be brought to bear in order to test the validity of their picture. But at least Professor Zasloff has resisted the temptation to try to fill in the gaps in his knowledge by unwarranted speculation. There are no doubt many points of interpretation which will become matters for future debate if more information becomes available.

What is lacking from the book is any serious study of the Laotian cultural and social background. The author pays lip-service to the conventional view of Laos as a 'loosely structured society whose people are tolerant and permissive', (p. 42), or as a 'little organised society' in which the Pathet Lao movement represents the first step towards 'discipline' (p. 91). But his main concern is with the application to just one more part of the world of a technique of analysis devised by American political scientists for the study of all communist parties and states. True, one of his source materials is a notebook kept by a Vietnamese communist cadre, which suggests that the Laotian interpretation of communism and of Vietnamese models of organisation might be less than perfect. But even there, Professor Zasloff is looking at Laos through Vietnamese eyes. Western writing on Laos has in general suffered from the tendency to treat the country either as an appanage of the Theravada Buddhist world, culturally associated with Thailand, or as a political appanage of Vietnam. The true significance of the development of communism in Laos, and of the Pathet Lao, can only be assessed when it is possible to see it against the background of a much fuller understanding of Laos itself, and when that country is seen as a region which exists in its own right with a cultural tradition and political possibilities of its own. The present work does not do that, though it offers plenty of detailed information which will eventually be useful in building up a fuller picture of what might in time come to be recognised as the new Laos.

R. B. SMITH

[1] Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff: *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1972, p. 704.

Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War. By Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan. Preface by Noam Chomsky. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1973. 446 pp. Maps. $15.00. £6·45.*

My War with the C.I.A.: Cambodia's Fight for Survival. By Norodom Sihanouk as related to Wilfred Burchett. Introduction by Andreas Papandreou. *Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. 1973. 272 pp. Maps. £0·50.*

A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement, 1863–1955. By V. M. Reddi. *Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara University. 1972. 228 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 8.00.*

THE authors of these three books on Cambodian affairs are aiming at different targets. Four out of five have political objectives in view. The target for Caldwell and Lek is a successful revolution in Cambodia. The target for Prince Sihanouk, to which his co-author Burchett assents, is put in the foreword: 'The present work is viewed by the author as a weapon in the struggle to regain his country's independence and as a warning to other countries marked down as future victims'. Reddi's target was a doctorate in philosophy at the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi. Reddi has achieved his target. The other four authors have not yet achieved theirs.

To dismiss Caldwell and Lek as prejudiced authors would be a mistake. Sandwiched between their emphatic references to the revolution there is a first-class account of Prince Sihanouk's later years in power (1966–1970). September 1967, they say, was a critical month in the evolution of Cambodian affairs towards the coup of March 1970. Prince Sihanouk closed down the friendship associations and the free press. One effect of these moves was to force the Cambodian Left out of legitimate politics. The Cambodian Right, led by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, quickened the process referred to here as the creeping coup. Leaders in the army and civil government were replaced by Lon Nol men—ostensibly because of a threat from the Left.

As long as Prince Sihanouk was presumed to be a better friend of China than of the West two guerrilla forces were being trained outside Cambodia. These forces were recruited by American advisers from the Cambodian minorities of Thailand and South Vietnam. The original objective of these groups was to embarrass Prince Sihanouk's regime. In 1968 their activities were scaled down and transferred to Phnom Penh. The new function was to stage rallies in the streets when Lon Nol needed support. The Cambodian economy was declining to its lowest point since Prince Sihanouk had assumed power. The Sangkum, a national party which he had started after his abdication many years before, was ineffective. The Prince himself was unpopular, perhaps not with the peasants (though Caldwell and Lek say he lost ground here too), but certainly in the towns. Charges which had not been taken seriously for almost two decades—that Sihanouk was a dilettante and a playboy—began to be heard again. Critics pointed to the amount of time the head of state spent making films. Film festivals were great national occasions—while Rome burned.

Caldwell and Lek show how dangerously ambivalent Prince Sihanouk's position became. He restarted a conciliatory policy towards the United States and at the same time tried to remain overtly friendly with Hanoi. The move to the right upset the balancing act which had succeeded for so

long. For once the ex-king was powerless to reverse the trend. In December 1969 he was denouncing a proposal to re-admit foreign banks to Cambodia. Four pro-Sihanouk ministers put pressure on the Right by threatening to resign. The proposal was thrown out, but Sirik Matak enforced the four resignations. The creeping coup was complete. In January 1970 Prince Sihanouk left the country.

The *Columbia Eagle* incident, which coincided with the March 1970 coup, shows Caldwell and Lek in disagreement with Burchett and Sihanouk. The hijackers of the *Columbia Eagle* were said at the time to be CIA agents sent to supply arms to the Lon Nol rebels. Caldwell and Lek say that the bombs on the *Columbia Eagle* were too big to be carried by Lon Nol's aircraft, and that there was no equipment at Sihanoukville port capable of lifting the bombs ashore. They also point to the later behaviour of the hijackers, which they think was inexplicable if the young men really had been CIA agents. Prince Sihanouk, on the other hand, says that some French secondary school teachers at Sihanoukville took photos of the hijacked ship when it arrived and again when it left. They noted that it had been very low in the water on arrival and very high on departure. On the day of the coup, he writes, Western correspondents noted that the Lon Nol troops were armed with brand-new rifles of a type which the Cambodian army did not possess.

Prince Sihanouk's book, dictated in French, transcribed very well by Wilfred Burchett into English, and corrected by Prince Sihanouk himself, will fascinate lovers of Sihanoukiana. A casual reader might be led astray by the style to disbelieve most of its contents. That would be a pity. Prince Sihanouk did more for his country than anybody else in this saga. It is absolutely true that he got caught in a sinister plot. Thanks to Sihanouk, Cambodia came out best from the French Indochina war. Thanks to those who overthrew Sihanouk, Cambodia is coming out worst from the American Indochina war.

These books point in two directions as to future events. Caldwell and Lek imply that Sihanouk is not essential to the future revolution. Sihanouk gives an impression (while saying the opposite) that he *will* come back as an illegitimate leader. Newspaper reports that Sihanouk has already once returned to Cambodia were published after these books went to press. Any move to get Sihanouk out of China back to Cambodia (except as the legitimate head of state) is regarded by him as a CIA plot. Could some of these CIA plots have been arranged by the other side?—that parcel bomb attempt on the late King Suramarit's life, for example? Over the years what an effective piece of anti-American propaganda it has proved to be.

Caldwell and Lek do not pay attention to Sihanouk's claim that in his person the Sisowath and Norodom branches of the Cambodian royal family were united. They emphasise the Sisowath blood of Sirik Matak while ignoring the fact that Sihanouk's mother (now in China) is a formidable Sisowath herself. The details of Sihanouk's selection as King in 1941 are given by Reddi in his well-documented and competent study (pp. 80–82). Burchett thinks that only a minority of the Sisowath family supported the 1970 coup.

CHRISTOPHER PYM

In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking, 1959–1965. By Antonie C. A. Dake. Preface by Richard Lowenthal. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 1973. 479 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index.*

Communists in Indonesia. By Leslie Palmier. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 302 pp. Index. (The History of Communism; Eds.: F. W. Deakin and H. T. Willetts.) £5·75.*

THE feature which the present publications have in common is their conclusion about the origins of Colonel Untung's coup of September 30, 1965, against the Indonesian General Staff. The survival of General Suharto—or rather his mysterious exclusion from that bloody event—enabled the army to recover its balance. It proceeded to eliminate the PKI (Aidit's Communist Party of Indonesia) in an atmosphere of *jihad* and, somewhat more gently, to ease Sukarno out of his presidential seat. The external consequences were consistent and no less epic: the collapse of the Djakarta-Peking axis and Indonesia's realignment with the United States. What has seemed inconsistent was the involvement of the PKI in an adventurist coup after fifteen years' inexorable approach to power, latterly through a national-democratic front with Sukarno. The 'Cornell Report', which reads today [1] as fresh and persuasive as ever, dismissed the notion that the PKI leaders knew their rank-and-file were being used as assassins. Published trial testimony has since pointed to conscious involvement. But more interesting is what the regime has found it expedient to suppress—the mounting evidence, some posthumous, of Sukarno's own initiating role. This is the conclusion of both Dr. Dake and Dr. Palmier—though for the former the PKI was a leading conspirator once Sukarno had given the word, while Dr. Palmier doubts this. Both authors say (Dake more explicitly) that Sukarno had succumbed to advanced paranoia. It is a pity that Dake (for reasons of partisan contempt—p. 439) and Palmier (who still treats the 'Cornell Report' as anonymous—p. 252) should both have ignored the Report's intuitive arguments against a Sukarno plot. These were that it was entirely out of character for Sukarno to use such drastic methods, or to leave the detail of implementation to subordinates. It is precisely when full credit is given to these objections that the plausibility, indeed necessity, of the paranoia hypothesis becomes evident.

In other respects the two books differ. *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng* was a Berlin doctoral thesis, a work of zeal conceived in 1964 as a case study of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute upon a non-ruling communist party. There are traces of Dutch linguistic structure and an inundation of detail (sometimes speculative) in which the life-raft of analysis tends to get submerged. More serious is the disjunction between a framework of communist international relations, conceived before 1965, and an attempt to exploit the journalistic potential of *Gestapu.* For although the plot was predicated on the Chinese alliance, and Peking's amenability to Sukarno may be interpreted in terms of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the roots of the plot must lie (must they not?—like Aidit's evolving doctrine of the road to power) somewhere within the dynamics of Guided Democracy. The value of the inward-

[1] Since its distribution, unattributably, in January 1966, the Report has been made available as: Benedict R. Anderson, Ruth T. McVey (with Frederick P. Bunnell), *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia.* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. Interim Report Series. 1971.)

looking, culturally-attuned work of the Cornell group, Gunawan,[3] or Palmier, is unconsciously confirmed by gaps in the local scenery.

Although solicited for a popular series, *Communists in Indonesia* reveals its academic authorship, being a skilfully condensed history of the ISDV (the predecessor of the Communist Party) and three successive PKIs. International communism and rapid social change combine as key variables (traditional cultural divisions in Indonesia are neglected, however, and *Murba* fits awkwardly into the book's simplified categories of communist). The prose is utterly superb. But there are neither map nor photographs. Further, Dr. Palmier's sardonic turn of phrase presupposes an already convinced anti-communist audience—a condition not often granted among social science students these days. Part of the potential readership may thus react with irrational scepticism to what is in fact an excellent introduction to the subject.

ROGER KERSHAW

The Philippines. An Economic and Social Geography. By T. M. Burley. *London: Bell. 1973. 375 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £9·50.*

THE Philippines has always appeared to be very remote from the British and European public, including students of South-east Asian affairs, certainly more so than from their American counterparts. Most of the few comprehensive studies on the country in more recent years hail from the other side of the Atlantic. This is of course very much the result of the historical association between the Philippines and the United States dating back to the turn of the present century when Filipino nationalism was first kindled after centuries of Spanish rule. The ensuing decades saw the development of a close relationship between the two countries in peace and in war and, in more recent years, in international trade and foreign policy orientation.

Over the past decade, the exclusiveness of American influence in Filipino affairs has gradually declined to the extent that Japan has replaced the United States as the major trading partner of the Philippines, despite the fact that an extension of the Laurel-Langley preferential trade agreement, which expired in 1973 and which protected Filipino sugar exports to America, is still being sought. At the same time, the Philippines has been playing a more and more significant role in South-east Asian political affairs. As an exporter of such valuable resources as coconut products, sugar and a range of other agricultural produce, and metallic minerals such as copper and chromite, the Philippines can claim an important place in international affairs. As a Third World country, the impressive progress made in recent years, despite many internal political, social and economic problems, will be of great interest to students of economic development and social change. At this particular juncture, a succinctly written and yet comprehensive work like the one under review is particularly welcome.

Although Dr. Burley has sub-titled his book an economic and social geography, he has given the reader much more than a geographical background to the Philippines. He has certainly achieved his goal of writing a book that goes beyond the traditional objectives of studies in economic and

[3] Basuki Gunawan, *Kudeta, Staatsgreep in Djakarta.* (Meppel: J. A. Boom en Zoon. 1968.) Dake wrongly alludes to this work as a doctoral thesis (p. 439).

social geography. Its ten chapters can be divided into three parts: the urban and the rural scene; the place, the people and the regions; and the past, the present and the future, together with a concluding chapter. The volume is amply illustrated by over forty maps and diagrams and with no fewer than thirty-three statistical tables, many of which contain the most up-to-date materials. Amongst other useful features are the references accompanying each chapter, a selected bibliography at the end and a short glossary of terms used in the Tagalog dialect.

However, an undergraduate in geography might like to read first about the land and the people before delving into the more detailed case study of Barrio Trinidad or the industrial centre of Iligan city; it would then be easier to put these case studies into perspective. Or perhaps the general studies student in the sixth form would be able to appreciate the book more if he could learn about the country's history before dealing with the regional contrasts. For the benefit of the layman, the solitary photograph on the dust-jacket desperately needs an explanatory caption. Despite rising printing costs, the general reader's comprehension of modern Filipino society and the diversity of the Filipino milieu would be much enhanced by the inclusion of more illustrations.

These minor points notwithstanding, it has been a delight to read this excellent work by an author who has presented his intimate knowledge of the archipelago with such geographical skill, such experience of economic research and above all, with such analytical insight. This book is essential for those wishing to understand the Philippines and it should be recommended to all those who are interested in South-east Asia in particular and in Third World development in general.

RONALD C. Y. NG

NORTH AMERICA

The Best and the Brightest. By David Halberstam. *London: Barrie & Jenkins. 1973. 688 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

MR. HALBERSTAM claims to have conducted 500 interviews, to have read the press as well as the monographic and memoir literature of the Kennedy-Johnson period, and to have used the 'Pentagon Papers' in the preparation of this book, which is a study of the growing United States involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and, in particular, with the role of the President's advisers—'the best and the brightest' of the title—in that process. Mr. Halberstam is no newcomer to the Vietnam problem. He was the *New York Times's* Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent in Saigon at the time of the coup against Diem in 1963 and has written an interesting book on that period.[1] One would therefore expect the present book to be of considerable value. Unfortunately, it is nothing of the sort.

There are three main reasons for this. In the first place, there is Mr. Halberstam's use of his sources. He does not disclose who his informants were because 'the political climate is somewhat sensitive these days, and the relationship of reporter to source is very much under attack' (p. 669).

[1] David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire* (London: Bodley Head; New York: Random House. 1965).

This means that we have to take most of the anecdotes and direct quotations which appear in the book on trust, and our trust has sometimes been abused. Thus, one of 'the best and the brightest', Professor Walt W. Rostow, has disclosed that Mr. Halberstam never approached him, not even to check the veracity of remarks allegedly made by him and reported to Mr. Halberstam by third parties. This throws considerable doubt upon the author's methodology and, in particular, upon his claim to have carried out 'checking and cross-checking as carefully as [he] could' (p. 669). Indeed, one cannot help wondering how many of 'the best and the brightest' were treated in the same cavalier fashion as Professor Rostow.

Even when conflicting published sources are available, Mr. Halberstam does not always see fit to present both sides of the story. For example, in his account of the famous telegram of August 24, 1963, in which the United States administration first hinted that Diem might have to be replaced, the author paraphrases Roger Hilsman's version of how the telegram was cleared (p. 263). He does not mention General Maxwell Taylor's version, which conflicts with Hilsman's on a number of important points, despite the fact that the former's memoirs figure in his bibliography and were therefore presumably consulted by him. Similarly, in his account of the raids on the Buddhist pagodas, which resulted in the despatch of the telegram in question, Mr. Halberstam quotes John Mecklin to the effect that the raids were a betrayal of Diem's promise to the outgoing American ambassador, Frederick J. Nolting (p. 262). Mr. Mecklin, whose book on these events was published in 1965, may be forgiven for taking Mr. Nolting's name in vain; but Mr. Halberstam could and should have read the latter's interview in the magazine *US News and World Report* in July 1971 in which he said that he does not blame Diem for moving against the pagodas.

Secondly, the book is riddled with errors. To cite a few: Walt Rostow is misquoted on page 123. John Foster Dulles did not say that Dien Bien Phu was 'a blessing in disguise' in 1954 (p. 145); he said it two years later when the situation was quite different. It is absurd to claim on page 149 that there is 'no such thing' as an anti-communist nationalism in Vietnam, especially when the reader is told on page 250 that the Buddhist crisis of 1963 'offered the population, for the first time under the Diem government, an outlet for latent nationalist forces'. The Griffin mission of 1950 was not sent to Indo-China 'to determine whether or not to send arms and other military equipment to the French' (p. 335); it was an economic assistance mission.

Finally, and most important of all, the book is grossly unfair to persons whose views do not happen to coincide with Mr. Halberstam's. Nowhere does this emerge more clearly than in the author's treatment of Dean Rusk. Thus, we are told that the fact that Rusk was not 'burned' by the outcry over the 'loss' of China in 1949 'should have been some kind of warning'. Yet, as Mr. Halberstam admits on the very next page, '. . . Rusk went to [the Far East division of the State Department] *after* China had fallen; it was a *fait accompli*, and he was in no way involved' (pp. 324–325). A few pages later, the author writes: 'the best people, who had correctly predicted the fall of China, would see their careers destroyed, but Dean Rusk, who failed to predict the Chinese entry into the Korean War, would see his career accelerate' (p. 343). Anyone would think that Mr. Rusk was solely responsible for the failure of American intelligence on this point! When Mr. Halberstam cannot think of any mistakes (real or imagined) to lay

at Mr. Rusk's door, he resorts to crude personal insults, as when he refers to the 'dowdy' appearance of the Rusks at receptions during the Kennedy era and jeers at Mr. Rusk's alleged reputation as a ladies' man during his wartime service in the China-Burma-India theatre: 'The first and last hint of Dean Rusk the swinger' (pp. 34, 36). It is particularly instructive to compare Mr. Halberstam's uncharitable interpretation of Mr. Rusk with his kid-glove treatment of the late John McNaughton (p. 362 *et seq.*), who, from a reading of the 'Pentagon Papers', emerges as by no means the least important architect of America's Vietnam policy.

In short, the impression is of a badly documented, inaccurate and malicious book. In writing it, Mr. Halberstam has not only done a great disservice to his own reputation as a responsible journalist, but also to his central thesis, which, whether one agrees with it or not, at least deserves serious examination: namely, that United States involvement in Vietnam was a disaster brought about largely by the advice and actions of politically irresponsible men.

GEOFFREY WARNER

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. By Robert A. Packenham. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1973. 395 pp. Index. $15.00.*

THE author, an associate professor of political science at Stanford University, has written a book which explains the ideas underlying the doctrines of government policy-makers and the theories of social scientists concerned with development. His thesis is that American development goals for the Third World were based on unrealistic liberal assumptions. According to these premises, foreign aid would promote economic development, which in turn would lead to political stability, democracy, peace and anti-communism.

The book shows that these ideas were accepted by presidents and administrators of both major political parties between 1947 and 1968. These assumptions appeared in justification of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Point Four, the Alliance for Progress and other aid programmes. These ideas, moreover, were sometimes explicit and often implicit in the writings of social scientists, such as Burgess, Friedrich, Finer, Lipset, Almond, Verba, Pye and others.

Drawing on the work of Louis Hartz and Samuel P. Huntington, Packenham contends that these assumptions were influenced by the 'American liberal tradition'. The United States, the author explains, did not experience in its own revolution the kinds of violence and upheaval which characterised the French and Russian revolutions. The American revolution was more moderate and reformist, and this unique revolutionary experience had an enormous influence on American attitudes from colonial times to the present.

The American liberal tradition, according to Packenham, was characterised by four assumptions: 1) change and development are easy; 2) all good things go together; 3) radicalism and revolution are bad; 4) distributing power is more important than accumulating power. Government policy-makers and social scientists concerned with development expressed ideas consistent with this tradition. They believed that Third World countries could copy the American experience and achieve rapid economic develop-

ment. They felt that the goals of economic development, political stability and democracy would 'go together'. They favoured reformist rather than radical change. Even when they sided with right-wing authoritarian regimes, they hoped to alter the character of those regimes by encouraging free elections, pluralistic voluntary associations, competitive parties and strong legislatures.

The author avoids falling into any ideological camp. He is critical of the utopianism of the policy makers' and theorists' assumptions, but he is equally able to find fault with the revisionists who offer a radical critique of American foreign policy. Although he favours aid to Third World countries, he argues that the United States should be selective about its aid, helping those governments with the 'will and capacity to cope with and generate continuing transformation toward economic development, social equity and certain kinds of political freedoms among other values' (p. 350). Although this policy would include aiding radical regimes, Packenham concludes with a conservative recommendation: 'We should learn to live more comfortably with a world of diversity and to allow political systems to evolve in their own ways. When in doubt we should restrain ourselves more and seek to impose our own preferences less' (p. 350).

The book makes an important contribution to the literature of political development through its perceptive analysis of ideas. The work is balanced. It is careful to point out that ideology alone does not explain American foreign policy, and that security and other considerations must be taken into account.

HERBERT M. LEVINE

The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. By Robert James Maddox. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1973. 169pp. Index. $7.95. £3·60.*

New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians. The American Revisionists. By Joseph M. Siracusa. *Port Washington, N.Y., London: National University Publications/Kennikat Press. 1973. 138 pp. Bibliog. Index. (National University Publications Series in American Studies; Gen. Ed.: James P. Shenton.) $6.95.*

No doubt it all began with Charles Beard, who, starting with an economic interpretation of the constitution, ended up by alleging that Franklin Roosevelt manoeuvred the United States into war. The historical sleuths got on to Beard's trail, notably the indefatigable Robert E. Brown, and convicted him of gross errors both of fact and interpretation. It made surprisingly little difference either to Beard's influence or to the spread of revisionist history. Now, in the wake of the Second World War, Korea, the cold war and Vietnam, we have a new revisionism, that of the New Left, at least as flourishing as the old.

Mr. Maddox's book subjects the New Left to a Robert E. Brown treatment, at least in respect of what is perhaps its central historiographic preoccupation, the origins of the cold war. He traces its development through the writings of seven principal diplomatic historians: William Appleman Williams, in many ways the forerunner and partner of the rest; D. F. Fleming, a *simpliste* conservative neither very new nor very Left; Gar

Alperovitz, a widely influential expounder of American ' atomic diplomacy '; David Horowitz, an influential publicist; D. F. Kolko, master of an opaque and heavily abstractionist style; D. S. Clemens, author of an arresting study of the Yalta Conference; and Lloyd Gardner, a persuasive analyst of dollar diplomacy and American economic penetration. In general Mr. Maddox's procedure with each author is the same, to test his reliability by comparing the sources used with the conclusions reached. The result is a mass of evidence which at the least demonstrates considerable carelessness on the part of the authors examined and very frequently points to deliberate participation or perversion. Not all the authors stand equally guilty: Williams, Clemens and Gardner might easily get off with suspended sentences. But a formidable indictment is returned against the rest. Will they succeed in laughing it off, as Beard laughed off Brown? Do facts, accuracy, logic, reasonableness matter when ideological issues are at stake? The reception accorded to Mr. Maddox's book will constitute an interesting test of the standards now current in the profession of diplomatic history.

Dr. Siracusa's ill-written and badly proof-read volume covers much of the same ground as Mr. Maddox's, though its object is more general—simply to survey New Left historiography as such. This it does by providing a précis of the principal writings, together with some background on the authors. There is little or no attempt at assessment and only a very little, low grade, analysis.

H. G. NICHOLAS

Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy. By Russell D. Buhite. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1973. 342 pp. Bibliog. Illus. Index. £6·55.*

PATRICK Hurley, like Bernard Baruch, was one of those figures who seem to thrive on the periphery of power in the United States. He is but dimly remembered today, yet in 1944–45, as American ambassador to China, he was at the centre of great events, although his power to affect them was far less than he assumed.

His career was a remarkable one. A son of poor Irish immigrants, he grew up in Oklahoma with no advantages other than a handsome presence and a consuming ambition. Virtually self-taught, he became a successful lawyer in the oil-boom city of Tulsa, and later went to Washington as national attorney for the Choctaw Indians. His gregarious ways, ability to cultivate important people, and a prestigious marriage, ensured his financial, political and social arrival.

In 1928 Hurley backed Hoover for President, and the following year became his Secretary of War. The future of the Philippines was then at issue, and, apprehensive of the growing power of Japan, Hurley advised Hoover against granting independence.

Undismayed by the rise of Roosevelt and the Democrats, Hurley was eager to serve the new President whom he genuinely admired. For his part, Roosevelt was attracted by Hurley, whose personality was in some ways a caricature of his own. With his penchant for personal contacts, and his dislike and distrust of the State Department and its Foreign Service, the President employed Hurley—now given the rank of ' General '—on a variety of wartime missions. These culminated in his appointment as Roosevelt's personal envoy, and later as ambassador, to Chiang Kai-shek.

After the recall of Stilwell, which he helped to procure, Hurley saw his chief task as bringing about the union of the Kuomintang and Communist armies under a government led by Chiang Kai-shek, but in which the Communists would take part. Such a scheme, which ran counter to the advice of the Foreign Service officers, had small chance of success, and in November 1945, tired and frustrated, Hurley resigned in a fit of pique. He was subsequently taken up by the Republican extremists, his extravagant justifications of his China policy and allegations of State Department 'conspiracies' helping to swell the hysteria of the McCarthy years.

Miscast as a diplomat, Hurley was essentially a man with a commonplace mind, prone to outbursts of fury, and inwardly insecure. The author is naturally interested in how he got as far as he did. He has written an excellent, critical study of this flamboyant figure—who first greeted an astonished Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai with a blood-curdling Indian war-whoop—and has shed additional light on a crucial period in American foreign policy.

BRIAN PORTER

To Save A Nation. American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II. By Geoffrey S. Smith. *New York: Basic Books. 1973. (Distrib. in U.K. by Harper and Row.) 244 pp. Index. $10.00. £4·80.*

THE period of the New Deal saw, not only significant changes in the composition of the major American parties, but also a great upsurge of movements on the political fringe. On the left, the Communists and Socialists, and smaller groups of Trotskyites, Lovestoneites and other dissident sects competed ferociously for the allegiance of those, living mostly in New York City, ideologically conscious enough to care. More important were those leaders, loosely defined as belonging to the 'radical right', who sought a mass constituency by reviving the populist traditions of the Middle West and the South. Roosevelt himself was well aware of the threat posed by Huey Long, Father Coughlin and Dr. Townsend; and he was fortunate that Long, the most dangerous of the demagogues, was removed in 1935. Of these major figures, Coughlin is the only one to play a part in Mr. Smith's study of counter-subversive movements. Beginning as a critic of international bankers and a fervent supporter of Roosevelt, Coughlin moved unsteadily into opposition, attacking Roosevelt as sympathetic to Communists and as a warmonger determined to drag the United States into the war against Germany for the sake of a Britain and a France not worth saving. What brings Coughlin within the scope of Mr. Smith's book was his growing obsession with the belief that a conspiracy of Communists and, by implication, Jews, was leading America into wrong courses of action. Coughlin's rhetoric, from his early attacks on international finance (itself, in mythology, dominated by Jews) to his attacks on Bolshevism (where the same stock figure could be blamed), led to his condemnation as an anti-Semite, and allowed his enemies to place him in the same category as the lunatic nativist anti-Semite William Dudley Pelley, and the German agent Fritz Kuhn of the German-American *Bund*.

Pelley was a buffoon, whose organisation, the Silver Shirts, had its headquarters in the South, and whose rambling and incoherent racism would not have disgraced the Ku-Klux-Klan. Kuhn was an aspirant *Gauleiter*

who was eventually convicted for misusing the *Bund's* funds. Mr. Smith deals with them as fully as they deserve. On Father Coughlin he has little to add to what is already known, but he is right to emphasise the damage which Coughlin suffered from his association in the public mind with disreputable anti-Semitic publicists. Mr. Smith shows that the identification of Coughlin, Pelley and Kuhn with the practices of a Nazi Germany which American opinion found increasingly repugnant led to their downfall. The isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had to be vigilant in distancing themselves from these proponents of racial hatred; as Charles Lindbergh, pilloried for an incautious remark about Jewish influence, was to discover.

Despite his rather ponderous style—he believes that 'solons' is an acceptable synonym for 'legislators'—Mr. Smith reveals much interesting information about groups whose historical insignificance he convincingly demonstrates: Coughlin apart, they require no further attention, except as footnotes in the sad story of American political pathology.

GERARD EVANS

American Military Commitments Abroad. By Roland A. Paul. *New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1973. 257 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $10.00.*

MR. Paul, who is a lawyer, was chief counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States security agreements abroad which held hearings in 1969–70 under Senator Symington's chairmanship. The book is an account of United States commitments, arising from treaties, agreements, declarations and other less precise obligations entered into since the Second World War, and is very useful. Mr. Paul begins by demonstrating what a wide variety of commitments is involved and then goes on to identify, with some observations about American governmental structures, the influence of overseas commitments on the defence budget and the influence which the maintenance of these commitments brings to the United States. As an introductory account it is all very helpful. But, at the level of critical commentary, it is not especially percipient or extensive.

PETER NAILOR

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America: A Short History. By George Camacho. *London: Allen Lane. 1973. 298 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50. Paperback: £1·50.*

IN his *Latin America: A Short History* George Camacho gives us a vivid and highly readable account of the history of the continent from the conquest to the present day. In doing this he answers a real need for a clear and balanced introduction to the subject in English.

Mr. Camacho's intention is to 'concentrate on the significant events and basic trends' (p. 229), and not to produce 'twenty brief histories', and he goes far towards achieving his goal by continually changing his perspective in order to emphasise the dominant characteristics of any one period. Thus, the later 19th century is discussed largely in the context of his chapter on immigration from Europe, the early 20th century in his chapter on the

Mexican revolution, the interwar period in a chapter which deals with the exploitation of mineral (and especially oil) resources, and so on. In this way he makes economical use of his brief narrative, including chapters on the military (regrettably short) and the Cuban revolution. In general, he is strongest on the Independence period and the present century. We learn relatively little about 19th-century Spanish America, though there is an informative sketch of the Empire in Brazil.

Although the book is structured in such a way as to highlight ' significant events ', Mr. Camacho evidently believes that it is people who make history, and not people in general, but the great men of history. These are seen as creating precedents which others will follow. They shape events and determine outcomes. The history of the conquest is almost a personal history of Cortes; the Independence wars are described in terms of the exploits of San Martín and Bolívar. Mexico in the 19th century, we are told, ' was subject to three dominating personalities, Antonio López de Santa Anna until 1855, Benito Juárez until 1876, and Porfirio Díaz until 1910 ' (p. 116). This approach helps Mr. Camacho to lead us through the complicated roundabout of presidents and constitutions, and simplifies the task of providing synopses of complex chains of events, but it must be said that his belief in great men sometimes verges on a reverence for strong men, and this has the effect of distorting the narrative. ' Madero was an impractical idealist, small in stature and with a high-pitched voice, almost ludicrous as a worthy opponent for Diaz ' (p. 149). Díaz in Mexico, Gómez in Venezuela, Machado in Cuba, are seen as bringing stability and prosperity to their countries by ruthlessly suppressing discontents, and attracting foreign capital. The social costs are not counted.

While Mr. Camacho offers an impressive amount of detail, his approach entails certain sacrifices. Analysis of the larger social and economic forces acting on the ' significant events ' he describes is sometimes simplistic, and more often absent. For instance, the role of Rosas in the creation of modern Argentina is examined in some detail, but we learn nothing of the origins and economic bases of the Federalist/Unitarian struggle of the time. A notable exception to this rule is the author's recurrent mention of foreign interests and influences, and the changing pattern of exploitation of the continent's resources. And he partially corrects the bias in his general approach in his penultimate chapter on ' New Economic Patterns '.

Given the scope of the book, and the vigour with which Mr. Camacho attacks every aspect of his subject, minor distortions and occasional lapses are easily excused (the reference to Rubén Darío's book as *Rosas Profanas* on p. 142 instead of *Prosas Profanas* is most likely a publisher's error). The book can be recommended to any student approaching the subject for the first time, and to anyone who wishes to remind himself of the diversity and historical richness of the continent.

J. FOWERAKER

Spanish America 1900–1970: Tradition and Social Innovation. By Frederick B. Pike. *London: Thames & Hudson. 1973. 180 pp. Bibliog. Illus. Index. (Library of World Civilization. Gen. Ed.: Geoffrey Barraclough.) £2·25. Paperback: £1·25.*

THE pictures which illustrate Frederick Pike's *Spanish America 1900–1970* are exceptionally good. They are the best thing about the book. Some come in colour, but most in black and white. Many contain their own ironies. The

picture of the Uruguayan branch of General Motors in the 1920s (p. 39) shows the factory, with automobiles lining both sides of the street outside. The only thing moving is a horse and cart in the middle distance.

'This book examines the uncanny skill of the directing classes of Spanish America in preserving the traditional social order against the multiple forces of change' (p. 9). The directing classes are rich, urban, educated, bourgeois or aristocratic (with some sort of industrial or commercial interests, unless they are landlords), and, above all, white. They form the 'dominant culture', in Pike's terminology. The rest of the population are lumped into the 'sub-culture' which includes the poor, rural, uneducated peasants, and anyone who is black, brown or Indian. This 'sub-culture' often seems synonymous with 'culture of poverty'. The author examines the cultural dimensions of a social and economic structure which encompasses vast masses of the very poor, and a handful of the very rich.

The main area of concern is with the culture of the dominant group, their ideas and ideologies, and how these equipped them to resist the pressures from below. The Church figures largely in the analysis, and Pike describes how old Conservative-Liberal differences were forgotten as the ruling classes rallied behind the Church in its work of defusing social tensions by promoting 'remedial' action within the sub-culture. This illustrates an important aspect of his thesis: that the dominant culture perceives the forces for change and acts to contain them. Paternalism and patronage are seen as the key mechanisms in appeasing the masses.

Most sectors of the middle classes identify with the ruling classes. Although the bourgeoisie is initially motivated by money (and the aristocracy by more 'spiritual' concerns) it merely muddles through with the help of foreign capital, and nearly always acts to defend the aristocracy. 'The dominant culture closed ranks in defense of a society attuned more to aristocratic than bourgeois values' (p. 167). Here, Pike's categorical assertions seem to rely on extrapolation from his greater knowledge and experience of Chile. In general, the very conceptual clarity of his model, which he attempts to apply uniformly to the different countries, tends in some instances to make the analysis teleological. He is best on Bolivia and Chile, but the cases of Argentina and Venezuela evidently proved more intractable.

Pike writes from the point of view of the aristocratic part of the dominant culture. 'Perhaps it will be kinder to the men of the sub-culture not to awaken their expectations of greater material wealth or to encourage their desire for a system that will give to them substantially beyond their needs' (p. 168). He sometimes appears as patronising as the aristocrats, and with less excuse. The physical and emotional deprivations of the masses are viewed as merely cultural characteristics, and not as social realities.

J. FOWERAKER

Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution. Edited by James Petras. *New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley. 1973. 274 pp. Bibliog. £4·50. Paperback: £2·80.*

Latin America—A Broader World Role. By Adalbert Krieger Vasena and Javier Pazos. *London, Tonbridge: Benn; Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1973. 207 pp. Index. £3·25.*

Latin America: British Trade and Investment. By Robert Marrett. *London, Tonbridge: Charles Knight. 1973. 248 pp. Maps. Index. £4·00.*

South America. Edited by Alice Taylor. *Newton Abbot: David and Charles in cooperation with the American Geographical Society. 1973. 274 pp. Maps. Index. (Focus Series; Ed.: Alice Taylor.) £4·25.*

THESE four books offer an interesting contrast, for their approach to Latin America, and to South America only in one of them, is wholly different each from the other. And yet they have a common thread, a linking theme, which though they express it differently, amounts to the same thing: that the countries of Latin America are growing in importance and self-confidence, and are clearly not going to be satisfied with a subservient position in the concert of nations. 'Latin America', writes James Petras, in the preface to the book he has edited (and largely written), 'was developing a whole new set of options that did not "fit" the patterns prescribed by the United States or Latin American social scientists' (p. viii). John W. Tuthill, Director General of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, who writes the preface to the book by Adalbert Krieger Vasena and Javier Pazos, puts it another way: '. . . one thing is common to the entire area; its citizens are becoming increasingly aware that they are not getting a fair share of what the world has to offer' (p. 6). Sir Robert Marett implies much the same when he writes: 'Latin America is today passing through a phase of intense nationalism . . .' (p. viii). Alice Taylor writes of how 'new ideas, attitudes and technology' in the less developed world are beginning 'to challenge ancient traditions and patterns of living'; and she continues: '. . . people are beginning to question political, economic and social organizations that fail to alleviate poverty and injustice' (p. vii).

The title of the first of these books is a little misleading for it is mainly concerned with Chile, Brazil and Argentina, with the Latin American policy of the United States and with the reaction of the United States to the expropriation of American enterpises in Chile. The book was completed before the overthrow of the late President Allende but the account and analysis of how things were developing are illuminating and contain much useful information. Much the same may be said about the treatment of Argentina and Brazil, not least the Brazilian economic 'miracle'; it is strange that only preliminary estimates of the annual percentage growth of the gross national product for 1968–70 are given, although definitive figures up to 1971 have long been available. The attempt to show that the Monroe Doctrine has been the spearhead of United States imperialism in Latin America is not convincing. It is difficult to believe that the policy of the United States would have been any different if Monroe had never announced it. Nevertheless this book contains much that is valuable and has a refreshingly new approach. The absence of an index is regrettable.

Krieger Vasena and Pazos have written a powerful and hard-hitting book with firm opinions. They have many recommendations to make, but basically they advocate accelerated economic growth, greater efficiency in all sectors, rapid development in manufacturing industries so that Latin America can claim a share in the expansion of world trade in manufactured goods, and a sufficient unity and co-ordination of policies to enable the area to negotiate multilaterally with world trade blocs. The authors are men of ability and experience: Krieger Vasena as a government minister, bank director and professor in Argentina, and Pazos as Director of the Cuban

Planning Commission, a guerrilla fighter under Che Guevara, and later, as a Venezuelan citizen, as a consultant to the Venezuelan Ministry of Development. Both men have had international experience and neither is easily persuaded to change his mind. As a result it proved impossible to reconcile their views with those of the steering committee set up by the Atlantic Institute to provide guidance and comment on the early drafts. An appendix includes comments from each of the five members of the committee and these provide a much more thorough and complete review than is possible in these pages; those of the chairman, the Mexican Victor L. Urquidi, are of particular interest. The book is well indexed.

Sir Robert Marett's book is much less high-powered and comprehensive. As he modestly says in the preface, he has sought to produce a 'practical man's guide' rather than 'an academic study in depth of Latin American problems'. Sir Robert writes pleasantly and readably and it is impossible not to sympathise with what amounts to a plea for Britain to make greater and bolder efforts, both in trade and investments, to participate in Latin American development. His chapter on the prospects for British trade is, on the whole, optimistic. He is able to point to some encouraging signs; one example is the increase in British exports to Brazil from a nadir of £10 million in 1965 to £84 million in 1971 (p. 105). Sir Robert is admirably accurate where he has been able to check the facts, but occasionally a bit shaky when he relies on memory. Thus, Mr. Tom Gale, to whom he pays a deserved tribute (p. 221), was not responsible for all the 450 daily rebroadcasts in the BBC's Latin American Service during the war; only for many of those in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Gale's great triumph was the erection of a vast purpose-built rhombic antenna on the property of the Mexican national telecommunications centre. This and the use of a French transmitter in Brazzaville to beam London transmissions to Mexico, helped to overcome the technical problems of radio broadcasts from Britain to Mexico. But these are minor blemishes in a curiously engaging book; there is a useful index.

Alice Taylor has edited a book about South America only, including Guyana, French Guiana and Surinam, which forms part of the *Focus Series*, and is published in co-operation with the American Geographical Society. Inescapably, in a book which includes contributions from some seventeen writers, it is of uneven quality, particularly the studies of the individual countries; but they should constitute a useful reference for those whose need for information does not require an analysis of any depth in terms of social and political conditions. Some of the subject studies which form the first part of the book, in particular a contribution by David A. Morse, formerly Director General of the ILO, are on a higher level. Mr Morse outlines briefly and lucidly the conflict between the desire for rapid economic growth and the need to reduce unemployment; it is difficult for nations aspiring to achieve economic emancipation to encourage low technology and labour-intensive industries, even though they require less capital, particularly in the light of the accelerated growth policies of Mexico and Brazil. The book is well indexed.

All these four books have been published in a year which may prove to be a turning-point for most of the nations they deal with. It is not just that none has been able to take into account the fall of Allende in Chile and the election of Perón in Argentina; it is also that in 1973 terms of trade, almost for the first time in a period of relative peace, were moving

in favour of primary producing countries. If this development continues, Latin America may well present a very different picture and play a much more important role in world trade.

J. A. Camacho

Guide to the Political Parties of South America. Rev. ed. By Jean-Pierre Bernard *et al.* Translated by Michael Perl. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1973. 574 pp. (Pelican Latin American Library; Gen. Ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·90.*

One of the admirable characteristics of the Pelican Latin American Library is its willingness to publish translations of European books about Latin America and so make known in the United Kingdom some of the expertise and scholarship which Europe can offer. It is a useful corrective to the flood of material from the United States, and is often of inherent distinction. This book is an example, first published in France by Armand Colin in 1969, and brought up to date for the English edition. There is clearly no obligation on writers and editors of works about Latin America to deal with the whole area. But in a book that sets out to explain the political parties of South America, it is a disadvantage to exclude Mexico, whose constitution of 1917 has so powerfully affected political thought in the rest of the area, and Cuba, whose Castro regime has radically changed the party political structure of several countries. It is odd, for example, to write about the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) in Venezuela, to say it 'was a socialist party of the people, inspired by "Fidelism" . . . ' (p. 557), and yet be unable to include in the same book a full explanation of what 'Fidelism' is and how it arose. This book invites comparison with Robert J. Alexander's *Latin American Political Parties* [1] which has two advantages over the Pelican book: it covers the whole area and it is well indexed, though it is fair to add that it is much more expensive. The absence of an index and the scantiness of information in the Contents reduce the practical value of this latest addition to the Pelican Latin American Library.

J. A. Camacho

Le Régime Modernisateur du Brésil, 1964–1972. Etude sul les interactions politico-économiques dans un régime militaire contemporain. By Georges-André Fiechter. *Leyden: Sijthoff; Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. 1972. 296 pp. Bibliog. Index.*

The astonishing economic development of Brazil since 1964, when João Goulart was forced out of office and fled to Uruguay, is perhaps one of the few such cases which merits the journalistic description of economic miracle. Between 1947 and 1955 Brazil made steady economic progress with an average annual growth in the gross domestic product of 6·8 per cent. But this figure fell to 3·2 per cent in 1956, the year in which Juscelino Kubitschek took office with Goulart as his Vice-President. In spite of the President's efforts to encourage an economic boom, the grossly inflationary effect of the building of the new capital, Brasilia, and the

[1] New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1974, p. 175.

erratic behaviour of his successor, Jânio Quadros, succeeded in turn by the extravagant Goulart, between them brought about something approaching economic chaos; in 1963 the growth in the gross domestic product had sunk to 1·5 per cent. And yet, within four years of the army takeover, not only was the economy restored, but the growth of the gross domestic product had risen to 9·3 per cent and has remained at about that figure or above (11·3 per cent in 1971) ever since.

This painstaking and well documented study makes a careful analysis and attempts an explanation of how this has come about. The author has drawn upon an impressive range of sources and the bibliography takes up nineteen pages, in addition to the copious footnotes throughout the text. The approach is comprehensive; the author does not restrict his study to economic matters and the politics, historical background and social structure are all admirably covered. Nor has he neglected the criticism of repression and brutality levelled at the military regime, not least by the Church and in particular by Dom Helder Câmara. Like so many students of Brazil, M. Fiechter is enamoured of its people which he describes in his introduction as:

> . . . *un peuple mêlant à une profonde fierté nationale, la chaleur humaine, l'esprit d'entreprise, la tolérance, un certain anti-conformisme mâtiné d'humour, une sensibilité pleine de prévenances, une débrouillardise souriante, l'amour des femmes, du rythme et du football* . . . (p. xi).

Perhaps this, and the brilliant successs achieved by the Finance Minister, Antonio Delfim Netto, make the author more willing to accept an authoritarian regime.

He concludes:

> *Bien que, pour les élites intellectuelles, la stratégie choisie n'ait pas toujours été satisfaisante sur le plan de justice distributive ou de la liberté démocratique, pour une partie importante du peuple le modèle de croissance accélérée a déjà porté des fruits.* (p. 250).

In saying this he is no doubt influenced by the result of a poll, published in 1970 in which 57 per cent declared themselves either a little or much better off, 68 per cent thought that the availability of employment had increased and 63 per cent believed that social services to wage earners had substantially improved; but the sample was small (500) and restricted to city dwellers.

The book nevertheless is as valuable as its conception was bold. The index is restricted to names of people, places and organisations; it does not include subjects. It is a pity that in so carefully prepared a study there should be evidence of careless production. In the copy here reviewed pages 114/5 and 122/123 are blank.

J. A. CAMACHO

The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression. By Carlos María Gutiérrez. Translated by Richard E. Edwards. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1973. 172 pp. Bibliog. $6.95. £2·75.*

THE value of this book lies in the fact that it exposes once again the unabashed and almost unconcealed intervention of United States interests in the government of the Dominican Republic. The author begins by explaining that apparently all that remains of the regime of 'Benefactor and Generalissimo Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina is a run-down cement plat-

form choked with weeds . . . . ' (p. 9); this was the plinth of Trujillo's statue. But this is not wholly accurate; for there is another reminder of the 'Benefactor' in the person of the President: Dr. Joaquín Balaguer. He was the titular president when assassination brought the Trujillo regime to an end. He is now serving his second term of office since United States military intervention prevented the restoration of Juan Bosch, which would otherwise have been achieved by the constitutionalist revolution of Colonel Francisco Caamaño in 1965.

It is fair to say that the author, a well-known left-wing Uruguayan journalist, warns that the book is based on his own material filed for a news agency. The book would be more valuable if it were less journalistic and more scholarly; it would be more readable if Gutiérrez had been better served by his translator. Some passages can only be understood by translating back into Spanish, and even then there are sentences which will surely baffle any reader: 'Balaguer's opponents agree that the apparatus of repression functions with a resolute autonomy from visible political authority' (p. 23). Obscure passages of this kind and the absence of an index greatly detract from the value of a book which contains a great deal of valuable information. There is a brief but useful bibliography.

J. A. CAMACHO

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. Second Series. Vol. XIII. Naval Policy and Defence Requirements July 1934–March 1936. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London: H.M.S.O. 1973. 945 pp. £10·50.*

THE main theme in the present volume of British *Documents* is British reactions to Japanese and Nazi German naval ambitions, and their implications for France, Russia and the United States in the mid-1930s. At the end of 1934 the Japanese denounced the Washington naval limitation treaty of 1922 and demanded equality at sea with the two Anglo-Saxon powers. At the same time the American administration of Franklin Roosevelt was alarmed by proposed increases in British naval tonnage and disagreed with Britain that any upper limit for cruiser strength (not provided for in the 1922 treaty) should be freely available for distributing over any number of vessels. When the London Naval Conference finally met on December 9, 1935 to find a successor to the expiring London naval treaty of 1930, all that could be achieved was agreement on the exchange of information about naval strengths; even so, Japan withdrew from the negotiations when its claim for a 'common upper limit' (a polite form of the claim for equality) was rejected. At the same time, Britain had offended another friendly state, France, by accepting Hitler's 'offer', as it was called, of 35 per cent of the naval strength of the British Commonwealth, a formula included in the Anglo-German naval treaty, signed in 1935 on the anniversary of Waterloo. France regarded this as a British legalisation of Hitler's breach of the demilitarisation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, while Britain considered that unless the German 'offer' were accepted there would be no chance of controlling German rearmament. The price which Hitler had to pay for this wedge driven into the Entente was merely a show

of interest in a European air pact and an Eastern Locarno which France desperately wanted.

These intricate developments can be traced through the Foreign Office papers here, chosen with their customary skill by the three editors. Professor Medlicott has written an explanatory Preface as a guide for the reader. Among the many interesting documents included in this volume is a characteristic Cabinet memorandum (no. 14) written by Neville Chamberlain when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer proposing a detente with Japan regardless of its effects on Washington. 'As for U.S.A.', he declared, 'don't let us be browbeaten by her'. Three years later, as Prime Minister, he was putting these suggestions into effect.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. V. The Campaign in Sicily and the Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944. By C. J. C. Molony *et al. London: H.M.S.O. 1973. 921 pp. Maps. Illus. Index. (History of The Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series; Ed.: Sir James Butler.) £10·50.*

THIS volume, covering the Sicilian and the first half of the Italian campaigns, is one of the most successful in the Military Series. Apart from those on operations in Burma, none has set its authors more daunting problems. It is in the very nature of mountain warfare, as the writers point out, that actions by sub-units tend to have a quite disproportionate significance. In Sicily and Italy such actions were myriad, and thus there was a danger of losing sight of the wood because of a plethora of trees. The authors, however, have marshalled their masses of detail skilfully, and whenever the occasion arises—Salerno, Anzio, Cassino—they broaden their scope to provide a suitable canvas for the great set-pieces. One of the merits of this volume is the distinguished quality of its descriptive prose: in particular the topographical passages, so important for these campaigns, are excellent. None of its predecessors, moreover, has surpassed it in keeping the reader continually abreast of the enemy's thinking in pace with that of the Allies. Another unusual feature, for an official history, is the openness and frankness which pervades the authors' interjected comments and assessments—best illustrated, perhaps, by the fact that what stands out most strikingly from their narrative is the unmatched professionalism of the Germans throughout campaigns notable for the bravery of Allied troops, if not for the brilliance of their generals. Nor is all this a dead letter. Those currently concerned about Nato and the United States could learn much from the relations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff, between Montgomery and Patton, and between Alexander and Mark Clark as they are displayed within these pages.

RONALD LEWIN

At the End of the Day: 1961–1963. By Harold Macmillan. *London: Macmillan. 1973. 572 pp. Illus. Index. £4·50.*

THIS is perhaps the best of the six volumes of Mr. Macmillan's memoirs. It is far better, at all events, than Volume V, although possibly it is too long. Most interesting is the chapter dealing with the Cuban crisis. Mr. Macmillan gives a running account of his contacts with the late President

Kennedy throughout the crisis and thus gives the lie to those who said at the time that Britain was not consulted. The extent of the deterioration in Anglo-American relations since 1962 is easily realised when we consider that Britain was not consulted about the nuclear alert in 1973.

The author's comments about Britain's economic crisis in 1961 prompts the remark that *plus ça change plus c'est la même chose*. He faced the same difficulties over wage restraint in 1961 as Mr. Heath did in 1973, with the TUC declaring that it would have nothing to do with any incomes policy (p. 108). The problems facing Britain then, internally and externally, were terrifying, just as they were in 1973. 'No one seems to realise their complexity, although the public are dimly aware of the dangers, and *resent* being the victims, when, in so many ways life could be so agreeable' (pp. 47–48). Another problem that was becoming acute in 1961 was immigration (Chapter III). There was also in 1962 a marked swing in favour of the Liberal Party (p. 58).

Mr. Macmillan writes endearingly about having no financial advisers to hinder him when he began expounding his ideas on monetary reform to Kennedy at the end of 1961 (p. 147). Sometimes one had the impression that Mr. Heath, too, was acting without benefit of financial advisers. When one reflects what these experts did for Winston Churchill when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and for the National Government in 1931, one may conclude that financial advisers are best left in the children's playroom.

Mr. Macmillan adds little to our knowledge of the Profumo affair; nor does he throw much light on the sacking of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and other cabinet ministers in 1962. The trouble with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was that he was far too loyal; too loyal to Eden during the Suez crisis, and too loyal to Mr. Macmillan in the subsequent years. All that the author tells us, in effect, was that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was very tired after carrying the burden of two of the highest offices of state for a considerable period.

There is perhaps one glimpse of the real Macmillan in this book. He comes out of the shadows of his carefully cultivated Edwardian façade in what he writes about the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. 'When the President gave me, on the telephone, the news which we had not yet got,'—about the conclusion of the treaty—'I had to go out of the room. I went to tell Dorothy and burst into tears. I have prayed hard for this, night after night' (p. 487).

THOMAS BARMAN

Witness to History 1929–1969. By Charles E. Bohlen with the editorial assistance of Robert H. Phelps. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 562 pp. Illus. Index. £6·50.*

THIS is a good book, giving an absorbing picture of the career of a decent foreign service officer who had the good sense to choose to be a Soviet specialist in the days when the service was only just beginning to depart from its generalist traditions. Thereafter, through a combination of ability and availability, Bohlen participated near the centre of great events for almost thirty years. He first went to Moscow in 1934 as one of Bullitt's staff after the United States finally recognised the Soviet Union, and stayed there for six years, in the curious position enjoyed by most foreign diplomats in Moscow of being within and yet at the same time totally outside

Russian society. He observed the trials and purges of the 1930s and the manipulations that finally resulted in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. After a brief period in Tokyo he spent most of the 1940s in the State Department, and attended many of the wartime conferences, particularly Teheran and Yalta, as a Soviet specialist and interpreter. He was briefly minister to France, was ambassador to the Soviet Union for four years, 1953 to 1957, ambassador to the Philippines, Kennedy's and Johnson's ambassador to France, and for a few days served as Nixon's acting Secretary of State before retiring in January, 1969.

Judgment on the book must be qualified by the fact that it was 'written' on a tape recorder and transcribed and edited by Robert H. Phelps who, by his own admission, asked the questions. The sort of questions he asked must have influenced the shape and patterns of the work, but it remains a very revealing document. Bohlen is good on people: Stalin doodling wolf heads with a red pencil, Hopkins, Roosevelt, Dulles, Khrushchev and Attlee who, from being 'a mechanical toy' performing as predicted, grew in strength at Potsdam after the election of 1945. In his diplomatic attitudes Bohlen shows himself to be a wary realist who understood the double tension in Soviet foreign policy stemming from the combination of dialectical communism and traditional strategic imperatives. He believed that after Roosevelt's death the United States over-interpreted Russian moves and consequently over-extended American commitments throughout the world. This view, compounded by personality conflicts, led to an unhappy relationship with Dulles that is amply documented. Bohlen's ambassadorship in Moscow, which should have been the crowning period of his career, was frequently sterilised by his relationships with Washington and ended with his enforced resignation. His five years as ambassador to France became anticlimactic, and are only allowed 21 pages as his career peters out. Part of the fascination of the story is that Bohlen emerges as a slightly tragic figure who never quite enjoyed the reputation he seemed to merit and who, for all his competence and perception of the Soviet way, never quite, over time, demonstrated the brilliance that he himself leads us to expect. Part of his problem was also his strength: he tended to externalise and render objective judgments rather than bow to contemporary fashion.

D. K. ADAMS

Philby of Arabia. By Elizabeth Monroe. *London: Faber. 1973. 332 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

THERE is always a tension in the minds of those who serve their own governments outside their own countries. In the diplomatic career it can easily be resolved, but even there the sympathies which must accompany increasing understanding of a different point of view are betrayed by the ranks of British diplomatists who preside in retirement over Anglo-Ruritanian associations and spend their declining years in representing the interests of another country on 'Panorama' or in letters to *The Times*. The tensions are far more severe for officials of imperial governments. To men brought up in the belief that government by consent is the norm, it comes as a shock to take part in government by superior force. This sometimes leads intelligent and sensitive men to leave imperial service, and intelligent and less sensitive men to insulate themselves from the peoples

they are governing and to take refuge in the belief that they are helping them to become 'better Africans' or Indians or Egyptians.

It is tempting to believe that Philby's promising career, first in India and then in Iraq and Transjordan, came to grief because of tensions like these. It is true that he clashed with A. T. Wilson over self-determination for Arabs, and that he had to leave Iraq because of his conviction that the British arrest of Sayyid Talib was a high-handed piece of injustice, but Miss Monroe has demonstrated that what really moved him was a passion for fame, not a passion for justice. Possessed of exceptional ability and energy, and of enormous courage, he was a true maverick, totally self-absorbed. He never developed the virtue of humility, and lack of humility left unchecked his capacity for self-deception. He believed his unwillingness to see another's point of view to be an 'uncompromising passion for truth' (p. 25). His judgment of political realities was weak. Every situation was judged in terms 'of personalities: The Hashimites were always wrong, and Ibn Sa'ud always right' (p. 97). Perhaps his success with Arabs may have owed something to his tenacity, so similar to theirs, in pursuing a vendetta. In 1925 the British Consul in Jedda described his faith as 'a simple dualism in which the powers of darkness are represented by His Majesty's Government' (p. 143).

But there was a great deal more to Philby than his spoilt career as an Indian civilian and as an administrator in Iraq and Transjordan. In the Prelude, 'In search of Philby', which begins her biography, Miss Monroe traces the geographical extent of her researches, which covered Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon. 'Intellectually', she continues, 'the chase was just as stimulating. The range of Philby's interests was immense. He was a glutton for work and ready to tackle any subject except music and machinery. His mind roved confidently over history and the classics, the literature of several modern languages, archaeology and the sciences, politics, economics, finance, geology and the animal kingdom. Pursuing him led me into study of subjects as various as Islam and the pre-Islamic history of Arabia, meteorites and bird-watching, the use of a sextant, oil concessions, epigraphy and the patina of rock-drawings, cricket, moths, the Palestine problem, British home politics and the rise of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud from desert predominance to royal power'.

To do justice to all this without distortion in less than three hundred pages is a marvellous feat of compression. It could not have been done without Miss Monroe's extensive and accurate knowledge of the historical background of Philby's career. His main achievement was in Arabian exploration, and she brings his desert journeys to life in a way his own descriptions of them never did. Her warm and sympathetic understanding of human nature has enabled her to present a credible portrait of an almost incredible personality. Most of her readers, as Sam Weller said, will 'vish there wos more, and that's the great art o' letter writing'.

J. C. B. Richmond

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The aim of this bibliography is to show what the British were writing about Europe between 1940 and 1970. This second volume contains over 10,000 articles from twenty-six British periodicals, six of them weeklies, the remainder monthly and quarterly. The articles are listed first by year of publication and then alphabetically by author or, if anonymous, by title. The introduction and indexes are in German, French and English. One index is for Europe with subject sub-divisions, a second for individual countries with similar sub-divisions, a third for persons (51 in all) who were mentioned in the titles ten or more times and a fourth for authors. About half of the articles are taken from *The Economist* which has in fact its own very good quarterly index.

The Middle East and North Africa 1973–74: A Survey and Reference Book. Twentieth Ed. A Survey and Directory of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spanish North Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic and Yemen People's Democratic Republic. *London: Europa. 1973. 872 pp. Maps. Bibliogs. £9·50.*

This valuable reference book continues to provide a great deal of useful information set out in a clear and orderly way. The latest edition includes a brief chronology of events from January 1971 to August 1973 and an essay entitled *The Year in the Middle East June 1972–73* by W. B. Fisher as well as chapters on the background to the Arab-Israeli confrontation and on oil. The greater part of the book however consists of country-by-country surveys. It is a pity that the bibliographies do not come up to the standard of the rest of the work, either in the choice of items included or in the accuracy of the entries.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE IRONY OF HENRY KISSINGER

Alastair Buchan

WHETHER President Nixon is impeached or merely impugned, whether he remains in the White House for six or eight years, his span in office, and his second term in particular, seems likely to go down in the history books as the Kissinger rather than the Nixon years. It is true that the Republican administration has significant domestic achievements, notably the control of inflation, to its credit; it is also true that during its era of excutive power many of the daunting problems of the Kennedy-Johnson years—race relations, urban decay, the dissipation of resources—have abated, although how much credit the federal government deserves for this and how much is due to the remarkable regenerative powers of American society, is difficult to judge at this distance.

But the executive decisions that catch the eye of the contemporary, and will probably catch that of the historian also, concern the adjustment of the United States to a changing international environment, and, by reason of its former power, and influence, the effect of such readjustment upon further change. The re-ordering of America's commitments in Asia, the opening to China, the arms control negotiations and the furtherance of detente with the Soviet Union, the surmounting of crises, the alleviation of regional conflict in South-east Asia and the Middle East, the evolution of a new relationship with allies, it is by reference to success or failure on these issues that President Nixon has repeatedly said that he wishes his administration to be judged. Yet it has been clear since 1969 that the creative mind behind these decisions was that of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, who, since September 1973, has also doubled as Secretary of State.

In the first four years one could talk of a complementary partnership between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the one supplying the authority and political experience, the other the energy and the intellectual acumen; for the available evidence shows that although their views have not always been identical, they quickly achieved a working consensus on the ways in which American policy must be changed. But since March 1973, when the President began his slow retreat from honour and credibility in face of the pressure of his Watergate accusers, the momentum of American foreign policy has been increasingly sustained by Kissinger alone. There will be a lame duck President in office, whether he be called Nixon or Ford, at the bicentenary of the republic;

and the stature of the nation—the extent to which the United States is seen, both by Americans and others, as the reliable guardian of orderly change in the last quarter of the century—is likely to depend for the moment, not only on the actions of the Secretary of State, but also on whether he can impart to the nation, its friends and its adversaries, a coherent prospect of its goals and interests.

'There has been no one', writes his intellectual biographer, 'like Henry Kissinger in a high governmental position in the United States at any time in its history.'[1] Certainly he is a figure of remarkable irony: he is a scholar turned politician whose literary output out-distances that of Lord Salisbury and approaches that of Guizot, yet who has a natural instinct for secrecy: an intellectual who has spent most of his life administering sharp and often lonely reproofs to the governments of his adopted country. He has a Wagnerian fascination with tragedy, yet is now the most influential figure in a country whose social instinct is to reject the tragic. He has written more about the shortcomings of bureaucracy than almost any contemporary political scientist; yet during his years in Washington the process of decision-making has degenerated from being merely slow and hidebound to being capricious. He was once a trenchant critic of summits or personal diplomacy, yet in office he has employed almost no other method. He was for years the great apostle of skilful and confident relations with America's European and Asian allies, yet this is the area where he has been least scrupulous and painstaking and consequently least successful.

Perhaps the greatest irony which his years in office present is that his successes, in re-ordering American relations with China or the Soviet Union, in achieving a Vietnam armistice or a partial settlement in the Middle East, seem to owe little to his intellectual training or scholarly equipment, still less to his taste for philosophical speculation about world politics. Instead, they derive from his unflagging physical energy, his charm and humour, his instinct for the psychological weaknesses of his interlocutors, his quickness on his feet, his eye for political opportunity. For these are gifts that one associates neither with an academic or a 'loner,' but with someone brought up in the rough and tumble of business or law, the two professions whose dominance in American diplomacy had distorted its conduct, or so Kissinger asserted in every book he wrote. For long the hammer of American pragmatism, he has become the pragmatist *par excellence.*

Thoughts on legitimacy and leadership

But Henry Kissinger is too important a figure to be summarised in such a fashion. Since, largely by circumstances but partly by his own

[1] Stephen R. Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind* (New York: Norton, 1973).

choice, he occupies a position of such lonely eminence, one must find what clues one can to the way his mind works. Although he now tells press conferences that his work as a professor is irrelevant to his present responsibilities, a man cannot recast his mould of thought in middle life; his writings, therefore, are an important key to it.

In many ways he never wrote anything better than *A World Restored*[2] his book on Metternich and Castlereagh, the book over which the world's foreign offices began to pore when it became clear that he was the creative mind behind the President. It is an excellent and lucid piece of diplomatic history, but Kissinger is much too intelligent a man to identify himself with Metternich, despite his obvious admiration for him, any more than his brief study of Bismarck[3] betrays adulation for the man who overthrew the Metternichean order in central Europe. But *A World Restored* is important for two idiosyncrasies or convictions of Kissinger which reappear both in later writings and in policy statements. One is his equation of a stable balance of power or international order with his own concept of 'legitimacy'. '"Legitimacy" as here used' he writes, 'should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.' 'An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is "legitimate". An order containing a power which considers its structure of power oppressive is "revolutionary".' 'A "legitimate" order limits the possible by the just; a "revolutionary" order identifies the just with the physically possible.' Here is the kernel of his approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union, as well as the explanation of a recent angry *obiter dictum* that there have been no legitimate governments in Europe since Versailles. It is idiosyncratic because legitimacy in this sense is based on no verifiable measurements of power or restraint, on no foundation of natural or international law which public opinion or lesser states can comprehend, but simply on the perceptions of a few statesmen, which among other things assumes long continuity of regimes. It could be used to rationalise almost any policy including appeasement.

The other personal emphasis that first emerged in *A World Restored* is his contrast between bureaucracy and leadership.

> The spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed. The essence of policy is its contingency; its success depends on an estimate that is in part conjectural. . . . The essence of bureaucracy is its quest for safety; its success is calculability.

This coincided with his view of leadership. 'The dilemma of any states-

[2] *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22.* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1957.)
[3] 'The White Revolutionary', *Daedalus*, Summer 1968.

man', he wrote in the now defunct *Reporter* after the Cuban missile crisis,

> is that . . . in reaching a decision he must inevitably act on the basis of an intuition that is inherently unprovable. . . . His resolution must reside not in "facts" as commonly conceived but in his vision of the future.

And in a later essay entitled 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy' [4] he wrote of bureaucracy,

> the question for "objectivity"—while desirable theoretically—involves the danger that means and ends are confused. . . . Attention tends to be directed from the act of choice—which is the ultimate test of statesmanship—to the accumulation of facts.

Henry Kissinger is a modern historian, not a philosopher, and his ruminations upon the two themes of legitimacy and leadership, on which he makes comments that partly contradict each other in his study of Metternich and his essay on Bismarck, would not have been credited with great significance had he not achieved power at a time when the postwar framework of American policy was breaking down. For of all the problems that faced the first Nixon administration—the need to limit American obligation in Asia, to shift as much responsibility on to the allies as they could safely assume, to restore relations with China, and to find means of exerting greater leverage on a Soviet Union that had achieved strategic parity and indeed superiority in some forms of military power—it was clearly the two latter which had priority.

What gave confidence to those who knew him, either personally or through his books, during his first few years in the White House was the fact that he had a perception of these problems that was unclouded either by optimism or moralistic ideals of the kind that had distorted the vision of John Foster Dulles. He had more contact with Soviet academics than most of his confrères through diligent attendance at Pugwash conferences. In his book *The Necessity for Choice* [5] which was largely an excoriation of the foreign policy of the Eisenhower years, he had criticised the 'convergence' theory or facile ideas that better commercial relations would promote detente; there and elsewhere he had continuously warned that though detente with the Soviet Union was essential if American security was not to be undermined, it would lead to no brave new world. In particular, he had shown an awareness, on the one hand, of the lengthening agenda of serious East-West or Soviet-American business, and on the other, of the need to sustain allied confidence in American policy during the process.

[4] Reprinted in *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York, Norton. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1969.)

[5] H. A. Kissinger. *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy.* (New York, Harper. London, Chatto and Windus. 1961.)

For this reason he was a popular figure in European capitals and conferences, particularly in Germany. Many Europeans saw in the strategic debates of the Kennedy years and in the Vietnam decisions of the Johnson years a retreat from containment to confrontation, while the fear of some Soviet-American bargain to escape this had gripped the last years of the Adenauer regime.

It was true that Kissinger's reputation as an expert in the strategic aspect of high politics had been undermined by the fact that his first book on the subject *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* [6] had proved to be largely misleading. Acting as the rapporteur of a Council on Foreign Relations study group, he had been induced to argue, largely in response to the views of senior officials and soldiers on the study group who had a special case to plead, that the West must be ready to fight limited nuclear wars with tactical weapons if it was to maintain a credible strategy of deterrence in the face of a diversified series of communist challenges. That the book did a certain amount of harm, that it led first the European allies and then the Russians to false conclusions about what American strategy really was, was a tribute to the trenchancy and clarity with which he habitually wrote. He played, in fact, little part in the intellectual evolution of American strategic policy, much less than, say, Schelling, Wohlstetter or Kahn, partly because he had no flair for the implications of technological change, partly because he was not as engrossed in the subject as they were. But his essential contribution was to bridge the gap between strategy and diplomacy, to try and tease out the political implications of strategic choice rather than laying down a series of politico-military *diktats* in Nato as McNamara and his academic supporters were only too prone to do.

It is often said that a statesman can achieve little more, especially in international politics, than make intelligent use of the opportunities with which he is presented. And in the first Nixon administration the re-ordering of the adversarial relations of the United States was not only one such opportunity but wholly in line with the conclusion that both Nixon and Kissinger, quite independently of each other, had reached during the course of the 1960s. Nixon's article on the subject in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967) speaks for itself. Kissinger, as the speech writer of Nelson Rockefeller in the 1968 campaign, had made Rockefeller say 'I would begin a dialogue with Communist China. In a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Peking and Moscow we improve the possibilities of accommodation with each as we increase our options towards both.' [7]

[6] H. A. Kissinger. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.* (New York, Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations. London, Oxford University Press. 1957.)

[7] Quoted in Graubard, p. 252.

By the same token there should have been no occasion for surprise in the way in which the two men reorganised the whole process of decision-making on foreign policy. The Eisenhower chain of command system had been superseded by Kennedy's informal gathering of advice from a mixture of friends and officials which had in turn become petrified under President Johnson into the small group, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, which met, almost solely to discuss the Vietnam war, each Tuesday in the White House. It was not Kissinger's decision to appoint a nonentity as Secretary of State. Nor does he have in quite such an acute form Nixon's class or party-conscious attitude to the old foreign policy establishment—McCloy, the Bundys, the Rostows, Ball, Vance and so on—which had run the nation's foreign policy since the Second World War, although it had been greatly weakened by Vietnam. The President's incoherent hatred of it has recently been documented in the Watergate tapes.

> The basic thing is the Establishment. The Establishment is dying, and so they have got to show that despite the successes we have had in foreign policy and in the election, they have got to show that it is wrong just because of this.[7]

But Kissinger shared the President's distrust of the open, plural system of American decision-making. Hence the decision to concentrate even more power in the White House, to revive the National Security Council, and effectively to exclude from any participation in the discussion of high policy those not within its limited ambit, whether in the State Department, the Pentagon or even the CIA. To be fair, the imposition of secret decision-making and diplomacy in Washington was an asset for the world as a whole during Nixon's first term. It would have been impossible to implement the decision to open relations with China by any other means. If one reads John Newhouse's account[8] of the steps by which the first SALT agreement of 1972 was reached, one is made aware of the bitter pentagonal arguments between the White House, the US Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Praesidium, and the Soviet General Staff, each reacting upon the other, and the hopelessness of achieving even this anterior agreement if any part of the argument had been regularly leaked to *The Washington Post* or to Congress. And this fact was accepted by other governments, even those whose interests could be crucially affected by the outcome of the negotiation.

But the missing element in the whole diplomacy of the first term was the evolution and sustenance of a new relationship with the major

[7] Quoted in *The Observer*, May 4, 1974.

[8] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn:* The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). The book, however, almost certainly underrates the role of the two negotiating teams in Helsinki and Geneva and indeed prejudices Kissinger's reputation for discretion since it is clearly based on White House briefings.

allies of the United States—Japan and Australia in the Pacific; Britain, France, Germany and the European members of Nato. This was an aspect of American power and policy to which Nixon attributed great importance, or said that he did, and to which Kissinger had devoted a complete book, *The Troubled Partnership*.[9] More than that he had published just before he entered the White House an essay called 'Central Issues of American Foreign Policy'[10] in which he posed the central issue as being the reconciliation of continued strategic bipolarity with political multipolarity, greater freedom of manoeuvre for many of the countries without whose support and understanding the American position in the central balance of power, however legitimised, would be seriously weakened.

On the question of consultation he pointed out in *The Troubled Partnership* that the United States always behaved in Nato like a majority stockholder in a corporation, but that relations between sovereign states could not be conducted on this basis. De Gaulle had put his finger on reality by insisting 'that a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has a real choice.' 'In an alliance of sovereign states a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted.' There are inconsistencies in Kissinger's writing about European-American relations. Throughout the 1960s he was a persistent sceptic about the Kennedy conception of European-American partnership—the dumb-bell—suggesting that the consequences of a tightly knit Community, especially with Britain as a member, might simply be that 'Europe would henceforth have conducted de Gaulle's policies with British methods' (a presage of his view of the developments of 1973). Yet in his essay of 1968 he also argued, in what sounds like an early definition of the Nixon Doctrine, that:

> To act consistently abroad we must be able to generate coalitions of shared purposes. Regional groupings supported by the US will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the US being concerned more with the overall formulation of order than with the management of every regional enterprise.

Possibly, by the time he entered public life, the course of contemporary history, in particular the need for the United States to recover greater freedom of action, had made him modify the judgment of a decade earlier.

> If we reserve the right to judge each issue on its "merits", we shall remove the psychological basis of a coalition policy. If other powers are assured of our support without formal commitment whenever

[9] H. A. Kissinger. *The Troubled Partnership:* a Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. (New York, McGraw Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1965.)

[10] In *Agenda for the Nation*. Ed. by Kermit Gordon. (Brookings Institution. 1968.)

> we agree with them, or if they can suffer our opposition regardless of past association when we differ, no special significance attaches to alliances any longer. The insistence on a complete freedom of action blurs the line between the allies and the uncommitted.[11]

But at the very least he appeared anxious to recreate the kind of working coalition between the United States, Britain, France and Germany that Acheson, Bevin, Schuman and Adenauer had put together twenty years earlier. In particular the temptation of each major ally to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union must be resisted.

Priorities for Nixon's second term

At the beginning of President Nixon's second term it would not have been difficult to write a summary of the problems that confronted American statemanship in the ensuing four years—a 'surprise free' scenario of subjects that could not be neglected. The more obvious tasks that would have confronted any administration coming into power in 1969 had been substantially accomplished and for the most part with relatively low diplomatic casualties, very largely as a consequence of Kissinger's skill and diligence. True, these achievements were by no means cost free in terms of either Nixon's or Kissinger's reputation. The slow withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the refusal or inability of the Administration to define what it meant by 'peace with honour', the invasion of Laos in 1970, showed that both men were susceptible to the influence of older policies. The ditching of Taiwan to achieve the opening to China suggested that they placed small value on such criteria of international status as membership of the United Nations. Both the Nixon doctrine and the China negotiations had created profound and lasting uncertainty in Japan about its future place in the American scheme of things. The veiled criticism of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* contained in the 1972 State of the World Message [12] made one doubt how far Kissinger was prepared to accept the logic of political pluralism. The crisis over Bangladesh in 1971 had been bungled (although American power had been used more skilfully in the Jordan crisis of the previous year). All the major capitals had been unsettled by an unwise *ballon d'essai* on the President's part at the beginning of 1972 about the return to a global simulacrum of the old European pentagonal balance of power.

Nevertheless, the great substantive changes had been accomplished. Mainland China had been restored to its 'legitimate' position in the

[11] *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, p. 253.

[12] "Some of our allies were pursuing détente in bilateral contacts with the East, but it was clear that most bilateral questions were part of a wider web of European security issues. The Soviet Union could not be given the opportunity to offer selective détente, smoothing relations with some Western nations but not others."

United Nations and the international community. The first step towards the control of a potentially disastrous upward spiral in the level and complexity of Soviet and American strategic weapons had been accomplished in the first SALT agreements of 1972. A Vietnam armistice had been achieved, at least on paper, and the open-ended nature of American political commitments in Asia had been narrowed and defined by the Nixon doctrine.

The principal tasks that lay ahead seemed to consist primarily of overhauling those aspects of American policy which had been neglected during the years of intense concentration on adversary relations, and of confronting a number of new problems which had risen to the surface in the early 1970s. Four areas of initiative and activity seemed to stand out from the ruck of minor issues, all of them in their different ways of equal importance.

The first was obviously the maintenance of momentum in Soviet-American arms control negotiations, for SALT I had solved only one issue, the deployment of ABMs, and had merely bought time for the solution of the more difficult problem of achieving a workable agreement to restrain strategic force levels and control the deployment of multiple warheads. Not even the bitterest critics of the Nixon-Kissinger policy, whether in the Quai d'Orsay or Harvard, were prepared to dispute the importance of this field of American endeavour.

But simply by reason of its importance it was clearly essential to give equal priority to the reform of relations with the principal allies of the United States. Not only did the second round of SALT pose problems in European-American relations—the future of American nuclear weapons in Europe, possibly also the future of the British and French nuclear forces—which the first round had not, but the agenda of allied business was rapidly becoming more complicated. Trade, monetary and defence problems were becoming intertwined, at any rate in the American public mind; the function of Nato and the distribution of responsibilities between the various allies had not been re-examined for a number of years; the straining of the enlarged EEC for political coherence posed new problems in American-European relations. And the scene was further complicated by the imminence of two multilateral East-West negotiations in Europe, on Security and Co-operation and on Mutual Force Reductions.

The third range of problems, which even a reader of the serious press, let alone a man with access to a wide range of expert advisers, could see looming on the horizon, concerned raw materials, which has been a traditional preoccupation of diplomacy even if it has been less prominent in the past twenty years. By the beginning of 1973, a great deal of expert analysis, American and non-American, had been accumulated, much of which pointed in the direction of a serious oil crisis

in the mid or late 1970s, independent of the course of Arab-Israel relations. There was the threat of a significant change in the terms of trade in other raw materials. A boom in commodity prices of staggering proportions was already under way, partly because of the negligence with which the Soviet-American wheat deals of 1972 had been handled. The problem of regulating access to the oceans and the ocean bed was every year becoming more urgent. The postwar era was ending and with it arose the need for the recodification of a wide range of international agreements.

These three main areas of concern pointed to a fourth of equal priority, namely the reform of the decision-making process in Washington, a broadening of the range of expert opinion involved in different American initiatives and decisions, a fresh attempt to reconcile the pressures of conflicting domestic interest, the improvement of American diplomatic antennae as well as the enlistment of the best brains in the country to deal with the unfamiliar problems looming over the horizon. Moreover, relations with the Congress needed setting on a new basis, for the President's concentration of power in the White House and his refusal to allow the members of its staff to testify before congressional committees had created a dangerous series of frictions between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

When strengths become weaknesses

In the confrontation of these priorities Kissinger's strengths unfortunately became his weaknesses. His contempt for bureaucracy, his inability to repose confidence in others, his alienation from the academic community and the old foreign policy establishment, his over-confidence in his own manipulative powers, made him—an isolated as much as a central figure—temperamentally unsuited to handle this new order of business.

To take the problems of American policy in the order in which I have listed them, one of the Administration's actions last year was largely to dismember the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to appoint a sound rather than a clever man as the head of the American delegation to the SALT negotiations, of which the second round is much more difficult than the first. At the end of last year Henry Kissinger was emphasising this latter fact, and the improbability of getting an agreement in 1974, because the central problem of SALT II was the control of qualitative change and 'our Government has not thought through all the implications of qualitative change . . . And I am frank to say that there is not the conceptual basis for SALT Two that existed over a decade of previous work on SALT One. . . .'[13]

[13] Press Conference, Washington, December 27, 1973.

Yet the American academic community, which has been the seed bed of conceptual thinking on arms control for twenty years, has been preoccupied with the problem of qualitative control for at least the past five.

The second problem, the evolution of alliance relationships, has been the subject of so much public vituperation as to require little comment. Kissinger should by no means bear all the blame for the degeneration of European-American relations that has occurred over the past eighteen months. He did not invent Michel Jobert though he brought out the worst in him; he may not have calculated on the strength of Edward Heath's determination to manifest Britain's credentials as a good European partner; or have known of the unhappy lassitude that was overtaking the once resolute Brandt. But Kissinger's great weakness is that although he knows a great deal about the history of diplomacy he does not believe in using the services of diplomats. There is only one first class professional ambassador in Europe at the moment (for a whole year there was no American ambassador at all in Moscow) and very possibly even his dispatches are not read.

The consequence was that what should have been a private dialogue among governments was conducted at the pitch of a school debating society. It was foreseeable that if Kissinger demanded a public declaration of common principles, as he did in his Atlantic Charter speech of April 23, 1973, the Community at that particular stage of its development would have to attempt a united response, differentiated from that of the Atlantic allies as a whole. It was equally foreseeable that neither the Community nor the Alliance would simply subscribe to an American draft. In his behaviour towards Europe during 1973 and early 1974 Kissinger stood on its head the whole of his thesis about alliance management that he had expounded with such lucidity in *The Troubled Partnership* and other works. Indeed both before and after the Yom Kippur war and the oil crisis, his public utterances sounded like a booming echo of Dean Rusk: the United States had global responsibilities, the allies merely local interests. He talked exactly as if the Americans were a majority stockholder in a corporation; he ignored much that he had preached earlier about respect for the sovereignty and freedom of action of lesser powers. Having been one of the most influential American admirers of de Gaulle he became a furious critic of de Gaulle's heirs, resorting in the end to threats of using military or economic leverage against Europe as a whole.[14]

The European record of response to American positions during the past eighteen months is not a glorious one. But Kissinger's sense of personal affront about recent European policies and reactions seems

[14] For example, in his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, March 12, 1974.

to me to reflect two weaknesses: first, how little serious thought he has devoted to the practical, institutional steps required to alleviate the conceptual problems which he identified in the 1960s, of reconciling strategic bipolarity with political pluralism; second, a curious strand of naiveté beneath the realism, that makes him believe, just as Eisenhower believed, that America's good intentions should be accepted at their face value.[15]

But more serious in many ways has been his rather old-fashioned view of the motive forces of world politics and his failures to live beyond the moment. 'What passes for planning', he once wrote, 'is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future.'[16] Yet by the beginning of last year the planning staffs of his despised bureaucracy were grappling with a number of quite unfamiliar problems, and arriving at disquieting conclusions. To give one example, the Office of Fuels and Energy in the State Department had independently arrived at certain alarming conclusions by then about an impending oil crisis, as had the oil companies and other agencies of the federal government. Yet when I inquired at the White House at the end of April 1973—less than six months before the crisis broke—about the implications of their studies, I was told that the White House had not yet begun to focus on the energy problem. A cabal system of government has no early warning system. Nor does it easily sustain the impetus of policy. The February conference of the oil consuming states, although an essential step to prevent the erosion of each country's position through a network of bilateral deals—a subject on which Kissinger has talked good sense and on which several European governments have not—has yet to lead to any long-range programme which meets their problem, let alone that of the resource-poor developing countries.

The limitations of tactical success

Henry Kissinger's triumph of the second term so far has been the partial settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict and the change in Egypt's attitude to the United States which has accompanied it. Superficially the process whereby he achieved a ceasefire, got the Geneva conference going, Suez opened, and Israel in the political mood to start bargaining about its frontiers rather than standing pat on its conquests, resembled

15 Consider, for example, these plaintive remarks made to journalists while flying back from Brussels on March 4, 1974, after hearing of the Community's decisions to engage in a separate dialogue with the Arabs: 'If the present trend in Europe continues, that will raise the question of troops in Europe . . . I don't understand why we couldn't get together in a unified position. Why is it so hard to get together and mention the world "partnership"? . . . We thought it [the new Atlantic Charter proposed by Kissinger in April 1973] would be like the Marshall Plan and that the process would end up by July, 1973. The last thing we expected was that they would start nitpicking.' (Quoted in *The Sunday Times*, March 17, 1974.)

16 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy' in *American Foreign Policy*.

his achievement of a Vietnam armistice. Here was the same continuous exertion of personal influence, in face-to-face encounters with local antagonists; here he displayed the energy, the seriousness and the humility to serve as a shuttlecock between them until the basis of agreement could be found. But unlike Vietnam, where an unmitigated hostility still divides North and South, and where the armistice merely provides a façade to enable those who do not wish to look from observing that a civil war still rages, Israel and Egypt were both longing to find an excuse to wind down their confrontation. And Kissinger properly took advantage of his opportunity. A much harder test is the achievement of a Syrian-Israeli agreement where almost every consideration—security, geography, Russian interests—works against him.

But tactical successes of this kind are not the test of statesmanship for the Foreign Secretary of a super-power. Moreover, for every week he spends away from Washington, he must spend two in resolving issues, within the bureaucracy, with the Congress, with the Russians over SALT, which have accumulated in his absence and which, by reason of his inability to delegate, can be resolved by no one else. The ultimate irony of his career in public life may be—especially if SALT and detente go awry—that his ancestor may seem to be not Metternich but Castlereagh, the representative of a country with global power but only limited interests in any particular area, backed by a weak Prince Regent and an indifferent parliament, with only a limited mandate to 'legitimise' the international order. He may prove to have had only the limited effect of modernising American interests, invaluable though this function has been, and to have provided no 'vision of the future'. His successor at the State Department is likely to be a man more in the tradition that stretches from Madison and Monroe through Hay and Hull to Acheson—probably a lawyer or a politician and probably not an intellectual. And upon this successor will fall the difficult task of defining the national interest in an international system of great complexity, of taking the lead in the re-codification of those realms of international politics that cannot be governed simply by the exercise of power, above all of rebuilding an American diplomatic system which is in serious disarray.

However, he had better watch his step. For when the Republicans leave office at the end of 1976, as presumably they will, Henry Kissinger will be only 53, bursting with energy, unfulfilled aspirations and an insider's knowledge, and thus with his qualifications for his old role as critic powerfully reinforced.

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE EFFECT OF IDEAS ON REALITY*

Duncan Wilson

LET me define more precisely the rather mysterious title of this lecture. The conduct of foreign policy is largely a question of reacting to various day-to-day stimuli. The reaction to them must often be quick. And the general trend of these reactions determines the philosophy behind our longer-term relations as much as vice versa. As is well known, the British diplomat's motto is ad hoc.

Now, politicians and diplomats are subject to stimuli not only from abroad but also from those organs of publicity at home which partly determine and partly reflect public opinion. And we are all subject, more or less unconsciously, to the intellectual climate of the time. I shall make some references to the states of mind in which all of us have in recent years approached Anglo-Soviet relations. My main effort will, however, be to illustrate various public views of the Soviet Union, and to see how much account has been taken of them by those responsible for our foreign policy.

Some obvious limitations of my treatment should be made clear in advance. I have confined myself to the period since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956; I am talking about Anglo-Soviet relations, not East-West relations, and cannot always pause to say how much the former were conditioned by the latter; in talking of official ideas about the Soviet Union, I have had to rely on political memoirs, and my own memory, suitably conditioned by the Official Secrets Act; and finally my judgments about public opinion are based on sampling which I know to be scientifically inadequate.

The repercussions of the 20th Congress

The year 1956 is the obvious starting point for a survey of the kind which I am attempting. Looking backwards from 1956, one can see that 1955 was the climax of the Soviet Union's first major diplomatic campaign after the death of Stalin. It was the year of the Austrian Treaty, the Geneva summit conference and (in the summer) of a certain

* This is a shortened version of a lecture given at Edinburgh University on March 5, 1974, by Sir Duncan Wilson, visiting Montagu Burton Professor of International Relations.

'euphoria' in Western public opinion. It was also the year of the autumn turning-point—when the foreign ministers, meeting at Geneva in October and November, failed to reach grand overall solutions of the questions of Germany, Europe and disarmament. It is hard now to recall the reasons for hoping that the Eden plan for re-unification of Germany, or any plan for far-reaching international control of disarmament, might be acceptable to any Soviet government, even as the starting-point for a bargain. Such reasons existed; but the failure of the Western proposals was definitive.

Looking forward from 1956, one may see it as a turning point of a different and equally important kind. It was the year of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, of the Soviet non-intervention in the Polish October, and of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. We can see these events now as part of a clearly emergent pattern. The Soviet government had to find new means of stimulating economic development at home and economic contacts with 'capitalist' countries, and of improving the Soviet image abroad. Khrushchev, anxious to establish a dominant personal position, decided to make this policy his own, to disown a good deal, but not all, of the Stalinist past, and to dish the more Stalinist of his colleagues. Neglecting or underestimating the risks of partially lifting the veil on the Stalinist terror, he unleashed political movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that had to be repressed by force if the whole Soviet system were not to crumble. The process of repression, among other things, did much to spoil the new image of 'coexistent' communism, and thus also hindered those developments of foreign policy which de-Stalinisation was meant to foster. One is reminded of Groucho Marx's inventor, who stuffed macaroni with bicarbonate of soda, thereby simultaneously causing and curing indigestion.

It is worth analysing fairly closely the state of British opinion in 1956 towards the Soviet Union, and of British public reaction towards the new Soviet policies, since the main elements of these have remained important down to the present time. The double turning-point of Soviet foreign and internal policy was of course not visible at the time either to officials or to the public at large. The dominant attitude towards any Soviet government was one of profound mistrust. There was widespread readiness, after the Cold War period, to regard hostility to the West as the mainspring of Soviet policy. It is not surprising that the outgoing diplomatic policy of Khrushchev in 1955 was greeted in official circles with almost as much suspicion as would have been excited by an open continuance of Cold War tactics. And Khrushchev's tour of India and Burma in the winter of 1955–56 deepened the general suspicion of his aims. He seemed to be acting on the Leninist principle that the way to defeat the West lay through Asia and Africa, and clearly enjoyed the opportunity of criticising the 'imperialists' to the Third World.

Such is the background to British official opinion early in 1956, and also to the treatment by the British press of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. There was a strong general assumption that Khrushchev's main aim at the Congress was to impress public opinion abroad, and that his main points of doctrine were devised largely for non-Russian ears—the new emphasis on peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, on the possibility of reaching 'socialism' by parliamentary means, and on the concept that war with the capitalist West was not inevitable. The *Spectator* of this period makes typical reading. The attacks on the cult of the individual and on Stalin personally were, it said on February 24, directed against Khrushchev himself. The Congress was remarkable for very little in the way of policy change, only the *impression* of far-reaching reform was given. War between East and West could of course be avoided but only if non-communist governments accepted communist terms. The Soviet diplomatic offensive was regarded as psychologically very dangerous at a time when the West was stretched and wearied. Decidedly one might think, life was simpler for Western conservatives under Stalin!

This was the dominant note of British comment. There remained, however, some traces among British intellectuals of a completely different line of thought about the Soviet Union. For long after 1917 some of them were determined to make the best of the Soviet example, if only because the realities of British society seemed so intolerable. This tradition was still strong in the 1950s. In spite of all that had happened and had been written since 1940 (particularly by Arthur Koestler and George Orwell), the idea of planned and purposive government, as exemplified by the Soviet Union, still fascinated some Western observers (E. H. Carr, for example). The Cold War years and the rise of McCarthyism in America led many intellectuals to equate the United States with the Soviet Union in villainy as well as in power, and to condemn the British government for its unqualified backing of America. There could also be detected, down to and beyond 1956, a feeling that the Stalin era was only a deviation from the true path of socialism, to which Stalin's successors were bound in time to return.

All these lines of thought were illustrated in certain press comments on the events of the spring of 1956. Isaac Deutscher, in particular, saw the 20th Congress as portending the revival of the CPSU as a whole. Khrushchev, the 'practical administrator', was yielding to 'the spirit of the times', and was likely to preside over profound changes, affecting particularly the administration of justice and the operations of the KGB (*The Times*, February 28). The same sort of line was illustrated by various articles in the *New Statesman*, which saw in the new form of Russian socialism a new challenge to the social democrats of the West. In radical as well as conservative press comments, therefore, there was

over-emphasis on the decisions of the 20th Congress as an instrument of foreign policy against the West.

A third and more realistic strand of thought about Soviet policies is reflected in *The Economist* of the time. This emphasised the primacy of the internal Soviet aspects and motivations of the 20th Congress, and argued that the forces wittingly or unwittingly set in motion during the debates were more important than any decisions taken. The resultant tremors would 'be heard for a long time, not only in Russia, but throughout the world of Communism'. These were wise and prophetic words. One must admit eighteen years later that talk about the 'agony of an anachronistic regime' was premature. But the main point is clearly made—that, whatever Khrushchev's intentions towards the outside world, it was Soviet society that would be primarily affected by the 20th Congress. The same essential message emerges from Edward Crankshaw's comments, not only in the *Observer*. Even when the Cold War was at its coldest, he had mocked the concept of a far-seeing Stalin executing a grand and detailed design for world revolution. And in 1956 he saw the new Soviet policies as motivated mainly by the need to mobilise the energies of the Soviet people, numbed by years of inaction under Stalin's dictatorship.

Thus the 20th Congress evoked and illustrated three types of British public reaction to the Soviet Union. The most widespread was one of extreme caution, stemming naturally from recent history; developments in Soviet Russia were seen as calculated mainly to harm the countries of the West. Then there were the heirs of the idealist and radical tradition, who had once hoped to find a new model society in the Soviet Union, and were now concerned with the decisions of the 20th Congress mainly as an additional reason for demanding a new and more flexible British foreign policy. In the third place were those who, one can now say rightly, saw the decisions of the 20th Congress primarily as likely to cause—with or against the will of the Soviet leaders—large social and international changes within the communist world.

The 20th Congress was followed shortly by the visit to Britain of Bulganin and Khrushchev (henceforward, as then, B and K) in April 1956. Here was a concrete expression of the new Soviet foreign policy, and an event full of comment-worthy incidents—particularly the famous row between Khrushchev and George Brown at the Labour Party dinner over the Soviet government's treatment of social democrat captives. Press comment was predictably more conservative than idealist or realist. The tone was set by a letter from Malcolm Muggeridge to *The Times*, asking what was to be gained by 'seeming to welcome two individuals, intolerant of freedom at home, and out to destroy our way of life'. There were echoes in other letters of the Prime Minister's hopes that the visit might 'educate the Soviet leaders about the British way of life',

but editorial comment was at best lukewarm. On April 28 *The Economist* emphasised that the visit should probably have not taken place, and would not have increased our international reputation. A week later it also poured cold water on the Soviet offer to buy up to £1,000 million worth of goods from us in the next five years—there was little chance, it said, of the Soviet Union earning enough sterling to pay.

Thus, to judge by a sample of the comparatively well-informed press at the time, public opinion in this country was extremely cautious about any prospect of opening up a new phase of closer Anglo-Soviet or East-West relations. There was no nibbling at economic bait, nor expression of the view that a new policy would be appropriate to deal with a communist world that was entering a new phase.

How far did this press reaction reflect or influence governmental views? At this point it is important to distinguish the official from the political. The senior experts in Soviet affairs at the Foreign Office were always, and naturally, cautious. On the whole they felt that summit meetings with Soviet leaders were at best a political necessity. At worst these could commit us to a lot of unnecessary discussions, from which the public, in 'euphoric' mood, would expect results. And so unnecessary concessions might be made. For such officials the basic reality about the Soviet Union was its hostility to the West and determination (in Khrushchev's famous word) to 'bury' our society. There was no proof that this basic reality would be changed as a result of the 20th Congress. If, improbably, it did cause difficulties for the Soviet government in Eastern Europe, there was nothing that the British government could do about this. Such, if my memory is correct, were the views of the leading official experts on Soviet affairs.

In the light of this memory, it is interesting to re-examine the texts of the communiqué issued at the end of the B and K visit, and of the Prime Minister's broadcast about the visit. The Prime Minister had to prove to his allies that he had not become too cordial with the Soviet government. This was no problem in the circumstances. But he also had to prove to a critical British public that the visit had been worth while. It was the clauses of the communiqué dealing with increased commercial, technical and cultural exchanges which could best be used for this purpose. In his broadcast on April 27, Sir Anthony Eden put much emphasis on the prospects of increased trade which, apart from commercial opportunities, would help to build the peace. 'We will not be parted from our friends, nor will we abandon our vital interests, but we will seek agreements with all. In the history of diplomacy, suspicion has done more harm than confidence'.

It is tempting to treat this as an implicit recognition that the brave days of overall plans for solving the German and European questions were past, and we would now have to concentrate on smaller and more

practical aspects of coexistence. It is certainly also fair to say that even such limited hopes owed little to any pressure of public opinion. The bulk of the British press, as well as leading British officials, remained highly sceptical about the likely results of doing even limited business with the Soviet government. Sir Anthony Eden's statements were not based on any broad philosophy of 'bridge-building'.

Increasing commercial and cultural contacts

By the end of 1956 Anglo-Soviet relations could be counted among the casualties of the Hungarian rising and the Suez operation. For some time there was no question of the British retaining the position of a most-favoured enemy, or of political leaders trying to pursue any 'bridge-building' policy. The dominant figure of the next eight years was Khrushchev, and the development of East-West relations as a whole was profoundly affected by that extraordinary personality. His impulsive initiatives for some spectacular success in foreign policy frightened the West as much as they annoyed some of his Russian colleagues, and there was little difference between official and public opinion here about the character of Soviet foreign policy under his direction.

After the purging of the 'anti-party group' by Khrushchev in 1957, there was a more general realisation that his desire for conspicuous success in foreign policy resulted partly from the need to strengthen his internal position and that, when he failed to achieve success in one field of foreign affairs, he had to compensate in some other. Thus the gradual defusing of the Berlin crisis in the autumn of 1961 was accompanied by the testing of a multi-megaton bomb, designed (as was recognised here) partly to show the world that there was no question of Russia making concessions through weakness. By this time too it was at last becoming clear in the West that Khrushchev had to impress, not only his rivals at home, but also an increasingly hostile government in China. But whatever the motivation of his aggressive foreign policy gestures, the dangers which they involved for East-West relations seemed real enough to politicians, officials and public opinion in Britain. The only difference between them was on how to meet the threat. The government was mainly concerned with co-ordinating policy with our Nato allies, and not giving any impression of weakness. The radical *New Statesman* used the Berlin crisis of 1961 as another reason for demanding a new look at the central concepts of our foreign policy, and even *The Economist* suggested that we should consider coming to some arrangement with the East German government over Berlin in order to remove a principal cause of East-West tension.

The failure of Khrushchev's Cuban adventure in October 1962, the open outbreak of bitter Sino-Soviet controversy and the conclusion of

the Test Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963 lessened Western fears of Khrushchev, but public opinion was still very cautious about Soviet foreign policy. The conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty for example was played up for all it was worth in a pre-election year by the governments of Mr. Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. But British press reaction was still extremely cautious. A summary of typical comment on the Test Ban Treaty would run as follows: its value was largely symbolic, but there might be some impetus of success. In the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Khrushchev needed at least some means of regular diplomatic consultation with the West, but there would be opposition at home if he tried to go too far. We could look forward at best to further partial disarmament agreements and the gradual growth of a habit of co-operation.

And here we come to the main point which I want to make about the Khrushchev period in Anglo-Soviet relations. Throughout these years from 1957–64 there was an intensification of contacts, commercial and cultural, which had little to do with the state of political relations and in most cases owed nothing to pressure of public opinion. Such contacts just seemed to occur quite apart from the general context of international relations.

How and why did this happen? Of course commercial and cultural events have to be planned a good way in advance and it would have been peculiarly difficult to combine programmes in this field with any sensitively co-ordinated reactions to the sudden variations of Khrushchev's policy. Of course too the British government, dealing with independent companies or institutions, finds it difficult (though not always impossible) to recommend cancellations or postponements. There were, however, other reasons. For the period 1957–59, it did not seem wise to shut further doors between East and West by cancelling such minor agreements as had been reached with the Soviet government in the non-political field. Then in 1959 it was politically necessary to produce for British public opinion some positive results from Mr. Macmillan's visit to Moscow—a visit which, like Sir Anthony Eden's reception of B and K in 1956, was regarded with some scepticism at home and abroad. Again the most concrete results had to lie in the commercial and cultural fields. Reference was made to the relevant commercial and cultural clauses of the communiqué issued at the end of the B and K visit in 1956; and the Macmillan visit was followed by the conclusion of a five year trade agreement signed in May 1959 and a one year cultural agreement signed in March of that year. There was no public pressure for progress on the commercial or cultural fronts. But a doctrine had been formulated in the communiqué, and on both sides a sort of philosophy was crystallising about the advantages to be derived from a programme of exchanges. The Soviet authorities could point out to their own party

members the concrete gains from commercial and technological dealings with the West. No doubt too they would reckon, rightly or wrongly, on gains of national prestige, as well as of foreign currency, from the foreign tours of Soviet artists.

On the Western side, there were no public expositions, so far as I know, of a coherent long-term philosophy behind the programme of exchanges. Mr. Macmillan has confessed in his memoirs to thinking generally that prosperity might corrupt communists. But no British political leader went so far as to suggest in a major public speech that increased commercial and cultural contacts with the West would inevitably mitigate the nature of communist totalitarianism. None the less, many Western officials concerned with such contacts believed that with luck and in the long term they would have a favourable effect on at least the spirit in which the Soviet authorities administered their regime. I certainly put forward the view myself in 1964 that East-West relations were likely to improve gradually in the long term, with down—as well as upswings, as Soviet society became more open and the need and opportunities for contact increased. There was always an element of *faute de mieux* in such a philosophy—one has to be busy, there was not much else to be busy about, it was better if possible to believe in what one was doing, and the danger of inspiring an over-optimistic view of Soviet policies was very small.

My main point here is that official policy began to be determined not only by the pressure of events, but also to some small extent by the development of its own philosophy. A constant element in this philosophy was that the utmost caution is needed in dealing with the Soviet government. A less explicit but growing element, however, was the idea that changes *were* taking place in the internal structure of the Soviet Union, and that further changes might result from increasing contact with the outside world.

Western sympathy for Soviet intellectuals

When Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, the general reaction was that he was being replaced by a collective regime of faceless men with a policy so balanced between various interests as to be almost static. Ten years after they assumed power, one must recognise that by steady slogging in the face of some Western disorganisation they have achieved the position of international strength which Khrushchev was trying to reach by short cuts. They have nearly arrived at a ratification of the division of Europe; and their country has clearly emerged as a super-power, with a voice in world affairs commanding more general respect than ever before.

East-West relations during this period have become more complex.

There is indeed an important new threat to Western interests posed by Soviet rocketry, guided weapons and particularly by the enlarged and diversified Soviet fleet. The existence of this threat is however mitigated by various factors—the persisting Soviet fear of a major clash with the United States, the growth in power of China and Japan and at least the prospect of the emergence of a world which is no longer entirely bipolar. Then too power is not the only factor in the East-West relationship. Almost as important is the evident desire of the Soviet government to stimulate its economy by extensive co-operation with the United States, Japan and Western Europe. This involves a big extension of commercial and technical contacts, and such an extension in turn involves big problems for the Soviet government. On its home front there has been a growth in the numbers and importance of the technician-intelligentsia. These are already a privileged caste, and some at least of the most important of them—not only Sakharov and the Medvedevs—want more contact with the West. Now the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime is intensely afraid of social and political change within the Soviet Union and the 'socialist camp'. It is much concerned lest increased contacts with the West should involve ideological infection—this is the reason for those frequent pronouncements that 'peaceful coexistence' does not mean any slackening of ideological war. And so increased contacts with the West have been accompanied by a growth of repression.

The new vigilance of the Soviet authorities has led to further important developments. The Soviet Union has lost any ideological magnetism which it retained in Khrushchev's era. There are virtually no important Russian contributions to the theoretical discussion of Marxism and communism and the Russian example of communism in practice acts mainly in a negative sense. Even on the British far left, those who want to contrast a brave new revolutionary world with that of the Western democracies turn to China or Cuba. The Soviet Union stands as the Great Power successor to the Tsarist Empire—expansionist and repressive.

At the same time, and continuously since 1968, Soviet repression, like Tsarist repression, has bred intellectual opposition. It is largely the unimaginative folly of the Soviet as of Tsarist, petty authority which has produced this result. Collective responsibility and lack of a personality as dominant as Khrushchev has had its good results for the Soviet Union and for the world, but it has also allowed such agencies as the KGB and the Ministry of Culture (not that the two are of equal weight) to operate with more freedom than they enjoyed in the Khrushchev era, and in a highly repressive sense. The results so far have been surprising. The Soviet authorities have stemmed any flow of anti-totalitarian literature. They have probably cowed and kept under a number of decent non-heroic writers. But a small number of intellectuals have become

increasingly conscious of their rights and increasingly ready to argue for them. The authorities were for some years unable to suppress the *Samizdat* movement and its *Chronicle of Current Events.* They have had to deport Solzhenitsyn and Sinyavsky. Coincident with their battle against intellectual non-conformists, and partly overlapping with it, has been the battle of Soviet Jews—to a large extent successful—for the right to emigrate. And—most important for my present theme—both battles have been fought in a blaze of world publicity.

I have tried to summarise the main developments of Soviet policy since the fall of Khrushchev. What has been the effect of these developments on the British public view of Russia, and British policy towards it? So far as the growth of Soviet armed power is concerned, one might well have thought that at least since 1968 there has been good reason to see the Russian bogey large. There was indeed a genuine public—not merely governmental—reaction of intense repugnance to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. But even then there was rightly nothing that approached a war scare, and no sign then or since that public opinion was willing to contemplate increased defence expenditure to cope with increased Soviet military capability. General hostility to official Russia, however, has become deep-seated. It has concentrated on Soviet oppression of intellectuals and Jews, and has been constantly expressed in all organs of publicity. Indeed I had not until recently appreciated how much more continuous attention has been paid to intellectual opposition and repression of intellectuals in the Soviet Union than to any other aspect of Soviet affairs. I do not think that this exclusive concentration of British public interest is entirely healthy—there are after all many other interesting aspects of life in the Soviet Union—but it is the Soviet government which bears a very large share of responsibility for it. It has chosen to persecute someone who enjoys world fame, and it puts great difficulties in the way of foreign journalists who wish to report on other aspects of the country.

Now what has been the effect on official British policy of these deeply-felt and constant attacks on Soviet tyranny in the British press? At first sight anyhow, one might say very little. Official policy has been more concerned than public opinion with the increased Soviet military threat and diplomatic and military means of meeting it. There has naturally been much concern on the official side with 'alliance tactics' and European strategy—culminating in the East-West talks now proceeding at Geneva. None of this lends itself easily to continuous and powerful publicity. Then there has been the bread-and-butter work of bilateral Anglo-Soviet relations—the sort of commercial and cultural contacts that were built up increasingly from 1959–68. There were interruptions—in 1968–69, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, by the British government, partly out of deference to British public opinion, and again in

1971 by the Soviet authorities after the expulsion of their agents from London. The process, however, has been resumed, and continues. This, it seems, is not the result of any public interest on the British side. There may at most have been some lobbying from the Department of Trade and from interested British firms for the removal of hindrances to trade with the Soviet Union at a time when heavy stress was being laid on the general need to increase our exports. Up to 1967 some large contracts in the Soviet Union had indeed been secured by British firms and it was a part of Soviet policy in 1968–69 to stress that more could be concluded if political relations could be restored to normal. On the British side, however, there was no strong *public* pressure for a new relationship with the Soviet Union as a means of increasing our exports, much less as a means of producing long-term changes in Soviet society.

In the meantime, however, the implicit philosophy of contact evolved between 1956 and 1964 continued to operate in forms modified to meet the new political circumstances. On the *Soviet* side, the need to renovate the Russian economy by exchanges with the West was growing more urgent. The events of 1968 increased the Soviet desire to institutionalise such exchanges. Long-term agreements on co-operation would make it harder for Western governments to interrupt the process for political reasons. At the same time, the existence of such agreements would make it easier for Western governments to go along with the formal political division of Europe, which from 1969 took a high priority among Soviet aims. On the British side, it will prove harder, even when the official papers are available, to find or even to deduce the philosophy behind British official agreement to an intensification of contacts. The element of *faute de mieux* remained. The need for better trade results had increased. To go along with the Soviet wish for more institutional contact might be the only way of securing a British share of whatever business was going to materialise in the Soviet Union. The growth of some political opposition there, and the evident desire of the Soviet authorities to limit contact with the West to the minimum, suggested to some British officials that its long-term effects were indeed powerful. Such speculation, however, would certainly not have been a principal ground for recommending to ministers the adoption of any particular policy. Nor were ministers themselves inclined to think in such general terms. None the less, the pursuit of bilateral contacts *was* one of the main ingredients of British official policy towards the Soviet Union, along with a reluctant readiness to make the best of talks on some new and broad East-West agreement at Helsinki and Geneva, and a determination, genuine if tempered by many domestic considerations, to 'keep its guard up' against an increased Soviet military threat.

But—and this is an important point—whatever the private views of the British politicians and officials, they were simply not concerned

officially with those ' internal affairs of the Soviet Union ', the oppression of Soviet intellectuals and Jews in which the British *public* was mainly —indeed almost exclusively—interested. This official attitude has been in accordance with normal and I think necessary practice. In inter-governmental relations, we cannot confine ourselves to dealing with governments whose general policies we approve, nor break international agreements already concluded because of actions by the other contracting governments in a completely different sphere. There are exceptions determined in the light of, so to speak, the collective conscience at any particular time. But in general our governmental relations with the Soviet Union have been conducted without regard to developments on the Soviet internal front. Thus, to go back over the main landmarks in the history of Russian intellectual opposition, the affair of Pasternak and the Nobel Prize (1958) was followed shortly, as things happened, by Mr. Macmillan's visit to Russia; the trial and condemnation of Sinyavsky and Daniel immediately preceded a visit to Moscow by Harold Wilson. The award of the Nobel Prize to Solzhenitsyn was followed immediately by a visit of Gromyko to London; and the ensuing row about Solzhenitsyn's movements immediately preceded the visit by Deputy Prime Minister Kirillin to London, which resulted in the establishment of the joint commission on scientific and technological co-operation. At none of these times was there any pressure from the British public to make Anglo-Soviet political or commercial relations dependent on internal developments within Russia; although, typically, the Soviet authorities would from time to time attempt to reverse the process, saying that the British government was responsible for unfavourable British press comment on Soviet affairs, and that this could only have unfavourable effects on official Anglo-Soviet relations.

We may now, it seems, be reaching the stage when this comparatively simple compartmentalisation of Anglo-Soviet relations is, to say the least, not going to be so easy. It seems likely to be broken down first in the wider framework of East-West relations. If the Soviet government want serious discussion at Geneva on the establishment of firmer political, commercial and technical relations between Western and Eastern Europe, it will probably have to allow at least some discussion of increased freedom of information and personal contacts. And the Western governments may not give the Soviet government the sort of formal arrangements which it wants in the political and commercial fields without insisting on some actual concessions on cultural and personal contacts (whether the Soviet government can make or will implement such concessions is another matter). If this analysis is correct, then it can fairly be said that Western public opinion, and not least British public opinion, is contributing directly and powerfully to the deter-

mination of official British and Western policies towards the Soviet Union.

The question remains how far Western policies, so determined, can help those of the Russian intelligentsia who are allowed to remain in the Soviet Union. So far generous emotion in the West has helped some of those Russian intellectuals who enjoy more than local fame. They have asked for maximum public support from the West, and in the face of it the Soviet authorities at least did not dare to arrest and try Solzhenitsyn, although other heroic figures have suffered and are suffering at their hands. How much more can be done to help such people? Private citizens in this and other Western countries should clearly continue to raise their voices to help them. I personally hope, however, that the pressure of public opinion to secure better conditions for the Soviet intellectuals will not force governments, our own included, to abandon altogether their normal stance on such matters. If more is attempted in the present situation, I doubt whether the interests even of the most prominent Russian intellectuals will be best served, much less those of thousands of others who have been characterised as 'unofficial Russia'. Suppose, for example, that there is a general attempt by Western governments, in or outside the Geneva context, to drive an official bargain—no more trade and technological contact without better guarantees of individual freedoms for all Russians within the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Americans, with their great bargaining power, may achieve something on these lines. I remain doubtful. I very much doubt, for example, whether the regime of Brezhnev and Kosygin would ever formally concede the introduction of large-scale democratic freedoms as part of an official bargain with the West. One need not enter into detailed speculation about hard and soft liners in the Kremlin. It seems likely, however, that Brezhnev and Kosygin would meet strong opposition from other conservative communist leaders if they concluded any such bargain and even more if they seriously attempted to put it into effect. I cannot conceive either that its terms would be executed in any way that could be satisfactorily checked from the Western side. This is not an admission of total Western impotence. For example, the jamming of Western broadcasts and the issue of visas to those who want to enter or leave the Soviet Union can be checked. So to some extent can the availability of scientists or artists for conferences or concerts; so can the existence of open persecution against certain leading figures of Soviet science and culture. But I believe that any official attempt to bargain for much more could be counter-productive and would at best produce 'scraps of paper' subject to widely different interpretation, and agreements of which one could not check the execution.

Here too is a field in which the best is probably the enemy of the

good. The system of commercial, scientific and cultural contacts worked out over the last ten years has owed little, as we have seen, to any pressure from public opinion, or to any explicit philosophy held by ministers and officials. It *has* resulted, however, in a considerable upward trend in East-West contacts, with considerable variation between the Western countries concerned and in the sort of contact made. The whole subject is full of unknowns and needs detailed argument. I believe, however, that in general the policy of contacts *has* had certain positive results. These are obscure to the British public, partly because the policy itself has been so casually adopted and so incompletely stated. Nevertheless, although a totalitarian and conservative regime is more firmly based in Russia than ten years ago, although it has conspicuously persecuted some conspicuous and many inconspicuous people, it has not used its powers to the full. There have been stirrings of intellectual opposition, and an increase in the number of technocrats—to use an imprecise word—who have an interest in opening up the Soviet system. They are helped by the present system of East-West contacts, and I believe that the present *sort* of system is the best which can for the present be worked out by official negotiation. It can, I think, realistically be improved to provide a little more light and encouragement for some thousands of Soviet citizens who may not be heroes or martyrs, but are equally not all the stooges or dupes of a cynical government machine. On the other hand, it would be premature to try to impose a new pattern of East-West relationships for which the present Soviet government is not ready. And such an attempt would probably harm primarily those who have derived some benefit from the present system of contacts. Ultimately I would hold, with Valerian Chalidze and Zhores Medvedev, that any important change in the Soviet system must develop from within—probably as the Brezhnev generation of leaders is replaced by a generation that cannot be thought in any way responsible for the Stalinist reign of terror. If it is not to hinder such a change, pressure from abroad has to be applied with care.

In sum, I am all for the free and strong expression of Western public opinion on the issue of internal freedom in the Soviet Union. I think that British government policy will now have to take more account of it than it has had to take in the last twenty years over any issue affecting our relations with the Soviet government. But on this issue I do not think that our official policy should be solely or mainly determined by public opinion, however well justified.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: FACTORS OF DISINTEGRATION

PRESSURE OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES *

Marcello de Cecco

IT is appropriate to begin this analysis of economic factors of European disintegration by analysing the most probable outlook for the world, and the European, economy, in the next two years. A necessary preamble must consist of a quick review of the geographical and commodity structure of world trade, as it has crystallised in the last ten years. It is not difficult to detect, if we examine trade statistics, that world trade in manufactures now centres around three major pivots, which can be called the workshops of the world—Germany, Japan and the United States. These three countries have a common feature, which is that they account for a large proportion of world trade, as importers as well as exporters. But a lot of meaningful information can be gleaned by looking into the commodity and geographical differences between their trade structures. Of the three, the United States is unique in having consistently remained an exporter of very large quantities of primary commodities. In 1971, according to OECD data, 1.54 per cent of its total exports were food and live animals, 1.86 per cent beverages and tobacco, 10.29 per cent crude materials, 3.18 per cent mineral fuels and lubricants, 1.04 per cent animal and vegetable oils and fats. Together, these items come to more than one quarter of total American exports. The other two countries are negligible exporters, and heavy importers, of these goods. This is particularly true of Japan, 30.31 per cent of whose imports consist of crude materials, 24.35 per cent of fuels and lubricants and 14.63 per cent of food and live animals.

As to the rest of its exports, the United States has concentrated on the other end of the 'value-added spectrum', i.e. on high technology exports. Of its total exports, 43.83 per cent are engineering products, and within that very large category, which has dozens of sub-categories, it has concentrated on relatively few items, like aircraft and aero-engines, computers and calculators, and special process machinery. In conclusion, American manufacturing exports consist of high income-elastic, low price-elastic goods, where the United States enjoyed a near-monopolistic position for several years.

* This article is based on a paper read at a Chatham House Study Group.

Germany and Japan are both even more heavily specialised in engineering exports (48.28 per cent and 47.76 per cent respectively of total exports). But, as we have just said, 'engineering products' is a portmanteau expression, comprising a very varied collection of disparate articles. The same applies to 'manufactured goods classified by material' which figures prominently in both German and Japanese exports (22 per cent and 29 per cent respectively). It is, therefore, useful to have a closer look at the contents of these two large categories. Here we find that both the United States and Germany have a much larger representation in non-electrical machinery than Japan (19.53 per cent and 23 per cent respectively, against 10.79 per cent), while Japan's exports of transport equipment are much more important, relatively speaking (24 per cent of total Japanese engineering exports, against 16.73 per cent for Germany, and the same for the United States).

Let us now examine the geographical distribution of these countries' trade. There are extremely important differences to be noted. The United States spreads its exports quite evenly in both hemispheres. Germany sends 65 per cent of its exports to Western and Southern Europe, and about 5 per cent to Eastern Europe. Japan concentrates on one market, the United States, where it sends 31.6 per cent of its exports and gets 25.3 per cent of its imports; otherwise it concentrates on the less developed and developed countries of the 'Pacific Basin', with no more than 12 per cent of its exports going to Europe.

Quite clearly, a geographical pattern of great interest emerges from these figures: the United States is still the multilateral key country, i.e. the pivot of the entire world trading system. The other two countries are pivots of their respective sub-systems, but while Germany has no overriding economic pressures in keeping its ties with the United States, Japan has reformed with the latter country the vital trade partnership which existed until the assassination of Prince Konoye precipitated its temporary destruction in the 1930s and 1940s. To this picture three more sub-systems have to be added: those that see as their respective pivots Britain, Russia and France (plus, possibly, a Latin American one, with Brazil as its pivot). Britain and France still send a notable share of their total exports to their former colonies, and Russia, of course, is the centre of Comecon. It is, in passing, worth considering that Russia maintains with the Comecon countries a pattern of trade roughly similar to that which the United States maintains with its allies. Basically, its exports are highly sophisticated products, like aeroplanes, and steel processing machinery, and raw materials, while its imports are engineering products and other manufactures (both producers' and consumers' goods). But the parallel, although suggestive, cannot be pushed too far, as none of the Comecon countries is in a class comparable to that of the Western countries and Japan, even if only judged by size.

During the last fifty years, the United States has been the country most interested in maintaining a world multilateral trade system in existence. Germany is certainly more interested in maintaining its position as the centre of the European production system than in expanding elsewhere. The 'Drang nach Osten' has indeed taken place, but although it has involved certain German firms very deeply, at the macro-economic level it is still a marginal phenomenon, since it involves only five per cent of total German trade.

Japan, on the other hand, has proceeded towards a deep economic integration with the United States, which, however, is profoundly lopsided in the sense that Japanese industry is much more dependent on the American market as an outlet for its wares than American industry is dependent upon the Japanese. In fact, as commodity trade goes, the United States has been vitally interested in maintaining the surplus it earns in Europe so as to be able to pay for the deficit it has with Japan, and Japan, in turn, has been able, by earning a surplus in the United States and in other developed areas, to pay for its imports of raw materials from underdeveloped countries, which are not capable of absorbing enough of its goods in return. As far as invisible trade is concerned, the United States derives from Europe a proportion of its investment income which is already substantial and which will increase in future.

The multilateral trade equation has, albeit with difficulty, been solved so far by the ability of the United States to absorb Japanese exports, through running down completely, or almost completely, some of its own light industrial sectors, while at the same time maintaining supremacy in some crucial high technology fields, like agricultural produce, aerospace, electronics and complex machine tools, which products it has sold as a quasi-monopolistic supplier, and at monopoly-fixed prices, to the developed countries. The remaining American payments gap, which originated in investment outflows and military expenditure abroad has been closed by maintaining the dollar in a virtual monopoly position as a reserve currency. On August 15, 1971, that became a total monopoly position, with the establishment of the two-tier gold market, which effectively demonetised gold, as far as central banks were concerned.

It is not difficult to understand why a more fully integrated Europe would seriously endanger the delicate multilateral trade and payments equilibrium which pivots on the United States. First of all, any common policy by the Europeans in the aerospace, nuclear and high electronics fields, adopted with a view to competing with the United States, could only be detrimental to American exports of these commodities; and we have seen how these exports are the bulk of American exports. Secondly, any success in establishing a European currency would mean the crea-

tion of an alternative reserve asset, in which the creditors of the world might want to denominate their deposits, thus competing with the dollar. European self-sufficiency in high technology would cause a yawning gap to open in the American trade balance. And the trade deficit with Japan could no longer be financed out of a surplus with Europe.

Quite apart from short-term conjunctural economic conditions, therefore, the United States Administration, no matter which party were to run it, would see as a guiding principle of its international economic policy the need to prevent a 'European solution' being arrived at in both the high technology and the international monetary fields. To that end, it would necessarily have to base its policy on an attempt to separate Germany and, possibly, Italy from France and Britain, since the last two countries, at very high cost to themselves, have been able to maintain a presence in high technology and international finance, and would thus want a European solution to be built on that existing base. Japan could also be persuaded to scrap any plans it had to achieve autarky in the high technology sectors.

From the point of view of Germany and Japan, a partnership with the United States in high technology would be logical and easy to absorb. Both countries are still, quite clearly, in a position of 'limited sovereignty' vis-à-vis the United States. Both countries are heavily dependent on American oil companies for their oil supply. Neither of them has a built-in position to defend in high technology and both have a marked desire to find a short-cut to high technology by latching their industry onto a technology system, like that of the United States, which has undoubtedly more to offer than the French or British.

Effects of the oil crisis on international trade

We now turn to examine how the recent oil crisis and its repercussions have affected and will affect the pattern outlined above. The Yom Kippur war had among its most serious effects that of escalating a race out of currencies and into commodities which had already been going on for almost a year. As relative scarcity hit one commodity market after another, as a result of the *joint* boom experienced by almost all industrial countries, commodity prices began to climb and in turn to affect price levels in industrial countries. Monetary authorities in the United States and elsewhere, having lost control over their money supplies, especially as a result of governments' large borrowing requirements, sought to limit the pressure on resources by controlling interest rates. In an inflationary situation, however, borrowers look exclusively at real interest rates. At the same time companies, both in the United States and in Britain, decided to float large share issues, so that the stock markets in London and New York could not as a result revalue

their indices following inflation. Thus speculation was allowed and induced to switch from financial assets to commodities. As with all primary commodities, oil prices were inflated by the international boom. The 1971 and 1972 dollar devaluations, and the floating of sterling, of course, contributed to reinforce the desire of raw material producers to get better prices for their wares, which are traded in dollars and sterling.

The Arab-Israeli war only accelerated price escalation. However, it also inflicted a random shock which made all the relevant curves shift dangerously, especially as it happened when the world boom was running out of steam. It thus played havoc with all the plans that the American and European authorities had been hatching to guarantee a relatively 'soft-landing' for the world economy. In so far as it is considered as a rise in the cost of an industrial input, a higher oil price ought to penalise oil-intensive products vis-à-vis other products. That, however, means very little. It is only true if competitive conditions prevail in all markets. If that is not the case, producers of commodities marketed in near-monopolistic conditions will be able to pass on increased oil costs. Things are made even more complex by the fact that producers may enjoy monopoly at home and oligopoly abroad, which means double pricing for goods sold at home and abroad. These remarks apply both at the micro and at the macro level of analysis: some countries may rely altogether on oil as an energy source, and still have an entrenched monopoly position in their export structure (which may very well not stem from a technological lead, but from an 'organisational' one, which concerns delivery promptness and marketing abilities). They will, accordingly, be able to transfer the burden of higher oil prices to their customers. Other countries will be less fortunate, as they produce exports in near-competitive conditions. They will have to absorb the shock of higher oil prices themselves, either in financial or in real terms.

Let us examine the position of the three core-countries vis-à-vis this problem. At first glance, it might appear that the future looks much brighter for the United States and Germany than it does for Japan. The first two countries have technical and organisational leads in many sectors. Japan, on the other hand, often has only a price lead in its exports, if we except a few products. It has, we have noted, established firm roots in 'Pacific Basin' markets, but we have also noted that these cannot, if the American market is subtracted, absorb Japanese exports to the extent needed to pay for Japanese imports of raw materials and fuels.

From the 'real' point of view, therefore, Japan can be expected to try very determinedly to obtain an even greater share of the American market, which will certainly not serve the purpose of opening the New

York financial market to it, since Americans will be irked by a flood of Japanese commodities and will not want to finance it themselves. It must be remembered that the American economy will be in downturn, and imports of Japanese goods will be seen as a further threat to jobs. As to more sophisticated products, the competition between Japanese and American producers for Pacific markets will grow fierce. It is natural to expect that the Japanese governments will try to get as many bilateral deals for its country as possible, on financial terms much less stringent than those for which the Japanese have so far been noted.

It is equally natural to expect that the American authorities will try to re-direct the Japanese flood towards Europe, as they have already done in recent years. In general, we can brace ourselves for a gigantic operation of global horse-trading: the Japanese will negotiate imports of high-technology goods from the United States in return for more exports of consumer goods to the United States. The Americans, in turn, will exercise pressure on their European partners, in order to induce them to absorb more Japanese exports. But European countries can themselves try to twist the American arm by hard bargaining in the field of agricultural trade and American high-technology exports.

It must be remembered that the United States has an extremely delicate employment problem to solve: its labour supply has been booming for some years, and has only been insufficiently absorbed by a booming economy, with the majority of new jobs not being created in industry, but in the services sector. To this must be added the large structural problem of the impact of high petrol prices on American car production. As is known, compact cars only account for one third of American car sales, and a good part of those are imported.

It is almost impossible to be optimistic about the immediate prospects for the American car industry. Price rises in the fuel market, before and after Yom Kippur, have probably modified the American public's expectations profoundly enough at least to generate an attitude of 'wait and see' towards large American-made cars. The direct and indirect impact of the car industry on the American economy, in terms of employment, must be estimated at about 15 per cent—which is a conservative estimate. At the same time, the civilian aircraft industry will be in the doldrums, in view of the vertiginous increases in fuel costs, which give airlines a good chance to reduce service standards, i.e. numbers of flights, and aeroplane purchases. Mr. Schlesinger's defence budget may have deep strategic meanings, but it is realistic to detect a 'Keynesian anti-cyclical' aura about it.

The really fundamental problem, in our exercise, is to find the proper correlation between unemployment and protectionism in the United States, to be extrapolated into the immediate future. As is well known the immediate postwar period witnessed a pact between farmers and

industrial trade unionists to back free trade. Southern and Western states, which produce agricultural commodities and aerospace and electronics goods, are free traders. The trade unions, and industry in general, in the north east, tend to be protectionists, as they face a direct threat from abroad, which has already meant running down whole industrial sectors. The 1974 Congressional elections will probably also be fought on these terms, and the overwhelmingly Democratic Congress which is bound to emerge, may be in a distinctly protectionist mood—if there is enough unemployment in the automobile and in the light industrial sectors to override the free traders from the exporting states.

To sum up, the Japanese may be expected to maintain a complex line of defence: they will have to negotiate from a very low posture indeed, since they import an insignificant amount of manufactures (compared to their exports of the same), and they can expect hard retaliation from everybody except the Americans. At the same time, they have a vital link with the United States, not only as a provider of defence, but as a market. The only trade offensive they can launch is towards the Soviet Union, but that must take into account Chinese reactions since the latter may well be sensitive to more extensive Japanese trade and investment links with the Russians.

As to the United States, it is very difficult to forecast whether it will go protectionist, or insist on maintaining multilateralism as the basis of its international economic policy. A Democratic presidential landslide in 1976 could allow a far-sighted President enough power to override the possibly protectionist attitude of Congress, but it is extremely hard to say anything definite. One thing we can be sure about is that the standard bearer of free trade will be Germany. There is a suggestive resemblance to Cobdenite Britain in the Germany of today. Supreme technological confidence breathes through every utterance of its manufacturers. If we examine the structure of its external trade, we find that it has become the industrial heart of the West; it almost invariably exports producers' goods which are of greater unit value than those it imports (with the exception of some items bought in the United States). The southern European countries depend on it as a market for their Mediterranean exports, their natural beauties, their excess labour force. Like Victorian England, it invests abroad directly, while foreigners deposit at short-term in its banks and buy its public and private securities. It has no industrial white elephants to run down or to impose on its neighbours. It is almost everybody else's best customer. It is almost impossible to see Germany initiating a protectionist policy, or even one based on exclusive bilateral deals. Such a policy could only be imposed on it by the rest of the world. It is unique in the fact that it has no protectionist pressure groups.

It is, therefore, essential to have an idea of how Germany's economy

will weather the next world recession. Being the world's main supplier of investment goods, it might be expected that it would suffer from a slump of investment all over the developed world. It is, however, probably more correct to expect it to suffer less than others: since the common worry for everybody will be how to pay for oil imports, a spate of beggar-my-neighbour exchange rate depreciations must be ruled out, because Germany's main competitors have undervalued currencies and may not want them to sink even further. Moreover, if it is possible, as it probably is, to consider German-made goods as every customer's first choice, a slackening of world demand will only mean that more people will have a chance to obtain a German-made article, which they prefer to one made elsewhere. This is a rather simplistic view of world trade, but an analysis of trade data bears it out.

The truth of the matter is that Germany can impose its will, in purely economic terms, upon the rest of Europe, and especially upon the EEC. And an alliance between the United States and Germany aimed at keeping the world on a multilateral, free trade, course would have an almost irresistible effect.

Attempts at international solutions

If, in a world of increasing oil payments deficits, there is a minimum of Western integration, this will mean that the rush by developed countries into the international financial markets will not become a stampede. A queuing system and a re-cycling mechanism will be required, together with a ruling out of interest rate wars and beggar-my-neighbour exchange rate policies.

If the D-Mark zone, which has come into being as a result of the events following the French franc's departure from the snake, manages to remain in existence as a strong-currency area, and if there are no war scares, which inevitably favour precautionary flights into the dollar, on purely commercial grounds the D-Mark zone will function as a magnet of attraction for oil money. As a consequence, the other industrial countries, which have relatively weak currencies, will be induced to deflate their economies, in order to keep their currencies desirable assets for oil investors. The spectre of the Franc Area of inter-war experience, which functioned as a deflationary magnet for the world at large, is clearly in the minds of European economic and political authorities. In order to exorcise it, two courses of policy can be attempted by weak-currency countries:

1. They can try to generate a real transfer of resources vis-à-vis the oil-producing countries, i.e. they may try to sell them as much as possible in return for oil. This is the meaning of the proposed Arab-European conference. A healthy restraint on Germany's part is required

in order to prevent the oil producers from crowding its market, to the detriment of the other European countries' chances of selling their own goods.

2. A managed debt operation via the IMF can be attempted, whereby the major prospective debtor countries contract debts with the IMF, and the latter in turn collect the oil countries' deposits. The main advantage of this operation would be in short-circuiting the Euro-dollar market, which, since it functions on the principles of demand and supply, would not be able to do the job without a notable increase in interest rates. The IMF itself, however, has a straight record of inducing deflation in countries that have had recourse to its help, and a major rethinking would be needed in its lending philosophy if that were to be avoided.

The recent abolition of American controls on capital movements introduces a third problem: the diaphram between the American money supply and the Euro-dollar market has now disappeared and, in principle, an increase in the former would spill into the latter almost automatically. But, conversely, a decrease in the former would cause an opposite movement of funds, and one cannot help feeling that the abolition of American capital controls was introduced to enable the American authorities to do just that, i.e. to attempt to reflate their economy by an inflow of foreign funds, in order to bring down the short-term interest rate and to bring up the long-term one. This would re-establish more orderly conditions for monetary policy, which in the United States is traditionally based on a term structure of interest rates characterised by a sizeable differential between the short end and the long end of the market. A lower short-term rate, i.e. an abundance of funds at the short end of the market, would allow a reflation of stock exchange values, which is now badly needed by the American institutional investors, if the pension system of the United States is to continue in its present form, and if a Wall Street crisis is to be avoided.

An ideal outcome of the present international crisis, therefore, would see the 'Nordic Bloc', alias D-Mark zone, operating the transfer mainly in financial terms, and the same happening in the United States, while the rest of Europe, and Japan, would be allowed to operate the transfer in real terms. If it is correct to believe that an increase in the demand for investment goods anywhere has a probable multiplier effect in Germany and in the United States, this outcome would maintain a good measure of equilibrium in the world economy—granting that at the same time a non-deflationary system is found to mop up the liquidity the oil producers will be unable to spend. If this favourable outcome were discarded, we would probably see, not a competitive devaluation race, but a competitive deflation race, with attempts from all industrial countries to maximise export returns and minimise import payments.

As this would lead to unemployment, the second stage would see the beginning of a devaluation race as governments in developed countries were compelled to reflate and increase exports at the same time.

Again, as we noted before, equilibrium seems to be based on the wisdom of American and German policies. No amount of bilateral deals on the part of other industrial countries can cause very negative results; in fact they can help the circle to remain virtuous while only a moderate amount of loss of goodwill by the United States and Germany can wreak havoc. In general, the United States and Germany ought to 'step back' from the Comecon and Middle East markets, and possibly from the Latin American one as well, so as to allow the other industrial countries to earn a surplus there. These countries can then pay, at least in part, for their deficits with the oil exporters and can continue to look with equanimity on their trade deficits with the United States and Germany.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: FACTORS OF DISINTEGRATION

POLITICS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS *

Louis Turner

IT is the nature of alliances and communities of nations to disguise genuine differences of opinion behind smokescreens of ambiguously-worded motions and unimplemented guidelines. It is the nature of crises to blow away this verbiage, thus cruelly exposing the principals' inability to overcome their fundamental dissension when called upon to take part in specific acts of co-operation. The aftermath of the Yom Kippur war demanded a series of crucial political decisions by the European Community. What the world actually saw was the impotence of Community political institutions in the energy field; the fact that the British and French instinctively turned to *sauve qui peut* policies for guaranteeing oil supplies; the willingness of the French to cause a Community crisis rather than co-operate with the Americans; and the remarkable vacillation of the eight other member countries when forced to choose between French and American positions on how to handle the growing power of the oil producing nations.

Despite all this public disarray, however, the Community seems to have come through the storm relatively effectively. Available oil did get shared equitably among the Community members. The differences between France and the rest over the future of the Atlantic relationship were real, but, against American wishes, a common European approach to the Arab oil producers seems more and more likely during the coming months. Finally, the search for a common energy policy was renewed with a vigour it never had before.

European unpreparedness

The decision of the Arab oil producers to play the oil weapon [1] caught the EEC totally unprepared. Apart from some minor precau-

* This and the following article are based on papers read at a Chatham House Study Group.

[1] On October 17, 1973 OAPEC announced a monthly 5 per cent. cutback in oil production until Arab goals were achieved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. A conference of Arab oil ministers announced on November 5 production cutbacks of 25 per cent. on September levels, with further monthly 5 per cent. cuts; furthermore there was to be a total embargo on supplies to the United States and the Netherlands.

tions, the Community had developed no strategy to counter such a cutback in the flow of oil from the Middle East. To all intents and purposes, the EEC had no coherent oil or energy policies. Since the same could be said for virtually every single country in the world, this was not particularly reprehensible, but in the Community discussions about what such policies might be like it was possible to see some of the differences of opinion which were to be so cruelly exposed by the crisis in the autumn of 1973 and the spring of 1974.

The roots of this policy vacuum can be traced back to the fact that the EEC was not only created in the 1950s when coal was still king, but actually sprang from a coal-based institution, the European Coal and Steel Community. In so far as the policy-makers thought about oil, it was as a useful supplement to coal, which could be safely left in the hands of the private companies. By the end of the decade, however, it was apparent that the potential role of oil had been under-estimated. Thanks to a major expansion of Middle East production, oil was now both cheap and plentiful enough to replace coal in many of its uses. A kind of fatalism grew up. Cheap oil could be relied on as a base for European industrial expansion, and, since the companies seemed able to bring in unlimited amounts, there was no need to rethink their role.[2]

During the 1960s, the situation did not change much. In 1964 a Protocole d'Accord relating to energy problems was signed,[3] and the attempted Arab oil embargo after the Six Day War in 1967 led to the first serious attempts of the Commission to formulate a series of guidelines which covered all energy resources at the same time.[4] These were not, however, an adequate answer to the problem of reducing Europe's over-dependence on Middle East oil. The only hard action in response to this problem was a directive obliging member states to keep oil stocks equivalent to 65 days' consumption.[5]

The early 1970s saw the rise of militancy amongst the oil producers, leading to the Teheran-Tripoli agreements of 1971, which served notice that the consumer governments could no longer count on oil prices staying at their historic low levels. Similarly, the willingness of Kuwait and, in particular, Libya, to restrict production meant that the security of supplies could no longer be guaranteed either. In the light of these threats the EEC at last started to react. The October 1972 summit meeting of Community heads of state included energy on the agenda—

[2] The 1962 Marjolin report came down heavily for 'cheap energy'—i.e. reliance on imported oil. *Memorandum sur la politique energetique*: Groupe de Travail Inter-Executifs 'Energie' (ECSC, EEC, Euratom), 1962.

[3] European Community's Official Journal, No. 69, April 30, 1964.

[4] Supplement to *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 12, 1968.

[5] *Official Journal*, No. L, 308/14, December 23, 1968. In December 1972, this directive was modified to require members to keep 90 days' stocks by January 1, 1975.

albeit low down it, after monetary union and regional policies. The member countries agreed to stockpile the equivalent of 90 days' consumption of oil, and the Commission announced that it would look into the technical and financial problems of raising this to 120 days. By this stage, also, the Commission was pressing ahead with plans to encourage oil exploration in new areas (particularly in Europe and its continental shelf), had made arrangements for regular discussions on energy matters with the United States and was hoping to inaugurate similar discussions with Japan.

On the surface, none of this was particularly controversial, but at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in May 1973, the French introduced a series of political objections to the creation of an EEC energy policy which go far to show that the French attitude towards the Washington energy conference of February 1974 had a certain historical continuity. The May 1973 meeting (the first ministerial one to tackle energy issues for over three years) took place as Henri Simonet, the commissioner in charge of energy, sought a mandate for the talks he was to have with the Americans later in the month, and with the OECD members early in June. The Eight wanted to push ahead with these consultations about the range of problems faced by all the major oil consumers. The French countered by insisting that such relations with third countries should be conducted by member governments and not by the Community as such. They also argued that the EEC should first work out its own energy policy and should unify its oil market before starting to discuss oil safeguards with outsiders. These demands produced an eighteen-hour marathon meeting, in which the Council was unable to complete an agreed resolution laying down the Community's overall energy policy. The only really positive step taken about oil was that the governments undertook to introduce 'crisis management' legislation, thus equipping themselves with legal powers to introduce petrol rationing and to activate emergency oil allocation systems, and so on. Apart from this move, the ministers contented themselves with asking the Commission to prepare by the end of the year concrete proposals on the points on which they were unable to agree.[6] Since these included virtually all the substantive issues which would need clarifying before a genuine energy policy could emerge, it is little wonder that the Arab oil cutbacks of five months later triggered off reactions from EEC members which were, in some cases, far more nationalist and self-serving than Community-oriented.

[6] These were: relations with oil importing and exporting countries; the organisation of the Community oil market; the promotion of nuclear power; the future role of coal; the use of natural gas; the implications for the environment; the more economic use of energy; the development of new energy resources.

Sources of European disunity

By the end of the partly abortive Council of Ministers' meeting in May 1973, it should have been clear that the debate was only partly about oil; that the French were pursuing issues which were peculiar to their own political inheritance; and that the energy issue was becoming part of France's wider campaign against Kissinger's Atlantic Charter proposals. The fact that this particular battle against American dominance should have been fought over oil should have surprised no one. The whole history of France's involvement in oil has been a story of bitter struggle against Anglo-Saxon dominance, which forced the French to protect and plan their oil sector very closely indeed. As a result, they have for years been the only country in the EEC with anything approach-a carefully spelled-out oil policy. At least in part, their dispute with the Eight has been over their attempts to convince the latter that the European energy market should be regulated in the same way as the French market has been run.

France's serious concern about oil goes back at least to the 1914–18 war, which showed it both the key strategic role that oil must play for a country as short of coal as it was, and the perfidy of 'les trusts', the forerunners of today's major oil companies.[7] While French politicians concentrated on the war on the Eastern front, both Royal Dutch-Shell and Gulbenkian moved in to try to take control of the French oil industry. After the war, the government reacted by encouraging the formation of the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles*, in which it took a share, and through whose stake in the Middle East, the French could turn their vestigial colonial influence into a solid economic benefit. But from that point on, as France's world role has been replaced by American influence, so have the Anglo-Saxon major oil companies moved in to whittle away CFP's territorial rights. As a result, the natural chagrin of the French at their reduced world status became hopelessly entwined with oil politics, showing itself in deep-seated suspicion of the motives of the Anglo-Saxon-dominated oil industry, and in a feeling that France's independence calls for rigid control of its domestic oil market. Thus, on the wider stage, the French have been counter-attacking in the Middle East by signing generous deals with producers like Iran and Iraq, often to the extreme annoyance of the Americans. One can almost interpret these actions as a calculated attempt to regain the influence and oil which France lost when the Americans extended their role in the Middle East in the 1930s and 1940s at the expense of France. On the domestic front, it has followed a highly dirigiste policy known as the '*monopole délégué*'. According to this policy, preferential treatment is reserved for French companies

[7] Tugendhat. *Oil: the Biggest Business* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968), pp. 72–3, 94–6, 109–10, 150–1.

and for franc zone crude oil; foreign companies can only enter the market by showing that their sources of supply are secure; and prices are carefully controlled.

France's attitudes towards the oil industry have been seriously at odds with those of most of its EEC partners. Two of them have a vested interest in the survival of the major companies, with the Dutch and British controlling Royal Dutch-Shell, and the British government having a stake in British Petroleum. Both these governments have instinctively followed laissez-faire policies in regard to their domestic oil markets and have held roughly the same official position regarding the international oil industry as the Americans. The West Germans might have been expected to have felt some sympathy for the French, since their promising pre-1914 oil industry was smashed by the victors of the First World War. But since the 1939–45 war, they also have followed a laissez-faire approach which, during the 1960s, led to a highly competitive (and therefore low-price) domestic market which rested on new cheap sources of oil such as Libyan crude. It was only towards the late 1960s that official circles became increasingly concerned by the possibility that a blind reliance on foreign oil companies might not always be for Germany's benefit. The Italians have been closest to the French position with a state-owned company, ENI, which, under Mattei, was a major thorn in the flesh of the international oil industry. Domestically, the market has not been as tightly controlled as the French, but, with price controls which on occasion have been savage, the Italian philosophy has been somewhat closer to France's than that of the northern Europeans. The Italian and French positions are also close when one

TABLE

Proportional Dependence on Primary Fuels
(1973)

%

	Oil	Natural gas	Coal *	Other †
Italy	78·6	10·0	8·1	3·2
France	72·5	8·1	16·1	3·2
Belgium / Luxembourg	62·1	13·8	23·7	0·4
Netherlands	54·2	42·3	3·4	0·1
W. Germany	58·6	10·1	30·1	1·3
Britain	52·1	13·2	33·6	1·2

* Including lignite and 'brown coal'.
† Including nuclear energy, hydro-electricity and geothermal energy.
SOURCE: *BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry*, 1973.

considers their relatively high dependence on oil. As the table above shows, both have had relatively weak coal and natural gas industries, thus having to rely on oil for 79 per cent. of primary fuels in the case of Italy, and 72 per cent. in the case of France. Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom have larger coal industries, while the Netherlands benefits from the enormous natural gas finds connected to the Groningen field. Each of these latter countries has a degree of flexibility that neither the French nor the Italians have.

In October 1973, then, the EEC was a group of countries whose disparate interests precluded any systematic response to Arab pressures. Some, like the French and Italians, were relatively close to the Arabs. Others, like the British and Dutch, still hoped that the international oil industry would manage to come to a modus vivendi with the producers which did not call for a diplomatic confrontation between producer and consumer governments. Others, like the Germans, wavered in between. Bonn was involved in a complicated goods-for-oil deal with Iran which would at last provide significant amounts of 'German' oil, and was also encouraging German companies, Veba and Deminex to merge, thus creating a marketing counterweight to the non-German industry. With such a variety of approaches, it is not surprising that the Commission was largely restricted to preparing guidelines and doing market projections. It is no wonder that the attempts of the Council of Ministers to formulate a common energy policy were doomed to failure.

The aftermath of the Yom Kippur war

It came as a shock to the Community when the Arabs decided to ban all exports to the Netherlands, and by the time the Arab oil ministers had finally regularised the situation on November 5, the problem of European oil supplies had become extremely complex. In contrast to the blockaded Dutch, the British and French had been declared 'friendly' nations which would be permitted supplies at the level of the first nine months of 1973, while the rest of the EEC members would suffer cutbacks equivalent to 25 per cent of September levels.[8]

In this dire situation, the Dutch hoped to receive overt help from the other EEC members and were angry when they did not get it. Instead, their foreign minister was forced to join with his EEC counterparts

[8] Although the Dutch were officially blacklisted for taking a pro-Israeli stance, it was obviously not incidental that Europe's largest oil port, Rotterdam, was on Dutch soil. West Germany, Britain and the Scandinavians were particularly dependent on refined products and crude from there. In purely tactical terms, the Arabs could exert pressure on Europe through Rotterdam, without having openly to antagonise any of the three major EEC powers. For a fuller analysis of Rotterdam's logistical importance to Europe, see *Petroleum Press Service*, December 1973, p. 446. Two questions were immediately posed. First, how should the available crude be allocated within Europe? Second, what should the Community response be to the Arabs if future supplies were not to be jeopardised further?

in issuing a resolution on November 6 calling, amongst other things, for the Israelis to give up their occupied territories. This was a blatant attempt to conciliate the Arabs, and the Community received its reward on November 19 when the Arab oil ministers announced that EEC members, other than the Dutch, would not suffer the next 5 per cent cut which had been planned for December. This may have helped Europe as a whole, but it still did not help the Dutch. What they wanted was an intra-Community allocation system which would share the available oil equally between all member countries, but this immediately ran into problems. For one thing, the Community had no allocation system waiting to be implemented. This had always been left to the OECD which had had the experience of helping to organise the oil industry in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis and the Six Day War.[9] Although there had been controversy in recent years about exactly what the United States contribution should be in emergencies, there was no technical reason why the OECD member governments should not have authorised its International Industry Advisory Body[10] to activate its allocation system, at least for Europe. As it happened, the OECD's oil committee decided at its meeting on November 21–22, not to do this. The Dutch were thus officially deserted, and, although the details are still obscure, it appears that it was the British and the French who were particularly insistent that the OECD should take no official action.

Throughout the crisis, the roles of these two governments were extremely ambivalent. Both appeared terrified that they might lose their hard-won 'friendly' status with the Arabs. Both enthusiastically launched a series of diplomatic missions round the Middle East aimed at arranging bilateral deals in which armaments and industrial products would be swopped for oil. Both also put considerable pressure on oil companies to discriminate in favour of themselves at the evident expense of their neighbours.

The British did at least have some sort of an excuse for panic, since the Conservative government was locked in combat with the National Union of Mineworkers, which began an overtime ban in the coal industry on November 11, culminating in an all-out strike in February 1974. This meant that British political leaders were particularly alive to the importance of oil, even if significant parts of the foreign policy establishment were unhappy about what was basically a self-serving approach. It is less easy to explain the French position as a temporary aberration from a Community approach because of exceptional circum-

[9] The OECD had also done most of the basic work on stockpiling policies, which the EEC had then adopted in its own time. Throughout the 1960s, the OECD's oil committee was far more seriously considered in oil matters than the EEC Commission.

[10] This is an ad hoc group of oil company officials with a history going back to the 1956 Suez crisis; after the Six Day War they were charged with setting up a mechanism for dealing with oil shortages.

stances. Rather, it can be seen as a continuation of the positively pro-Arab drive which had been launched in the era of President de Gaulle and which had been showing distinct diplomatic and commercial promise in the years immediately preceding this crisis. It appears that the French government saw the emergency as a chance to make major inroads into the political and commercial hold that the Americans had in the Middle East; was unwilling to face the domestic problem of explaining to the French electorate why all that Arab oil should be shared with less diplomatically adept Europeans; and was slow to realise the anger that such go-it-alone policies would arouse in the rest of Europe.

Despite, however, all this apparent perfidy respecting Community ideals, it appears that the EEC's overall interests were in practice not all that badly served. For one thing, oil was shared equitably within Europe despite the failure to activate the OECD allocation scheme. This was carried out by the oil companies, but with the covert knowledge and approval of most European governments, which did not wish to take a public stand that would antagonise the Arabs, but which saw that the companies would ensure that no country would actually suffer disproportionately. Admittedly, both the British and French governments did later exert considerable pressure on the companies to discriminate in their favour, but neither pushed very hard when the companies made it clear that the governments would have to specify publicly which other countries should go short. In addition, the Dutch were able to point to the fact that the Parisian region of France was heavily dependent on Dutch natural gas, so there would be reprisals if the French refused to co-operate.[11]

The Copenhagen conference of heads of state in December 1973 came near the end of the first stage of the crisis. The Dutch, Danes and Germans still favoured some formal EEC policy on oil sharing, while the French and British still argued that 'secret diplomacy' would in the long run be more effective. These latter governments reluctantly agreed that the Commission should put proposals forward at the end of January to ensure the orderly functioning of the EEC energy market, and the four foreign ministers from the Arab League were told that the EEC was not going to move any more positively against Israel than the foreign ministers' resolution of the previous month. By the end of December, the Arabs had decided to relax their cutbacks to Europe, and the Belgians had been added to the list of 'friendly' countries. The corner had been turned. The physical availability of oil was less a problem

11 One lesson from this crisis is that the European oil market is no respecter of political boundaries. The Scandinavians depend on Rotterdam; the Swiss are supplied by pipelines originating in France and Italy; there is a significant intra-European trade in refined products. In fact, one of the first problems facing the EEC in October was to stop its members banning the exports of refined products to each other.

than the price at which it was sold and the precautions which should be taken to ensure that the industrialised world would never find itself in so desperate a situation again.

In retrospect, the deliberately low-key diplomacy of the French and British seems to have paid off, even if the process of conciliating the Arabs may have been somewhat galling. Undoubtedly, there was a distinct element of self-interest in this policy, but, as these two governments appear to have argued at the Copenhagen conference, there was a good chance of persuading the Arabs to start restoring the cuts they had made in oil supplies; such persuasion, however, was best done quietly. It is of course a delicate judgment as to whether this approach was really best suited to the situation, but it is certainly difficult to believe that a formally spelled-out EEC policy of help to the Dutch would have eased the situation in any way. Undoubtedly, this would have been a more truly 'European' solution, but it could easily have been interpreted as an act hostile to the Arab cause and have led to further restrictions on oil supplies. The Anglo-French expediency was not glorious, but it seems to have been effective.

The Washington Energy Conference

The intra-EEC feud at the Washington energy conference of February 11–13, 1974, had virtually nothing to do with energy. It was much more a continuation of the battle which the French had previously fought in the May 1973 Council of Ministers' meeting; just how should the EEC handle relations with other world powers, particularly the Americans? In such relations, should the Commission have any significant role? Could one collaborate with the Americans and still be a good European?

From the beginning of Dr. Kissinger's efforts to call a general energy conference for industrialised consumer governments, the French position was intransigent. They saw the conference as an attempt by the Americans to re-establish their hegemony over Europe, and also as an attempt to create a confrontation between producer and consumer governments, thus running counter to the whole point of the low-key, conciliatory stance that France had been taking towards the Arabs.

The reactions of the other eight were somewhat more complex and considerably more irresolute. None of the others had anything approaching France's paranoia towards anything American, but they also had been uneasy when Dr. Kissinger unfolded his plans immediately before the Copenhagen conference. At this meeting, the Nine issued a statement about the importance of entering into negotiations with the producer governments, thus implying that it was not only the French who were worried about the dangers of confrontation. In particular,

the four Arab foreign ministers in attendance had requested technical aid from the Community in return (implicitly) for guaranteed oil supplies. This approach was taken seriously and, in early January, the Nine secretly agreed, at the level of national officials, to convene an Arab-European conference later in the year. This proposal had French parentage (though M. Henri Simonet in March 1973, and the Western European Union in 1972 had called for much closer Arab-European ties), and it had a European logic since the continent is so very heavily dependent on Middle East oil. On the other hand, it ran counter to the interests of the Americans who felt that this initiative smacked too much of a bilateral deal which would tend to bid up the price of oil. Besides which, even discussing such a conference could embarrass Dr. Kissinger in his search for a Middle East peace by implying that the Western world might not be fully united behind him.

The Eight thus found themselves being pulled two ways. They wavered and managed to get the worst of both worlds. First, at the foreign ministers' meeting of February 5, a mandate was agreed which was quite close to the French position, in that it was agreed that the conference should restrict itself to looking at how energy problems should be treated, with a view to passing them on swiftly to the appropriate international bodies; above all, the conference should not be turned into a permanent organ. However, once they got to Washington, the Eight, under the influence of a strong German delegation, drifted away from the French position and finally signed a communiqué without France calling for a series of actions in the energy field and the creation of a group of senior officials to direct and co-ordinate them. Finally, having arrived back in Europe to a chorus of scholarly analyses of the European Crisis, the Council of Ministers resurrected the very idea which Dr. Kissinger thought he had scotched in Washington when he had got the Eight to agree that bilateral deals were no solution to the problem—the idea of an Arab-European conference. The claims that Dr. Kissinger had effectively split the EEC at Washington died in commentators' throats. With his furious response to the fact that the United States had not been consulted before the decision was taken, it looked as though it was the Atlantic relationship which was in danger, not the Community.

Verdict on the crisis

All told, the situation since the Yom Kippur war has been a complex one. A crisis which originally concerned only oil acted as a catalyst, producing an intricate set of reactions from a wide number of actors, and incidentally throwing light on problem areas which the rhetoric of European unity had tended to gloss over.

First, the crisis exposed the Community's almost total lack of an oil, let alone an energy, policy. At least part of the dissension of the October-December period stemmed from the fact that there were no previously agreed guidelines in existence. By April 1974, however, the EEC's energy committee was discussing a variety of proposals for increasing the diversity of European energy sources. At the time of writing it was not known what the Council of Ministers would decide in June, but the initial response from informed sources had been friendly.

The Community, however, has yet to tackle the potentially disintegrative implications of the increasingly significant oil and gas finds in the North Sea. The British should easily be self-sufficient in oil by 1980, and this gives their politicians the option of withdrawing from the EEC on the assumption that the oil boom of the 1980s will provide power for Britain's economy despite the country being on the wrong side of the EEC's tariff wall. The exact influence that Brussels will try to have over such developments is a highly inflammatory issue, and the legal interpretation of the amount of jurisdiction the Treaty of Rome may grant the Commission in such an area is still disputed. There is also the lesser problem stemming from the inability of France and Britain to agree on a median line down the Channel, where the position of the Channel Islands could give the British the lion's share of the oil that will probably be found there too. This could be a long drawn-out issue generating considerable ill-will between the two countries.

The crisis has also highlighted the fact that even the enlarged EEC is not big enough to handle the oil issue on its own. Within Europe, the pattern of pipelines and refineries is such that, at the very least, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Austria should be considered as part of the European oil market. On a more general level, many of the problems thrown up by high prices and restricted supplies, can only be solved in collaboration with the United States and Japan; for instance, any emergency allocation scheme for Europe would almost certainly involve diverting oil bound for North America. It is thus not accidental that the OECD has always been a more important forum for discussing oil issues than the EEC Commission. Moreover, the existence of these wider issues, and the fact that the Americans need Europe's help in these matters less than Europe needs America's, means that the Atlantic dialogue will continue on energy matters, thus perpetuating a situation which could lead to further disputes between France and the Eight on the issue of trans-Atlantic relations.

Ultimately, however, the verdict on the crisis must reflect the fact that the Community survived with no more dissension than was generated by the regional fund issue. In fact oil and the latter issue were linked at the Copenhagen meeting, when the British, in a fit of pique about the size of the proposed regional fund, vetoed a proposal that

the Commission should prepare a series of short-term solutions to the crisis. This is a fairly clear demonstration that, by December, oil was just another issue over which the member states could fight without endangering the overall institution of the EEC.

Events since October, however, may well have changed the nature of the Community. For one thing, it appears that Europe has moved further out of the orbit of American influence, despite Dr. Kissinger's apparent success at the Washington conference. This is not surprising since oil is an issue in which the European position is qualitatively different from that of the United States. Both Europe's geographical proximity to the Arab world, and its high dependence on imported oil make relations with the Arabs something very much more than just a factor in achieving eventual peace in the Middle East. In this case, despite inflexibility on some issues, the French (with British help) were actually very successful in persuading other members of the Community to take a low-key approach to the Arabs throughout the crisis. This was probably in the best interests of Europe as a whole, and this crisis may well be seen in retrospect as a turning point in the relationship between Europe and the Arabs—perhaps at the eventual expense of the Americans.

Finally, the crisis may have marked the political coming-of-age of the Germans. Throughout the crisis, their role was to lead the opposition to the French and British. At the Washington conference, the Germans were confident enough to launch a frontal attack on the French and, even more important, to ignore them when they refused to compromise. It has been suggested that the decision of the Eight to co-operate in the post-Washington institutional arrangements might well be used as a precedent to break the rule of unanimity which has in recent years so hampered the development of the EEC. In these circumstances, the oil crisis has probably been more therapeutic than divisive for the European Community.

IS THE WORLD RUNNING OUT OF RAW MATERIALS? *

Robert Perlman

THE argument that the world is running out of raw materials has recently taken on a great deal of additional credibility. Oil prices have risen almost four-fold and many other commodities from wheat and sugar through to copper have also shown spectacular increases in price. In fact, the extent and ubiquity of the price increases in primary commodities has been unprecedented. One could almost say that never have so many commodities risen so far and so quickly in such a short time.

There are several reasons for what has been happening, yet the proposition that the world is about to run out of raw materials is not one of them. As always in commodities, the reasons for the sharp movement in prices are due to factors on both the demand and supply sides. Had the price increases been due to resource depletion one would have expected the main factor on the supply side to have been the sheer limitation on increasing production beyond existing levels of capacity. But a closer look at the situation in most commodity markets will quickly reveal that production has not in fact been held back by an ultimate capacity constraint. On the contrary, the problems have been ones of disruption and dislocations in supply so that production has in many cases fallen well below potential capacity. This is true for agricultural commodities such as wheat, sugar and coffee where weather conditions have played havoc with the annual harvest or crop. Many metals have been hit by an unusual number of production disruptions due to strikes, political problems, as in Chile, or technical breakdowns at processing plants. This has been further aggravated by the introduction of stricter anti-pollution legislation as well as by one or two factors which have either forced the complete closure of processing plant pending the construction of new plant and equipment, or forced existing plant to operate at well below design capacities. Thus in zinc, for instance, around twenty per cent. of the non-socialist world smelting capacity has been closed down over the last three years. Even in the case of oil, where those who support the resource depletion argument can probably make out their strongest case, the price increases have also been associated with a substantial cutback in production.

* An address given at Chatham House on March 20, 1974.

Meanwhile, on the demand side commodities have enjoyed unusually buoyant conditions. Economic activity almost everywhere in the industrialised world has, until recently, been bounding ahead, with the growth of industrial production reaching levels almost twice the longer term average rate of increase. No doubt the general acceptance of floating exchange rates has had a lot to do with this. Under fixed exchange rates at least some of the strength of the boom would undoubtedly have been dampened down by governments compelled to intervene in order to maintain parities. But in the present context of floating rates, and given the political commitment to full employment and rapid growth, the temptation to let exchange rates take the punishment has been very considerable. Furthermore, the expansionist policies of governments have been successful in keeping industries working near, in some cases beyond, optimum capacity levels. But this has been at the cost of severe inflationary pressures which have in turn been further added to by the general rise in commodity prices. In this situation of eroding money values and the uncertain buying power of even the most respectable looking hard currency, people have turned to commodities in preference to money, thus generating more pressure on commodity prices. It need not take an army of speculators to switch their holdings into commodities for prices to respond. If sellers hang on a little longer to their goods, and buyers order slightly further in advance prices will, in conditions of shortage, rise sharply. It is all these factors that largely explain the general upswing in commodity prices. Had resource depletion been the fundamental factor for the recent surge in commodity prices one would have expected commodity prices to have been pushed up by rising production costs or the cost of unsuccessful exploration for further supplies. One need only take a cursory glance at the profits of commodity producing companies, which have not doubled but quadrupled or more, to appreciate that they have not been unduly beset by cost factors. Now it is only the time it takes for additional investment to be translated into higher production that is preventing increased supplies from bringing commodity prices down more quickly.

Nevertheless, although the present situation in commodities has little to do with the sheer physical depletion of natural resources, the question of whether the world will be confronted by this problem, at least in the foreseeable future, remains. Before taking up this point, let me make it clear that I will be restricting myself to non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels and metals as opposed to renewable resources such as foods and timber. I do this for several reasons: to discuss all commodities would, given their different characteristics, be a major undertaking beyond the scope of this talk. Secondly, if those who hold to the resource depletion argument have a case, it must be amongst the non-

renewable resources that they must surely be able to find most support for their position.

The argument that the world is running out of natural resources rests largely on two assumptions. One is that reserves are not only finite which is, of course, a truism, but that they are limited in the sense that resources can only sustain present rates of growth in consumption for a relatively short period of time. The second assumption is that the growth rate of consumption, if left to itself, is not able to respond to the reduction in that of supply. For even if prices rise sharply, the response to this, through substitution or raw materials saving, would take too long to prevent ultimate depletion.

Let us first look at metals which are non-renewable but, unlike fossil fuels, a large part of the supply of which is reclaimable after use. World reserves of metals can be divided into two categories. Proved reserves and potential reserves. Proved reserves are relatively limited; in aluminium, reserves are equivalent to 31 years trend rates of growth in consumption, in copper the figure is 21 years, in zinc it is 19 and in tin it is 15. But in looking at these facts there are two important points to bear in mind. One is that the amount of proved reserves relative to trend rates of consumption has varied little over the last forty years. Secondly, potential reserves in the first mile of the earth's crust, which can be determined by geological sampling techniques, are many thousand times proved reserves. Thus in aluminium, total abundance in the first mile of the earth's crust is more than 10 million times proved reserves; in the case of tin it is one million times and in the case of other metals mentioned it is more than 100,000 times. Hence, there is little danger of physically running out of these metals. What is true is that the concept of total abundance tells us that more than enough reserves exist, but it does not tell us where these reserves are located in commercially exploitable concentrations. Thus the resource depletion argument could be altered to read that it will become increasingly costly to discover new deposits and exploit them. Calculations done at the Commodities Research Unit show that, given present technology, it will in fact become increasingly costly even to exploit presently known reserves as companies move from mining higher grade and accessible deposits to lower grade and less accessible deposits.

New techniques of exploration and exploitation

But technology is not constant. Breakthroughs in technology and continual improvement in existing techniques have made it possible for technology to offset, at least partially, cost increases due to falling grades, and in some cases technology has more than offset this tendency. If we look at copper, average ore grades being mined today are almost half those mined forty years ago, yet the real price of copper has risen by

only forty per cent during that time. Meanwhile, the real price of iron has remained fairly constant and that of aluminium has actually fallen. These are the three most important metals in terms of the value of world metal consumption.

Admittedly, there is a danger here of being lulled into complacency by the rhetoric of extrapolation; namely, that past improvement in technology will necessarily continue into the future. Some argue that we are bumping against the limits of possible improvement in the existing technology of mining and processing many metals. What is now required to keep costs down is no longer technical improvements but technological breakthroughs to totally new techniques of exploration and exploitation. Even if one accepts this argument, there are a host of new techniques that have recently appeared on the horizon. These include nuclear blasting, deep sea mining, hydrometallurgical methods for processing metals as opposed to conventional pyrometallurgical methods, as well as other new processes such as those recently announced in aluminium which promise vast savings in production costs. Similarly, exploration methods are improving through the adoption of geophysical techniques, the use of satellites as well as advances in the understanding of how continents were formed and hence where geological anomalies are to be found. Just to take satellites, recent photographs taken by an American satellite have uncovered a large copper deposit in the United States in an area where previous geological work concluded that nothing worthwhile existed.

There is one further point about reserves that ought to be made and that is that reserves of all sorts of materials exist but they only become worthwhile if there is a potential demand for them. Take uranium for an example. Only 0·7 per cent. of the world's uranium occurs as the fissile isotope U235, the remainder consisting almost wholly of U238. However, with the advent of breeder reactors, which convert a high proportion of U238 into fissile plutonium, the world's reserves of nuclear fuel, in terms of energy, are effectively multiplied many times and the change will also mean that even rock with a very low uranium content becomes economic to mine. Another way in which one can see how technology has changed the nature of worthwhile reserves is to reflect on the historical order in which different energy sources have been used: from dung the world has gone onto wood, peat, coal, oil and uranium. In this case there was not even a long-run tendency for the world to turn to increasingly more expensive natural resources to meet its requirements.

The link between what at any time can be called worthwhile reserves and the changing structure of demand highlights another important point. The demand for almost all mineral resources is a derived one: in other words, a fundamental demand for some property or combination

of properties—strength, say, or electrical conductivity—underlies the observed demand for particular metals or other minerals. The fact that most properties are shared by several minerals gives rise to the possibility of substitution and is the prime reason for being suspicious of simple extrapolations into the future of the past rates of consumption of a particular resource. We should not allow our ideas of the needs of industry to be set in the mould shaped by one particular period or by one particular year. Apart from our need for food, we have no absolute need for any particular raw material; we value the materials we use for particular properties which could be supplied by alternative materials, or by more or less of the same materials. Thus, to summarise the arguments about resource depletion as it affects metals, the situation is that metal ores are still very abundant although a slow upward trend in real costs is possible unless progress in extractive or consumption technology keeps pace with declining ore grades. The problem is not one of sheer physical depletion, but one of mining and engineering technology and economic adjustment.

Broadly speaking, the problem with oil as a source of energy is much the same as it is with metals. But there are important differences which make the process of adjustment away from conventional oil a much more difficult problem, at least in the short to medium term. It is not that the adjustment away from conventional oil will necessarily bring economic activity to a halt, or that this adjustment cannot be made, but it is the speed of the required adjustment that is the villain of the piece: known reserves are equivalent to a shorter number of years consumption for oil than for any other important resources. Although there may still be a lot of oil to discover, the ultimate abundance of oil cannot be estimated by the sampling techniques used in metals. Oil is only found in sedimentary basins but not all sedimentary basins contain oil. Hence the presence of recoverable oil in any sedimentary area is very difficult to predict. Oil's historical cheapness has, moreover, stimulated the growth of oil-dependent industries which would at the margin be unprofitable without the availability of cheap energy at extractive or manufacturing stages of cheap oil-based raw materials or of continuing supplies of cheap oil products.

Adjustment to a world with less conventional oil will involve not only higher costs, where oil can be obtained, but substantial technical changes as well. Of course, conversion to the use of oil during the last thirty years involved similar technical change—but it offered the compensation of lower final costs. Moreover, it took place in a context of rapid growth, when the stock of capital equipment was being expanded, and the stock needing to be converted was of diminishing importance. Now that expansion—based on cheap oil among other factors—has already taken place, the conversion is inevitably a much larger task.

It is characteristic of most raw materials that their costs form a relatively small proportion of final prices, but that they are nonetheless of critical importance as ingredients. Iron ore is cheap, as are some of the other raw materials for steel making, but it would be impossible to provide a whole range of goods and services without them. Oil shares this characteristic. Even at the new higher prices it represents only 4–5 per cent of the GNP of industrialised countries. Nevertheless it is of even more pervasive importance than iron and steel. Among most raw materials, especially among the metals, there is a moderate degree of substitutability even in the short run. There are other materials which, at greater cost or at some inconvenience, can be used to replace a traditional material, and in the longer run technical development may even eliminate this extra cost. But the substitutes for crude oil are much more expensive. At least, much more expense is involved in producing a near substitute for oil for those uses where oil is needed for its special chemical or physical characteristics. The adjustment to a shortage of cheap oil involves a much bigger and more sudden jump in costs and a much bigger programme of investment than the adjustments involved in the much more gradual drop from higher to lower-grade deposits in metals.

Substitutes for oil

Until now oil has been the main source of incremental energy supply. In the long run the vast world resources of coal could easily meet future incremental demand and replace oil. But the main concern must be with the immediate future, should oil supplies fail to expand in response to demand. The near substitutes—heavy oils and shales, tar sands and coal synthetic crude oil—cannot be produced in quantity without long lead times both at extractive stages and at processing stages. The shortage of oil in the near future will thrust industry into dependence on alternatives where techniques are known and developed and plant is available. Natural gas can make some contribution, but over the world as a whole it is no more abundant than oil and in many places, in any case, occurs in association with oil. Nuclear energy would involve almost as high an investment bill and certainly as long a lead time as a programme to develop synthetic crude oil. Only coal remains as an abundant, known source, the technology of which is both known and amenable to rapid further developments.

Assuming that the demand for energy continues to grow at present trends, and assuming continued increases in the supply of oil from countries with an interest in maximising production and no cutbacks in oil production from the so-called surplus oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia, and assuming extra supplies of synthetic oil and coal in line with current published plans, there will, by 1980, be an energy

supply deficit of some 500 million tonnes of oil equivalent. Economies in the use of energy which would not inflict serious penalties on growth or living standards could reduce this gap to between 100 and 200 million tonnes of oil equivalent. An annual increase in the oil exports of the surplus oil producing countries of only 1·5 per cent a year would eliminate the gap altogether.

This may seem too neat an answer. However, it does assume maximum efforts to prepare industry and households to convert and to make energy savings (mainly in transport and space heating). The savings will not just happen, and without them there will have to be cuts in consumption which *would* cut output and living standards, in the short and medium term.

Assuming that the oil gap of 100–200 million tonnes a year by 1980 will be met, there are many who argue that even under the most favourable assumptions this cannot be done without an appreciable slow down in world growth. First, there is the problem of coping with the trade deficits that are bound to be run up by oil-importing countries as a result of the very much higher price of oil. Secondly, in more global terms, there is the problem of the additional investment required to produce the more costly forms of energy, be it unconventional oil or coal, and the investment required in switching from energy-intensive forms of production.

Let us take the trade problem first. One possibility is that in order to correct the import deficits resulting from higher oil prices, industrialised countries will have to restrict import demand by deflating. But by the very nature of the problem such a policy cannot eliminate the trade deficits of all industrialised countries so long as the oil-producing countries are not willing or able to spend their additional export revenue on additional imports. And most calculations show that the unspent additional export revenues accruing to oil-producing countries will be very substantial indeed. But providing the industrialised countries are willing to recognise that they are all in more or less the same short-term position of trade deficit, the result need not be a slow down in growth. If funds are accumulated by oil producers they can only, in practice, be placed on the capital markets of advanced industrial countries or spent on goods made by such countries. Either way, the balance-of-payments problem disappears. Indeed, it is fortunate for the advanced industrial countries that so large a part of oil production is in the hands of countries which are believed to be unable to convert their excess of funds into import goods and must instead lend them back.

This greatly reduces any immediate real income loss by the advanced countries. Oil producers will be building up deferred claims on goods from advanced countries which will enable them to maintain their own consumption standards two or three decades from now when their oil

production is diminishing. This will, therefore, allow the advanced countries to meet the claims against their production over a longer period and by the time repayment is due there is the possibility that the price of manufactures will have risen relative to oil and thus make the repayment burden that much less. The real losers from the balance-of-payments standpoint are the non-oil producing developing countries, notably India, which have to pay higher prices for essential oil imports but can expect little in the way of capital inflows or export orders from the oil producers.

Another argument—that the oil crisis is likely to lead to an overall decline in growth—is based on the cost of extracting oil from unconventional sources. It is argued that since far larger quantities of real resources—capital equipment, labour, etc.—will need to be invested to obtain oil from coal or shale than would have been needed to obtain it from traditional oil fields, fewer resources will be available for other activities, thereby reducing consumption standards in the long term. This is true, but it is not all that great a problem since the proportion of the industrialised countries' GNP that has now to be devoted to energy will still only be about 4–5 per cent compared to about 1·5 per cent previously. And secondly, the amount of investment required to bring about the transition does not appear to be all that high.

To give you an idea of the investment costs that are required, I earlier suggested that the apparent oil gap is of the order of 200 million tonnes by the early 1980s. How much investment then is needed to produce oil from coal or shale to bridge the 'gap'? A rough guide to this is that it costs about 10 to 12 times as much in terms of capital to produce a barrel from shale or tar sands than from a Middle East oil field, which means $20,000 million by 1980. This in turn implies additional investment in the next six years of an extra $3,500 million per annum, which is equivalent to only 20 per cent more of the total amount invested by the world oil industry in 1971. Clearly the additional investment can hardly be considered as financially impossible.

As regards the additional burden higher oil prices will place on consuming countries in terms of the need now to change over to energy saving production methods, this again need not be insuperable. The average life of industrial equipment, in a relatively slow growing under-investing economy such as the British, is around 15 years. In faster growing high-investment economies it is about half that. Given the necessity to replace old oil-dependent equipment, the effort of a complete change-over would not be necessary, since some oil products would still be available either from continued crude oil production or from synthetic crude oil plants.

Thus, in summary, it can be concluded that the world is not at the moment facing a depletion problem as regards natural resources. Recent

price rises can be explained in terms of extraordinary rises in demand coupled with largely man-made reductions in supply (or failures to expand capacity) and the probability is that these price rises will be reversed, except possibly in the case of oil. The price increase of oil does represent a real burden to oil consumers, but is a corresponding benefit to low-cost producers. If this burden was spread equitably among the countries of the world according to their abilities to meet it, the oil problem would not be all that serious. However, the benefits accrue to a tiny minority of the population in a handful of countries, while many millions of people in resource-poor developing countries like India seem destined to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. The oil problem is, therefore, not one of resource availability, but rather one of resource distribution.

As far as the oil-consuming industrialised countries are concerned, the impact of the burden on their consumption standards will be lessened to the extent that they are able to spread their debt repayments over a long number of years in the future, by which time their terms of trade will probably have improved, partly as a result of greater demand by oil producers for manufactured consumption and investment goods, and partly because of the lower costs of producing alternatives to conventional oil.

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES—II

J. D. B. Miller

THE results of the Australian general election on May 18, 1974 suggest that the Whitlam government's foreign policy was not a factor of importance in the reduction of the government's majority. Apart from the fact that the Labor Party's proportion of the total vote was higher than at the 1972 election, the loss of seats was due very largely to domestic issues, especially inflation and the failure of the government to continue the concessions which its predecessors had made to the farmers. Although opposing groups made much of the Whitlam government's failure to support American policy as zealously as Liberal-Country party governments had done, this does not seem to have had much effect on the voters. So far as domestic constraints and opportunities are concerned, the government's advantage, described in an article in the previous issue of this journal, appears to have continued. It may well have been aided by the continuance of external influences, which had removed or reduced the sense of danger which the majority of Australians had clearly felt while their country was involved in the Vietnam war, and which had given the previous government its greatest triumph at the general election of 1966. Since then, there appears to have been a declining public concern about external policy, evident at the 1969 and 1972 elections, and again in 1974. This article is concerned with the nature of the opportunities and constraints imposed on the Whitlam government's policy by external events.

In the first twelve months of the Labor Party's term of office, the world outside Australia provided more opportunities than constraints, enabling Mr. Whitlam to move quickly in a number of fields, and to give the impression of briskly bringing Australia up to date. He told a gathering of New York businessmen on August 1, 1973:

> It's a great thing for me and my colleagues just not to have to waste time pushing against the wind on matters like China and Vietnam. Had my political fortunes been otherwise, had the party I lead come into power at any time in the last seven years, I should have made basically the same decisions. We would have transferred our China Embassy to Peking, we would have ended Australia's military commitment in Indo-china, we would be pursuing the same policies about tariffs and investment and monetary reform and aid to developing countries. But gentlemen, what a relief it is, what an exhilaration it is, what a help it is to

be moving on the wave of great events rather than swimming against the tide.

This surfing metaphor describes the major opportunity which the Whitlam government had derived from the considerable changes in United States policy in the previous three years. President Nixon's withdrawal of American ground troops from Vietnam had caused the Liberal-Country Party government to withdraw nearly all the Australian troops. Only a few were left in Singapore and Malaysia in accordance with the Five Power Agreement which had signalised Britain's partial withdrawal from that area. More important, there had been President Nixon's rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union, and the enunciation of his doctrine of self-reliance for the allies of the United States in Asia. It had become clear that the United States would no longer shore up ailing anti-communist regimes in South-east Asia by the use of ground troops, and also that American approaches to China would now be direct; no longer would expensive proxy wars be waged against those smaller states considered to be China's puppets.

There had already been some re-examination of assumptions by the Liberal-Country Party before it lost office. Similar reassessments had been going on in Japan, Malaysia and Thailand. Former rhetoric and former policies would no longer be sufficient. Whether the policies adopted by the Whitlam government were the best for the circumstances is a matter of legitimate argument; but there can be no doubt that new policies were called for, or that, for the time being, the government in general and Mr. Whitlam in particular gained prestige from so swiftly applying them.

There were also constraints, however. No government can do what it likes in foreign policy. Up to a point it can say what it likes, but saying is a form of doing, and there may be damaging effects from saying what one likes, as three of Mr. Whitlam's ministers discovered in January 1973 when they openly attacked President Nixon's resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. Constraints are implicit in the very existence of a network of international relationships: policies cannot be strictly bilateral as between two countries, or entirely exclusive as regards one particular aspect of policy, or equally applied to all states with which one's country has relations. The interests of both friends and enemies have to be considered. Even a rhetorical statement which is not followed by any corresponding action has its effects: it may set up unsatisfied expectations, create alarm, breed distrust, or simply, by repetition, give the impression of a government which never does what it says. Constraints such as these are implicit in membership of the society of states. There are others, of course, which arise from the particular circumstances of states with which it is necessary to conclude agreements or simply maintain friendly relations. This is why diplomats usually

have so little regard for the foreign policy formulations of academics. They argue that the academics neglect the obstacles and constraints which an experienced diplomat can see ahead, and which he expects to see.

The existence of opportunities and constraints for the Whitlam government may be illustrated from situations in which one or the other was predominant, and from others in which the two were mixed.

In South-east Asia, the area in which there had been most change as a result of President Nixon's revision of the policies bequeathed to him by President Johnson, Mr. Whitlam was able to do very much what he wanted to do while suffering little obvious harm. The new climate created by the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the conclusion of an agreement with North Vietnam enabled the government to remove its troops from both Indochina and Singapore, and in the case of Indochina to recognise the government of North Vietnam while paying more attention to the Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao than any previous Australian government. In the Indochinese case it was doing very much what the United States government was doing, though with a different kind of rhetorical flourish. In regard to the Five Power Agreement and ANZUK, it was able to profit from the fact that the Liberal-Country Party government had concentrated Australian ground forces in Singapore, and reduced them to a specialist group and a small garrison force. Removing the garrison was a simple matter, watched with indifference by Malaysia (where the Australian government continued to retain two squadrons of Mirages, thus retaining a stake in the Five Power system); it did not please the government of Singapore, which had placed great emphasis on the advantages of having British, Australian and New Zealand troops on its soil. Since, however, the advantages seemed to lie in the extent to which these might deter Malaysia, which was itself one of the Five Powers, and since Australian governments for some time had been uneasy about their troops being a pawn in Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's local game, the removal occasioned relatively little disturbance. Although Britain and New Zealand continued to retain troops in Singapore, they showed no inclination to increase their forces to make up for the small Australian loss. It could hardly be argued that Malaysia and Singapore were less well defended as a result. Indeed, when the Liberal-Country Party opposition declared in April 1974 that it intended to restore the Singapore garrison if returned to office at the coming general election, the statement was received coolly in both of the Asian countries. The Singapore government made it known that the barracks vacated by the Australian troops were needed for other purposes, and that, in any case, Singapore did not want to be pushed backwards and forwards by the demands of Australian party politics. The presence of

Australian troops was clearly not vital, and the situation had been one in which the Australian Labor government could do much as it wished.

In contrast, we may take another situation in which Mr. Whitlam did not get what he wanted, even though he laid much emphasis on it. On January 27, 1973, a month after taking office, he told the annual summer school of the Australian Institute of Political Science that Asia needed a new forum for regional co-operation. He saw little virtue in either SEATO, which would have to change its character to overcome its former position as an anti-Chinese alliance, or ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council), which no longer reflected the realities of the situation, since Taiwan was a member. ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) was a viable sub-regional grouping which did not need to be changed or enlarged. Mr. Whitlam said he would like to see Australia's ASEAN neighbours in a larger regional association for Asia and the Pacific. He foresaw a regional community 'genuinely representative of the region, without ideological overtones, conceived as an initiative to help free the region of great power rivalries that have bedevilled its progress for decades and designed to insulate the region against ideological interference from the great powers'. It emerged that he had in mind a body which was consultative, not executive, and one which included Japan and China, as well as the states of South-east Asia, but not, it appeared, either India or the Soviet Union. He disclaimed any attempt to impose a detailed formulation, but said that Australia would be patient and punctilious in seeing whether such a body could be set up.

He pursued the idea, patiently and punctiliously, in his visits to Indonesia and India, and in discussions with the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister. All the discussions were confidential, but it seems likely that he struck trouble because of his wish to include China and to exclude India and the Soviet Union, both of which were understandably disturbed at the prospect of some new Asian body in which China would be represented and they would not. Indonesia, it is believed, was strongly opposed to any organisation in which China was included. Japan may well have doubted the desirability of joining a body in which China would be so prominent, especially when it had so many matters to arrange with China on its own account. The ASEAN countries generally were doubtful of aligning themselves so quickly with China; they were also anxious that ASEAN, their own instrument (especially Indonesia's) should not be overshadowed by something bigger but less suited to their needs.

This was a clear case of what suited the Australian government not suiting anyone else. In the abstract and the long run, there was much to be said for including China in some general Asian-Pacific organisation; China had been long separated from the other countries of the area, and would benefit, as they might, from a frank exchange of views. Australia

could gain prestige from acting as the honest broker who brought these previously estranged Asians together. Each of them, however, had reasons of its own for being slower and more tentative in its approach to China. Malaysia and Singapore obviously had to find means of rapprochement which did not affect the loyalty of their Chinese populations. Indonesia had to be assured not only that China would abstain from harbouring the Indonesian Communist leadership and interfering in Indonesian affairs, but also that China would accept Indonesia as a major Asian power in its own right. Thailand and the Philippines had their own special reasons for being cautious. Mr. Whitlam was thus in the position of asking too much too soon of his Asian associates. No progress was made with the scheme, although Mr. Whitlam continued to believe that it was desirable. The constraints of other countries' interests had been too much for him. He was able, however, to widen Australian contacts with China, and thereby to secure some domestic advantage, on account of the out-dated rigidity of his predecessors' approach.

Certain other international issues with which his government had to deal showed a similar pattern of opportunities derived largely from the previous government's rigidity, and constraints imposed by international circumstances. The most outstanding was that of security relations with the United States, but one may also include issues of Commonwealth relations and of resources diplomacy.

In the case of the United States, the Labor Party had long declared itself a supporter of ANZUS, but had denounced the previous government's continual subservience to American policies, and in particular the one-sided nature of the Battle-Barwick agreement of 1963. This was an agreement between the US Ambassador and the Australian External Affairs Minister of the time whereby the United States gained exclusive control of an area at North West Cape, in Western Australia, where it established a naval communications station to which Australia had no access. There had been much inflammatory discussion of the purposes of this station—in particular of its role in targeting for nuclear-armed submarines—but the Liberal-Country Party government had refused to discuss it in any detail or to seek revision of the 1963 agreement. From its point of view, the North West Cape station was a visible sign of the confidence which the United States government had in Australia as a reliable ally. Any attempt to investigate it publicly or question its uses would redound to Australia's discredit.

In fact, the United States government proved quite amenable to suggestions that it should reconsider the Battle-Barwick agreement. After lengthy preliminary discussions, the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr. Barnard, was able to conclude a new agreement in Washington in January 1974. In addition to agreeing that the Australian government

should receive more information about 'strategic and operational developments relevant to the station', the United States government agreed to joint use of the station, to the participation of Australian servicemen in its operation, to an Australian as deputy commander, and to the setting up of a separate Australian communications centre at the station, so that it could be used separately by both navies. It also, for good measure, handed over to sole Australian management two other American installations in Australia, both of which were used for monitoring nuclear tests. The new arrangements did not satisfy extreme left-wingers in the Labor Party, who wanted the North West Cape station closed down altogether, or a veto by Australia over any messages sent by the United States to its naval vessels, but it satisfied moderate Labor opinion, which had been affronted by the existence on Australian soil of a foreign installation to which the Australian government had no right of access.

In other respects, however, the Labor government found itself unable to reconcile its wishes with the realities of world politics as these affected American naval activity. In regard to both the 'zone of peace' in the Indian Ocean propounded by Sri Lanka, and the proposal to increase the use of Diego Garcia by American forces, the government's first impulse appears to have been to support those non-aligned states round the Indian Ocean which wanted it to be a non-nuclear area and which protested against the proposed use of Diego Garcia. The 'zone of peace' concept was specifically approved in the joint communiqué issued after Mr. Whitlam's visit to New Delhi in June 1973. Equally, however, the joint statement issued after Mr. Barnard's visit to Washington in January 1974 spoke of an important function of the station at North West Cape being 'to serve as a key element in a complex system of communications supporting the global balance', and it noted the importance of 'effective and reliable deterrence for the promotion of stable relations among the major powers, for the maintenance of international security, and for the security of the United States and its allies, including Australia'. The Australian government could not, in the last resort, have its cake and eat it too; it could not press the 'zone of peace' concept so far as to forbid the activity in the Indian Ocean of the US navy when engaged in precisely the work of deterrence of the Soviet Union to which the North West Cape station (itself on the shores of the Indian Ocean) made a substantial contribution. If the Soviet navy left the Indian Ocean, the US navy might be induced to do so too; but the projected reopening of the Suez canal made any such action by the Soviet navy even less likely than before. In the upshot, the Whitlam government had to accept a situation in which its support for the 'zone of peace' was vague enough to enable it to continue with the American alliance.

Changing attitudes to the Commonwealth

The opportunities arising for the Whitlam government in Commonwealth relations arose from the comparative neglect and occasional suspicion which its predecessors had shown towards the African members in particular and new members in general. The most obvious early signs of this attitude had been shown by Sir Robert Menzies after his disillusionment with President Nkrumah and his experience of African pressure over the South Africa and Rhodesia issues. Sir Robert ceased to be prime minister in 1966, but his successors, Messrs. Holt, Gorton and McMahon, took up much the same approach, except perhaps for Mr. Gorton in his personal admiration of President Nyerere. More important was the growth of an orthodoxy amongst other Liberal-Country Party ministers and some senior civil servants, to the effect that the Commonwealth had become a sham, that Australia might be led by it into policies which conflicted with its interests in Asia (and especially the role of the United States in Asia), and that, in particular, any schemes for economic aid to under-developed countries because of this membership of the Commonwealth should be sceptically scrutinised. The rejection of the contemporary Commonwealth had not been total; Australia continued to provide technical aid to a variety of fellow members, to contribute to the upkeep and staff of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and to mention the Commonwealth link whenever a minister visited another Commonwealth country. But suspicion and scepticism were manifest, except about Commonwealth members in South-east Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Mr. Whitlam had been anxious to change this. He recognised that the Commonwealth could be used to further his desire that Australia should present less of a racist image. At the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Ottawa in August 1973 he made common cause with the general Third World complaint about the activities of multinational corporations, linked the Australian interest in commodity prices and resource development with that of the under-developed countries, and generally showed himself to be more receptive to their viewpoint than his predecessors. There were no British, Canadian or New Zealand guests at the dinner parties he gave. (His biggest disagreement, however, was not with any of the representatives of the old dominions, but with Lee Kuan Yew, who defended multinational corporations.) His government also widened the scope of Australian representation in Commonwealth countries beyond the restricted number of posts which the Liberal-Country Party coalition had established. However, as indicated below, it could not give the Africans all they wanted, notably in respect of the use of force in Rhodesia or the endorsement of guerrilla violence elsewhere in Southern Africa.

In another and older sphere of Commonwealth relations, that of the constitutional links between Britain and Australia, Mr. Whitlam had less success. He did obtain British agreement to a formal change which gave the Governor-General a bigger role in the accreditation of ambassadors, but was unable to persuade the British government that, in the absence of full agreement by the Australian states, it should take legislative action which in certain cases would have prevented appeals from Australian courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The British government's view was that it should not take action which affected the status of the states unless the states agreed. Since Mr. Whitlam was theoretically able to get what he wanted from a referendum of the Australian people, and since some state governments loudly proclaimed their disagreement, it would not have been in the spirit of the Statute of Westminister for the British government to proceed. This was a constraint, but the matter was symbolic rather than serious.

The pattern of opportunities and constraints was again evident in the Labor government's desire to take a more active role in the disposal of Australia's exports of minerals, the development and sale of which had been left by the previous governments to private enterprise, especially to big multinational companies based in Britain and North America. Iron ore is the most obvious example, but bauxite, copper, nickel and coal are other minerals to which were also applied the argument that there should be a more vigorous 'resources diplomacy' in the national interest. Mr. Whitlam told Parliament on May 24, 1973, in a general statement on foreign policy, that the major consumer countries were likely to develop comprehensive resource policies towards Australia and other producers, and that Australia would have to develop policies of its own for both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. He had in mind such things as resource conferences, and co-operative cartels of both producers and consumers. In general he believed that the world's growing need for Australian raw materials would give Australia 'a growing political voice'. It was clear that he wanted to co-ordinate more closely the economic and political aspects of Australia's position as a producer of scarce raw materials.

Again there were opportunities to develop a more vigorous policy towards the sale of commodities because of the previous government's inactivity. In particular, there was scope for governmental intervention in negotiations with Japan for the purchase of iron ore and coal. On the Japanese side, the combination of government and industrialists was a formidable one; on the Australian side the companies had managed for themselves without any direct governmental support or intervention. The Whitlam government made up some ground here, although its other dealings with the mining companies, especially as regards taxation concessions, led to bad feeling between them and it. Little could be done,

however, to fit Australia into a wider network of consultation with other countries producing raw materials for the same markets. Undoubtedly some people in the Labor government were inspired by the example of OPEC, and the capacity of the oil-producing countries to hold their customers to ransom. This feeling was to be encountered even before the oil producers raised the price of oil so steeply in the latter part of 1973. But, while Australia now produces enough oil for nearly all its own needs, it has little for export, except to New Zealand. The resources which Australia does produce for export in quantity are not analogous with oil, which is unique in its relative homogeneity as a material, in the worldwide network of companies which market it, and in the cohesive character of the states which produce it. Copper, iron ore, bauxite and nickel do not share these characteristics sufficiently to encourage the same sort of cartel approach. Brazil and India, which compete with Australia for the export of iron ore to Japan, have different kinds of ore and are emphatically not the same kind of political animal as Australia. Neither is France for nickel (from New Caledonia) or Guinea for bauxite. The Labor government did participate in an international meeting of bauxite producers at Conakry in 1974, fortified by the contacts which Mr. Whitlam had made with the heads of government of Jamaica and Guyana at the Commonwealth meeting at Ottawa; but the results did not suggest any continuing co-operation or unity of approach comparable with those of OPEC.

Finally, the balance between opportunities and constraints is strikingly illustrated by policy towards Africa. As indicated in the previous article, one of Mr. Whitlam's main aims was to make Australia's international image less racist, and, in particular, to show the nations of Africa that the caution which his predecessors had shown on the South Africa and Rhodesia issues, and on the whole question of white rule in Southern Africa, was not shared by Labor. Not only did such an aim coincide with those of many ardent young people in Australia itself, to whom the term 'racist' had become the worst of maledictions; it also coincided with Mr. Whitlam's own personal outlook. In numerous UN votes, in special attention to the African position at Ottawa in 1973, in verbal attacks on South Africa and in the banning of South African sporting teams, he made a sharp break with his predecessors. It was not, however, an absolute break. In at least two ways the Labor government drew back from doing what the African states wanted. In the economic sphere there was no attempt to reduce trade with South Africa, which is one of Australia's best customers for industrial goods such as cars, or to denounce South African membership of the International Wool Secretariat. This body, which has its headquarters in London, is financed by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, but has been largely run by Australia. It provides worldwide publicity for

wool, and encourages scientific research and improved marketing. It is he one international organisation in which Australia could strike an effective blow at vital South African interests; but, since these interests re largely identical with Australia's, any blow at South Africa would reate opposition within Australia itself, and would weaken the combined front of wool exporters struggling against the advance of synthetic ibres. This is a clear case of economic interests overriding political nterests.

The other way in which the Whitlam government failed to live up o its African associates' requirements was its refusal to approve of violence as a means of removing the white governments in Southern Africa. Senator Willesee, who first helped Mr. Whitlam with the Foreign Affairs portfolio and later became Minister for Foreign Affairs in his own right, told the UN General Assembly on October 3, 1973: 'We understand the frustrations that have led the OAU and the non-aligned countries to adopt the position that armed struggle is essential to end colonialism and racial discrimination. While we sympathise with the aims of the National Liberation Movements in Southern Africa, we ourselves stop short of endorsing the use of force to attain these and ndeed any other objectives.' While stopping short before the endorsement of violence, the government showed that it would accept the esults of violence even when these were not yet conclusive. In April 1974 it was preparing to give recognition to Guinea-Bissau (i.e., the national liberation movement's 'government' in Portuguese Guinea) at the WHO meeting in May, when it was overtaken by events through he calling of a snap Australian election for May 18 and then through a coup d'etat in Portugal itself. Guinea-Bissau had already been granted ecognition by the FAO, and Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines had recognised it as a sovereign state. Australia, it was said, should be neither the first nor the last in such actions; the example of the previous government's tardiness over Communist China was a warning not to be last in queues to which so much international attention was directed. To what extent such actions might stir the sleeping uneasiness n Australians about coloured peoples could only be decided by events. They do not seen to have contributed materially to the result on May 18.

New relationship with the United States

Thus the mixture of external constraints and opportunities differed or the various issues of foreign policy which the Whitlam government ook up. The Labor Party was undoubtedly fortunate to come in when t did, and to succeed another government which had been so uninterested in initiatives. Much of what it did in its early days was

rhetorical rather than substantial, but was none the worse for that. It had, after all, to counter the rhetoric which its opponents had used for so long. This rhetoric, concentrating on communism, had recognised new forces at work in the new nations of South-east Asia, but was reluctant to give them the same interest and recognition in Africa, and was mainly concerned to demonstrate loyalty to the leadership offered by the United States. Any government which succeeds Mr. Whitlam's will benefit from the distance he has managed to place between Australia and the United States, while reasserting Australia's ultimate faith in the ANZUS relationship. Previous ministers had sometimes expressed in private their desire to establish such a distance, but had been bound by the fervour of their public pronouncements and by their basic conviction that the Australian public wanted American guarantees more than anything else which might be obtained by means of foreign policy. In a similar way, successor governments will benefit from the greater attention paid to the governments of Africa and the Caribbean, and from the impression created at the UN that Australia is not simply an American client. In each case the new relationship is capable of being operated in more than one way; but it is unlikely that any new government, no matter how hostile towards Mr. Whitlam personally. would wish to return to the situation which he found when he took office.

It was clear, however, by the time of the elections in May 1974 that the Whitlam government had gone about as far as it could go in bold new initiatives. The tie to the United States was strong enough to prevent the adoption of a policy such as the Singapore government hoped to pursue, that of so balancing the great powers against one another that the influence of each cancelled out that of the others. Mr. Whitlam's government retained the North West Cape station, and agreed to the American forces keeping their own messages secret (though it was promised that Australia would be informed if the alert status of the facility was changed at any time). In April 1974 it rejected a Soviet suggestion that a jointly manned scientific station be established in Australia. Although Mr. Whitlam said that the government would prefer to have no foreign installations at all on Australian soil, the fact that it was continuing with an American facility of major importance for global deterrence was an indication of how far it would go in asserting a fully independent position. Its enthusiasm for closer relations with China, for example, would not lead it to endorse every twist and turn of Chinese policy, especially on those occasions when Peking denounced the governments of countries friendly to Australia, such as Japan, Thailand and Indonesia, or condemned the position taken by the United States. In relations with South-east and Southern Asia, and with Third World countries generally, little scope is left for major initiatives

without coming up against basic Australian interests and characteristics. In regard to foreign aid, for example, it is unlikely that the Australian public would accept any really massive increase which reflected itself directly in increased taxation. Like the peoples of other Western countries (and those of Eastern Europe), most Australians do not believe that it is their job to change the world radically and to pay for the change.

There is, perhaps, rather more room for further initiative in certain aspects of foreign economic policy, so long as the commodity boom continues. Any government which attempts the tricky diplomacy of raw materials must try to see that it does not nourish political enemies at home (which the Whitlam government did in the case of the mineral companies with its revaluation of the Australian dollar and its withdrawal of tax concessions, and in the case of the oil companies by seeking greater participation in the industry), and that it does not make things so difficult for customers that they switch to other sources of supply. In addition, however, if it wishes to co-ordinate its diplomacy with other producing states, there are the difficulties of combining interests which, while superficially similar, may prove to be separate. Australia is a highly developed country with rather different needs from those of under-developed countries. In particular, despite Mr. Whitlam's warnings to the multi-national corporations, it needs further investment from North America and Western Europe. It could hardly adopt President Boumedienne's recipe of nationalisation of major resources: for one thing, the federal government does not possess the legal power to nationalise, and, for another, the effect on further investment would quite possibly be disastrous. Apart from minerals, Australia's interests in the export of temperate foodstuffs and wool coincide with those of similarly developed countries like Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, rather than with the under-developed. In the one case of a major tropical foodstuff which it exports—sugar—Australia has had the experience of being shut out of any concessions which Britain can secure from the EEC for the under-developed members of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. This could, of course, be an isolated case; but, since the reason for Australia's exclusion was its status as a developed country, it illustrates the difficulties of bringing Australia's commodity policies into line with those of states with different backgrounds.

In two other fields of foreign economic policy—monetary and trade arrangements generally—no distinctive Labor policy emerged during the first eighteen months of the Whitlam government. Since the government was not dependent on farmers' support to the same extent as a Liberal-Country Party coalition, it was able to appreciate the Australian dollar as the Treasury and Reserve Bank had advocated. A 25 per cent reduction of tariffs, announced on July 18, 1973, would help to strengthen

ustralia's position in tariff negotiations with the members of GATT. owever, both steps were taken primarily because of their anti-in- ationary effect at home, rather than their influence on Australia's ternational position; and both might have been taken by a Liberal- ountry Party government with sufficient courage.

A period of consolidation is bound to follow the initiatives of the rst eighteen months of Labor government, partly because of the lack new areas of initiative, and partly because of the inevitable bureau- atisation of the government's ideas about foreign policy. Labor in ustralia will suffer, in fact, the normal experience of a Social- emocratic government such as those of New Zealand, West Germany id Britain. In each case one can discern, when the party is in opposi- on, a leaning towards large promises of vague and often undefined tion in pursuit of mildly leftist objectives, both because the leaders ant to emphasise their difference from their opponents, and because, opposition, leftist elements have more influence in Social-Democratic arties. The leaders, deprived of the patronage and sanctions of office, annot afford to be regarded as copies of the government, for fear of sing their influence; they are, in any case, often enraged by what they gard as fumbling or foolishness on the part of the government of the ay. When they are in office, however, they are forced to consider kely repercussions of the relatively simple policies which they espoused opposition; their officials make them aware of interests which they ay not have considered but which have to be taken into account; their wn contacts with foreign leaders often convince them of the mixture f human motives in other countries' policies which they had previously enounced. They end by showing more pragmatism and less of what ey would earlier have called principle. The same sort of process is vident in new non-Labor governments, especially after they have had me enough in opposition to generate principles of their own. The ntrast is probably less acute, however, because non-Labor governments end longer in office and less time in opposition; they are natural overning parties in a way that the Social-Democratic parties (except Scandinavia and Israel) are not.

Mr. Whitlam's aim is to convince Australians that there was nothing evitable about the twenty-three years of non-Labor government which ey experienced before he won the elections of 1972, and that they can asonably regard Labor as their natural governing party, especially in ew of its strong emphasis on nationalism and independence. In his cond term he can be expected to provide new initiatives while cognising that those which he espoused in his first eighteen months f office cannot all be sustained. In spite of the natural tendency towards nsolidation, and the need to retain bedrock policies such as friendship wards the United States, Japan and Indonesia, his government will

continue to seek accommodation, and sometimes more, with the Third World and communist countries. Unless there is some major upheaval in world affairs in the next three years, the Liberal and Country parties will find it extremely difficult to retrace the steps which Labor has taken. It is even likely that they will not want to do so, since, by the time they return, the characteristic policies of the 1960s will be little more than a memory in all the countries towards which they will have to determine their attitude.

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE ERA OF DETENTE*

F. Parkinson

SCHEMATA for obtaining an overall view of Latin America's international relations exist and have proved useful[1]; but to appreciate the full variety of the diplomatic scene in the area it is advisable to break down these patterns into their constituent parts. It is proposed to attempt this by examining the foreign policies of the key countries of Latin America from within.

The present foreign policies of the Latin American governments are largely a function of the interplay between changing United States and Brazilian policies on the one hand and those of Argentina, Mexico and Peru on the other, with Cuba presenting a pivot on which the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union and the Latin American countries turn. The chief factors in the scene have been the declining stature of the United States and the growing role of Brazil.[2] The policy of the 'low profile' in Latin America now being practised by the former appears to be partly a tactical device, and partly the product of a strategic reappraisal by Dr. Henry Kissinger, who—until the oil crisis—considered the region inessential to the security of the United States.

Brazil: Ordem e Progresso

The explosive rate of Brazil's economic development has forced the pace of international relations in Latin America. The early foreign policy of the military regime was marked by notions of world bipolarity held in the *Escola Superior de Guerra* since 1949, but the sharp edges of this rigid conception were somewhat blunted by the impact of sub-

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1 See, for instance, E. Kaufman, 'América Latina en el juego internacional', *Aportes* (Paris), April 1972, pp. 137–162; J. D. Martz, 'The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics' and E. Williams, 'Comparative Political Development: Latin America and Afro-Asia', both in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 342–353; G. Germani, 'Pertenece América Latina al Tercer Mundo?', *Aportes*, October 1968, pp. 6–32; and Aldo Ferrer, 'Latin America in the World Economy', *Chronique de politique étrangère* (Brussels), November 1973, pp. 709–724.

2 A sense of relativity should be preserved: the population of the United States exceeds 205 million and that of Brazil 105 million; the gross national product of the former is now more than $1,000 billion, while that of the latter barely touches $50 billion.

sequent economic development. That in spite of numerous changes since the Castelo Branco administration (1964–1967) these ideas are not yet dead, was attested recently by General Ernesto Geisel, the new President, who reaffirmed the indissoluble unity of economic prosperity and security. Brazilian administrations have only themselves to blame if the oft-stated twin goal of security and development[3] has given rise to expectations that before long Brazil will be the most powerful and prosperous country in the region, bent on securing *liderança* in South America.

Mere size and prosperity may present no threat by themselves; but past history would appear to conspire with present trends to reinforce these nagging suspicions. It was the *bandeirantes*, an irregular force of motley composition, who crossed the demarcation line between Portuguese and Spanish America in colonial times. Under the Médici administration (1969–1974) the opening of the vast Amazon hinterland; the economic encroachment on Bolivia; and the vigorous Brazilian 'kilowatt' diplomacy developed in the Pilcomayo-Paraná river system —harmless as these may be—are arousing misgivings in numerous quarters in Latin America.

If Brazil's relations with Hispanic America have been marked by a sense of ambiguity, those with the United States have grown more and more ambivalent. There may have been some substance in the left-wing charge that, at any rate under Castelo Branco, Brazil allowed itself to be used as the stalking horse of the United States in Latin America. However, for some time Brazilian attitudes towards the United States have shown conflicting tendencies, represented respectively by Juracy Magalhães (Castelo Branco's last foreign minister) and José Magalhães Pinto, who held the same office under President Arturo Costa e Silva (1967–1969). The former's ill-chosen dictum that what was good for the United States was good for Brazil fairly reflected the general direction of his policy. By way of complete contrast, Magalhães Pinto tried to set Brazil back on a diplomatic course of its own in the fields of nuclear proliferation and world trade, as well as in other fields, in a manner distinctly at odds with the policies pursued by the United States.

Moreover, Brazil's foreign trade is showing long-term tendencies to expand faster with Europe, especially Germany, than with the United States; so that even before the enlargement of the EEC in 1973 Brazil's trade with the European Common Market was more significant than its trade with the United States.[4] It is not perhaps surprising, therefore, that in these circumstances the views of the professional diplomats in

[3] See J.O. de Meira Penna, *Política externa: segurança e desenvolvimento* (Rio de Janeiro: Agir. 1967).

[4] It could be argued that investment was more important in Brazil's case than foreign trade; but that makes Brazil's drive towards more foreign trade all the more remarkable.

the Itamaratí (the Foreign Ministry)[5] should be beginning to carry more weight than the outdated notions of the *Escola Superior de Guerra*. Thus, Brazil's ideological rigidity towards China and Cuba is giving way steadily to considerations of self-interest, and even before the April coup in Lisbon Brazil's attitudes towards Portugal were changing.

The rest of Latin America has had to adjust to the changes in United States and Brazilian policy alike, and it is to an examination of these reactions that we must now turn our attention.

Argentina: Peronismo reconstituido

Argentina, Mexico and Peru have been the three countries whose foreign policies were activated in response to the new evolving diplomacy of the United States and Brazil. In the case of Argentina a decisive turn was taken early in 1971 when President A. Lanusse (1971–1973) resolved to seize the occasion provided by the accession of Allende to power in Chile for an opening to the Pacific along the Andes. It looked like the throwing of a *cordon* around Brazil, with a complete repudiation of President Onganía's (1966–1969) hankering for a close partnership with Brazil based on the maintenance of 'ideological frontiers' against communism. 'Ideological pluralism' was the new concept that was henceforth to govern the relations between Argentina and the Andean countries. President Héctor Cámpora continued this course, going to some lengths in assimilating Argentine legislation to control foreign investments to that of the Andean Group.

Upon his accession to power, Perón halted the policy of encircling Brazil, making vigorous efforts instead to regain some of Argentina's lost hegemonial positions in respect of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.[6] At the same time, in typically Peronista fashion, the way was left open for an informal understanding with Brazil on the lines of the one Perón had once had with Getúlio Vargas.

It was left to Cámpora and Perón to react to the United States policy of the 'low profile' in Latin America. Cámpora re-established relations with Cuba, while Perón made himself Latin America's chief spokesman for the rehabilitation of the Castro regime, with which he concluded a major trade deal.[7] This defiance of the United States was reminiscent of Perón's earlier refusal to boycott the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1951–1954. Apart from a natural eagerness to develop trade with Western Europe and an understandable desire to secure his oil supplies,

[5] The Brazilian diplomatic corps survived the military revolution of 1964 almost intact and has managed to preserve a high degree of professional integrity.

[6] Argentina threw itself with gusto into the 'kilowatt' diplomacy at present being practised in that area; but an editorial in the Buenos Aires quarterly *Estrategia* of January–February 1974 by General J. E. Gugliamelli strongly criticises Argentina's policy towards Bolivia as inept, and providing gratuitous openings for Brazil.

[7] See below.

historical parallels can also be invoked for Perón's present preference for Italy and Libya, since his earlier tenure of office was marked by an attempt to create a combination of Latin European and Latin American states capable of balancing between the United States and the Soviet Union, and by a consistent sympathy for Arab policies.

Perón's present policies towards Eastern Europe also recall those of his earlier periods in office. In 1952 Argentina was the first country in Latin America to enter into a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. His present Minister of the Economy, José Gelbard, strongly favours economic relations with Comecon.[8] But, again as in the 1940s and 1950s, Perón's approach showed a basic mistrust of the world powers; it was only in President Ceausescu of Rumania, who visited him in Buenos Aires in March 1974, that he was able to find a kindred spirit.[9]

Mexico: 'So far from God and so near to the United States'

Far more than Argentina's foreign policy, that of Mexico has at all times to be measured so as to preserve the delicate balance of opinion at home, particularly within the ruling *Partido Revolucionario Institucional.*[10] Beyond that there has been a preoccupation with the United States, rather than Brazil. The two doctrines of non-intervention and self-determination were originally devised as a legal means of defence against United States aggression. This danger has long passed, but what is sticking in Mexican gullets is the country's over-dependence on United States capital, described in March 1973 by President Echeverría as 'unhealthy'.[11] This accounts in large part for the efforts to diversify Mexico's foreign relations made by President A. López Mateos (1958–1964) and Luis Echeverría, the present chief executive, both of whom travelled widely in pursuit of this objective.

Two cases bear witness to Mexico's frustrations vis-à-vis the United States. López Mateos, who had at first supported the Cuban Revolution, had to beat a hasty retreat when a cold war situation began to develop over it. Similarly President G. Ordaz Díaz (1964–1970), while refusing to join the OAS embargo against Cuba, remained extremely circumspect in his dealings with the Castro regime. It was only in the wake of the policy of the 'low profile' that Mexico dared to promote the normalisation of Cuba's relations with the remainder of Latin America; and it was

[8] Council of Mutual Economic Aid, with headquarters in Moscow.

[9] A large Argentine trade delegation went to Moscow in May 1974 to implement a broad techno-economic agreement between the two countries signed in Buenos Aires in February 1974.

[10] The quotation at the beginning of this sub-chapter is Porfirio Díaz', dictator between 1872 and 1910.

The Party seems to have become much aware of this need, and in 1971 instituted regular courses in international relations for its officials.

[11] Mexico's trade with the United States in 1971 amounted to $2,383 million; with the rest of Latin America to only $222 million.

only in March 1974 that Emilio Rabasa, Mexico's Foreign Minister, visited Havana—almost certainly prompted by his personal friend, Henry Kissinger, to sound General Castro's views on that subject.

What is true of Mexico's approach to revolutionary Cuba is true of its attitude towards Communist China. In spite of the existence of the Estrada Doctrine,[12] which dictates that the recognition of new governments should not be decided on ideological grounds, the government of the People's Republic was not recognised until President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. Peking was studiously omitted from President López Mateos' itinerary in 1962, when it would not have had the imprimatur of Washington's approval, but was included in President Echeverría's in 1973, when it had.[13]

The parallel course of Mexican and Argentine policy may be illustrated with reference to commercial policy towards the Soviet Union. In April 1973 Echeverría was able to secure a Treaty of Commerce with the Soviet Union on relatively favourable terms, and this was followed later in the year by negotiations in Moscow for the purpose of fixing the details. Like Argentina, Mexico has shown an interest in the progress of the Andean Group, although on commercial rather than political grounds.[14] Unlike Argentina, however, whose attitude towards the Chilean junta has been one of great caution, Echeverría, a warm supporter of Allende, and (unlike Perón) free from geopolitical restraints, withdrew his ambassador from Santiago in disregard of the Estrada Doctrine. He thus went against his own Declaration of State of September 3, 1973 which had stressed the principle of 'ideological pluralism' in Mexico's foreign policy. Echeverría's courage in taking this step should be underlined, since he was attacked for it at home and since it caused an outflow of foreign capital from Mexico.

Mexico is giving belated support to the movement of non-aligned countries now that, in the context of world detente, the movement has been robbed of most of its former significance.[15] In canvassing a Charter

[12] See M. Seara Vázquez, 'México y la República Popular', *Boletín del Centro de Relaciones Internacionales* (Mexico City), September 1971, pp. 75–79.

[13] Much was made on this occasion of the President's success in persuading the Chinese government to sign the Second Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 which attempted the denuclearisation of Latin America. By signing the Protocol, China undertook to respect the nuclear-free area. However, the President's victory was a barren one, since the Tlatelolco Treaty had long since been overtaken by the near-universal non-proliferation treaty signed in 1968. What was more significant was the President's inability to induce the Russians to sign the Protocol. The latter feel inhibited by the attitude of Cuba, a persistent non-signatory of either Treaty.

[14] Mexico was the first Latin American country to devise a system of controls for foreign investment after 1945. But the fairly radical nature of the Andean legislation compelled Mexico to pass fresh legislation in March 1973.

[15] The non-aligned movement is increasingly duplicating the work currently done in the 'Group of 95' underdeveloped countries in the economic sphere, though it is true that it continues to reflect mainly the views of the radical underdeveloped countries.

of Economic Duties and Rights in the United Nations, Mexico's performance has been unimpressive; its efforts were eclipsed by President Boumedienne of Algeria, who emerged as the undisputed champion of the claims of the underdeveloped countries at the Conference on Energy and Raw Materials held in New York in April 1974.

Peru: the French connection

After the military coup of October 1968 fears were expressed in Peru and abroad by both Right and Left about the possibility of a sell-out to the Soviet Union or the United States respectively. It is now well known that the inspiration for the coup, and for the policies subsequently adopted, came from General Juan Velasco Alvarado himself, who had imbibed his political and social ideas during his stay as military attaché in Paris under General de Gaulle.[16] It was the latter's dislike of the prominence of United States-based transnational corporations that made Peru adopt an unwavering attitude in its dispute with the International Petroleum Company,[17] and induced Velasco Alvarado to devise a system for the legal control of these corporations, first for Peru, and later for the Andean Group. Gaullist insistence that independence was a state of affairs which, beyond being asserted, had to be seen to be asserted, eventually led the new Peruvian government not only to re-establish relations with Cuba, but also to render these relations ostentatiously cordial. Communist China, too, was eventually recognised.

In the field of foreign policy, the similarity of outlook between Peru and Argentina is now striking, and it is heightened by almost identical reactions to Brazil. Like Perón, but unlike Mexico, the Peruvian military government maintained a detached silence over events in Chile after September 11, 1973, even though relations with Allende had been close. Like Perón also, it refused to close the door to Brazilian efforts to improve relations,[18] while on an non-governmental level maintaining contact between its own *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* in Lima and the *Escola Superior de Guerra* in Rio de Janeiro. Of late, however, the Peruvian government has shown signs of irritation over Brazil's energetic Amazonian drive towards the Pacific, which is seen as strategically motivated and may have caused Peru to purchase a consignment of Soviet tanks.

16 It is significant that Señor Carlos García Bedoya, present Permanent Head of the Torre Tagle, the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was chargé d'affaires and minister in the Peruvian embassy in Paris at the same time.

17 A global settlement for the taking of the IPC by Peru was reached with the United States at the beginning of 1974.

18 Witness the exchange of foreign ministers, 1971 and 1973.

Chile: vía chilena, vía brasileira or vía peruana?

The Declaration of Principles published in *El Mercurio* on March 11, 1974 over the signatures of the four Chilean junta chiefs envisages the creation of a Vichy-type regime which rejects both 'Marxism-Leninism' and the 'consumption society', while insisting on a *vía chilena* in world affairs. It is difficult to see how the latter would differ from the *vía brasileira* travelled by the Castelo Branco administration between 1964 and 1967, which followed the United States with almost slavish devotion. The great prominence of the Chilean navy and the laisser faire economists in the government would suggest that the present pro-United States and anti-communist policy will continue. But although both the United States and Brazil may be glad to be rid of Allende, they would be foolish to back the junta unconditionally, seeing that within Latin America it has failed to reach a solid agreement, beyond a vague ideological consensus, with anyone.[19]

A growing sense of isolation, coupled paradoxically with the prospect of economic relief from super-high receipts from copper sales, could impose strains on the unity of the junta, leading to an army-led coup and the subsequent emergence of a *vía peruana* which might return Chile to an Andean orientation in foreign affairs and realign it with the policies of Argentina, Mexico and Peru.

Venezuela: going Latin American

While Argentina, Mexico and Peru are pursuing roughly identical foreign policies and the Chilean junta is trying to find its feet, Venezuela has been undergoing a major reorientation of foreign policy during the last three years by moving out of the orbit of the United States into that of Latin America.

Because of the 'enclave' character of the Venezuelan economy, internal and external developments tend to be closely linked, and it is precisely the gradual diversification of the country's economy that has given rise to increasing pressures for internal and external change. While Venezuela, which depended exclusively on oil, was enjoying a special relationship with the United States, there was little inducement to throw in its lot with Latin America. However, largely as a result of economic policies initiated by Rómulo Betancourt (1959–1963), there grew up a complex Venezuelan industry, which required markets to absorb its products. Venezuela joined the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1966 and the Andean Group in 1973.[20]

19 Such as the one agreed between General Pinochet of Chile and General Stroessner of Paraguay in mid-May 1974, which condemned 'ideologies which ignore the transcendental nature of the human person'.

20 See the Venezuelan government publication of the Oficina Central de Coordinación y Planificación, *Posibilidades de exportación de la industria venezolana* (Caracas—1974).

Already early in 1971 the decision was taken, against the advice of Venezuela's partners in OPEC,[21] to make existing oil concessions revert eventually to the state, rather than enter into new sharing agreements with the oil companies.[22] When the oil crisis broke in October 1973, nationalist self-confidence began to demand the outright expropriation of the foreign oil companies.

At this stage, Venezuela—the world's largest producer of oil after Saudi Arabia and Iran—found itself drawn into the maelstrom of the world energy crisis. With the prospect of gigantic oil revenues, Venezuela has tended to give preference to Latin America as regards security of supplies, but at price levels in line with those determined by OPEC. These whirlwind developments have left Venezuela's statesmen little time to settle the outlines of a foreign policy appropriate to its new role, and the country now finds itself at the crossroads between a Latin American policy, an Andean policy and—since it joined the Development Bank of the Caribbean Community (the Leeward and Windward islands states and Guyana)—a Caribbean policy. If it decides to pursue them all and gets involved financially, both on the inter-governmental level and by way of injections into various development funds, it is likely to find itself with a host of political problems on its hand.

One of these concerns the place of Cuba in Venezuela's future foreign policy. Like his fellow-Christian Democrat, President E. Frei of Chile (1964–1970), President Rafael Caldera was among the first to envisage Cuba's return to the inter-American system in some form, though he would not act without the United States. While there is no evidence that his successor, President Carlos Andrés Pérez, is prepared to go any further, there are persistent rumours of impending sales of oil to Cuba, and it would seem that the two countries—once at daggers drawn in the Cold War[23]—are predestined to co-operate in future. Elected in an *Acción Democrática* landslide, Andrés Pérez might be persuaded by Congress to invoke the defunct Betancourt Doctrine in order to recall Venezuela's ambassador in Santiago, following the precedent set by Mexico.[24]

Cuba: between bear, eagle and condor

The most important constant in Cuba's diplomacy has been its changing relationship with the Soviet Union. An ally *de facto* after mid-

[21] Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

[22] The *Ley de reversión* was passed on July 31, 1971.

[23] President Andrés Pérez used to be a tough, anti-Castroite Minister of the Interior in a previous *Acción Democrática* administration, while Señor Gumersino Rodríguez, at present Minister of Planning, on the contrary, used to be an insurrectionary *mirista*. That large sections of the formerly irreconcilable Left have been brought together in recent years is due to Rómulo Betancourt, active behind the scenes in this sense.

[24] The Betancourt Doctrine rules out diplomatic relations with governments that have come to power by unconstitutional means.

1960—although never a member of the Warsaw Pact—Cuba's faith in Moscow was shaken by the outcome of the 'missile' crisis of 1962. After that its status was unique: neutralised in respect of all highly sophisticated weapons by the terms of the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement which terminated that crisis; isolated in Latin America after 1964 by an OAS embargo ignored only by Mexico; increasingly dependent on, but resentful of, Soviet economic aid; yet in spite of having a token force of Soviet troops stationed on its territory, Cuba tried to achieve an independent position in foreign affairs between 1964 and 1968 by sponsoring guerrillas in Latin America. If successful, this might have enabled it to shuffle off Soviet tutelage. The attempt failed, as did the subsequent effort to pay off the burdensome Soviet debt by trying to achieve a record sugar harvest of 10 million tons [25] in 1970, which, however, only realised just over 8 million tons.

The first straw in the Cuban wind of change came in August 1968 when Castro produced a curiously ambiguous justification of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Contacts with the Soviet Union multiplied after Marshal Grechko's visit to the island in 1969, and when Kosygin, the Soviet prime minister, visited Havana in October 1971, the cordial atmosphere contrasted deeply with the chilly reception he had had there in July 1967. One must suppose that the final seal of Soviet approval of Cuba's new policy was set by Brezhnev's visit to Havana in January 1974.[26]

Economic relations between the two countries were also in need of repair. The expansion of the non-sugar export sector was making no headway, while import needs, especially of oil, were mounting steadily. And while there was a 50 per cent. rise in the level of Cuban-Soviet trade between 1969 and 1970, the amount of Soviet aid—negotiated annually in Moscow—was almost as important an item in the Cuban economy as was the country's production.[27]

This state of affairs was considered unsatisfactory by both sides, and there were indications that during the first half of 1972 the Soviet government began to insist on imposing a system of short-term and long-term planning on Cuba. The Cuban government was reverting to orthodox methods of economic management at home, and this made it easier to integrate it in Comecon in July 1972—a move doubtless designed to minimise the costs of subsidising the Cuban economy.[28]

[25] The previous Cuban sugar harvest record was over 6 million tons, achieved by the Batista administration in 1952. What must ultimately have induced the Cuban leadership to realign itself with Soviet foreign policy was the poor showing of the 1971 *zafra*, of 5·9 million tons only.

[26] See H. Borovik, 'Kuba v dnye vizita', *Novy Mir* (Moscow), March 1974, pp. 3–10.

[27] At the end of 1971 the total Cuban debt to the Soviet Union was estimated to be in the region of $4,000 million.

[28] The Soviet Union showed its appreciation in a series of agreements signed in December 1972 in which the Soviet government agreed to defer payment of the

The extent of Cuban indebtedness has raised the prospect of an indefinite dependence of the Castro regime on the Soviet Union, but the recent steep rises in the price of sugar may enable Cuba to free itself a good deal sooner than expected from the economic embrace of the Soviet bear.

Cuba might also break out in other directions. A few years ago few would have rated the chances of a Cuban rapprochement with Latin America as less than rather dismal; but history seemed to be smiling on Castro, as the growing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the advent to power of Allende in Santiago in 1970 on the other, foreshadowed a reversal of fortunes. Within three years, Chile, Peru and Argentina had re-established relations with Cuba, while the anglophone Caribbean states of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago established relations with Havana in December 1972. The Chilean junta, it is true, at once severed relations with Cuba, but the general climate for a wide rapprochement with the rest of Latin America has continued to be good.[29] A specially favourable set of circumstances played into Castro's hands when Fiat of Argentina secured a $100 million contract for the delivery of motor vehicles to Cuba late in December 1973 in the wake of handsome Argentine government credits, and this was followed by an order for 42,000 motor vehicles from the Argentine subsidiaries of Chrysler, Ford and General Motors.

Cuba had always traded with Western Europe and Canada, but since these countries were not parties to the OAS embargo of 1964, those transactions had no legal consequences. The present deals, however, are placing the United States administration on the horns of a dilemma. If it were to insist on the strict application of the embargo in respect of the Argentine subsidiaries of United States corporations, the awkward issue of 'territorial versus personal jurisdiction' which had bedevilled relations between the capital-exporting countries and Latin America for well over a century,[30] could be revived. With memories of Spruille Braden, United States ambassador to Buenos Aires, who in 1946 tried to prevent Perón's election to the Presidency, still alive in Peronista minds,[31] any attempt on the part of the United States to claim personal

Cuban debt and of future deficits accumulated before 1975 for 14 years, after which Cuba would still have a margin of a quarter of a century to complete its repayments free of charge. For good measure, an investment credit of $300 million was also granted on that occasion.

29 There can be little doubt that such a rapprochement would be greeted in Moscow with much relief. A Tass report at the close of Brezhnev's visit to Havana intimated, in typically oblique Soviet fashion, that 'many observers hold that the trip [Brezhnev's] will bring about a thaw in the political atmosphere of the Western hemisphere'. See *The Times*, February 5, 1974.

30 On this point, see D. R. Shea, *The Calvo Clause* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1955).

31 Spruille Braden's clumsiness provided the Peronista movement with the highly welcome slogan 'Braden or Perón?'

jurisdiction over those subsidiaries would be regarded as a provocation and lead to the poisoning of relations between the United States and Argentina just at a time when Perón is being seen in Washington as the country's guardian of law and order. If, on the other hand, the United States were to give in on this point, this could be regarded as political weakness in the face of a rising chorus of Latin American discontent regarding the maintenance of the embargo on Cuba.

In the event, the United States gave in by exempting the US corporations' subsidiaries in Argentina from the application of the embargo, while sounding a warning that subsidiaries elsewhere in Latin America must not expect a similar favour. This made matters worse for the United States, as there is every reason to believe that, having got away with it this time, the Cubans will try the same technique again—Venezuela, Colombia and even export-eager Brazil spring to mind—in an effort to break down the remaining barriers of the embargo.[32] Meanwhile General Castro can afford to wait and adopt a nonchalant attitude towards the United States and Latin America.[33]

A new diplomatic system for Latin America?

If the United States policy of presenting a 'low profile' in Latin America is more than a temporary tactical device, then the testing ground of its ultimate intentions is likely to be Central America, traditionally the most sensitive area of Latin America in United States strategy. If a crisis were to develop in Honduras, where President O. López Arellano's struggle with the Standard Fruit company is strongly reminiscent of Lt.-Col. Jácobo Arbenz' struggle with the United Fruit company in Guatemala between 1951 and 1954, and the United States failed to overthrow the regime, this could be taken as weighty positive evidence.

In such an event there would be no point in propping up the creaking structure of the OAS and every reason to replace it by a new set of multilateral relationships between the United States and Latin America, roughly analogous to that already existing between the *Comisión Especial para la Coordinación Latinoamericana* (CECLA), created to co-ordinate Latin American strategies in matters of world trade, and the *Comisión Especial de Consulta y Negociación* (CECON), set up to

[32] The Soviet government in the 1920s similarly used economic leverage to break out of its isolation by making diplomatic recognition a condition for granting most-favoured-nation treatment to capitalist countries anxious to enter into trade relations with it.

[33] On January 1, 1974 Castro announced that he would come to the aid of any Latin American government under the attack of imperialism, but that continent's statesmen, recalling that, though favourably placed to do so, he never lifted a finger to come to the aid of the hard-pressed Caamaño forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965, will know how much store to put in these promises.

associate the United States loosely with CECLA.[34] The groundwork of such a diplomatic organisation is springing up now, as more and more inter-American meetings of foreign ministers are taking place informally outside the framework of the OAS, with the Cuban issue acting as a spur.

Paradoxically, a readjustment of United States Latin American relations along those lines could render intra-Latin American relations more fragile, as intra-Latin American conflicts, hitherto repressed by the power of United States hegemony, could burst out into the open and reproduce a balance-of-power system not unlike that existing in Latin America before the onset of United States predominance in the 1880s. From this point of view it is just as well to identify potential factors of intra-Latin American instability as: (a) Brazil's seemingly relentless progress towards the West; (b) the tendency of Hispanic South America to rally in response to this; (3) the appearance of a power vacuum within two intermediate zones, composed respectively of (i) Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia (contested by Argentina and Brazil), and (ii) Central America (contested by Colombia and Mexico).[35]

Meanwhile the dynamic centres of Latin America's foreign relations will be found to be in Brazil on the one hand, and in the parallel policies pursued by Argentina, Mexico and Peru (before long joined by Venezuela perhaps) on the other, with Cuba, a relic of the Cold War, still awaiting adaptation to conditions of detente. Among the remainder, making up the static and passive elements on the Latin American diplomatic scene, Panama,[36] Costa Rica and Honduras in Central America, and Colombia [37] and Ecuador in the Andes probably sympathise with the policies pursued by Argentina, Mexico and Peru, while Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia tend to look with favour on Brazil.

The long-term trend in Latin America's diplomacy is probably to be found in a progressive normalisation of its relations with the rest of the world, with fewer inhibitions suffered on account of the United States, until a complete balance is achieved all round.

[34] On this point see the present author's 'Latin America: Present Options in the World Trading System', *BOLSA Review*, January 1974, at pp. 6–7.

[35] See F. Alcalá Quintero, 'México y su relación con el mercado común centroamericano', *Foro Internacional*, October–December 1973, pp. 175–203.

[36] President Omar Torrijos seems eager to avoid conflict with the United States over the Canal, but is willing to go on pressing his claims in respect of a new Treaty.

[37] President-elect López Michelsen, due to take up office as President in August 1974, is a one-time sympathiser with the Cuban Revolution who might give Colombia's foreign policy a further twist in the direction of Argentina, Mexico and Peru.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s. By Alastair Buchan. *New York: Praeger; London: Chatto and Windus for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1973. 120 pp. Index. (The Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures, 1972.) £2·25.*

The Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics. By Robert Purnell. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 332 pp. Index. £4·50.*

In *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*, Alastair Buchan analyses the power political structure of the contemporary system with great clarity. He outlines the gradually emerging pentagonal global equilibrium and its two major subsystems, in Europe and in the Far East, and discusses in some detail the theory of the 'balance of power', its nature today and the policies and capabilities of its major participants. In many respects Professor Buchan's analysis has withstood the impact of the events following the delivery in April 1972 of the three Russell Leffingwell Lectures on which this slender volume is based. These events have, however, accentuated the question of 'multiple co-existence' which he merely mentions in his conclusion. The relationship of 'power' in its traditional strategic, conventional military, political and economic forms, as discussed by the author, and of actual influence, which had already become tenuous before 1972, is even more tenuous now. Moreover, while Western Europe—one of the five central powers distinguished—shows little signs of advance towards unity, although non-alignment, as Professor Buchan convincingly states, is dead, new regional powers are rapidly rising elsewhere, notably Iran, Brazil and Nigeria. The author's striking central simile of the contemporary balance of power remains valid: it resembles 'a mobile, which at different horizontal levels has a varying number of vertical components of different weights, the whole system being in a constant state of movement and vibration'. It is also much more perturbing than a year ago—events in the autumn of 1973 have forcibly reminded us that mobiles can easily disintegrate under the impact of shocks.

In *The Society of States*, Robert Purnell similarly discusses the international system as operating through the activities of states but, in contrast to Alastair Buchan, he proposes no clear hypothesis about its *modus*

operandi and does not undertake any clear classification by power of the 145 states which pursue their individual national interests. The book is written for the general reader, and succeeds in its pleasant and simultaneously erudite presentation of several central aspects of state behaviour. At the same time, however, it is severely limited in its comprehensive objective of offering, as the sub-title claims, 'An Introduction to International Politics', because it omits functional, especially economic, political and transnational activities. Mr. Purnell discusses national states as operating within an international system, but uses neither the traditional unifying hypothesis of balance of power nor the admittedly limited insights gained by contemporary theory. This impairs the unity of the book. Thus, in the two chapters which discuss the international system, he aptly compares the Greek system with the postwar bipolar one—following Professor Fliess—but, rather unaccountably, compares the Roman system with the United Nations, which, as he himself admits, is not very illuminating. Systems analysis would have helped him to identify the outstanding elements of structure in all systems and to compare them more systematically.

The five subsequent chapters, which deal with states, postulate the primacy of their national interests but, with the exception of peripheral mentions of security in narrow military terms and of 'the good life' of the citizens, the nature of these interests is not discussed at all. Nor does the author develop the theme of the growing inadequacy of states to secure their interests, and of the consequently increasing importance of 'milieu goals', aiming at shaping a more congenial international system. Finally, any variant of functionalism would have provided a much more promising framework for the discussion of international institutions, which appear on the unpromising level of a dichotomy between the dreams of world unity and the reality of 'sovereign' states, and also of international law, which is dismissed in three pages wedged into a long—and, in itself, interesting—chapter of 34 pages on international morality.

J. FRANKEL

United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine. By David P. Forsythe. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press with the Middle East Institute. 1973. 201 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·75.*

THIS is a book for the specialist rather than the general reader. It makes a valuable but limited contribution to the study of UN peacemaking.

The contribution is limited for two reasons. First, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) has been one of the less important and least effective of the UN's peacemaking bodies. Many of those interested in the Middle East will not have known of its existence even during 1949, its most active year. Although created at the suggestion of Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator, its work was overshadowed in turn by his successor, Ralph Bunche; by the UN Relief and Works Agency, which gave practical aid to the refugees, whose fate the CCP tried in vain to settle; by the personal efforts of Hammarskjöld, the Suez crisis, the Six-Day War of 1967, and finally by the appointment in the autumn of 1967 of Gunnar Jarring as the UN's Special Representative to the Middle East. As early as 1951 the Commission reported to the General Assembly that it had

become impossible to carry out its mandate, and from then on, as the author points out, the CCP was 'primarily a symbol of UN concern for the unresolved aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict'.

Secondly, the introduction and the final chapter, which deal with peacemaking in general, are disappointing. In the opening section a dull and hardly helpful account of the UN's different methods of peacemaking, described as a 'ten-part typology of roles', is followed in the conclusion by a weighing up of the pros and cons of different forms of peacemaking organs which is so judicious as to be largely inconclusive. The author attempts also in his last chapter a summary analysis of the UN's peacemaking efforts in five other major conflicts, Kashmir, Indonesia, Korea, the Congo, and Cyprus, with a result that is inevitably scrappy. He would have been wiser to have used those other cases for purposes of comparison only and to have concentrated at the end on pulling together conclusions based on his study of the CCP.

However, this study, which is the book's main purpose, does throw light both on the Middle East conflict and on UN peacemaking. Incidentally, the reader is made aware of the reasons for the indefinite postponement of an Arab-Israeli settlement and for the virtual acquiescence of both sides in the existing state of affairs. More deliberately his attention is drawn, through an analysis of the CCP's record and problems, to some of the options and difficulties facing the UN when it is required to tackle a dispute or a potentially inflammatory situation. Should any peacemaking organ that is set up be composed of individuals or of representatives of governments, or should it consist only of a single mediator or conciliator? Should it be given a specific or a general mandate? The author makes clear, with references both to Palestine and Cyprus, that a successful ceasefire or armistice agreement may crystallise a bitter relationship between the parties to a dispute and thus reduce the probability of success for peacemaking, a point which is unfortunately still relevant to the present situation in the Middle East, in spite of all Dr. Kissinger's journeys.

RICHARD HISCOCKS

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Public International Law of Money. By M. R. Shuster. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. 356 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

THIS thorough and lucid survey will be useful both to the lawyer who seeks to understand the intricacies of the international monetary system, and to the economist to inform him of the part that law plays in it.

The book concentrates on the public law of money and on the advances and retreats over the last half-century in inter-governmental efforts to manage it. It is divided into three parts: monetary arrangements before 1945 at the international level; the IMF system; and the recent disruptions and disintegration. The description of the IMF system picks out certain essential features: the relation between the IMF and GATT and their common function of trade liberalisation by constraint upon exchange restrictions, including multiple rates, on the one hand, and upon tariffs and quantitative import restrictions on the other; the role of monetary gold; and the use by Fund members, now well over a hundred in number, of its resources. The complex structure of special drawing rights (SDRs) is well described and analysed. In the third part, the emergence of the Group

of Ten, now enlarged, as a monetary 'manager' alongside the IMF, the use of 'swap' arrangements, and monetary developments in Europe are discussed; but the Euro-dollar and Asian dollar markets oddly get no adequate mention. The book has an excellent chronology and bibliography.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

The Euro-dollar Market and the International Financial System. By Geoffrey Bell. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1973. 125 pp. Index. £4·95.*

IN the preface to this book, Geoffrey Bell states that his purpose in writing it 'is to examine the growth of the Euro-dollar market and its relationship to the functioning of the international financial system as a whole. The aim has been to blend economic analysis with the practical problems of international monetary relations and the field of international banking and finance'.

Mr. Bell must be congratulated: his purpose—as will appear to both specialist and lay readers—he achieves admirably. He deals with very complex issues of international political economy in a few, well chosen sentences, nobly refraining from the ugly jargon of the international financier and of the cambist. Clarity is the outstanding quality of this essay. And it is a quality all the more admirable as Mr. Bell manages at the same time not just to engage in a taxonomic *tour d'horizon* of the subject but to put forward very subjective views on the problems he writes about. With most of these views this reviewer agrees, but other readers, no doubt, may not. The field is so intensely imbued with politics that a subjective approach is the only honest and possible one. Where Mr. Bell's heart is transpires from his introduction: 'The collapse of Bretton Woods'—he says there—'was largely determined by the inability of the system to deal with the problem of the balance of payments imbalance of the United States *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. At the same time, the underlying malaise of the system was brought into both sharp relief and up to breaking point by the weight of short-term capital movements emanating from the euro-currency markets'. Quite sensibly, however, he refuses to subscribe to the view that short-term capital movements have recently become destructive. He points out that all the market has done has been to force long overdue parity changes in the right direction. Also very sensibly, he points his finger at central banks as protagonists in the early and more recent history of the Euro-dollar market. And he devotes several extremely clear and well-argued pages to analysing the impact of American *domestic* monetary policy on the Euro-dollar market. The layman will also find his treatment of the 'do Euro-dollar banks create deposits?' *querelle*, both relaxed and enlightening. Finally, his speculations about the future of the Euro-dollar market suffer slightly from the disadvantage of having been made before the Yom Kippur war. But no more than slightly, since most of the basic reasoning remains correct and defensible.

M. DE CECCO

World Agriculture in Disarray. By D. Gale Johnson. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Trade Policy Research Centre, London; Paperback ed.: Fontana; New York; St. Martin's Press. 1973. 304 pp. Index. (Fontana World Economic Issues; Ed.: Hugh Corbet.) £3·50. Paperback: £1·25.*

THIS book has as its background the low farm incomes, depressed world prices and widespread protection which have conditioned agricultural policies in industrialised countries in recent years. It is a measure of its excellence that, despite appearing when world prices have reached record levels, it remains a very important contribution to the discussion of agricultural policy and trade.

The book may be divided into four parts. In the first three chapters agricultural politics and policies are described and the disarray of agriculture illustrated by reference to different prices paid to farmers in various countries, the costs of farm policies to the citizens of the United States and the Community (of Six) and the tendency for industrial countries to increase output more than consumption. Chapters 4–6 present a conventional but well argued and carefully documented analysis of the underlying reasons for agricultural change. There follow three chapters dealing with issues that often form the subject of controversy. Johnson argues persuasively that world prices, even in the 1960s, cannot be dismissed as meaningless, despite the effect of agricultural policies. He discusses the usefulness of food surpluses generated in rich countries as a means of aiding developing countries. His conclusion that other forms of aid would be more effective and that care must be taken in 'surplus disposal' not to reduce the agricultural production of the developing countries, is familiar. After a careful analysis of the distribution of the benefits from agricultural protection, the author concludes: 'A major degree of agricultural protection contributes little or nothing to the long run solution of the farm income problem . . .'. Food for thought for farmers' leaders as well as agricultural policy-makers. In the final three chapters, Johnson turns to consider what agricultural policy should look like in the 1970s, the importance of trade and the prospects for freer trade in agricultural goods.

This book will command a wide readership. At a technical level it provides a lucid, carefully referenced analysis of great professional competence. As such it will become required reading for students whom it will help both to understand policy issues and to develop their skills as economists. It is much more than a textbook. At a very serious level it explores the predicament which governments face in relation to agriculture, and it describes how conventional policies damage both the countries that apply them and other countries. The argument that high levels of protection should be cut will be taken by many farmers as an attack on their position. In fact, as careful reading will demonstrate, it stems from a deep understanding of the problems of farmers (especially poor ones), and a wish to encourage policies which really help to solve them. Those concerned with the development of international trade will find the book illuminating if at times depressing. Most depressing of all, for those who agree with Johnson's argument that negotiations on domestic farm policies are a pre-requisite for trade liberalisation, and recognise that his suggested approach is constructive and relevant, is that it seems very unlikely that governments will be prepared to accept even this degree of

restraint on their actions. Perhaps if enough people in enough industrialised countries read this book such negotiations might become possible.

J. S. MARSH

Transatlantic Trade: USA-EEC Confrontation in the GATT Negotiations. By Gian Paolo Casadio. Translated from the Italian by John Cuthbert-Brown. Foreword by Gerard Curzon. *Farnborough, Hants; Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, Heath. 1973. 260 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Saxon House Studies.) £4·50.*

IT is useful to have a study of international trade negotiations since 1962 by a European scholar. The advocacy of a world order of international trade relations based on the principles of free trade has been described, by its critics, as an ideology serving the interest first of England's monopoly after the Industrial Revolution and, later, of the American dominance in international trade. Free trade is seen by these critics as the mercantilism of the top dogs. The British adherence to free trade principles after loss of dominance may be explained as intellectual inertia, a cultural lag. It is for this reason that it is interesting, as Professor Curzon says in his foreword, to see how a young European scholar (admittedly trained at the London School of Economics) comes to the same conclusions as the Anglo-Saxon ideology on the desirability of free trade.

Professor Casadio takes the reader carefully and lucidly from the introduction of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to the Nixon Round. All the familiar topics are covered: the special problems of certain industrial sectors, non-tariff barriers, agriculture, East-West trade, Third World trade and the resurgence of protectionism. The basic contradiction of GATT is that the principle of reciprocity is a built-in obstacle to the achievement of its objective; the bargaining power to obtain tariff concessions from others is increased by keeping one's own tariffs high. Making concessions weakens the power to obtain them from others. It therefore establishes a good reason against unilateral tariff reductions, even though these are beneficial to the reducing country according to free trade doctrine. The American proposal for a complete elimination of tariffs over five to ten years would overcome this difficulty. Another drawback of this kind of bargaining is that it is multilateral, but confined to one issue, so that 'concessions' on other fronts than trade policy are not on the agenda of the negotiating parties.

The three pillars of GATT—non-discrimination, prohibition of quantitative restrictions and generality—have been steadily undermined, even while the much-hailed Kennedy Round was still in progress. There has been a proliferation of common markets, free trade areas, economic co-operation agreements and other preferential arrangements. They clearly violate the principle of non-discrimination. Generalised preferences for less developed countries have removed a further chunk of world trade from the so-called most-favoured nation principle (making the 'most-favoured' the least favoured nations). Quantitative restrictions or their equivalent, 'voluntary agreements', are literally mushrooming; they have been extended from cotton textiles (and synthetic and wool textiles, oil and shoes) to tinned mushrooms. With Britain's entry into Europe, the British agricultural market has been removed from the type of competition envisaged by GATT.

But all this has become obsolete almost overnight. Free trade doctrine has never been able to accommodate the oligopolistic relations between countries. It is hard to see how the traditional tools of the economist could enable him to take into account the effects on the international system of the dramatic rise in the price of oil. The fantastic oil deficits of all oil-importing countries will call for policies which make the Nixon Round irrelevant. While Professor Casadio has integrated trade and monetary analysis, the lack of integration of the geo-political aspects of energy has thrown the whole works out of gear.

The agenda for the next round of trade and monetary negotiations must be concerned with how to maintain and expand trade in spite of the gigantic oil deficits, how to avoid competitive devaluations, deflations or trade restrictions, how to use the monopoly powers of the West to countervail the power of the oil exporters, how to expand trade with the Third World, how to use the oil surpluses to finance supplies to developing countries from Europe, America and Japan, how to enable the Arabs to invest their surpluses in assets sufficiently secure and attractive to them to maintain the supply of oil, and so on. None of these items appear on the agenda, but then the events of the last few months have overthrown, at least for a decade, so many time-honoured notions. As an historical account, the book is useful. But, alas, the lesson to be learnt from history may be only how to fight the last war.

PAUL STREETEN

Trade Strategies for Development. Papers of the Ninth Cambridge Conference on Development Problems, September 1972. Edited by Paul Streeten. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for The Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee. 1974. 375 pp. Indexes. £8·00.*

THIS collection of papers submitted to and discussed at the 1972 Cambridge Conference on Development Problems consists of an introductory chapter by Paul Streeten together with the texts of the two opening addresses, the fifteen contributed papers grouped under eight themes, and a background statistical paper from the Economic Planning Staff of the Overseas Development Administration. All this material, together with information about the contributors and conference members, marks a great advance in presentation (and price) from the somewhat austere reports which HMSO published for the Cambridge University Overseas Studies Committee on the conferences of the 1960s.

The relationship of development to trade policies is involved and controversial. Terms such as inward- and outward-looking require interpretation in the context of trade. Neither relates only to the principle of comparative advantage. Inward-looking is 'identified' with import-substitution and 'outward-looking' with 'export promotion' (pp. 3–4). Beyond this, a further distinction has to be drawn between primary (agriculture) and secondary (manufacturing) production. This results in 'a fourfold division primary-outward and secondary-outward, primary-inward and secondary-inward' (p. 3). Colonial regimes were primary-outward looking, while the EEC Common Agricultural Policy is typically primary-inward. Secondary-inward policies are concerned with import substitution, but these have lost ground, particularly in Latin America, to

secondary-outward. The argument here is 'that protection, overvalued exchange rates and the resulting encouragement to exercise import substitution has penalised exports' and that 'some of these countries could have earned more foreign exchange by increasing primary exports' (p. 5). A further supporting argument is that 'administrative, central controls make for inefficiency and inequality, and that prices should be used much more as an instrument of policy-making and decentralised planning' (p. 5). It should be added that mistakes in pricing policies can be disastrous as, for example, in the case of the decline in Burmese rice production and exports.

The trade implications of differences in technology operate in both directions. Barriers against imports of labour-intensive goods from developing countries must be set against those protecting infant industries. The former, according to Professor Harry G. Johnson, are due to the fact that 'the developed countries in spite of their vaunted "economic flexibility", have not really mastered the problem of moving labour out of low-skill labour-intensive industries into high labour-skill capital-intensive industries' (p. 29). This failure applies both to agriculture and to industries such as cotton textiles, which together typify the commercial policies of developed countries currently thwarting the development of a world trading or investment system. The case for protection in developing countries is dealt with by I. G. Patel in a keynote address. In his view 'growing inwards is unavoidable for most of the poorer countries' (p. 43) but at the same time the logic of development calls for greater diversification of exports to meet import needs. The OPEC experience raised hopes that combined action by developing countries could secure better terms for primary products. While confrontation will undoubtedly take place 'it is by no means certain that it will lead to any concrete and significant advantage for the developing countries taken as a whole' (p. 45). The impact of increased oil prices on India and other oil importers among the poorer countries has shown that poverty offers no protection against the effects of confrontation.

Appearing at a time of intense activity on the international monetary and trading fronts, the Cambridge Conference papers are of more than usual interest.

RICHARD BAILEY

Employment Creation in Developing Societies: The Situation of Labor in Dependent Economies. Edited by Karl Wohlmuth. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1973. (Distrib. in U.K. by Pall Mall.) 342 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·50.*

SOME years ago, it would have been generally accepted that the major task facing the less developed countries of the world was to achieve a higher rate of economic growth. The standard of living was low and needed to be raised. In particular, food production had to be increased to feed an increasing population and to raise nutritional standards. More recently, there has been a change of emphasis. Although many may still see the problem in this light, the fact is that (despite occasional famines) food production has kept pace with population. Economists with a special interest in development are becoming increasingly aware of the need to

create employment for a growing labour force. This is the central problem to which this collection of essays is addressed.

It is not merely the rapid growth of population that causes difficulties All too often the problem is aggravated by the policies adopted by the developing countries. Industrial development has usually over-emphasised the most up-to-date capital intensive technologies, which are appropriate to advanced countries where capital is relatively abundant and labour scarce but inappropriate to less developed countries where the position is reversed In agriculture, too, labour-saving machinery has been unnecessarily employed. More than one author shows how growth could be achieved *and* more jobs created if capital intensive development ceased to be subsidised by low interest rates, special incentives and over-valued currencies.

For the most part, the standard of the contributions is very high Inevitably, in a collection of essays of this kind, there is some duplication but this is no great fault. It is perhaps also inevitable that some contributions should fall short of the general high standard. The theoretical mode developed by Krishna (chapter 1) does not make easy reading for the non specialist (especially if not mathematically inclined). The fact that there are some misprints in setting out the symbols does not help.

Part IV is devoted to a number of regional or country studies. Mos of these are disappointing. One learns little from the Schwefels' contribution (chapter 13) on the social meaning of unemployment, and Kirkcaldy' (chapter 14) on Jamaica is little more than a catalogue of measures taken without any real evaluation.

These defects are minor. There is much here that will be of grea value to all who are interested in the problems of the less-developed countries, not just the economist. Banerji's contribution (chapter 8) on technological change in agriculture, demonstrating how increased output can be achieved with labour intensive methods, is particularly valuable.

J. M. JACKSON

Development Today. A New Look at U.S. Relations with the Poo Countries. Ed. by Robert E. Hunter and John E. Rielly. *New York Washington: Praeger in co-operation with the Overseas Developmen Council. 1972. London: Pall Mall. 1973. 286 pp. Bibliog. Index £3·75.*

THIS book succeeds in doing what the Pearson Report signally failed to do It sets out in clear and simple language designed for non-specialist readers especially non-specialist readers in the United States Congress, the chie elements of a 'liberal consensus' concerning the main current issues in international aid, and it relates its presentation of those issues to a rang of concrete policy problems which most of the developing countries face.

It succeeds because it is explicit in stating the ideological and ethica biases of the contributors, and because it is modest in its recognition tha these *are* biases, and that alternative assessments are possible. It is modes also in its delineation of the scope and limitations of aid. It does not seel the massive pretensions of an international enquiry, and it refrains fror propounding yet another grand global strategy. Its contributors severall make some sensible if limited suggestions, which, if adopted, would mak the relationships between rich and poor countries slightly more benign.]

does not make very exciting reading, and the evident niceness and common sense of some of the contributors is perhaps a little dispiriting, but it is probably pitched at the right level for the audience that the editors appear to have had in mind.

One conspicuous exception is the re-issue of Samuel P. Huntington's sharp little essay attacking the propensity of aid propagandists to seek a multiple rationale which will please everybody. In particular, he attacks the tendency within the liberal consensus to argue that aid should not serve political objectives. 'It is a little peculiar', he says, 'to try to mobilise the support of politicians for something by arguing that it has no relevance to politics' (p. 28). Huntington will probably find more sympathy on the right than on the left, but he is no Peter Bauer, and he does not attack aid on *a priori* grounds. All he does is to show, with dazzling clarity, that the liberal consensus is sometimes just a little bit soppy.

The book is divided into four parts, on 'The Setting', 'The Problems of the Poor Countries', 'Foreign Trade, Investment, and the Multinational Corporation', and 'U.S. Views'. Of these, the introductory section is the best, and the section on the private sector the weakest. (Why do the advocates of the allegedly 'hard-headed' private sector sometimes exhibit even more missionary zeal than the avowed moralists in the aid lobby?). The section on American views will be of little interest to readers in other countries, apart from an interesting observation by Representative Fraser that the Congress lacks internal processes, and that Congressmen interested in aid therefore seek to act upon each other through the medium of external lobbies. Is this peculiar to aid, or peculiar to Congress, or generally true of legislatures, or simply not true at all? It merits further discussion.

In conclusion, one must note, as so often, the speed with which such books go out of date. Commenting on the growing realisation among developing countries of the power inherent in their command of natural resources, especially oil, Hunter comforts us with the thought (p. 10) that 'clearly, these demands will not have much impact on us for some time'!

But it is a good book, which strikes the right balance between the demands of morality and attention to real interests.

JOHN WHITE

Aid and Development: A Handbook for Small Donors. By Marian Radetzki. Foreword by Erik Lundberg. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 323 pp. Index. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £9·00.*

SWEDEN is a relative newcomer to aid-giving, but the problems it encountered in this field are by no means new. This is one of the lessons to emerge from this study of aid with special reference to Swedish experience in Kenya and Tanzania. In consequence, it is not altogether surprising that much of the book covers familiar ground. Its claim to attention does not so much derive from being Swedish as from skilful application of economic theory to the problems in hand.

Part I is intended as a primer for small donors. Part II tests Swedish experience against the rules laid down in Part I and also contains a useful survey of the economies of the two East African countries. It is perhaps unfortunate that the opening chapter is the weakest. There are all the now customary rantings of the 'aid is not all it seems to be' variety: aid dis-

bursements fall short of commitments, the cost of technical aid rises with inflation in industrial countries, project aid tends to be tied to donor countries, and the like. Untroubled by problems of financial prudence and monetary policy, the author seems unaware that much of this was inevitable, though later on in the book he shows himself well enough aware of the skills-restraint in developing countries which should go at least some way to answer the complaints. The next chapter surveys the theory of bottlenecks in development, with special reference to the skills, savings and foreign exchange restraints. It is well argued along familiar lines. The last of the three general chapters has more claim to originality. It divides aid into 'bulk aid' and 'innovation aid' (p. 85). Bulk aid is defined as aid which provides additional resources for known activities, and innovation aid as aid which contributes something new which for various reasons could not have been accomplished without aid support. In this there may well be a new line of approach to the subject. In the way it is worked out here, however, the conclusion is the already well-worn one that developing countries want labour-using innovations rather than the labour-saving ones aid-givers tend to provide, and that the labour-using ones are the innovations of an earlier age in the industrial world—which is not an unchallengeable reading of economic history.

The case studies in Part II point to a lack of innovation aid of this nature. Swedish aid is shown to have concentrated somewhat more on rural areas and social development than did other aid, but it was bulk aid just the same. Here again one comes up against some controversial points. For instance, if Sweden provided silos, although it might have provided manually operated warehouses, it provided labour-saving rather than labour-using aid. But did it not act in line with its comparative advantage and is comparative advantage really irrelevant to aid? Evidently one can differ, and it does not belittle the author's contribution to ask for further consideration of innovation aid.

F. V. MEYER

Multinational Companies and the Third World. By Louis Turner. *New York: Hill & Wang. 1973. London: Allen Lane. 1974. 294 pp. Bibliog. Index. $8.95. £3·50.*

IN the wide spectrum of attitudes to multinational companies operating in developing countries, ranging from those who regard them as absolute and undiluted evils, to those for whom they are the only effective force for economic development, Mr. Turner stands to the (non-Marxist) left of centre. His view is that, properly controlled and in selected areas, multinational companies can make a useful contribution to development. He takes the needs of the developing countries as the standard by which their impact is judged. His book, though neither original nor analytically rigorous, is a useful, highly readable, non-technical survey of the main problems raised by multinationals spreading to poor countries. It was written before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on multinational corporations had revealed facts which, had they appeared in an undergraduate's essay, would have been dismissed as vulgar Marxist nonsense. It was written before the overthrow of Allende, before the revelations of the activities of ITT in Chile, and before the large increase in the price of oil last autumn. But these more recent events

would have been grist to the mills of Mr. Turner's critical (though not hostile) appraisal of the contribution of these companies to the achievement of the aims of the developing countries.

Mr. Turner says in his introduction that he 'found it chastening to discover how often journalists raised crucial issues years before academic authorities had begun their analyses' (p. ix). This is quite true, but raising issues is not the same as analysing them, and the book is weak on analysis.

There is a tendency to use both ends of any available stick to beat the multinationals, and occasionally the author gets hold of the wrong end. Thus, tourism is bad because a large proportion of the receipts are remitted abroad, but also because it causes vicious inflation (p. 192). (To be fair, the passage could be interpreted as saying that high wages trigger off wage-push inflation because of the large wage differentials between foreign and domestic firms.) Remitting profits from industry to the parent country is bad because it burdens the balance of payments, but retaining profits is also bad because it raises foreign ownership of assets. Bringing in capital from abroad is bad because it leads to servicing burdens, but borrowing locally is also bad because no capital is brought in.

There is evidence also of some curious paleo-mercantilistic beliefs, such as: 'if [complementation agreements] reduce costs, the economies profit, but the region as a whole will benefit only at the expense of the rich nations if these reduced costs are translated into exports to the developed economies' (p. 170); and 'It is now clear that the expansion of [trade] is severely restrained by the selfishness of the developed world' (p. 165).

The discussion of the benefits and costs of high wages paid by multinationals in poor countries is confused. 'Unless the [Western trade unions] narrow the wage differential between the developed world and the Third World, they will steadily lose jobs' (p. 196). In discussing the loss of jobs resulting from higher imports from developing countries into developed countries, the author does not mention the fact that new jobs will be created in export industries (p. 181).

The book is best in presenting brief, vivid sketches of particular companies and projects, from the horror stories of the United Fruit Company and the *Union Minière* to Lonrho, Heinz and the International Basic Economy Corporation. But the author does not mention the Commonwealth Development Corporation which, like Tom Lehrer's dope pedlar, claims to be 'doing good by doing well'. There are good chapters on South Africa, on tourism and on ecology.

PAUL STREETEN

LAW

International Law in Historical Perspective. Part VI: Juridical Facts as Sources of International Rights and Obligations. By J. H. W. Verzijl. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 1973. 861 pp. Indexes.* (Nova et Vetera Iuris Gentium. Publications of the Institute for International Law of the University of Utrecht. Series A. Modern International Law, No. 10.)

IN this volume, completed in his eighty-fifth year, Dr. Verzijl reveals no diminution of the broad sweep, clarity and intellectual tautness of the earlier volumes. It is devoted in great part to treaties, placed in the context of 'acts in the law'. It is characteristic of the pragmatic approach of the author that he takes 'acts in the law' as matters of fact, rather than

metaphysical creatures; he discusses only summarily 'the origination of international rights and obligations' (p. 2) and is not attracted by ambitious concepts such as 'international criminal law', which he describes as an 'artificial hotch-potch' (p. 16). He takes his stand on the 'simple fact of the co-existence of sovereign States in a legal order', and on 'the fact that the community of States still attaches . . . much importance to the universal recognition of certain basic rights and duties in order to achieve or ensure the possibility of peaceable intercourse between sovereign States'. He does not pause to deal with the circularity of these statements, but presses on to unroll the record of state practice over a thousand years—from Charlemagne to Brezhnev and from the Treaty of Verdun (843) to the United States-Cuba arrangements against hijacking (1973).

Yet there is nothing superficial. There is of course much selection of material, but the treaties that are chosen for discussion or reference are chosen always to illuminate a particular practice or a precise issue. Here the analysis of treaties of alliance, and especially of those concluded in the half-century before the Treaty of Versailles (1920) is of outstanding interest, and poses large questions about the role of law. Why is the treaty form resorted to for what are often bare declarations of intended policy? What were the real sanctions behind the bargains? What was the validity or efficacy of a secret agreement? Was the formal expression of the Entente Cordiale, or the Triple or Quadruple Alliance, as a treaty a legal commitment, or simply a decent covering for enforced or traded concessions, or no more than the mindless ritual of a traditional diplomacy? Though the author does not answer these questions, he has gathered much material to suggest answers.

After the excursus on treaties, there is a substantial section on international delicts as a source of rights and obligations, and the basis and pursuit of international claims, advanced on behalf of individuals, are discussed with many apt examples and on classical lines.

The treaty lists, summary review of boundary treaties in all parts of the world, and chronologies, which are incorporated in the text, and the innumerable historical and legal sources that are traced and identified, make the volume a mine of information, gathered with high perception and scholarship.

Three further volumes are planned to round off the set, and we must wish Dr. Verzijl the time and energy to complete this great work.

J. E. S. Fawcett

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By I. M. Sinclair. Foreword by B. A. Wortley. *Manchester: Manchester University Press; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1973. 150 pp. Index. (The Melland Schill Lectures.) £2·40.*

Introduction au Droit des Traités. By Paul Reuter. *Paris: Armand Colin. 1972. 236 pp. Index. (Relations et Institutions Internationales. Gen. Ed. R.-J. Dupuy.) Paperback: 22F.*

These two slim volumes complement each other. The first, by the second Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, provides a critical analysis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties against the background of pre-existing law and practice. Although the views expressed are personal,

the author is undoubtedly well placed to know the official British attitude towards the Vienna Convention. He describes the political in-fighting behind many of the debates, explains the significance of the British declaration attached to its signature and ratification of the Convention (p. 45), and examines the Syrian reservations and the British and American attitude thereto (pp. 46–49). (It is a pity the text of these instruments is not included in an appendix.)

The other volume, by Professor Paul Reuter, whose work on European Institutions is well-known, gives a masterly exposition of the modern law of treaties in 187 pages. As an introduction it assumes considerable knowledge of international law—the notes are a particularly rich source—but it is written for a wider circle than the academic, for all those employed on international work in the government or the commercial field, and eschews theoretical problems, such as the effect on a treaty of error or constitutional irregularities in a state's ratification—conundrums enjoyed by armchair jurists—for a discussion of topics requiring more immediate solution. Thus, the author investigates the Soviet claim that federal units like the Ukraine, and the political regimes of North Korea and North Vietnam, have a right to participate in treaties (paras. 116–124); and examines with rigour the degree of identity, legal or otherwise, which will make an entity (such as the European Community or its member states) bound by a treaty to which it is not strictly a legal party (paras. 176–185). The divisibility of treaty obligations and the reconciliation of conflicting obligations which may arise from a succession of treaties on the same topic, as with the Universal Postal Union and BIRPI, are also discussed.

Both studies applaud the Vienna Convention as a necessary stage in international development but both point out grave weaknesses. Professor Reuter stresses the logical defects: the inclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties in the same code, the blanket reference to 'the object and purpose of the treaty' in place of classification of treaties, the confused terminology and scanty rules provided for nullity and termination of treaty obligations. The International Law Commission's exclusion from the Convention of oral agreements and treaties made with international organisations is generally supported, but its attempt to exclude state responsibility is challenged by Professor Reuter. The rules which render a treaty obligatory are external to the treaty itself, and he maintains that it is impossible to discuss legal situations resulting from a state's flouting of treaty provisions after signature but prior to ratification, from a state's mistake or deception on entering a treaty, or from its subsequent denunciation of the treaty, independently of an examination of the general rules of state responsibility (para. 220).

Sinclair's attack is more from the practical angle. The rules, he states, are expressed 'at a level of generality and abstraction sufficient to hide underlying divergences'. Thus, the territorial application clause, which should involve nothing more than a conveyancer's task of accurate delimitation, is, because of its colonial implications, shelved under the vague formula of 'entire territory' employed in Article 29 (p. 58). The functions of the depositary state, as Professor Reuter shows, were an early method of converting a multilateral treaty into an international organisation (para. 10); but the adoption of a scheme of reservations which in practice permits as legally effective *any* reservation which *one* other state is prepared to accept, reduces the depositary state to a postbox and results in 'the fractionalisation of treaty regimes' (p. 50). The inclusion of every

hypothetical ground for invalidating or terminating a treaty in Part V of th Convention undermines the general obligation that treaties were made t be observed (p. 86); and the abandonment of compulsory settlement c disputes for a system of conciliation under Article 66 offers 'a fra procedural barrier' against wholesale denunciation and overturn of treati (p. 142).

These works complement each other in that Mr. Sinclair is particularl good on interpretation of treaties and the progressive development of th law made by the Convention, whereas Professor Reuter has much more t say on parties to a treaty and the rights and obligations of third partie Both are good on the inadequacies of the Convention in incorporating *ju cogens*. Between them they include references to most of the voluminou writing published on treaties in the last twenty years. The French wor has the advantage in that it includes a text of the Vienna Convention a an appendix. Indeed, the English work is largely unintelligible to th reader unless he has a copy of the Convention to hand. HAZEL FOX

International Migration Law. By Richard Plender. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 197 293 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Law and Population Series No. 2) Fl. 55.0*

THE central theme of Dr. Plender's *International Migration Law* is th restrictions which international law imposes on each state's rights an powers to exclude aliens and control immigration. This theme is develope by a thorough survey of relevant international agreements, declaration diplomatic opinions and practices, international judicial decisions, an above all by an examination of the domestic law of over one hundred state literally from China to Peru. Special reference is made to British an United States practice. Two apparently competing principles in the 20t century jurisprudence of this subject lie at the root of all the author observations: state sovereignty, which argues for the right to exclude alien and state inter-dependence, which argues in favour of their admittanc because the facts of international life require it. Dr. Plender contends tha the 'right to exclude aliens has not always been regarded as an essenti attribute of a state's sovereignty' (p. 39), though states have rarel accepted, except under treaty, that their inter-dependence obliges them t admit aliens. In recent times 'the most significant limitations on a state right to exclude aliens may be based not on inter-dependence, but o extant and nascent rules designed to protect human rights' (p. 39).

The early chapters set up the relationship between immigration law an nationality, discuss the growth of the modern concept of nationality an citizenship, and trace the origins and general development of the tw principles referred to above. Dr. Plender takes the reader back to th customs of the early Germanic tribes, to the laws of the Romans, Saxor and Normans, and to the writings, for example, of Gentilis and Grotiu Naturally, special reference is made to the impact, in more recent times, c the refugee and *émigré*. Chapter 7 is devoted exclusively to them. Th more discursive early chapters are followed by highly detailed monograph on the main aspects of 'Migration Law' (not always an entirely appropriat name for this subject though an alternative does not come readily to mind the state's duty to admit its own nationals; exceptional duties to adm aliens (for example, diplomats); migration for employment; the positio of dependants in immigration; prohibited immigrants, and so forth. Ther

is a select bibliography and a table of statutes which is seventeen pages longer than the index.

It is a token of the book's worth that so many areas in all this might excite further consideration here. Of special interest to the present reviewer are Dr. Plender's remarks on the position of diplomats in the territory of a third state (*i.e.* in a state neither the sending nor the receiving state)—a subject of marginal significance perhaps, but one, for this reason, never satisfactorily considered in the books on the subject. There are a number of relevant cases. The author appears to take the view that, except under the provisions of Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, such diplomats are not entitled, *inter alia*, to immunity from suit and personal inviolability, and that even under Article 40 the presence of the diplomat in the third state (while taking up or returning to his post or returning to his own country) must be for the purposes of his official duties. He cannot, for example, take a holiday there, while still an accredited diplomat, and be entitled to immunity. This also seems to be Professor D. W. Greig's view (see his *International Law*, p. 184).[1] For a number of reasons such an uncompromising view may be doubted. Suffice it to say that Article 40 entitles the diplomat to immunity when *returning* to his post. Literally, then, he may return from a third state and still be entitled to immunity of some sort. Should we then conclude, for example, that the diplomat who takes a fourteen-day driving holiday in a third state and who 'returns' from the tenth day is entitled to immunity from day ten to day fourteen but not from day one to day ten? The object of Article 40 is to ensure the diplomat's transit or return. It may be supposed that any proceedings against him from day one to day ten would fail to ensure this facility and thus run counter to the object of the article. Some support for this view is provided by *New Chile Gold Mining Co.* v. *Blanco* (1888) 4 T.L.R. 346, at least in the judgment of Manisty J. (at p. 349), a case which is hardly authority for the proposition, as Dr. Plender contends it is (at p. 107), that diplomats are entitled to immunities in transit through third states to their posts or their own countries. It was concerned with whether process could be served upon the Venezuelan ambassador to France while he was actually resident in France. Nor does *U.S.* v. *Rosal*, 191 F. Supp. 663 (1960) wholly support Dr. Plender's view, for in that case Rosal had been dismissed from his post after his arrest. The author fails to mention this crucial feature (as does Professor Greig: see above, p. 204).

Much painstaking research has gone into the production of *International Migration Law*, which will be of inestimable value to serious students of this subject and international legal practitioners. For this Dr. Plender is to be warmly congratulated. Doubtless, had more space been available to him, he would have been able to offer a more analytical approach, more discussion, more argument, to counterbalance the at times overwhelming catalogue effect produced by his endless observations on the law and practice of innumerable states. This is not a book for gently browsing in. Perhaps this is why Dr. Plender never quite seems to resolve the question of whether the 'right' to exclude aliens is a rule of the system subject to exceptions, or a mere power, or was once a right and is now a power or vice versa: compare, for example, the dust cover (a 'power' and a 'right' to control immigration) and p. 39 ('The Origins of Exclusionary Power'

[1] London: Butterworth. 1970.

and the 'state's right to exclude aliens'). The book was completed on June 7, 1972. As the author acknowledges in his foreword, the United Kingdom Immigration Act 1971 was not then fully in force. It is now: see S.I. 1514 (1972). As Dr. Plender anticipated, the then Home Secretary did indeed issue new sets of Immigration Rules (laid before Parliament under section 3 (2) of the Act on 23 October, 1972). Broadly, the new Rules do correspond with the Draft Rules (Cmnd. 4606) referred to in the book. An important additional feature, however, is the inclusion, in Part V of the Rules on Entry, of special arrangements for nationals of EEC countries after the United Kingdom's accession to the Treaty of Rome; for the obligation under which see Dr. Plender's book at pp. 123–125. CLIFFORD HALL

Privacy and Human Rights. Reports and Communications presented at the Third International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, organised by the Belgian Universities and The Council of Europe, with the support of the Belgian Government. Brussels, 30 September–3 October 1970. Edited by A. H. Robertson. *Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1973. 457 pp. Index. £6·00.*

THE Third International Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights, organised by Belgian universities and the Council of Europe, was held in Brussels in October 1970. Over 350 persons attended, and this volume contains the seven principal papers and sixteen written communications presented to the Colloquy. That they run to 430 pages shows how much unpacking may be done of the simple sentence in the European Convention that 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence', and the qualifying clauses that follow.

The paper by Jacques Velu is a comprehensive survey of the meaning and application of the notions of private life and correspondence, as seen in the context of international efforts to protect them. The paper is supported by valuable studies of national practice in the United Kingdom (Dr. Andrew Martin), Italy (Dario Foligno) and Malta (Chief Justice J. J. Cremona). The communication by Dr. Martin is of particular interest in its description of a series of bills, introduced in Parliament in the last decade but not adopted, for the greater protection of privacy in one form or another; and it remains to be seen whether the modest recommendations of the Younger Committee will be implemented.

Professor R. V. Jones, writing with considerable practical experience in charge of Scientific Intelligence in the Second World War, contributes a fascinating paper on the threats of technology to privacy, and there is a communication by G. B. F. Niblett of the British Computer Society on the impact on privacy of computers.

Professor Torkel Opsahl of the University of Oslo contributes a humane, thoughtful and judicious paper on the protection of family life under the European Convention, in which numerous applications to the European Commission are described and analysed. The remainder of the volume is devoted to the institutional machinery of the Convention and tends to wander rather far away from the main theme. Dr. Robertson criticises, not without justice, delays in the procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights, and proposes improvements. Steps have been, and are being taken, in this direction.

Altogether, the volume is a useful source of ideas and information about the state of the international protection of the rights to privacy.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

Cases and Materials on International Law. By D. J. Harris. *London: Sweet & Maxwell. 1973. 779 pp. Index. £8·50. Paperback: £5·75.*

THIS is a collection of cases, conventions, resolutions, opinions of law officers and government ministers, I.L.C. statements, extracts from textbooks and learned articles etc. Though distinctly 'traditional' in approach, it is the only up-to-date work of its kind, containing all the necessary ingredients—not only a wide range of materials, some of which are unfamiliar, but also useful commentary and questions for the student to follow up. There are two main, inter-related, reservations. It is far too expensive if students are expected also to purchase a textbook. Moreover at a time when students are turning to the more substantial introductory works (for example, Professor D. W. Greig's *International Law* [1]) and source material is so readily available in law libraries, this work's place in the teaching and learning process is obscure. Ten years ago it would have been both an excellent book *and* a relevant one.

CLIFFORD HALL

WESTERN EUROPE

The European Administrative Elite. By John A. Armstrong. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1973. 406 pp. Bibliog. Index. £9·20. $20.00. Paperback: £4·45.*

JOHN Armstrong's *The European Administrative Elite* is an important book in many ways. It represents a major contribution to administrative history and at the same time an important cross-national comparison of the role perceptions of the administrative elites of Britain, France, Germany and Russia in economic development. The emphasis is upon the dynamic and varying nature of elite role perceptions both historically and comparatively. Recognition is given both to the differing patterns of development of social structure and to the different patterns of relationship between the educational system and other social elites. Armstrong's attempt to answer the question 'why were these elites so differentially receptive to developmental ideologies as these developed" produces some rich insights.

The availability of developmental ideologies (e.g. Saint-Simonism, Keynesianism) was not alone sufficient to produce a perception of a developmental role within the administrative elite. One factor influencing the receptivity of the elite was the nature of the accommodation between aristocratic ('all-rounder', with stress on 'character') and bourgeois (specialist, with stress on achievement) role models and the role of the monarchy in shaping that accommodation. The impact of an aristocratic role model in Britain contrasts with that of a bourgeois role model in France, whilst Prussia represented a more subtle accommodation. Another factor is the interaction between family, educational and in-service socialisation patterns. Interesting differences emerge in the relative impact of these three socialisation agents, in the values and attitudes which they foster

[1] London: Butterworth. 1970.

and in the congruence between them. For example, in Britain the academic establishment played a decisive role in shaping elite role perceptions in the 19th century, whilst in Prussia and France the function of the academic establishment has been to provide ideological justification for existing elite status. Thus the *Rechtsstaat* concept provided a major legitimation of official autonomy in Germany, that is, it had an ideological function. In Britain the amateur administrator model was a legitimation of the Oxbridge curriculum. Only France and, of course, Russia seemed to discover an alternative route into elite positions which did not necessarily depend on classics, literary subjects, pure mathematics or the law. These latter subjects were essentially associated with a dominant aristocratic role model. Engineering and economics as alternative possibilities were first developed in France and were compatible with a bourgeois role model. Unlike the experience of Britain or Prussia, the enterpreneurial counter-role in France did not militate against administrative intervention.

Five factors seem positively related to development interventionist role definition—metropolitan influence (stronger in France than Britain where a rural nostalgia and anti-industrialism seem to qualify cosmopolitan outlooks); territorial experience (especially through a prefectoral system); administrative integration; scientific-technological education component (e.g. France's Polytechnique); and systematic economic training (e.g. ENA in Paris). Armstrong is led to conclude that archaic values and styles pose a major impediment to effective intervention in the British and West German economies and may in the future have an increasingly debilitating effect on growth performance.

The British government requires not only greater economic and technological expertise but also greater receptivity to ideas and greater personal experience and knowledge of social and economic problems. Its geographical and intellectual remoteness provides serious obstacles to its capacity to learn, innovate and adapt. The EEC may at least help to provide a truly metropolitan influence. One of the most disturbing features of British society remains, however, the weak links between the governmental, industrial and educational subsystems not only in terms of careers but also of action-oriented research.

Armstrong's book directs attention to two critical questions: who established the dominant administrative ideology, and whose interests are served by the maintenance of that ideology? In particular, who defined recruitment methods and standards and with which reference groups in mind—nobility or bourgeoisie? The answer to these two questions varies from society to society, but has critical implications for future governmental performance.

K. DYSON

The Politics of the European Community. By Roy Pryce. *London: Butterworths for the Centre for Contemporary European Studies, 1973. 209 pp. Index. (European Community Studies. Gen. Ed. Roy Pryce.) £2·00.*

National Governments and the European Communities. By Helen Wallace. *London: Chatham House—PEP. April 1973. 104 pp. Tables. (European Series No. 21.) £1·25.*

THERE is an increasingly close correspondence between the literature appearing on European integration and the development of the European

Community itself. At last those characteristics of the EEC so prominent in recent negotiations are being brought into sharper relief in studies of the Community. Helen Wallace's study of national governments in the European Communities is a very good example of this welcome trend. Dr. Roy Pryce's book, on the other hand, follows very much the pattern set by earlier studies of the EEC. In this sense the two books make an ideal contrast with each other.

Dr. Pryce's study adopts a ' Community ' perspective in his analysis of the development and functioning of the Community, stressing the institutional features and goals of the EEC which distinguish it from other forms of European co-operation. Part II, which deals with the problems of an enlarged Community, incorporates into this rather broad view of the EEC some of the issues, both institutional and policy-related, which have emerged from the prolonged enlargement negotiations and the adjustment of the Six to their new partners.

Helen Wallace's study brings a change of perspective and a change of approach. Hers is a detailed, even pioneering, study of one neglected aspect of the EEC, the role of national governments in constructing positions to be defended in Brussels, their points of contact with Community institutions and their differing responses to the demands made by Brussels on governmental machinery. The real value of this careful, clear addition to the Chatham House-PEP European Series lies both in the information it provides on the ' other world ' of EEC politics and its forceful conclusion. ' Membership of the Communities has not reduced differences in national style and these continue to act as a barrier against a wider consensus '. ' . . . governments are elected to make national policy and to protect national interests, and as yet national goals are not sufficiently closely identified with Community collaboration for a shared Community interest to be easily defined.'

One wishes that such a book had been available earlier to balance some of the exclusive ' Community-oriented ' studies which, in their focus on the European corridors of the Eurocrats, neglected those other immensely active corridors of power in national capitals. Dr. Pryce's book is an up-to-date introductory and readable volume appropriate for the many outlets where a succinct introduction to the Communities is wanted. It is Helen Wallace's study, however, which leaves the strongest impression, particularly when eyes are turned towards the British Labour government's handling of the ' renegotiation of entry terms ' issue.

CAROLE WEBB

Britain in the EEC. Edited by Douglas Evans. *London: Gollancz. 1973. 208 pp. £2·80.*

THIS volume of ten essays with an introduction by Mr. Evans is an able sequel to his earlier symposium, *Destiny or Delusion.*[1] The aim is essentially twofold: to examine critically what the EEC has achieved, or plans to achieve; and, to consider what effective role Britain can play now that it has become a member of the Community. As the book was published in 1973 it suffers from the technical weakness that the statistics relate mainly to the period before Britain became a member while the important arguments concern 1973 and the future.

[1] London: Gollancz. 1971.

The book clearly highlights the problems facing both Britain and the Community. In the case of Britain, the fundamental weakness of insufficient industrial investment is brought out by the first chapter, which is by Sir Frederick Catherwood but, surprisingly, he does not discuss the fact that this relates to the need for a radical modernisation of the British banking structure to bring it more in line with models such as that of West Germany. The point is also well made by Mr. David Robertson in the eighth chapter on 'The Enlarged EEC in the International Trading System' where he claims that there has been 'a passive attitude . . . towards some domestic economic issues in an apparent belief that achieving membership of the EEC would provide solutions' (p. 144). For the EEC itself the difficulty resides in the fact that, as Andrew Shonfield stated in his Reith Lectures of 1972, since the aim of federation had not been realised, the EEC was on a drifting course with an uncertain destination. This issue is also taken up skilfully here by Mr. William Pickles, who believes that 'No change in the Community's institutions short of federation can democratise it' (p. 204). It emerges from the chapters taken together that the EEC wishes to ignore the basic check to its integration and to paper over the real problems by much, and generally somewhat frivolous harmonisation. In addition, as Professor Harry Johnson aptly puts it, 'One of the least impressive characteristics of the Brussels bureaucracy is its fondness for believing that if it can only persuade the member governments to agree to establish some major outward symbol of integration, it can con them into taking the supporting steps necessary to make integration effective' (p. 135).

The necessary major economic function of the EEC in its early stages is to promote income equalisation amongst its member states but, as the symposium shows, the tendency has been for France—through a combination of determination, skilful diplomacy and exploitation of German inhibitions concerning the Nazi period—to obtain a major share of the Community's benefits. But, as William Pickles notes, Germany is growing in political confidence; and, as those who attended the recent talk given at Chatham House by Herr Helmut Schmidt, then West German Finance Minister, are aware, West Germany contributed to the expected French economic miracle of the 1980s but it will not—unless policy changes—similarly contribute to the industrial restructuring which Britain had hoped for through the large regional development fund, to which Germany was expected to be the main contributor. To conclude, the volume plays a useful role in displacing the uncritical Eurofanaticism which marked the weakness of British diplomacy preceding and after the entry to the EEC in January 1973.

M. J. GRIEVE

British Taxation and the Common Market. A volume of essays. Edited by Douglas Dosser. *London: Charles Knight. 1973. 180 pp. Index. £3·80.*

In this collection of seven essays, Professor Dosser and his associates subject the principle of fiscal harmonisation to a thorough reappraisal. In the first place, they doubt if fiscal harmonisation can make sense by itself unless its effects on other EEC policies are taken into account. Secondly, although they agree that VAT, corporation tax, and excise tax are appropriate as

the objects of harmonisation, they see little point in dealing with them in isolation from each other, since their relative importance varies among the EEC member countries. Thirdly, they illuminate both the complexities for the Community, and the implications for Britain, of any rigid harmonisation in the fiscal field. Their general argument is, therefore, that fiscal harmonisation should not be conducted piecemeal, and that fiscal policy itself should be regarded as only one plank in the broader platform of economic union.

If it is taken for granted that fiscal harmonisation has, at least, a three-fold purpose—to enhance the conditions for free competition, to facilitate economic union, and to provide revenue for the Community budget—then the authors see a need for harmonising on a broad front but, at the same time, allowing national governments some flexibility. Thus in the final essay Professor Dosser proposes a clear distinction between national and Community taxation. The latter would be based primarily on the corporation tax; but this would be supplemented by a fixed and equal percentage contribution from national VAT and excise revenues. The greater part, however, of these latter revenues would remain with national exchequers and could, presumably, be used to alleviate regional problems.

Needless to say, this scheme presupposes an extensive harmonisation of national fiscal policies. Most of the essays, in fact, discuss these problems, especially as they affect Britain. The emphasis on VAT as *the* Community tax seems to stem largely from the relative ease with which it can be harmonised throughout the Community. Certainly the problems of harmonising VAT pale in comparison with those involved in harmonising excise taxes. On this intricate subject, Dodsworth's essay is illuminating. He shows that Britain is out of line with the rest of the Community because of its much greater reliance on revenues from excise. Although the tax on petrol is lower in Britain than on the Continent, the amounts levied on wines, spirits and tobacco are much higher; so much higher that Dodsworth estimates a £650 million annual loss in revenue if British excise rates were aligned with those of the EEC in general. The divergences in corporation tax in the Community are also daunting. The short essay by Professor Dosser on the subject succinctly pinpoints the differences, but he clearly believes that the spin-offs from a harmonised corporation tax would be considerable. Hence his preference for corporation tax as *the* Community tax.

As economic integration proceeds, and various forms of economic management (e.g. exchange rate flexibility) disappear, a higher premium will be placed on the fiscal weapon. The great virtue of these essays is that they suggest how this weapon can be purposefully deployed in a way which is compatible with both the *dirigiste* and *laisser faire* philosophies lying behind the Community's development. At a time when there is some despondency about the prospects for economic union, these essays merit the closest attention.

E. Moxon-Browne

The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy. By Patrick Keatinge. *Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. 1973. 323 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·00.*

A straightforward discussion of the institutional and non-institutional

context within which Irish foreign policy is made is a welcome addition to the literature on Irish politics and on comparative foreign policy. Mr. Keatinge offers a conventionally organised study of Irish foreign policy-making over the fifty years from the formation of the Free State to entry into the European Community, with chapters on the roles of the prime minister and of the minister for external affairs, on the Department of External Affairs, the diplomatic service, Parliament, public opinion, political parties, and interest groups. In the absence or unavailability of much useful secondary material, he has relied heavily for sources upon Dail debates, less heavily upon Irish newspapers, and for recent years also upon interviews; noting with regret that among Irish diplomats only Conor Cruise O'Brien has followed the established British pattern of recording his impressions in published memoirs.

The content of the book contains few surprises for those familiar with the outlines of Irish politics and with the foreign policy predicament of comparable states. For the first twenty-five years of Ireland's statehood, the continuing struggle to assert its independence from Britain and to gain international recognition dominated its whole external policy. With the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act in 1949 the independence issue was at last settled, and in the 1950s Irish involvement in European organisations, its new-found role within the United Nations, and the rising importance of foreign commercial and economic relations combined to diminish the predominance of the border question and of relations with Britain as foreign policy issues. To cope with these new demands, the Irish diplomatic service has been sharply expanded; although Mr. Keatinge considers it still too small and too lacking in specialised training and skills adequately to fulfil its proper role. In spite of these changes, however, foreign policy remains 'near the periphery of the Irish political consciousness', while a 'casual attitude towards foreign policy . . . pervades all levels of public life' (pp. 75, 299). There is very little in the way of informed debate on issues of foreign policy, inside or outside Parliament. In the absence of such informed criticism, successive governments make foreign policy within a context relatively free from positive criticism or public scrutiny.

For the student of foreign policy, this book is in many ways disappointing. It shows little awareness of the by now extensive literature on foreign policy-making in other states, relying exclusively on Joseph Frankel's *The Making of Foreign Policy*[1] for theoretical references. Comparisons are few and in passing, and relate only to Sweden, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand. The chapter-by-chapter treatment of each separate aspect makes the discussion at times rather wooden; a short case-study or two would have made it easier for the reader to appreciate the process as a whole. One gains only by implication a picture of the major historical changes in the whole context of Irish foreign policy, muffled as it is by the organisation of chapters: the transformation of the Department of External Affairs between 1948 and 1951, and the reasons for this, the slow response to the European Communities from 1958 onwards, let alone 'the transformation of Ireland's role in international politics which has occurred since 1968' (p. xi). Most disappointingly for this reviewer, there is no attempt to separate out the different issue areas within the foreign policy field. Economic relations, which Mr. Keatinge

[1] London: Oxford University Press. 1963.

acknowledges as a rather more difficult area for diplomacy to grasp, are mingled in with the Northern Ireland issue, with the assertion of Irish neutrality and with the use made of international organisations.

Nevertheless this is a useful book, which brings together a wealth of material not readily available elsewhere. His proposals for reforms to improve the management of policy and to create the basis for the informed debate and criticism now lacking, though not unfamiliar to other countries, are worth repeating: a more professionally trained diplomatic service, more interchange between diplomats and home civil servants, a parliamentary select committee on foreign affairs—and the establishment of an Institute of International Affairs, to act as a focus for intelligent and informed discussion.

WILLIAM WALLACE

Conservative Politics in France. By Malcolm Anderson. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1974. 381 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

DR. ANDERSON surveys the development of French conservative political forces throughout the era of parliamentarianism: from their first confrontations with the consolidated Republican regime in 1880, through the permutations of two world wars and the dislocations caused by decolonisation, till after almost a century the Gaullist UDR—only tentatively accepted in Jean Charlot's terms as a centralised, disciplined and well-financed party with a mass following—has captured the field and bids fair, with the support of the Independents, to entrench itself as a party of government.

Analytical sections discuss the social role of groups traditionally considered to have wielded influence on the nature of the policies of the Right—the Church, the army, the aristocracy, peasantry, business interests and local notables. But the work, which is in the main the fruit of historical scholarship follows a chronological progression, and the author is a master in the art of approaching problems of contemporary government and politics by an historical path. It is in the chapters which follow the fortunes of liberals and independents, from the *Fédération Républicaine* to the CNIP and *Fédération Nationale des Républicains Indépendants* that he makes his most original and welcome contribution. The study of the Right has indeed lately experienced a happy revival; nevertheless the strand of political allegiance which leads to M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has had to wait while movements more given to pathos and drama held the front of the stage in academic writing as well as in real life. Dr. Anderson has redressed the balance.

Wisely, no doubt, Dr. Anderson does not waste time trying to give a definition of conservatism, but allows the reader's perception of what the word may be used to connote in the French context to develop with his historical exposition. Even this method leaves one with a feeling that some arbitrary decisions have had to be made on what to include and what to leave out. For instance, the extreme Right is discussed particularly as custodian of the intellectual life of the Right; consequently the *Ligues* have their rightful place; however, this leads to the inclusion of tendencies that were fascist or counter-revolutionary and so difficult to look upon as conservative. By the same token, if it is correct to draw attention to the

'visceral conservatism' (p. 152) which even afflicts Radicals, then the MRP and Democratic Centre for whom conservative votes have been cast and which have contributed voters to the alleged unification of the Right in Gaullism, might also merit consideration in a discussion of conservatism with a small 'c'.

The lack of homogeneity of the Right is much emphasised, as is an incapacity for discipline and organisation. Dr. Anderson regards the need for unity and discipline as self-evident, although he cites occasions on which the Independents had good reason to eschew such aims (p. 235). He believes that the 'second industrial revolution' (p. 22) has made it possible to overcome these weaknesses, so that latterly the UDR, aided by the General's charisma and with a capacity to marry stability to economic progress, has at last repaired the split between Rightist thought and right-wing parliamentarianism, between national needs and disparate economic interests. Is it not permissible to feel that this is putting the cart before the horse? In the first place, whereas political failure was felt perhaps as tragedy by the OAS in the 1960s, the Right of earlier generations accommodated itself very nicely to the fluctuations and transmutations of its parliamentary formations, for whose efficiency there was little vital need. *Les droits acquis* could be safeguarded by extra-parliamentary methods—as they still are today—either with discretion or by direct action by sectional groupings. In the second place, it used to be essential for social, as distinct from political, stability that no political party of mass stature should arise to alarm the public. A fear of efficient political organisation and a contempt for political parties and even for parliamentarianism as such have for long been a constant of French life. J. E. C. Bodley was already eloquent on the point in 1898. Only with difficulty, and by careful steps, did de Gaulle wean the country from this fear. In order to do so it was necessary that he too should disclaim any connection with a party and base his personal power on something other than a single political formation. When his capacities had been demonstrated and developed by the Second World War and the conflict over Algeria and he had resigned with true scrupulousness, having achieved the reputation of *un homme propre* (i.e., the opposite of a mercenary politician seeking the spoils of office), conservative France had learned that a mass following does not necessarily entail a threat.

Dr. Anderson's wide learning makes this a most important book, and at the same time reveals that the ways of studying the Right are many. He has related social and economic and grassroots conservatism to parliamentary manifestations and discussed other mediators preferred by some organised interests and the professions. But the richness of the work means that other questions immediately spring to mind: if the day of the notables is over, then what about the mayors? On p. 335 Dr. Anderson deplores a tendency in some Gaullists to make promises of material rewards for the constituencies. Is he not being more puritanical, not only than M. Debré, but than any Frenchman? Candidates for election in France are frequently in local government, and do not hide but rather vaunt the fact that, if deputies or ministers, they will be well placed to canalise government credits into their region. Nor is their right to attempt this ever disputed. Only large-scale and quantified research could justify the suspicion that, through the distribution of development monies, the Gaullists are able to dig their roots more firmly into the life of the regions. For the moment it must remain a reviewer's wild surmise.

M. Hilton

The One and Indivisible French Republic. By Jack Hayward. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 306 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Modern Governments; Gen. Ed.: Max Beloff.) £5·50. Paperback £1·95.*

IN *The One and Indivisible French Republic* Professor Hayward gives one of the more striking general accounts of the French political system that have appeared. It is a comprehensive interpretative essay rather than a conventional textbook and he is to be congratulated on the freshness and vigour of his effort, which will help his readers to reappraise the French political system and which should stimulate the comparative study of political systems.

The first chapter—' The Unwritten Constitution '—sets the general theme of the book: ' the perennial dialogue between French unity and French diversity, between a divided nation and a unitary state ' (p. 1). As Professor Hayward remarks, France is characterised by counterbalancing contradictions: anarchic individualism and centralised statism—' revolutionary responses and rhetoric are coupled with the conservative traditionalism of entrenched vested interests ' (p. 4). With well-chosen quotations he succinctly presents the country's political culture and sets the stage for his consideration of the structure, participants, and outcome of the system.

Professor Hayward argues that ' France is a state-nation rather than a nation-state. The nation is an artefact of the state. The political regime has retained a precedence over the political community that is derived from but extends far beyond its historic precedence ' (p. 17). His chapters on local and regional government, the national representative organs, and the central government, provide both an account of the institutions of the Fifth Republic and a good deal of evidence about the attitudes of the French towards their political system. Chapter 2 on local-central relations, the sections on the consultation of interest groups and on the civil service in the next two chapters, and Chapter 5 on civil liberties are particularly helpful.

The later chapters are concerned with the development and implementation of policy on economic planning, education, public enterprise (perhaps somewhat curiously separated from economic planning), and external relations. The first theme is treated very effectively: Chapter 6 is a wide-ranging account and shrewd assessment of the agencies involved in economic planning, their rivalries, and their achievements. Chapter 7 surveys the social, administrative, and political aspects of the development of educational policy in the Fifth Republic, with special reference to the Debré law of 1959 on Catholic schools and the Faure law of 1968 on the universities. Both in that survey and in his account of state enterprise Professor Hayward emphasises how the centralising tendencies of many Gaullists and officials have held their own against tendencies towards autonomy, pluralism and participation, and how the development of adequate long-term policies towards the nationalised industries has been bedevilled by short-term considerations. Chapter 8, on foreign policy, the former Empire and defence, is a bold effort to describe institutions, problems, attitudes and policies; it is a pity that these themes could not be given more space, for Professor Hayward's too succinct accounts and observations raise some important problems about the formulation and execution of policies and some tantalising questions about the development of attitudes. A brief chapter on President Pompidou's style of government

concludes a book that is a welcome addition to Professor Beloff's 'Modern Governments' series.

PETER CAMPBELL

The Social Economy of France. By Peter Coffey. *London: Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 133 pp. Index. £3·95.*

The Social Economy of West Germany. By Graham Hallett. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 150 pp. Index. £3·95.*

THESE two volumes are doubly fashionable; they each discuss their subject in the context of the European Community and each is an essay by an economist in political economy. They set out to answer a wide range of questions about German and French society by describing the economy of the country in the fullest sense. Thus Hallett includes one chapter on the communications media and one on the educational system of Germany, while Coffey has one on the social structures of France and another on 'the environment'. But the meat of the two volumes is their presentation of recent economic data and their analysis of how the economy in each country actually functions. In this respect Hallett succeeds quite well. His collection of relevant and up-to-date information would not be so easily found elsewhere, and it is clearly presented. The general comments are related to a foundation of hard facts for which the author must often have searched diligently and the book serves in some ways as a useful work of reference. Outside the sphere of applied economics the standpoint is much more personal. The long passage on university government is an attack on the many schools of opinion holding different views from his own and of which the author is so frightened. He is a knowledgeable admirer of the *Bundesrepublik* as it has developed and quite rightly wants to dislodge the complacent prejudices of his British readers about a country whose level of interest—economic, political, and social—has been consistently underestimated in his country. But those who become interested in its future will also be interested in why so many of its citizens want to change the *Bundesrepublik's* nature, and it is not much use turning to this book for an answer.

As for Coffey's inconsequential jumble of not so up-to-date information on France, there are many other books which serve the same purpose. Almost every one of them I know is cheaper and better-produced than this one, and they are all better written. As an object the book is a disgrace to the publisher and the price is no less disgraceful. The only readable and logical section is Appendix Two, which also appears, virtually word for word, but better expressed, as Chapter 1 of Hallett's book.

ALAN S. MILWARD

Parteiensystem und Aussenpolitik: Zur Bedeutung des Parteiensystems für den aussenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess in der BRD. By Reinhold Roth. Foreword by Heino Kaack. *Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain. 1973. 159 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Studien zum politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 1; Ed.: Heino Kaack.) DM. 22.00.*

FOR a complex of reasons political parties have had a more pervasive influence on foreign policy in the German Federal Republic than in most

West European states. Reinhold Roth's work is therefore to be welcomed as a very preliminary attempt to bring together the study of political parties and foreign policy. Unfortunately it attempts to do too much, with the result that it ends by becoming little more than an annotated bibliography of what one would need to read before embarking on a serious study of the relationship between party system and foreign policy. The work is 159 pages long, but of these only 85 are the text proper. These 85 pages have 432 footnotes often with multiple references. The result is that interesting ideas are constantly being thrown up only to disappear without adequate discussion three or four lines later.

This attempt to cover such a wide field has led to the prevalence of three sorts of error; errors of interpretation, errors of omission and errors of fact. The major errors of intepretation relate to the foreign policy programme of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 1950s. Two examples will suffice. It is seriously misleading to describe the policy of what Dr. Roth calls the bureaucratic wing of the SPD under Ollenhauer as neutralistic and pacifistic (p. 42). Again it is quite wrong to describe the reform process in the SPD as being contingent upon a change of personnel in 1957. In internal affairs it had begun in 1953, in foreign affairs in 1955.

Obviously in a book of such a short compass, there are many omissions. Dr. Roth can be forgiven for not analysing at any length the foreign policy split in the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) from 1963 to 1965, since there is no adequate analysis for him to draw on. His failure to mention the role of Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg is however almost inexplicable. Guttenberg decisively affected the interaction of foreign policy and the party system in the 1960s. First, by initiating coalition talks with the SPD in the autumn of 1962. Secondly, in playing a leading role in the Gaullist wing of the CDU/CSU from 1963 to 1965. Thirdly, and most importantly, in the Grand Coalition where as Parliamentary State Secretary in the Chancellor's Office he fulfilled a dual role acting as link man to the SPD through Wehner and as watchdog for the CSU. Another important omission is the failure to bring beyond 1969 the material on party support (pp. 39–40).

With regard to errors of fact, the most important relates to the period of the Grand Coalition. Dr. Roth assigns to 'the Kressbonner Kreis' (p. 71) a role in foreign policy making though, as Professor Carstens has pointed out, it never discussed foreign policy.

Despite its very serious limitations, this book might still fulfil a useful role because of the compendiousness of its bibliography and references. Teachers of German foreign policy will probably use it for that purpose while recommending their students to read Wolfram Hanrieder's excellent 'The Stable Crisis'.[1]

W. PATERSON

The Churches and Politics in Germany. By Frederic Spotts. *Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 1973. 419 pp. Maps. Index. $15.00.*

THIS book is an important and at the same time limited contribution. It is important in the first place because of the breadth of the field covered: the relationship between the West German Churches and political life from 1945

[1] New York: Harper & Row. 1970.

to 1968, with some partial updating to 1972. It is equally important because of the scope of the oral documentation. Indeed, if *lacunae* appear in the bibliography and it is not always fully utilised, the direct investigation by interview is unprecedentedly rich, to the point where the author has been able to divide up the very long list of personalities questioned among the different chapters.

The book is also important because of the light it throws on the events and processes occurring, sometimes overtly, but more often beneath the surface of the public relationship between the Churches and the parties, the Churches and the unions, and the Churches and the governments (at the *Länder* as well as the *Bund* level).

The book's limits stem from the limitations of the author, who is a diplomat by profession. The table of contents gives the impression that fundamental questions are dealt with: it includes chapters entitled 'The Political Ethic of German Protestantism', 'The Political Ethic of German Catholicism', 'The Legal Relationship between Church and State', 'Key issues of Church interest'. However, on closer scrutiny, the reader realises that he is constantly being led back to the narrative, and to the presentation of minor detail, before the essential problems have even been broached. The tone is set in the introductory chapter with its superficial description of the situation of the Churches when confronted with National Socialism. A few names and a few dates, even a few quotations, are no substitute for a synthetic presentation of the historical, ideological, and sociological motivations behind the behaviour of the hierarchies and the 'Christian people'.

Is it really legitimate—for the postwar period—to discard almost entirely the fundamental theological debates at the heart of the two creeds on the nature of politics and on the relationship between faith and politics? It is significant that the chapter on the Occupation does not even allude to the common nature of the problems of German and French Christians or to the contacts between them; there is no reference either to the Franco-German Protestant *Bruderrat* nor, above all, to the influence of Emmanuel Mounier (who is not even mentioned by name), notably on the *Frankfurter Hefte* group.

The failure to appreciate the transnational evolution of the Catholic Church impedes chronological categorisation; the German hierarchy, close to Rome and far from the French during the cold war period, then trying to conform to the progress shown by the Vatican Council, then suddenly in retreat in its relations with the Holy See (with the return to political interventionism in the 1972 elections); political and social theology, for long fairly conservative, and then quite suddenly in the *avant-garde*, especially by comparison with France, if not the Netherlands. This transnational evolution should equally have helped to illuminate the difficulty of defining the political field in which the Church ought to intervene: the emphasis placed on abortion in 1972 (as on divorce in Italy) gives a completely different orientation from the putting forward of social injustice by the French, the Dutch and even the Spanish episcopates.

It is incorrect to say, as Spotts does, that in the Federal Republic today there is a separation between the Churches and the State. He would have done better to study carefully the ways in which they overlap. As Axel von Campenhausen's outstanding study, *Staatskirchenrecht*,[1] had not yet

[1] Munich: Goldmann, 1973.

appeared, the author should have paid closer attention to Rudolf Smend's important work on the subject. In the same way, a deeper study of the specialists in political science and religious sociology would have allowed him to distinguish more clearly between the various levels of the CDU (electors, members, militants, local and national leaders), an indispensable distinction for an understanding of the relationship of the party with Catholicism.

Finally, we find ourselves faced with a book that is eminently useful for a factual knowledge of Germany and the German Churches since the war, but one that does not fully satisfy the expectations aroused by its ambitious title.

ALFRED GROSSER

The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy. By Gaines Post, Jr. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1973. 398 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·50. $16.00.*

THE basic problem which the author examines in this book is an extremely good and valid one, the relationship between the civilian and military authorities in the formulation and execution of Weimar foreign policy during the years 1924 to 1933. Not only is this an important subject in itself but, considered in the wider context of German history and foreign policy in the inter-war period, it helps to make important contrasts and distinctions as between the Weimar and Nazi periods. Since the author concentrates on German policy towards Poland, this contrast is heightened when one thinks of Hitler's policy in that direction from mid-1933 to the winter of 1938–39. For the axiom of Weimar foreign and military policy was unmitigated hostility towards Poland and the Poles, and the return of the Corridor and Danzig, by force if necessary, as and when international circumstances were judged to be ' favourable '. The author finds, therefore, that a great deal of co-operation existed between the German Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, the latter generally accepting the primacy of the former in the field of foreign policy. Yet while both agreed on the ' correct ' policy towards Poland, and both accepted that at some time in the future force would have to be used to further Germany's interests, the author makes the important point that ' neither the Army's operational studies nor its expansion program demonstrates the actual planning of an offensive war. They do indicate explicitly the Army's determination to ready itself for any future decision by the political arm to defend Germany or resort to war for national objectives ' (p. 233). What is clear from this study is that the national objectives in mind were essentially of a limited nature, but that, even if their forcible attainment resulted in armed conflict, there was all the difference in the world between this kind of thinking and that which so fatefully guided Hitler's foreign and military policies.

The book is based on a good selection of documentary and secondary sources, but—surprisingly—falls short of what one might have expected the author to have achieved. One answer would most certainly have been a reduction in length by at least a third. It is a pity also that instead of examining his subject by a more conventional chronological approach, the author first gives an account of how the German Foreign Office viewed Eastern or Western problems at a particular time and then examines the same period from the point of view of the military authorities. Inevitably, repetition creeps in and this somewhat disjointed approach tends to blur just the point the author is trying to make—the nature of the relationship

between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence in the making of Weimar foreign policy. The author has also been unfortunate in that so many authoritative studies of Weimar foreign policy have appeared in recent years, and inevitably these have made reference to the influence and role of the military authorities in the making of Weimar foreign policy. This is seen in the present study by the large number of footnote references to the works of other authors in the field. This would not have mattered so much had the author approached his subject somewhat differently, so that although he makes some good and useful points one has to be patient to ferret them out.

JOHN P. FOX

Italia, Italia. By Peter Nichols. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 346 pp. Maps endpapers. Index. £3·75.*

MR. NICHOLS calls his first chapter ' The Centaur ', symbolising the duality, the paradox, in Italian characteristics and situations. This theme of centaur-like duality recurs throughout the book in all sorts of different connections: not just the obvious (and ubiquitous) contrast between North and South but also in the expansion of industry without the necessary social change; the Italians' response to physical beauty, coupled with an apparent indifference to the destruction of beauty in landscape or ancient monuments; a Catholic party ' with ministries and patronage at its fingertips '; a Communist party representing itself as the party of law and order . . . .

This duality has been emphasised by the pace of technological change, which has hit Italy, with its ancient civilisation yet young nationhood, especially forcibly. The quick-witted Italian admires and emulates modern innovations, but resents their implications when he finds they impinge on the spheres where he is essentially conservative—and in which his main strength lies—such as, in particular, the family and the place of origin. This has given him a sense of beleaguerment, of being torn out of his familiar—if fault-ridden—pattern of life and driven towards some unrecognisable goal. So there have been violent reactions—from students in revolt, trade unionists on strike, extremist groups attacking the Establishment and each other, even from Catholics who see the divorce law as a threat to the family stronghold.

The prime mover in Italian social change has been, as Mr. Nichols says, industry, ' for better or for worse ': until its decline in the 1970s Italy's industrial expansion was the fastest in Europe. But while the industrialists are giving the country a modern economy, ' they cannot be asked to provide the palliatives for social change . . . and carry out what the politicians do no more than promise ' (p. 174). And the politicians' promises, over the well-nigh thirty years of predominantly Christian Democrat rule, have failed to keep pace with the needs for drastic reform in education, health, housing, and all the ramifications of administration of justice. Mr. Nichols devotes only two chapters (out of fourteen) directly to politics, and this in itself reveals the irrelevance of governments to the people themselves. Rome, as he says, is an impossible city from which to govern, more especially for a Christian Democrat prime minister who cannot but be constantly aware of the presence of that other city, the Vatican, across the Tiber. And the hopes placed in the decentralising effects of regional government, introduced only in 1971 after long delays, have so far been disappointed. Mr. Nichols, in a chapter examining each of the twenty individual regions, shows how the impact of regional government has

varied, from the most successful northern region of Lombardy to the southern areas of Calabria and Abruzzo, where it has brought discord and revolt.

Mr. Nichols's book is not a chronological account of events in postwar Italy but rather a series of vignettes of significant aspects of the Italian scene; he conveys, however, a great deal of factual information by way of illustrating his points. This he does dispassionately, acutely aware of the shortcomings but striving to account for them by reasons of history and environment. In his sixteen years as correspondent of *The Times* in Rome, he has reached a deep understanding of this complex country and its inhabitants which at times almost verges on acceptance of their own fatalistic attitude—he will surprise some indiscriminate ' lovers of Italy ' by putting relentlessness and realism among the Italians' outstanding characteristics. Readers of *The Times* over the years have had cause to be grateful for Mr. Nichols's lucid reports; they now have an additional cause for gratitude in this penetrating and thought-provoking study.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Politics and society in post-war Naples. By P. A. Allum. *Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 410 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £11·00. $32.50.*

THE cholera epidemic of last autumn in Naples gave a sharp reminder to the outside world that this is still a problem city, as it has been ever since Italy's unification. The immediate cause of the epidemic was polluted mussels; but the background lay in inadequate sewage and a polluted sea-coast. The Christian Democrat Mayor resigned—and was re-elected; but some members of his party, alarmed at the city's reputation for corruption and maladministration, embarked on efforts to get rid of local party bosses.

It is an old story. Naples, once the capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies under the Bourbons, like the rest of the South when Italy was united had the northern parliamentary system imposed on it with no previous preparation. The effect was to produce a duality which has persisted ever since.

Dr. Allum, who is Lecturer in Politics at Reading University, in this study takes the Naples-Caserta constituency as a microcosm of the South. Adopting the terminology of F. Tönnies's book *Community and Society* (*Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft*),[1] he describes its transition from a *Gesellschaft*, a social formation based on individual, personal, interests and relationships, to a *Gemeinschaft*, a civil society with an organisation evolving out of production and commerce. The *Gesellschaft* characteristics are seen in patronage and *clientelismo*, exercised in immediate postwar politics by the surviving *notabili* and later by the party boss—here the outstanding examples are the shipowner Monarchist leader Achille Lauro and the clan of the Christian Democrat Senator Silvio Gava (these two get a chapter to themselves). *Gemeinschaft* standards intrude with the efforts to form local confederations of the organised national political parties, basically an alien conception; and, on the economic side, with the advent of a few giant state-controlled industrial concerns, in sharp contrast to the myriad small handicraft trades and shops, with relatively little medium-sized industry in between.

[1] New York: Harper Torchbook. 1963.

Nor was there, until recent times, much of a middle class. Politicians came from the intelligentsia, deriving their votes from their personal following—background life-histories of 33 selected deputies (Appendix B) suggest that this remains largely true today, and Dr. Allum says it would be rare for a manual worker to be elected even as a representative of the Communist Party. That party has, however, steadily increased its vote in all general elections, accounting by 1968 for ten of the constituency's 38 seats, whereas by that time Monarchist supporters, who in the South had figured so largely in the 1946 referendum, were virtually on the way out.

Dr. Allum provides a wealth of detailed analysis about the social, occupational and regional backgrounds of voters and candidates. In addition to his own personal knowledge of Naples and his numerous interviews there, he has drawn his material from official publications, survey material, and census data. There is a useful and extensive bibliography. Only the ardent psephologist will follow him through all the minutiae of his researches; but this scholarly study will also have a much wider interest for the student of politics. Dr. Allum rather disarmingly remarks in his introduction (p. 3) that 'it is superfluous for the writer to declare his political sympathies; they are blatant on every page', (in fact he begins with a quotation from Mao Tse-tung and ends with one from Karl Marx). Thus forewarned, the reader may well find the book unexpectedly dispassionate.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Government in Spain: The Executive at Work. By Kenneth N. Medhurst. *Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Braunschweig: Pergamon Press. 1973. 256 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Commonwealth and International Library. 'Governments of Western Europe.' Gen. Ed.: Nevil Johnson.) £2·85.*

Spain under Franco. A History. By Max Gallo. Translated by Jean Stewart. *London: Allen & Unwin. 1973. 390 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War. By Gabriel Jackson. *London: Thames and Hudson. 1974. 192 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £2·95.*

STUDENTS of politics tend to assume that the states of contemporary Western Europe are but variants of a common strain. It is high time to discard any such comforting thought. The stark truth is that the time-scale of the Iberian political process is something quite different, *sui generis.* Here is, as Kenneth Medhurst says, 'a society which in the main does not share or understand bourgeois liberal values'. Franco's pragmatic rule—a superb balancing feat indeed—can only be understood and appreciated when set against the background of the Spanish state's volcanic history going back a long way beyond the civil war of the 1930s. Throughout the major part of the 19th century, and again after the accession of Alfonso XIII, the story is one of a perpetually crumbling political facade, with the army rampant, or couchant, in the wings as the embodiment and arbiter of the 'general will': that same military class which, behind the mask, still rules the roost today. So Kenneth Medhurst does well to devote two sections of his invaluable study to this backcloth.

What are the main features of the governmental structure? First of

all, Franco is in a very real sense both head of the government and head of the state. Second, the powers of the executive are untrammelled: the Cortes, with its *procuradores*, set up in July 1942, is no legislature properly speaking. And in any case such wartime observance of democratic shibboleth has been effectually scotched by subsequent edicts: the 1946 Act consolidating the decree-laws system; various ordinances on the principles of 'the Movement'; the Organic Law of 1966; and the Law of Succession of 1969. Both Max Gallo and Kenneth Medhurst make the point that the Generalissimo's proclaimed intention is to 'install', not to 'restore', the Monarchy: and both imply that the Monarchy card is one that is never likely to be played.

On the wave of economic development the 'technocrats' (not all of them belonging to *Opus Dei*) have been carried to the top, and the links between political figures and civil service elements continually strengthened. But policy remains the prerogative of Franco and his immediate associates. The author describes with remarkable lucidity the workings of the governmental machine and the structure and functioning of the civil service, and he shows how the state has been adroitly geared to the incidence of economic and social change. In a final chapter he analyses the—largely ineffectual—constitutional controls. Commendable welfare promotion there has been over these thirty years, and undeniable economic progress. But the privileged position of the all-powerful Church and the land-owning aristocracy, with its banking connections, has scarcely been affected. And above all, Spain remains the supreme example—unique in Western Europe—of a stratocracy.

For the interplay of political forces we must go to Max Gallo's 'History'. This translation of a French study published in 1969 (and a very good translation, incidentally) recounts in considerable detail the events of the thirty years since the Civil War, in terms of Franco's persistent mastery of all the conflicting currents: a story with which English-speaking historians like Stanley Payne, Brian Crozier and George Hills have made us familiar. The author's documentation is formidable. Thus Franco's preternatural tacking skill during and after the Second World War gets the full treatment—now that the diplomatic archives have disgorged all the relevant material. This occupies over half the 368-page volume. The rest covers, in particular, the Stabilisation and *Desarrollo* Plans of 1961–63, the flurries of opposition and the current characteristic compound of 'liberalisation' and repression—but always within the framework of the regime. Max Gallo, rightly I think, sets great store by the 'special relationship' between Franco Spain and the United States (to their mutual advantage) developed by the Pact of Madrid of 1953 and succeeding defence agreements. The only criticism I would make of his book is that it gives undue importance to the activities of Franco's old Republican adversaries, inside and outside Spain. They are just not relevant; Franco Spain is another world.

Gabriel Jackson's *Concise History* is a splendid re-creation of the glory that *was* Spain—to the generation before us—with 156 nostalgia-inducing illustrations. In his original admirable monograph on *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931–1939*, published in 1965,[1] the author, a professor in the University of California at San Diego, was chiefly concerned with the collapse of a hopeful political experiment, made possible by the fifty

[1] Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

years or so of constitutional monarchy preceding it. Here he is dealing more specifically with the elements of revolution and counter-revolution in the maelstrom of the period, the international ramifications of Spain's war and the significance of developments within the wartime Nationalist government as pointers to the future. W. HORSFALL CARTER

Five Roads to Nordic Security. Edited by Johan Jørgen Holst. *Oslo, Bergen, Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. 1973. 240 pp. Bibliog. (Orig. published as Vol. 3, No. 4 of Cooperation and Conflict, the Nordic Journal of International Politics, 1972.)*

THIS symposium, No. 9 of the series of Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies—in English—published by the Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut, was originally issued in 1972 as a special number of *Cooperation and Conflict*, the Nordic Journal of International Politics. The editor, who is one of the two leading academic strategists Norway has produced in recent years (the other being Professor Nils Ørvik), also contributes a preface and the section on Norway's security policy. The other sections are by Nikolaj Petersen (Denmark), Aimo Pajunen (Finland), Björn Bjarnason (Iceland) and Nils Andrén (Sweden). A third of the book consists of documentation, some of which is useful as it is not readily or compendiously available elsewhere, although a certain amount goes rather beyond security matters in the strict sense.

Mr. Holst's own essay not only is the fullest but also goes deeper than the rest. Among other things, it gives due weight to the problems posed for Norway by Soviet naval activity: it touches on the question of the continental shelf and North Sea oil, as well as on Spitzbergen; and it concludes with the author's own ideas on current arms control possibilities as affecting Norway and the Nordic countries. The remaining essays are less discursive, and they do not face up quite so robustly to the strategic challenges with which each country, and the area in general, is confronted. In fact, with perhaps the exception of the Icelandic one which has a rather refreshing directness, they tend to be more descriptive than critical; while that on Denmark is also subject to the comment that further uncertainty has been introduced into the country's defence posture by subsequent domestic developments.

A point of incidental interest is that more than one of the contributors manifest unease about the term 'Finlandisation'—without however adducing arguments to invalidate a concept that has at least the merit of corresponding precisely to the situation it purports to represent. Nor does it impugn recognition that the Finns' postwar plight left them no other choice than a policy of compliance towards their powerful neighbour, if they were not to go the way of Eastern Europe (whereas, by contrast, it was their wartime resistance that saved them from the fate of the Baltic States). MICHAEL F. CULLIS

Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change. By M. Donald Hancock, *Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press. 1973. (Dist. in U.K. by Holt-Blond Ltd.) 298 pp. Index. Bibliog. (Modern Comparative Politics Series; Ed.; Peter H. Merkl.) £2·00.*

Sweden: the myth of socialism. By Larry Hufford. *London Fabian Society. 1973. 36 pp. (Young Fabian Pamphlet 33.) £0·40.*

THESE two authors provide sharply contrasting views on the health c Swedish politics. Mr. Hufford offers much useful, if indigestible, histor) Intense industrial conflict at the turn of the century failed to lay th foundations for a true socialist party as revisionism had already triumphed Since the Social Democrats were in power throughout the 1930s, thei work with business against the Depression gained them a permanent labou vote. The inheritance is inescapable. Although Mr. Hufford makes n comparisons, it is rather as if Herbert Morrison were the leader of th British Parliamentary Labour Party today.

The ploy of the Social Democrats in the later 1960s to promot socialism by interventionist industrial policies was bound to fail in vie of the complex structure linking government and business in Sweden ove the last forty years. An attempt by the government to diminish incom inequalities in 1970 was defeated by the strike action of a well-placed interes group.

The trouble is that all this needs more detailed argument than Mı Hufford has provided. It may well be that forty years of the Social Demc crats have left almost untouched the concentration of private wealth. 1 does not necessarily follow that the elite remains in full 'control' of th economic system (p. 35).

Mr. Hancock's account is much more substantial. But jargon makes i hard to read. 'Until economic and social modernisation yielded spatia mobility and new forms of group consciousness, little basis existed for join political action . . .' is a fair sample of the way simple ideas may b dressed up. But it contains an impressive amount of material and sensible stress on the geographic and historical constraints on Swedis politics. The party system, the machinery and methods of governmen even foreign policy, all receive extensive treatment, but the main interes is in the sociological background. Participation, attitudes and the natur of elites are the material Mr. Hancock uses to defend his choice of titl for this book.

He hedges his bets as to how the system may change. But up to now, a least, it has done pretty well: 'confronted with the increased competitivenes of a partially consolidated nonsocialist bloc and the New Left ideologica critique of their government policies, the Social Democrats modified thei own attitudes toward system change by undertaking new socio-economi policy initiatives' (p. 144). But on whether the trends in Swedish societ are so different from elsewhere as to justify the term 'postindustrial', Mı Hufford may be nearer the mark.

ROGER SCEATS

U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE

Gierek's Poland. Edited by Adam Bromke and John W. Strong *New York, Washington, London: Praeger in co-operation wit Canadian Slavonic Papers. 1973. (Distrib. in U.K. by Pall Ma Press.) 219 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics an Government.) £6·25.*

GIEREK'S POLAND breaks new ground among the volumes of East Euro pean studies produced by Praeger in recent years, for this collection c

essays was prepared by both Poles and outside observers of the Polish scene. Polish academics, journalists and politicians have joined with university colleagues in the West (most are of Polish origin) to examine how Poland has changed in the years since Edward Gierek replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. The result is proof enough that the political climate in Poland has mellowed in the aftermath of the 1970 December riots which toppled the old guard.

The question that obviously arises in a work of this kind is whether the Western scholars' impression of the extent and nature of change under Gierek differs widely from that of the Poles. In fact there emerges a remarkable similarity in approach and interpretation. All authors give brief accounts of the Gomulka era and the tragic events that resulted from his inability to adapt and innovate. This provides ample opportunity for criticism, and here the Poles are more vehement than their Western colleagues. However, when they turn to an appraisal of the policies Gierek has introduced since December 1970 they are not overtly fulsome in their praise. One or two, it is true, do indulge in the familiar rhetoric. Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor of *Polityka,* is one of these—' the new style of the party's work was immediately and positively noted by the entire nation ' (p. 33).

Yet for the most part there is no heady talk of the new dawn of socialism and no attempt to ignore the difficulties that must be overcome. The Western writers express themselves more sceptically than the Poles when they write of the changes Gierek has implemented (remembering no doubt that the Gomulka regime was also full of promise when it began), but the essays by most Polish contributors demonstrate clearly their recognition that Gierek has an acute sense of survival, and thus far has tailored his policies accordingly. Poles and Westerners alike emphasise that only the first tentative steps have been taken in propelling Poland along the path to freedom and prosperity. Witold Lipski, a Sejm deputy, comments on Gierek's agricultural reforms: ' In spite of all the achievements . . . Polish agriculture remains poorly developed and in some respects even backward. The facts tell us the brutal truth ' (p. 106).

There is not enough space to mention each of the eighteen essays, but Zbigniew Pelczynski's analysis of Gomulka's fall stands out, as do Zbigniew Fallenbuch's examination of Gierek's economic strategy and Witold Trzeciakowski's review of Polish foreign trade. Together, the essays provide a comprehensive glimpse of modern Poland, ranging as they do from administrative reform to contemporary theatre and the role of the intellectuals. This is a readable and varied book; a welcome interim study of Gierek's Poland.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria. By Nissan Oren. Foreword by Jan F. Triska. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. 204 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Integration and Community Building in Eastern Europe. Series Ed.: Jan F. Triska.) £3·85. $8.50. Paperback: £1·80.*

Bulgarian Economic Development Since World War II. By Bogoslav Dobrin. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 185 pp. Tables. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

THE five centuries of Turkish rule, coupled with the spiritual domination of

the Greek Phanar, almost effaced the Bulgarian nation. It was saved from extinction by Tsarist Russia which, in pursuance of its designs on Constantinople and the Turkish Straits, presented itself in the Balkans in the guise of a liberator. In March 1878, at San Stefano, Russia compelled Turkey to recognise the independence of a 'Great Bulgaria' which included the whole of Macedonia; but four months later, in Berlin, under pressure of the 'Concert of Europe', the new state was considerably reduced territorially. The rulers of Bulgaria nevertheless became so hypnotised by the apparition of the San Stefano map that they fought as Germany's ally in the First World War and collaborated with it in the Second World War in order to recover Macedonia. The result was that in 1944 Bulgaria was 'liberated' once more by Russia—now a communist power—but Macedonia became one of the component republics of the Yugoslav federation.

In his lucid and well-documented study, Professor Nissan Oren presents in two chapters the eventful history of Bulgaria between the two world wars and in the following five chapters he analyses the methods of administering the Bulgarian revolution brought in by the Red Army. Born in Bulgaria, now a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mr. Oren published in 1971 a valuable book on *Bulgarian Communism*.[1] In his present book he remarks significantly that 'Communist rule in Bulgaria has endured for almost one-third of Bulgaria's modern history of independence', and concludes that 'the maxims of Russia's righteousness and of Soviet superiority in all spheres of endeavour have, since 1944, taken official precedence over all national values'. The new Bulgarian army, standing in striking disproportion to the country's economic capacity, serves Soviet strategy in the Balkans. In his seventh chapter Mr. Oren emphasises that the Macedonian problem is not forgotten in Sofia. The Bulgarian Communist Party's leaders deny the existence of a Macedonian nationality or language. For them, as it was for royal Bulgaria under Ferdinand and Boris III, Macedonia is a geographical area but its inhabitants are Bulgars.

Mr. Dobrin is presented by the publishers as a man who was educated 'in Europe', undertook postgraduate work in the United States and travelled extensively in Eastern Europe. His book is a useful study of the transformation of a purely agrarian country into an industrial one. In his view some great errors were committed by Bulgarian planners but growth rates are still very high, and Bulgaria is relatively far better off than the other Comecon countries. Although packed with statistics, Mr. Dobrin's book does not inform us how large the Soviet loans to Bulgaria were. The author assumes, however, that they were 'large enough to mean that the deferred price of industrialisation will have to be paid by several succeeding generations'.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

The Ottoman Empire and its Successors. By Peter Mansfield. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1973. 210 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (The Making of the Twentieth Century. Series Ed.: Christopher Thorne.) £3·50. Papermac: £1·75.*

THIS book performs satisfactorily the function of providing a brief survey

[1] New York: Columbia University Press for Columbia University and its Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

of the main events and trends in the 20th-century history of the Arab Middle East (with a few glances at Turkey and Persia), concentrating heavily on the development of nationalisms in the various regions and written from a point of view strongly sympathetic to their aspirations, although not uncritical of their tactics. Perhaps his theme is orchestrated somewhat too loudly, and the tone in which it is enunciated is sometimes too apologetic, for the balance of the book as a whole. Mr. Mansfield sets his essay against the background of the Christian West's 'prolonged political and military struggle with the Islamic world' and treats its subject matter as the latest chapter in that struggle, although, as he admits, throughout the 19th century and, indeed, up to 1914, important elements in the West were anxiously seeking ways of shoring up the greatest of the Islamic powers. Broadly speaking, the most rewarding parts of the essay are the more recent ones, in which the author's detailed and unusual knowledge of the modern Arab world and its politics are of immediate use to him. The introductory chapters are marred by too many irritating slips—for example, the dates of the Crimean War were not 1853–54; the Treaty of San Stefano was not set aside by the Cyprus Convention of 1878; not Greece but Italy occupied the Dodecanese before the First World War; OETA East in 1918–19 was not French. To say that 'Because the people of the Arab heartland—Arabia, Syria and Iraq—were under Turkish, and not western Christian, rule it was against the Turks that the Arab national rebellion was ultimately directed' seems, even in a preliminary paragraph, to suggest a very misleading idea of why the Sharif's revolt broke out when and where it did. Still, the book as a whole will provide a useful introduction to the contemporary Arab scene. But why appropriate from an already well-known work, recently republished, a title that only imperfectly fits the scope and character of this one?

J. S. F. PARKER

The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. By William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1973. 234 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (A Rand Corporation Research Study.) £3·30. $6.95. Paperback: £1·40.*

Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs. By John K. Cooley. *London: Frank Cass. 1973. 263 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £3·50.*

It is often assumed that the political aspirations and national demands of the principal parties engaged in the Middle East crisis, summarised as peace for Israel and justice for the Arabs, are so irreconcilable that the realisation of one would necessarily mean the abdication of the other. By its very nature, therefore, the Arab-Israeli dispute would have to be regarded as insoluble as it becomes self-perpetuating. However, the two books under review, written from similar but not identical perspectives, seem to indicate that there has been some change in the entrenched traditional attitude of the conflicting parties towards each other. Quandt concludes that the Palestine Arabs are willing to acknowledge the presence of the Jewish *community* (*not the Jewish state*) and talk about its political accommodation; while Cooley asserts that an increasing number of Israelis has come to recognise the existence of a nation in the Palestine Arabs, and are prepared to help in its rehabilitation. Neither the authors nor the parties

concerned, however, have expressed what this reciprocal recognition would amount to in more concrete terms. It is inconceivable that the Israelis would agree to the disestablishment of their state, and the creation of an independent state of Arab Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan would not meet the wishes of the radical leaders of the Palestine national movement which is the theme of the two books.

In both books the origins and evolution of the Palestine national movement and its subsequent emergence as a guerrilla force are traced, with an account of the politics that led to its factionalisation, and the ideological orientation of the various groups that make it up. Cooley is sympathetic to the cause of the Palestine Arabs and enthusiastic about their pursuit of it. He sees it as a genuine revolutionary movement emulating the Algerians in their struggle for national identity. Quandt and his co-authors, Fuad Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch, take Palestinian nationalism as a variant of Arab nationalism. Quandt and Jabber provide a competent study of the movement in recent years, dealing with its impact on Arab politics, the civil war in Jordan in 1970 and the threat of it to the Lebanon, as well as the change it brought about in popular attitudes. Lesch has written an interesting but controversial essay on the mandatory period in which the underlying assumption is that the Arabs had not only the right but the obligation to resist British policy in Palestine irrespective of the consequences which were in most cases detrimental to their cause.

ABBAS KELIDAR

AFRICA

Africa Emergent: Africa's problems since independence. By John Hatch. *London: Secker & Warburg. 1974. 233 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

JOHN HATCH has written a 'What's gone wrong in Africa' book. Drawing upon his wide experience of the continent, he contrasts the high hopes which were held at the time of independence with the problems and failures which have been experienced since. He rightly argues that the high hopes themselves helped to create some of the problems for the new governments labouring under 'the burden of expectation' (p. 5). In explaining, or perhaps more accurately seeking where to lay the blame for the difficulties and failures, Mr. Hatch uses a shot gun technique, with the pellets scoring hits over a wide target area—colonialism, the nation-state, the black elite, the military, multinational companies and so on. This approach has the advantage of demonstrating that the problems facing African states are complex and multi-faceted. There is, as Mr. Hatch rightly suggests, no easy message to be preached to the rulers of these states, no single set of problems which, once resolved, will leave an easy path ahead. But while recognising the complexity of Mr. Hatch's subject matter, his approach has its deficiencies. There is no analytical framework pulling his study together. There are far too many unsupported judgments, and several contradictions. For example, he blames the colonial powers for creating 'communal separation' (p. 32), but a few pages later recognises that Africans have largely organised themselves, and still do, in 'tribes' or 'ethnic groups'—'global societies of comparatively small size' (p. 35).

Although Mr. Hatch gives praise to some African leaders, notably Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, the book has an air of gloom and

foreboding. He even argues that civilisation itself 'is finally collapsing' (p. 197).

JAMES BARBER

Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence. By Kenneth W. Grundy. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press for the Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver. 1974. 360 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Perspectives on Southern Africa; No. 10.) £5·95. $12.50.*

THIS is the first major, published work on international affairs in southern Africa which attempts to apply explicitly to its subject the concepts and methods of regional subsystems analysis as they have developed out of the formal study of international relations in America. In it Professor Grundy demonstrates the usefulness of these concepts for organising material, and discussion itself, provided that they are employed sufficiently loosely and commonsensically, and the subsystem is not reified. Indeed, when construed rigorously—I do *not* mean rigidly—they yield perverse results, as Professor Grundy's discussion of the concept of 'borders' and his appendix on 'the analysis of regional subsystems' show. The main weaknesses of these theoretical concepts, as Professor Grundy appreciates fully, is that they are of a narrow specialist interest (that is why he relegates explicit discussion of them to the end of his book); and difficult as they probably will be for the general reader to follow, they will hardly repay the effort. They provide analytical techniques which are founded neither on a clear methodology (not in the sense of technique) nor in a coherent theory. That is why one wishes Professor Grundy could have been more critical than he is. He would have discovered that the 'regional approach' as such adds little to his own less formal observations as a well-informed, judicious, and intelligent observer. He might also have felt the need to look for theories that *do* add to the achievements of commensense. In fairness, Professor Grundy does consider that some aspects of a Leninist theory of imperialism might be applicable to South Africa's relations with some of the countries of 'southern Africa' (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia), yet he gives much less than adequate consideration of *exploitation* in the specific, Marxist sense which is, of course, central to Lenin's thesis; nor does he consider any of the theories of South African imperialism that have been put forward by various writers. Indeed, my main criticism of the book is in this area, and it is twofold. First, the historical situation of southern Africa, as it has emerged from one set of imperial and colonial external and intra-regional relationships, does *not* receive the treatment it deserves. And secondly, Professor Grundy sees the 'ideological confrontation' in Southern Africa purely in terms of racial beliefs, totally ignoring the divergent choices of social development (and the determinant social relationships within these countries) which define policy options on a matter which was never one of 'deracialisation' only but always involved national and social revolution also. Indeed, although South Africa's own domestic conflicts are carefully, though—understandably—very briefly, considered, the domestic origins of regional behaviour in the other states are virtually disregarded.

Yet this *is* a very competent, clearly argued, and eminently convincing work. If its sources are all familiar and its facts only rarely new, that is the price of contemporaneity which is fully justified by the pressing nature of the problems—both intellectual and civil—which will not await the publication of private and archival documents. It is hard not to agree with him that the 'regional sub-system' of Southern Africa, characterised as it is by white domination, seems, from a scientific as well as a moral point of view, to have outlived its day:

> Although black Africa should not fall victim to the naïve optimism of the past, the southern African sub-system seems to be, for many reasons, a fundamentally unstable one, despite its amazing staying power. In the long run, its core is predicated on what has historically proven [sic] to be an insecure as well as a morally objectionable foundation (p. 301).

Of course, he has taken sides. But, then, has not everyone?

SAM C. NOLUTSHUNGU

Banda. By Philip Short. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1974. 357 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

MR. SHORT has gathered from many sources, for which he gives detailed references, the material for this excellent biography of the man who has revived in modern form and in a slightly different area the Chewa kingdom of Malawi, which flourished about 300 years ago, partly through trade with the Portuguese.

Dr. Banda has been a man of remarkable perseverance. Mr. Short tells of his ten years in Rhodesia and South Africa and twelve in America, where he did odd jobs, saved money, attended church and studied a wide variety of subjects. He experienced colour prejudice, saw urban vice in Johannesburg and Chicago and a lynching in Tennessee. He also saw the weaknesses of people of his own colour and received help and sympathy from some white people.

Since not all his qualifications were internationally recognised, in 1938 he went to Edinburgh to qualify as a doctor. Britain also treated him not unkindly and in due course he established a flourishing practice in the London suburb of Harlesden, where he met people like Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Padmore and members of the Africa Bureau, and established contact with Malawi politics.

In 1953 a divorce case drove him from Harlesden to Ghana, but this was not the Utopia he sought. He quarrelled with Nkrumah and when in 1958 the Malawi Congress Party, divided and in disarray, invited him back home, he made his own conditions. If Chiume and Chipembere thought they could control him, they mistook their man. He had more fixity of purpose than they gave him credit for.

Since he has been the virtual dictator of Malawi, he has followed his own line; for him Independence has not meant holding anyone else's stirrup. He has been called a maverick, not inaptly, because nobody has ever quite succeeded in branding him. He has said he would have no objection to an alliance with the Devil if it were in the interests of the people of Malawi, and as an autocrat in a small, poor, country he has done more for the ordinary villager than many of his neighbours.

Mr. Short gives many examples of Dr. Banda's repetitive and often turgid oratory and of his impulsiveness. If the author generally refrains from com-

ment or passing judgment, this is understandable in view of his personal experiences, but he has set out the evidence very fully and clearly.

JAMES MURRAY

Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria. Edited by Ukandi G. Damachi and Hans Dieter Seibel. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1973. (Distr. in UK by Pall Mall Press.) 252 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £7·75.*

NONE of the fourteen essays in this volume, with the possible exception of the second by Bascom, should have passed the publisher's reference. The papers by Seibel (nos. 1 and 4) suffer from not being clear about the hypotheses being tested, and one has the feeling that it would not be particularly enlightening to find out. Koll's paper is without serious content, which puzzles me, for he has done first-class work on Nigeria. The two papers by Damachi contribute nothing original and one looks in vain for insights. Melson's paper is an improvement, but only by comparison with the others. His discussion of trade union politics has no analysis beyond the level of personalities, and looks superficial indeed compared to the work of, say, Robin Cohen. The three papers on education do little to relate the educational system to the structure of society, particularly to access to privilege. In the last section White's paper could be made publishable with more thought and work, but the last two essays have few redeeming characteristics.

JOHN WEEKS

ASIA

Asia and the International System. Edited by Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd. *Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop. 1972. 383 pp. Index. £3·75. Paperback: £2·80.*

ON the world map Asia looms like a vast and much battered parallelogram whose two straightest sides are roughly 8½ and 4½ thousand miles long. This book seeks, so its editors tell us, to portray the foreign policies of the Asian states and the super-powers in Asia, in both their domestic and global context. Their Asia excludes South-west Asia (sometimes known as the Middle East), Mongolia and Afghanistan. It is thus basically Southern and Eastern Asia plus China and the Soviet Union with one chapter on the United States and Asia.

Besides themselves, the editors have conscripted a team of nine contributors and divided their book into four parts: (1) the foreign policies of the larger Asian states—one chapter each on China, Japan, India, Pakistan and Indonesia; (2) the foreign policies of the smaller Asian states—four chapters grouping two or three neighbouring small states together; (3) super-power interaction in Asia—one chapter on the United States and another on the Soviet Union; and (4) functional dimensions of Asia's international interaction—one chapter entitled 'Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia' and another called 'The Asian State System in the 1970s'.

In Part 1 there is an excellent chapter on India and very competent ones on Japan and Indonesia. The chapters on China and Pakistan have been

rapidly overtaken by events (the Nixon visit to Peking, the birth of Bangladesh and so on) and already look rather odd, especially the one on China. In Part 2 each of the essayists wrestles expertly with the task of elucidating the idiosyncrasies of groups of little countries in ways which make their relations with the wider Asian and world canvases intelligible. In Part 3 a rather breathless chapter on American policies in Asia is matched with a much more balanced and composed assessment of Soviet policy in Asia. Finally, in Part 4, there is a deft and wide-ranging analysis of the many factors that have to be accounted for in any overall assessment of balance of power in Asia and a workmanlike profile of what the Asian state system is like today.

The editors warn the intending reader in their introduction that 'if the authors and the book appear to be inconclusive, it is because the political process, both domestic and foreign, is without conclusion' (p. x). Amen to that; but nevertheless this is a worthwhile book deserving a few years of sales and use despite its unevenness of quality and style. Some of its chapters should be much appreciated in undergraduate courses and at staff colleges.

PETER LYON

India's Second Liberation. By Pran Chopra. *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas. 1973. 270 pp. Map. Index.*

The Emergence of Bangladesh: Problems and Opportunities for a Redefined American Policy in South Asia. By Wayne Wilcox. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1973. 79 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study, 7.) $3.00.*

The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict, 1971. By K. P. Misra. *Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Kanpur, London: Vikas 1973. 197 pp. Index.*

MR. CHOPRA is a veteran newspaperman and traveller, and his book is a striking exercise in both political analysis of the causes leading to the conflict of 1971, and military analysis of the causes of Pakistan's defeat. Like Neville Maxwell in his book on the Sino-Indian conflict, he draws heavily on unnamed sources: on confidential information and comment from India's political and military planners, which the reader cannot strictly evaluate, but which seem on the whole to ring true. He writes well and incisively, and he brings independent judgment to bear on his material. He is critical of Indian unreadiness in the earlier stages of the crisis, because of faulty intelligence; and in Part IV, which is an absorbing narrative of the fighting aided by detailed war-maps, he does not belittle Pakistani tactics or successes on the western fronts. A very full account is given of India's preparations for intervention, which appear to have been remarkably thorough and well co-ordinated, on the part of the navy and the air force as well as the army. On the enemy side, the three services combined far less well; factions and feuds were at work among them (p. 185), while the Pakistani soldier fighting in East Bengal was demoralised before the real test came: 'the unprecedented rapacity in which he indulged for many months had made him a mindless brute' (p. 189). One point made clear is that the Mukti Bahini was far from being a mere paper tiger. The Indian army's respect for the guerrilla fighters, low at first, rose steadily as their campaign developed, and when the time came for the Indian troops to march in they provided invaluable help.

On the international stage Russia is shown to have been strongly averse to action by India, though in the end it was the umbrella of the Indo-Soviet treaty that enabled India to act without too much fear of Chinese meddling. As to America, Mr. Chopra recalls how ardent a supporter Nixon had been, as vice-president, of the policy of building up Pakistan's armed strength. In 1971 he and his factotum Kissinger seemed bent on going to all lengths to prevent Pakistan from falling apart. When they moved a task force of the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, India showed cool nerve in disregarding the clumsy threat. Mr. Chopra might have offered some comment on the fact he notices briefly on p. 125—that India too, if on a much smaller scale than Pakistan, was waging armed action against separatists; or on the unwillingness, which he recognises among India's motives for entering East Bengal, to see left-wing tendencies grow too strong there and infect West Bengal (pp. 77, 105). In Pakistan today a small powerless left wing is making the most of this explanation of the war. However, Mr. Chopra's concluding reflections are not at all complacent; he warns of fresh trials to come, and urges the best possible relations with Pakistan. It might be added that if India's leaders could bring to bear on its internal problems the same skill and resolution as they displayed in 1971, the future would be better assured.

Professor Wilcox provides another judicious commentary, from the starting-point of the need for a 'fundamental redefinition' of American policy in South Asia (p. 1). His study throws into relief America's divided counsels during the 1971 crisis, with various responsible quarters pressing for a loosening of ties with Pakistan, and with a by no means negligible revulsion of public feeling against the massacres carried on in East Bengal with the help of American—and Chinese—weapons. Nixon and Kissinger, in defiance of all such protest, were pursuing a devious strategy of their own; typical of it was Kissinger's visit to Yahya Khan at Islamabad and his secret flight from there to Peking (p. 33). Professor Wilcox's recommendations for the future are sensible: America should avoid political and military entanglements in South Asia, where it can gain nothing from them, while it should continue economic aid, but partly on new and more helpful lines.

India was forced to act because the world community would not or could not act. Professor Misra's study shows that the United Nations' responses to the crisis were well described as 'an exercise in futility'. U Thant's very passive conception of his duties as general secretary held him back from giving any lead, and Pakistan had friends pledged to back it through thick and thin. Thus the book's theme is a negative one; but its painstaking coverage of the successive resolutions and debates, with the texts of documents and lists of countries participating in debates or voting in divisions, makes it a useful work of reference.

V. G. KIERNAN

A Beacon Across Asia: A Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose. Edited by Sisir K. Bose, Alexander Werth and S. A. Ayer. *New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longman. 1973. 340 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 40.00.*

SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, the leader of the Indian National Army which

fought on the Japanese side in the Second World War, died in an air crash on Formosa as he was trying to make his way to the Soviet Union three days after the Japanese surrender. But such is 'Netaji's' semi-mythical status in India that the Indian Parliament has seriously discussed his possible survival and two official commissions have investigated it.

Another result in India is a thriving biographical industry. Of that industry the present volume is an example, though a respectable one. It has been put together by Indian, German, and Japanese authors and has appeared more or less simultaneously in English, German and Japanese editions. (The Alexander Werth who co-edits the work, by the way, is not the late foreign correspondent but a German official and former associate of Adam von Trott.) The aim of the book is to provide a collective biography of Subhas, giving equal importance to his prewar role in the Indian National Congress and to his wartime efforts to enlist help for the liberation of India in Germany and Japan; the editors also seek to refute what they see as misunderstandings of Bose's career, for instance in Christopher Sykes's life of von Trott.

In the event the book does little more than pull together in one volume material which has already appeared elsewhere. Even then the different contributions vary in quality. The best written are those by N. G. Jog on Bose's role in India; he brings out both Gandhi's ruthlessness and Bose's miscalculations in the clash between the two leaders just before the war. Dr. Werth brings out the failure of the Nazis (as against some of the more flexible minds in the German Foreign Ministry) to grasp the opportunity offered by Bose. Bose ran into Nazi colour prejudice and was told by Hitler that Indians would not be able to rule themselves for another 150 years.

JOHN ROSSELLI

The Future Role of Singapore. By Dick Wilson. *London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1972. 120 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £1·30.*

THE unrivalled balance and clarity of the brief historical sketch set the whole tone of Dick Wilson's compact handbook. The title notwithstanding, there is not an undue amount of speculation about the future. The possibility that Singaporean nationalism *could* emerge in a dangerously Chinese guise is balanced (in the account) by the point that as of now relations with Indonesia are quite sound, for despite Lee Kuan Yew's occasionally provocative behaviour, his concern to prevent Singapore from becoming a Third China is taken at face value across the water. In the short term, the greater fear must be of communal warfare across the Causeway (in Malaysia) spilling over into Singapore. The author acknowledges the jealousies which success can arouse in neighbours, even if that success is no longer built on the entrepot but on world-wide trading relations and the provision of financial and technical services to the economies of the region. But there is reason to hope that economic complementarity with neighbours will increasingly be perceived and valued as such. The major uncertainties concern the future roles of Japan, China and the Soviet Union. However, Wilson communicates a sense that Singapore's leaders will continue to be equal to the challenges of a rapidly shifting balance of power, not least because they take all their problems seriously.

The basic foci of the book are strategic and economic, internal politics being relatively neglected. Had it been possible to include the 1972 election results, Wilson might have commented that although Barisan, the voice of Chinese chauvinism, only polled 4.5 per cent, the opposition as a whole rated 28.9 per cent. A figure that was low by the standards of Western democracies shocked Lee, who saw it as a rejection of the system as such. Certainly Singapore's highly organised society is very much Lee's own creation: a vote against the man could have deeper significance. If, then, the pervasive paternalism of today's People's Action Party is going to produce a legitimacy crisis, some analysis of ruler-ruled relationships would have been in order.

ROGER KERSHAW

Twenty Years Indonesian foreign policy 1945–1965. By Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Introduction by Dr. Mohammed Hatta. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 1973. 640 pp. Bibliog. Index.*

THIS account of the course of Indonesian foreign policy up to 1965 by a former foreign minister and current ambassador is part memoir and part historical survey. The element of memoir is not substantive but takes the form of an attempt to establish the nationalist *bona fides* of the Dutch-sponsored state of East Indonesia of which the author was prime minister, and also of a detailed and illuminating analysis of the unsuccessful initiative by the Burhanuddin government in the mid-1950s to resolve the West Irian dispute with the Dutch, which culminated in the abrogation of the Indonesian-Dutch Union. In the other sections, which constitute the bulk of this book, the author writes very much as a political outsider, despite his long involvement in the diplomatic service of Indonesia. Apart from a sensitive appreciation of the force and impact of domestic politics on the foreign policy-making process, there is little in this volume (apart from the limited element of memoir) to set it apart from a body of well-known academic and journalistic writings on various facets of Indonesian foreign policy on which the author relies almost totally for his sources and for his arguments. There is one underlying point of view, however, which emerges as the thesis of this volume and as the deeply-held conviction of the author: namely that the late President Sukarno violated and distorted the independent and active foreign policy of Indonesia as formulated by Dr. Hatta in September 1948, and transformed it into an instrument of devious Sino-Indonesian purpose in South-east Asia until the political beneficiaries of the abortive coup of October 1965 restored that policy to its original form.

This is not a work of special insight or indeed one in which new information is added to the available store on Indonesian foreign policy. Nonetheless, it has utility in that it provides competent if somewhat pedestrian accounts of major episodes, such as the transfer of power, the Bandung conference, relationships with the Dutch, American intervention in inter-island conflict and confrontation against Malaysia, and also of the changing temper of domestic political order which is central to their understanding. The appendices at the end of the text include several documents dealing with the abrogation of the Indonesian-Dutch Union in 1956 which are not readily available elsewhere.

MICHAEL LEIFER

The Philippines. By Keith Lightfoot. *London: Ernest Benn. 1973. 251 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Nations of the Modern World.) £3·50.*

THE author of this book is a former army officer, now in business in France, who served as an attaché at the British embassy in Manila from 1964 to 1967. He writes about the Philippines from Miocene to Marcos, and this he does in three stages. He begins with two chapters totalling twenty pages on geology, geography, anthropology, ethnology plus some achaeology and early history, followed by a third chapter of five pages describing the country and its inhabitants at the time of the arrival of Spain in the 16th century—altogether a concentrated dose. Part two consists of ten chapters running to about seventy pages on the history of the Islands from Magellan in 1521 to MacArthur in 1945, a well-arranged and readable summary but not without many mistakes in detail. The third section of the book, covering a hundred pages divided into half-a-dozen chapters, deals with the Republic, from 1946 to date. Here Colonel Lightfoot is able to supplement his reading by personal experience, and this is the part of the book likely to be of value to readers of this journal. Two thorough chapters review the economy of the country. Colonel Lightfoot's own professional knowledge is evident in what he writes about public order, defence and foreign policy. His travel among the Islands makes his observations of, and comments on Filipino life of interest, and his discussion of the political scene since 1946 and of the factors that led to President Marcos's proclamation of martial law on September 22, 1972 is especially useful.

It is too early, Colonel Lightfoot recognises, to sum up the political and practical results of the new regime. It has produced an efficient administration, he writes (p. 221), but 'it is also nevertheless true that the upheaval has been traumatic'. The shock has been one of 'severance with the past, rather than any belief that there might be a threat to the long-term liberty of the individual. . . . Political evolution, therefore, although taking place under not wholly unsatisfactory conditions, is no longer on a calculable course. There is, however, no sign at present that anything but progress may be expected, even though a progress outside the framework of normal parliamentary practice'.

Colonel Lightfoot writes sympathetically about the Philippines and its problems, and he appears to have been very much at home among the Filipinos: one wishes that he had devoted more space to the Philippines of the present and less to the Philippines of the past where he is not quite so much at home.

IFOR B. POWELL

Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China. Essays by a European Study Group. Edited by Stuart R. Schram. *London, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 350 pp. Index. £5·50. Paperback: £1·70.*

An Introduction to Chinese Politics. By Harold C. Hinton. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles. 1973. 323 pp. Maps. Index. £4·95.*

DESPITE its rather cumbrous title, the first of these two books is an important contribution to an important subject, from the hands of various craftsmen at their trade. The subject is an immensely topical one—an

attempt to define the changes in Chinese life and society resulting from the cultural revolution, changes in attitudes and behaviour.

It is often difficult, in collections of this kind, to maintain cohesion and unity of theme from a number of contributors, each tackling the subject from a different angle. In this respect, this volume is more successful than most. The authors, on the whole, stick to their last. This is to the credit of the editor, Professor Schram, who himself contributes an opening essay of breadth and distinction, touching on almost every relevant problem and drawing on some of the most recently available evidence.

Inescapably, the authors are faced with all the compelling questions raised by the cultural revolution in China. What was it all about, and what were really the faults of the accused? How far, indeed, has it changed anything at all, and are we not now back to something like the situation before it all began, back to normal? What is 'normal' anyway? A more prosaic title for the book might have been 'The effects of the cultural revolution', but it is precisely the attempt to assess such effects that forms, to my mind, the most refreshing and most novel part of the endeavour.

It is indicative of the fundamental nature of the cultural revolution that it should lead scholars to reassess Chinese communism on such a comprehensive scale, in theory and practice. Professor Schram returns again to the Li Li-san controversy and relations with the Comintern, the perspectives of the first rectification movement in 1942 at Yenan, and the strands of Leninism in Mao's own attitude to elitism and democratic centralism. (It is interesting, here, to note Mao's own endorsement of the cult of his thought.) He then turns to Mao's increasing hostility to Liu and the party bureaucracy, and incidentally to one of the most teasing questions about the whole cultural revolution. Why, if Mao was so opposed to the trend of development, did he not intervene before? Where was he and what was he doing? Mao's own explanation, offered in 1966, was that he had deliberately stood back from day-to-day administration after 1949. This, despite his spectacular intervention in the co-operative programme and the 'great leap'. The cultural revolution, therefore, was Mao's definitive come-back.

In that case, one would expect the continuing effect of the cultural revolution to be a reversal of previous trends. Not the least puzzling aspect of the whole affair is that it is not, or so the scholars here assembled find. There has been something like a reversion to the previous situation. Miss Bastid points to the re-establishment of hierarchy and centralised authority in decision-making, Dr. Howe to the 'revival of bureaucratic and technical rule systems' and material incentives in industry, Gardner and Idema to the partial watering-down of educational reforms, and Watson to longer-term and complex patterns of social behaviour that the cultural revolution touched only marginally, temporarily or not at all.

The exception here is Jack Gray, who sees a much more marked divergence between Mao and Liu, and whose essay is called 'The two roads'. This he posits, essentially, as popular power versus paternalistic administration. This perspective, however, scarcely confronts the questions raised by the rest of the book, or indeed by more recent developments. A high degree of confusion is involved and, one might add, a high degree of cynicism is called for, in Chinese politics even more than the British variety. The attitude of some Shensi textile mill workers, cited in Howe's essay, may evoke the utmost sympathy: 'Many declared that they would differentiate clearly between the Red and the black lines. They would do their utmost

if the line was Red, and would repudiate it if it was black. However, they just could not distinguish clearly the Red line from the black'.

The only element missing from the book, which would seem to require specific treatment, is the army, though several essays touch on it. The army, after all, was such a major element in the cultural revolution, and under Lin Piao had become such an ideological torch-bearer, that recent developments affecting the army, including the demise of Lin Piao himself, and the reorganisation of the command structure, are surely crucial to the consideration of present trends. Whether Mao, after the cultural revolution, found it convenient to rid himself of Lin, and whether the 10th Party Congress in 1973 restored a civilian balance to the apparent military preponderance of the 9th Congress in 1969, are material factors. All in all, though, this is a good first attempt to discern the direction China is now taking.

Professor Hinton's book is, as one would expect, a capable summary of developments in China since 1949, intended for the undergraduate and general reader. The chapters break down the various branches of national life, ideology, leadership, state and party, armed forces and so on. A surprising omission here is any solid reference to agriculture, which has certainly been the scene of major political activity and conflict. A useful feature of the book is a list of further readings at the end of each chapter, and an appendix note on research in Chinese politics that will be of particular value to university courses.

V. C. FUNNELL

NORTH AMERICA

The Retreat of American Power: Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy—and its effects. By Henry Brandon. *London: Bodley Head. 1973. 368 pp. Index. £3·75.*

Neo-Isolationism and the World of the Seventies. By Walter Lacqueur. *Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies in association with the Library Press, New York. 1972. (Distr. in UK by Sage Publications, London and Beverley Hills, Calif.) 50 pp. (The Washington Papers, 5.) $2.50.*

The Next Phase in Foreign Policy. Edited by Henry Owen. *Allen & Unwin.) 345 pp. Index. $8.95. £4·50. Paperback: $3.50. £1·75.*

THESE three publications deal with the problems of analysing the contemporary period of transition in American foreign policy; attempts are made to explain the sources of change, to calculate the consequences and to recommend policies appropriate to the world of the 1970s. They are complementary and together provide good, provocative background reading to the present upheaval in political and monetary relationships within the Atlantic alliance, although the scope is much broader than relations between Western Europe and the United States. All were written before the 1973 Middle East war and the consequent energy and political crisis.

Henry Brandon's book concentrates on the domestic sources of President Nixon's foreign policy; his account of the negotiations presided over but not fully controlled by the President and Dr. Kissinger provides easy reading because of the author's acquaintance with many of the American

politicians involved, some of whom, as for example, John Connally, do not come across sympathetically. Walter Lacqueur's short essay is a polemic addressed to those who would return the United States to an isolationist stance; he is particularly hostile to American left-wing critics of their country's foreign policy. Lacqueur, who includes a projection of likely economic and strategic developments in the 1970s, is intensely worried that the United States in vacating its global role is leaving the Soviet Union in a position to increase its prestige, power and influence, thereby threatening the interests of states still dependent upon American power. The collection of essays from the Brookings Institution offers a more balanced and less emotive forward look at American foreign policy: the essays deal with regional trends (American relations with Japan, Western Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and China) and with functional areas (economic, strategic and general purpose forces); there are also essays on the domestic politics of American foreign policy and changes in the international system. This collection is comprehensive and gives a more complete view than does either Brandon or Lacqueur.

All agree that under the pressures of the Vietnam war and an intensification of domestic problems American foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved disengagement from an over-exposed global commitment. But agreement ends when the implications and the extent of the 'retreat' (Brandon) to 'neo-isolationism' (Lacqueur) or the 'redirection' (Brookings) are evaluated. In particular, the future of Soviet-American relations is controversial. Brandon foresees a 'balance of mutual weakness' as the United States experiences 'the bitter transition from hegemony to mere leadership'. Lacqueur postulates 'no symmetry between the two super-powers. While America is in retreat, the Soviet Union still has a global policy—the Soviet Union is now in a superior position'. Henry Owen implicitly disputes Lacqueur's analysis when he recommends that the United States' 'primary concern should shift from East-West security to economic relations within the non-communist world . . . from unilateral to multi-lateral action'. The Brookings essays tend towards the views that the nation-state is approaching obsolescence in certain respects and that there is an international system which constrains even the most powerful states. Lacqueur, on the other hand, dislikes the determinist overtones of 'system' because of his belief that the concept is contributing to the deterioration which he sees in American foreign policy today. His vision does not include any genuine multipolarity, significant changes in the distribution of economic and military power among the super-powers and middle powers, nor even an ideologically driven Soviet Union. Rather neo-isolationism will cloak the reality of American power, reducing credibility in American responses in confrontation situations and encouraging the Soviet Union to increase its sphere of influence. The antidote to Lacqueur for anyone persuaded by his arguments is provided by Brzezinski's essay on 'US-Soviet Relations' in the Brookings volume. Brzezinski sees a continuation of a rivalry between the two super-powers which will be 'more tense, complex and far-reaching than in the past' but not one 'dominated by the one-sided hostility of . . . the earlier cold war'. No hints here that the United States will be content to play second fiddle. Indeed Brzezinski exaggerates the influence of the super-powers; he talks of 'violence by proxy' in, for example, the Middle East, where it now seems that Israel and the Arab states, though armed by the super-powers, decide whether and when to go to war.

Brandon and Gelb in 'Domestic Change and National Security Policy' (Brookings) attempt to answer the question of how far the domestic desire for withdrawal is likely to go: both admit the increasing domestic difficulties which confront the President, difficulties which could increase if Congress in the post-Watergate era enlarges its influence in the foreign policy field. One final point: these books make it clear that the foreign policies of West European states are not increasing the capacity of the United States to readjust successfully to the world of the 1970s; if Lacqueur's worst fears are realised, much of the responsibility will lie on the shoulders of European statesmen.

PETER FOTHERINGHAM

The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States. By Denis Stairs. *Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1974. (Distr. in UK by Books Canada Ltd.) 373 pp. Index. £6·70. $15.00.*

PROFESSOR Denis Stairs has produced a thorough, agreeably written historical account of Canada's part in the Korean war. The author's principal concern is with the political and diplomatic aspects; so much so that the reader is obliged to freshen his or her memory of military events by consulting a compendium of recent history. As an anlysis of political decision-making, however, Professor Stairs' work is excellent: soundly based on documents reinforced and illuminated by personal interviews with leading participants; and all acutely analysed and clearly presented.

The story starts with the tired old statesman, Mackenzie King, warning his Cabinet colleagues to beware of involvement in Korea at the behest of the United States. So disturbed was he by the proposal that Canada should become a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea that the crisis in the Canadian Cabinet was described by one minister as comparable with that over conscription in the Second World War. In the end, Mackenzie King accepted Canadian membership in UNTCOK, and departed forever from the field of politics; but all which followed revealed how sound his forebodings were. Canada was sucked into an American enterprise wrapped up in the flag of the United Nations, and emerged five years later with nothing to show for it except perhaps the wisdom to be found in the pages of Professor Stairs' book.

If there is an important conclusion to be drawn from a study of the Korean war, it is this. The super-powers would be well advised in their own interest and in the interest of the world generally to put the formation of their foreign policies into the hands of independent consultants, much as ailing businesses rely on management consultants and people charged with crimes turn to solicitors and barristers. From Professor Stairs' study it is evident that on all major points—for example, the unity of the communist powers, or the inevitable consequences of a unilateral establishment of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee—the outsiders like the Canadians, the Indians and the British were right and the United States was wrong, and that this was so before the United States made its mistakes and persuaded and pressed others to join it in error. It can be concluded from this that the real utility of the United Nations—and this is a quite limited usefulness—derives from the fact that a United Nations operation involving one or more of the super-powers exposes them to criticism and knowledge which they

would be unlikely otherwise to encounter. In the Korean case, the President of the United States was eventually obliged to line up with his colleagues in the United Nations on the subject of General Douglas MacArthur, and it was this which enabled the United States to emerge with a score of 0–0.

In a final chapter Professor Stairs essays to present his material in some of the 'languages' of modern political science. His book itself demonstrates, however, that there is nothing like history for illumination and wisdom—provided, of course, it is written with some of the organising insights with which Professor Stairs is acquainted and with which he has obviously sharpened his mind and refined his talents.

H. S. FERNS

LATIN AMERICA

Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. Edited by Alfred Stepan. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1973. 265 pp. Index. $10.00. £4·00.*

ANALYSES of the post-1964 regime in Brazil are often confused and contradictory. It has proved difficult for academic observers to define its essential characteristics, or to assess how far it represents a new political departure in Brazilian history. In *Authoritarian Brazil* the foremost experts on Brazil,[1] historians, economists and political sociologists, present their most recent work, and together they attempt to introduce greater conceptual clarity into our thinking about contemporary Brazil. In some cases they are revising earlier interpretations (as Thomas Skidmore does in his contribution); in others they are elaborating insights gained in another context (Juan J. Linz, whose model of 'authoritarian Spain' has been widely applied to Brazil, writes on Brazil for the first time). All of them are searching out and testing new conceptual frames of reference, not only to explain the Brazilian regime better, but to help put the Brazilian political process in a larger comparative perspective. The results are impressive, and this collection forms the most important of the recent contributions to our understanding of Brazil.

Brazil is widely known, on the one hand, for its 'miracle' rate of economic growth and, on the other, for its harshly repressive military regime. This combination alone is enough to raise disturbing questions about the relationship between political authoritarianism and economic dynamism. Whether the high growth rate is dependent on political coercion emerges as a major debate in this volume, and one in which no consensus is reached: the economists Samuel Morley and Gordon Smith conclude that it is not, but Fernando Henrique Cardoso argues that if the repressive military structure were removed, then investment rates would decline.

There are two other dominant themes, which recur throughout the collection. The first concerns the 'authoritarian tradition' in Brazilian politics, or how far the new regime can be viewed as an extension of Brazil's previous 'pure' authoritarian period, the *Estado Novo* (1937–1945). Thomas Skidmore focuses attention on the continuing operation of many authoritarian structures throughout the period since 1945, and Philippe Schmitter also contends that the present regime is basically a 'restorationist' move-

[1] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Albert Fishlow, Juan J. Linz, Samuel Morley, Philippe C. Schmitter, Thomas E. Skidmore, Gordon W. Smith, and Alfred Stepan.

ment. Cardoso and Stepan do not question these assertions, but rather choose to emphasise transnational processes which have introduced new political components into the present 'model'.

The second, not unrelated, theme questions the future of the regime, and explores the possibilities open to the military for legitimising and institutionalising its rule. Everyone agrees that the military can impose order, but differ regarding the achievement of a more truly political stability. Juan J. Linz thinks this achievement will be difficult, if not impossible (in Brazil there is an authoritarian situation, not an authoritarian regime), while Schmitter demonstrates the progress that has already been made in this direction. What may finally decide the issue is the vitality of what Cardoso describes as a new process of 'associated-dependent' development: if the economy continues to grow, then the military may have the time, and may maintain the unity, they need in order to institutionalise the regime.

JOSEPH W. FOWERAKER

The Argentine Republic 1516–1971. By H. S. Ferns. *Newton Abbot: David and Charles; New York: Barnes and Noble. 1973. 212 pp. Bibliog. Index. (National Economic Histories; Gen. Ed.: W. E. Minchinton.) £4·75.*

ARGENTINA is often cited as a fearful example of the kind of inflation into which Britain could slide if current trends continue. For more than a quarter of a century, prices have risen at an average rate of around 30 per cent. a year. At the same time, the growth of output has been disappointingly slow. In the 1920s, Argentina ranked with Australia and Canada in terms of income per head; since then, it has fallen sadly behind, with per capita income now less than a third of Australia's. Since we, too, face the possibility of stagnation combined with more rapid inflation, the Argentine experience is well worth our attention, and Professor Ferns's book provides an admirable introduction to it.

He shows how, after slow beginnings under the Spanish crown and in the first few decades of independence, Argentina began to tap its enormous agricultural potential, drawing in foreign labour and capital to build railways and farm the *pampa*, and building up a vast export trade in meat, wheat and wool. Its 'golden age' was in the first thirty years of this century, during which its population more than doubled and its real output more than trebled. By 1929 it was supplying two-fifths of the frozen and chilled meat and one-fifth of the wheat that came on to the world market; nearly half its agricultural output was being exported, and it relied on imports for a large part of its consumption of manufactures. This pattern of international specialisation was disrupted by the slump and the Second World War; instead of trying to restore it, postwar governments have pursued policies of industrialisation and import-substitution, for example by increasing steel output tenfold since 1950 and creating an automobile industry. But because the domestic market is limited, manufacturing activities cannot achieve economies of scale, and consequently produce at high cost; import-saving through domestic production of consumer goods is offset by the need to buy more heavy equipment and industrial materials from abroad; meanwhile, the agricultural sector has remained relatively stagnant, and no longer produces enough to satisfy both the growing internal demand for its products and the requirements of the balance of payments.

The result has been a continuing fall in the exchange rate, chronic inflation and persistent unemployment, frequently exacerbated by the mistakes of governments.

Professor Ferns tells the story with great lucidity and compelling narrative power. He handles the statistical evidence extremely well, always providing enough to substantiate his argument, yet never overwhelming the reader. He is kinder to the conservative regime of the 1930s than most Argentine writers would be, and merciless to the military government of 1966–1973. It is to be regretted, perhaps, that he could not have given more space to the Perón regime of 1946–55, and to the post-1955 period, for example in order to discuss more fully the arguments for and against industrialisation and to give a more detailed analysis of the inflationary process. But these are not reasonable criticisms of a study intended to be a short one. Its only real shortcoming, in fact, is its price; it is to be hoped that a cheap paperback version will soon follow, to give this excellent book the wide readership it deserves.

F. S. BROOMAN.

Chile's Road to Socialism. By Salvador Allende. Edited by Joan E. Garcés. Translated by J. Darling. Introduction by Richard Gott. *Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1973. 208 pp. Index. (The Pelican Latin American Library. Gen. Ed. Richard Gott.) £0·40. A$1.35. NZ$1·35. $1·65.*

Chile's Marxist Experiment. By Robert Moss. *Newton Abbot: David & Charles. 1973. 225 pp. Index. (World Realities Series.) £4·50.*

THE speeches of Salvador Allende in *Chile's Road to Socialism* make for sad reading. Allende's political vision and tactics, if not his economic policy, come through very clearly in some of the speeches. 'The road to socialism lies through democracy, pluralism and freedom' (p. 61). There is the constant insistence on the need for the Popular Unity alliance to include the middle sectors; 'we guarantee that middle- and small-scale businesses may rely on the close collaboration of the State to ensure the sound development of their activities' (p. 64). There is the repeated plea 'to avoid provocative acts. Do not be tricked into provocation. Reject irresponsible or demagogic attitudes' (p. 71).

Allende's speeches are not particularly eloquent nor theoretically profound. But they movingly express his deep convictions, held unwaveringly since he first became involved in politics forty years before his tragic death in 1973. We learn a lot about the man and his principles from these speeches—though not a great deal about politics and economics in Chile during the Popular Unity government.

Robert Moss would presumably regard all these speeches as lies, designed to mask Allende's real intentions, which were 'the concentration of political power in the hands of a narrow ruling group' (p. 58). But then Mr. Moss has information denied to most observers—such as knowledge of the 'clear, popular mandate for military intervention' (p. ii). All Mr. Moss's informants are perceptive, distinguished and intelligent. We should not worry too much about the junta's policy, as they 'acted to preserve [pluralism], at the cost of the temporary loss of some basic liberties' (p. vi). (Mr. Moss has a light way with Chilean lives—the massacre of 61 young Nazis in 1938 is described as a 'comic-opera incident' (p. 36).)

The only surprise in this book is to read (on p. 79) that the government's economic policy was not really socialist anyhow, as it did not experiment with worker participation. One might have thought that Mr. Moss would have been grateful that at least Chile was saved that, but not so. Given Mr. Moss's assumptions, and the way he uses evidence, it must have been an easy book to write.

ALAN ANGELL

SECOND WORLD WAR

The Warsaw Rising of 1944. By Jan M. Ciechanowski. *Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 332 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. (Soviet and East European Studies; Eds.: R. W. Davies et al.) £6·60. $19.50.*

THERE can be no doubt that this important and detailed study will take its rightful place in the historiography of modern Polish history and that of the Second World War. Part of the reputation which the book will undeniably create for its author will be due to the wealth of meticulous detail from Polish sources which has been gathered together to recount the political and military background of the Polish struggle for nationhood during the Nazi occupation. At the same time this book is bound to stimulate a debate which, in some quarters at least, is likely to be as bitter as it will be intense.

This is because of the author's basic contention that the Warsaw uprising of August 1944, with its consequent and great loss of life and property, was misconceived and ill-advised and therefore a wasted effort because it failed in two directions. It failed to dislodge the Germans from the city at a time when, certainly in mid-July, the occupying forces had appeared to be in a state of panic and on the point of withdrawing. More significantly, this failure meant that the rising's second, anti-Russian, purpose, which towards the end of the war was perhaps the most important one, also failed. The idea had been for the Home Army authorities, the military arm of the Polish Government-in-exile in London, to have 'liberated' Warsaw from the Germans and hold the city for at least twelve hours before the first Russian units in the vicinity entered the capital. The pro-London authorities would thus have presented themselves to the Russians as the 'legitimate' government of Poland in opposition to the communist Committee of National Liberation. But the Germans did not withdraw and were not dislodged, and advancing Russian units were held back by German counterattacks—a long-standing controversial point which the author goes some way towards clearing up. In practical terms, therefore, the rising failed, and in the author's words, 'the insurrection and its aftermath helped, rather than frustrated the Communist assumption of power in Poland' (p. 314).

In fact, it was this consideration of preventing the possible Sovietisation of Poland which motivated the efforts of the Polish government in London and its supporters in Poland in their attitude to the Polish problem during the Second World War. But throughout his detailed and masterly narrative of the diplomatic, political and military events of the war years which led ultimately to the Warsaw rising, Dr. Ciechanowski consistently argues that the London Poles were mistaken in their continual refusal to come to

terms with the new balance of power situation that was bound to arise in Eastern Europe after the war. Coming to terms with the new situation would have involved accepting Stalin's demands that the new Russo-Polish frontier should be established on the Curzon Line, such losses of Polish territory being made up, eventually, at Germany's expense. Although the Polish Premier, Mikolajczyk, was under constant pressure by Churchill to accede to Stalin's wishes, he refused to commit himself to such a solution. In Dr. Ciechanowski's eyes, therefore, the final error which compounded all others was the Warsaw rising.

Since the final delimitation of Poland's postwar borders was in general accordance with Stalin's 'solution', Dr. Ciechanowski's thesis is a valid one—that is, in terms of cold, hard logic. At the same time, though, it seems that this argument can be carried too far. Given the experiences of many Poles in the 1920s and the 1930s *vis-à-vis* both Germany and the Soviet Union—the new partition of 1939 and those examples of horror during the war, Auschwitz and Katyn—it is not surprising that so many Poles wished to struggle and fight, and finally die, to see a Poland constituted and delineated as *they* wished to see it, rather than calmly to accept a solution from outside which was to the convenience of one of their former 'enemies'. Nevertheless, whatever one's views about the deterministic nature of historical development, readers of this book will gain new insights into its subject matter and be stimulated by its arguments.

JOHN P. FOX

Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941–1944. By Mario D. Fenyo. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1972. 279 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·95.*

'*MINDENT VISSZA!*' ('Everything back!') clamoured the posters covering the walls of Budapest in the autumn of 1938. 'Everything' meant, according to the programme of the *Magyar Revisios Liga,* restitution of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia in the north, of Transylvania in the east, of Banat, Bacska and Baranya in the south, and of the Burgenland in the west. The dream of restoring the old Hungarian kingdom within its historic frontiers—in spite of the fact that on the eve of the First World War that kingdom had a population of 20·8 million of whom only 9·9 million were Magyar—explains the tragedy of Hungary's position on the eve of the Second World War. Miklos Horthy de Nagybanya, the Regent and the country's undisputed ruler, did not like the Germans in general or the Nazis in particular, and yet he was hoping that by shrewd manoeuvring he would be able to recover the lands of St. Stephen's crown with the help of Hitler who despised the Magyars. In his well-documented and lucid book, Mr. Mario D. Fenyo, the son of a distinguished literary and political figure in Hungary, describes first Horthy's pathetic exertions to achieve his territorial aspirations, and later—when he grasped that Germany's defeat was inevitable—his hopeless efforts to extract his country from Nazi clutches.

Hitler started to entangle Horthy in his grandiose strategic plans on November 2, 1938, when Hungary was 'awarded' the southern part of Slovakia. On February 2, 1939, Hungary had to pay for this by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact. On March 14, 1939, it was authorised to occupy Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and on August 30, 1940, it obtained the northern

part of Transylvania. In October Horthy permitted a German motorised division to cross Hungary into Romania and in April 1941 he allowed German troops to be deployed on Hungarian territory for an attack on Yugoslavia; this caused the suicide of Count Pal Teleki, the prime minister.

To carry out his Barbarossa Plan, the Führer needed Hungary as *Durchmarschgebiet*, but—as Mr. Fenyo affirms—that country 'did not figure at all in Hitler's plan for a campaign against the Soviet Union'; Horthy, however, was 'eager to participate in an anti-Soviet crusade', and five days after the German attack on the Soviet Union a state of war was declared between Hungary and the Soviet Union. A mobile Hungarian army corps took part in the 1941 operations, but in 1942 Hungary had to send to the Soviet front an army of nine divisions which in January 1943 was heavily defeated on the Don river. The capitulation of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad induced Horthy to establish secret contacts with Great Britain and the United States, and on September 9, a day after the surrender of Italy became effective, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen and two Hungarian diplomats signed a secret conditional armistice at a meeting on board a vessel in the Sea of Marmara. But it was no more than an operation of psychological warfare. How could Hungary surrender to the Anglo-Americans who, having landed at Salerno, advanced only seventy miles in four months?

Obsessed to the end by the *idée fixe* of Hungary's historic frontiers, on February 12, 1944, Horthy sent Hitler a letter proclaiming that he intended to defend the ridge of the Carpathians with the Hungarian army alone. Suspecting that Horthy was preparing a coup *à la* Badoglio, Hitler decided to occupy Hungary militarily. Not even a token resistance was offered by the Hungarian army.

Humiliated and powerless, Horthy devised his last manoeuvre after the Romanian surrender on August 23 1944. He sent a mission to Moscow with a letter in English to Stalin begging him to spare Hungary which 'never ever wanted to take but a single inch from anybody [*sic!*] that was not ours by right'. An armistice was signed on October 11, and four days later Horthy broadcast an order for the cessation of hostilities. But this *coup d'état* failed completely. With the exception of General Bela Miklos, commander of the First Army in the Carpathians, who surrendered to the Soviet forces, the order was not obeyed. On October 16 Horthy was arrested by the Germans and had to submit to the indignity of signing the appointment as Regent of Hungary of Ferenc Szalasi, the head of the Hungarian Fascist Arrow-Cross Party.

Mr. Fenyo concludes his melancholy book—the best to date on the subject—with the comment that Horthy, 'while lacking neither courage nor a sense of honour, was remarkable mostly for his hesitations, his indecisions'. But even if Horthy had been a genius, could the Hungarian tragedy have ended differently?

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

The Six Years War. A Concise History of Australia in the 1939–45 War. By Gavin Long. Foreword by E. F. Herring. *Canberra: The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service. 1973. 518 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. A$7.50.*

THE sub-title is an accurate description of this book. The author was general editor of the Australian official history of the Second World War,

which runs to 22 volumes and is, like its First World War counterpart, an example of clarity and detachment. In both cases it was thought desirable to have a single volume summarising the rest: for the First World War this was C. E. W. Bean's *Anzac to Amiens*, and *The Six Years War* is the outcome for the Second World War. The history of the wars in which Australia has fought since 1945 is now being written or planned.

Gavin Long's book is a judicious mixture of detailed battle narrative with summaries of the domestic political scene, the administrative arrangements for war, the strategy of the war as a whole, and the relations of Australia with its allies. The arrangement is systematic and the writing clear; the judgments are well argued, but the emphasis is on narrative rather than analysis. This is a sound piece of synoptic military history which could be acquired with advantage by those libraries which cannot afford, or do not wish to have, the full set of 22 volumes.

J. D. B. MILLER

The World at War. By Mark Arnold-Foster. *London: Collins in association with Thames Television Ltd. 1973. 340 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

THIS spare, intelligent and intelligible summary of the Second World War was written to go with Thames Television's long and admired series of pictures and interviews. But it stands on its own feet, as the author insists. It is not just the 'book of the film'.

On the other hand, if Mr. Arnold-Foster had set out to write such a book without this prompting, it would have been a different book. It would certainly have been longer: the present fewer than 300 pages of the main text is a feat of simple compression. It would have been more reflective and, in the best, balanced sense, more critical. Where Mr. Arnold-Foster does pinpoint issues, large or small, such as strategic bombing (pp. 263–277) or the assault on Monte Cassino (pp. 120–125), he shows how shrewdly the sensible commentator could have filled in the expert journalist's brief chronicle.

Inevitably, as it stands, the question to be asked of this quick, lucid round-up—France, the Battle of Britain, the Atlantic, the Desert, Italy, Russia (a single chapter), the Pacific, Burma, the Allied conferences, the Reconquest of Europe, the Resistance, the Aftermath—is one of the balance. Is this really the war as it was, or just the war as we saw it in London, and in our newspapers?

It is everyday nonsense nowadays for people and politicians to compare our present troubles with oil and coal and prices with 'the war'. But in a sense they are right. This is how we remember 'the war'. It is not how the Russians and the Germans (with losses running for each into over eight figures), or how some of the occupied countries, remember their war. Mr. Arnold-Foster does mention, though probably he underestimates, the Russian losses (p. 256); and he does point out that, whereas 60,000 of the total 357,000 British killed were civilian air-raid casualties (twice as many as the merchant seamen lost), at least 60,000, and possibly many more, were killed in one raid on Dresden (p. 274).

The war and its consequences—its 'Legacies' as the last skimpy chapter of this workmanlike book puts it—cannot be weighed without weighing the influence of all these real facts of war, including America's guns with

butter, on the attitudes, fears and hopes, the politics and the economics of those who fought and suffered it.

DONALD TYERMAN

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Europe Since 1870: An International History. By James Joll. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 541 pp. Maps. Index. £6·20.*

INTERNATIONAL history is still a rather new subject in British universities, and in the process of finding its feet it has tended to stand on the firm ground of diplomatic negotiation and inter-state crises, exciting and almost excessively well-documented topics, for purposes of teaching and study. Professor Joll's new book (and his lectures at the London School of Economics) are a welcome reminder of the need for wider and perhaps more sophisticated perspectives. He does, indeed, deal amply with the wars and political transformations of the period, right down to the present day, but he does so particularly in their association with the development of ideas and social movements common to all European countries.

This treatment can be highly illuminating at many points. Dealing with the 'New Spirit' after 1918, Professor Joll quotes Karl Jaspers' comment in 1935 that 'quietly, something enormous had happened in the reality of western man', resulting in a dissolution of bonds and a radical disillusionment which 'have made anything, absolutely anything, seem possible'. The story develops with five good chapters outlining the debate on social change, socialism, imperialism, liberalism, and the nature of industrial society before 1914; in the interwar years the corresponding themes are the postwar search for stability, fascism, communism, and liberal democracy, and later the movements of collaboration and resistance.

If we are sometimes in doubt as to which came first—mood or action—we are usefully reminded that links between the two may exist. But equally they may not, as Professor Joll recognises. How far, for example, are we to attribute Nazi anti-Semitism and *Lebensraum* ideology, which clearly have many anticipations among Wilhelmite publicists, to a more or less self-generated extremism?

It becomes evident that the emancipated artists and writers did not create the political revolutions of the period or (in most cases) surrender to them. In Russia, trends in the 1920s towards the abstract and concrete in art, producing such groups as the Suprematists and Constructivists, did end in the 1930s with bureaucratic control and submission to the doctrine of socialist realism. In Germany as in France Expressionist gloom led some to embrace communism, others into the Dada movement (to which Professor Joll reverts more than once), mocking bourgeois values. The Surrealists, also out to shock the bourgeois world, were for a time welcomed as allies by communism, which, however, was soon repelled by their 'wild Bohemian iconoclasm'. The Surrealists were often more interested in their debt to Freud, who was not flattered by their admiration. The 'bleak doctrine' of Existentialism had attractions for the lonely and anxious in a time of social fragmentation, but was not its child or creator.

In other cases an ideological offensive could make a direct impact on domestic politics, but the author does not explore to any extent such mobilisations of ideas for immediate ends. There is no reference for example to the artillery of leftist propaganda wheeled into action by the

Left Book Club in England in the late 1930s. One cannot have everything—this remains for the moment a portion of the promising field which Professor Joll's students may well like to explore.

The dependence of ideas on policy seems more easy to establish after 1945, and this aspect is particularly well treated in chapters 15 and 16. The first is entitled 'Divided Europe', and there are some familiar confusions as to whether the Soviet Union is in Europe or not (in on p. 483 apparently; out on p. 474). Is 'Eastern Europe' a part of Europe? However, it does not really matter; the context is clear. The work is remarkably free from errors of fact, and the theme is sustained throughout by the author's wide reading in all aspects of the cultural, social, and political history of this long period. It is a major addition to the small field of genuine 'international' histories.

W. N. MEDLICOTT

La Grande-Bretagne et la Petite Entente. By Ozer Carmi. *Geneva: Librairie Droz. 1972. 377 pp. Index. Bibliog. (Travaux d'Histoire Éthico-Politique, XXIV.)*

THIS is an interesting analysis of the relations between Great Britain and the Little Entente between 1920 and 1937. The author suggests that the prime motivating force behind the formation of this group was a common fear of Hungarian revisionism and the two efforts of the ex-king Karl to recover his Hungarian throne in 1921, and that in fact France (at first) and Great Britain gave little encouragement to the new grouping.

Dr. Carmi deals with the Little Entente chiefly in the light of Anglo-French relations. Much of what he has written about the quarrels between the two over security and economic issues in the early 1920s is already known, but he reinforces the fact that the root of the failure of the two countries to reach agreement was Britain's refusal to undertake any commitments to reserve the frontiers in Eastern and Central Europe, a position it maintained until 1939.

During and after the Great Depression, Britain began to make initiatives of its own in the area instead of leaving the field to others. This was a result of the increasing economic activity of Germany and the intrigues of Italy in the Danubian area, which caused great concern to France and the Little Entente. Britain hoped to mediate between France and Germany to settle the economic problems of the area, and thus contribute towards European peace and disarmament. However, its efforts to promote a Danubian customs zone ended in complete failure.

The most interesting chapters in this book are the last two, dealing respectively with the effects of the Ethiopian war, and the final disintegration of the Little Entente. The author shows that the Little Entente threw its full support behind Britain's apparent initial determination to use the League of Nations to resist Mussolini's aggression. The Hoare-Laval plan and Britain's subsequent *volte-face* over sanctions led directly to the *rapprochement* of Yugoslavia and Romania with Germany and Italy, on whom, in any case, they had already come to depend economically. Thereafter Britain found itself impotent to influence the course of events in the area. Thus by 1937 Czechoslovakia was already virtually isolated. Eastern and Central Europe were now low on Britain's list of priorities until 1939.

This book is based primarily on British Foreign Office political archives, and for the rest on published sources. British Cabinet papers appear to have been ignored. There are also some irritating typographical errors. Nevertheless this is a useful and stimulating contribution to our knowledge of the fluctuations of British foreign policy towards the Little Entente between the wars.

M. L. DOCKRILL

Selections from the Smuts Papers. Edited by Jean van der Poel. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1973.*
Vol. V: Sept. 1919–Nov. 1934. *621 pp. £15·00.*
Vol. VI: Dec. 1934–August 1945. *551 pp. £15·00.*
Vol. VII: August 1945–Oct. 1950. *496 pp. Index. £15·00.*

THESE three volumes mark the completion of one of the great biographical enterprises of our time on which biographer, Sir Keith Hancock, editors and publisher (except in respect of price) are alike to be commended on the quality of an achievement sustained to its richly satisfying close.[1]

These three concluding volumes of the Smuts archive are edited with loving care and scholarly precision by Dr. Jean van der Poel alone. She has followed the pattern of the earlier volumes jointly edited with Professor Hancock in providing a brief linking narrative outline at the beginning of each section, an indispensable biographical guide to Smuts's correspondents in many walks of life, and, by way of uncovenanted, editorial munificence, the authentic originals of Smuts's countless, but almost always slightly inaccurate, literary or biblical allusions. 'Somehow', wrote Smuts to Gilbert Murray in 1948, 'the eternal wings are over us and temper the storm to the shorn lambs.' Dr. Jean van der Poel properly refers us to Psalm 36.7, and Laurence Sterne's *A Sentimental Journal* where Maria remarks, 'God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb'. On the major question of editorial policy, *i.e.*, what to include and what to exclude, Dr. van der Poel when in doubt has reproduced Smuts's own letters at the expense of incoming letters from others. Without having seen the latter, it is difficult to judge of the balance here but, in general, while Smuts was diffuse in his choice of epistolary topics, the contents of his individual letters are nonetheless ordinarily self-explanatory. One could, perhaps, have dispensed with even more of the speeches—Smuts himself expressed a sharp judgment—'stale speeches are intolerable'—admittedly on Roosevelt's, not his own! (No. 564); and some of the adulatory comments on them (*e.g.*, Nos. 122–125) as well as with some others, which might seem to be included to bring out the range of his interests, but may serve chiefly to sow doubt as to their depth. Yet when so much is said, what remains is three volumes of contemporary comment by a man rich in insights on life in the round as well as on public affairs; ready, perhaps too ready, in judgment on the events, as they unrolled, of one of the most troubled and yet fascinating periods in human history. Few indeed could fail to find pleasure, profit or even solace in them.

The first of the volumes under review opens with a letter to Mrs. Smuts on 'the colossal responsibility' that would begin for him with the

[1] W. K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel (Eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, Vols. I–IV (London, Cambridge University Press. 1966). W. K. Hancock, *Smuts* (London, Cambridge University Press. Vol. 1, 1962; Vol. 2, 1968).

swearing-in of his first Cabinet that afternoon, September 3, 1919; it is followed by one to Margaret Gillett saying: 'I am now Prime Minister but my heart is not in the thing. . . . Botha's loss to this country is quite irreparable'; which is followed in turn by one from Botha's widow saying that Botha thought of Smuts as 'the greatest man in our country, the coming man of the age'. All this, as this record shows, was, or proved to be, true. Smuts's responsibility was 'colossal', his heart was not always 'in the thing'—the problems of the great world far away from South Africa and, at a deeper level, botany, philosophy, and other intellectual interests all attracted or distracted him, reflecting 'the striving for mastery between the creative and the instrumental' so evenly balanced in him, as one correspondent shrewdly wrote (No. 13). In terms of human leadership, Botha's loss was irreparable, as Smuts was the first to acknowledge—and there is something direct and very moving in his tribute at the unveiling of the statue of his old leader in Pretoria in 1946 (No. 712); while beyond question Smuts was, and remained, a coming man of the age in the sense that in most, but not all, of the great questions of his time he took, despite dreadful discouragement, the constructive forward view.

Or so, at least, it appeared. Yet almost always, there was a note of ambivalence. On Ireland at the outset, the former republican—a convert to a Commonwealth to which monarchy provided an essential, cementing ingredient—nearly but never quite, one feels, understood the forces with which he was dealing. He was prepared to accept the irony of history, and to travel to areas where he had fought for the republic asking the people 'to let the republic go' (No. 6). But he had little patience with those who were not so minded. He had even less with the France of Poincaré, or with defensive frontiers and reparations. There is passage after passage of denunciatory refrain on French policies right down to the mid-1930s. In February 1922 he contemplated the possible need for a European coalition against the French (No. 68); in November he was admonishing Bonar Law lest his government lean too much towards France, 'for centuries the curse of Europe', and now once more the leader of the Continent 'with the old bad instincts fully alive in her' (No. 84). A continuation of Austen Chamberlain's Locarno policy, with its French commitment, filled him with dismay—'a dreadful mistake' (No. 389)—and, even after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, he remained critical of French unwillingness to examine Hitler's overtures constructively—'France is unreliable . . . ; fixed only in her fear of Germany' (No. 395). But in the end he was compelled to acknowledge that France, although 'hopelessly unwise', 'fundamentally stands for human conscience and freedom like Great Britain'.

His faith, indeed, rested elsewhere: first in the League to which he remained loyal long after it had ceased to be loyal to itself, and second in the Commonwealth, which by his thinking (he was out of office in 1926) he had done so much to fashion. Of these twin pillars, the Commonwealth weathered better the tensions of the time. But Smuts, who had protested at the 'Carthaginian' peace in 1919, was clear before Munich about what, in Commonwealth terms, was needed and what was possible—'a resolute policy of appeasement and reconstruction of the peace by Great Britain' (No. 376) and no commitments in central or eastern Europe—'the Dominions . . . will fight for Great Britain if attacked: they will not fight in the battles of central or south-eastern Europe. I even have my doubts whether they will fight again for France or Belgium. They are now out

of that business under the Locarno Treaty . . . ' (No. 436). He was writing to Amery—their correspondence is one thread of interest—and, regarding the world, or the dominions, as they *were*, unlike subsequent commentators many of whom lost sight of this by reason of their convictions on what they *ought* to have been, his assessment of dominion attitudes was correct.

Not that Smuts was blind to the realities of the European situation. The sending of Runciman to Prague impressed him with the gravity of the situation, and while he did not think much of Chamberlain's choice of emissary he consoled himself with the reflection that 'the Lord sometimes uses indifferent instruments to show His power' (No. 440). But then, in documentary terms, there is a disappointing and surprising gap [1] at the climax of the story, namely Munich, no document appearing between September 15 and October 20. In a lengthy footnote to a letter on the outbreak of war, the editor alludes retrospectively to the Hertzog-Smuts compact on neutrality of a year earlier, but the evidence she adduces, while of interest, is all *ex post facto* and derived from the acrimonious Assembly debates of 1940, when a lot of party emotion had been stirred up on the issue and which for that reason is to be treated with caution. As for the sequel, Chamberlain's Polish guarantee of March 1939 'has simply made us gasp', partly on politico-strategic grounds, but still more because of its possible impact on the unity of a Commonwealth which from 1926 had been expressly and consistently averse to commitments in Eastern Europe. Yet Smuts's attitude to Munich and his reactions to the Polish guarantee serve in longer perspective not to demonstrate his fallibility—though in some measure it was there—but the heroic stature of the man who, having travelled so far along one road because—on this he insisted time and time again—of the abandonment of the League (which he never ceased to regard as the great error of the 1930s), recognised that it was his responsibility in 1939 to bring South Africa, against the domestic odds, into the war against a world-menacing tyranny, and see it through to a successful conclusion.

'Life is too much of a toil. . . . What does one care about distant countries and insoluble financial problems' (No. 683) he wrote in October 1945. Yet he went on caring, too much perhaps, about distant countries and the United Nations, and not enough about the problems of his own. It was in distant places he was most forcibly reminded of them; ' . . . the going is very bad here', he wrote from New York in November 1946 in phrases already made familiar in Professor Hancock's biography. 'Violent opposition both on the Indian and South West Africa questions. Colour queers my poor pitch everywhere. I . . . can look at it all philosophically. But South Africans cannot understand. Colour bars are to them part of the divine order of things' (No. 733). There it all was, the present understood, the future foreseen and Smuts trapped in old age between forward-looking international opinion which had long been his source of hope for the world, and domestic opinion which alone could provide him with authority. It was the stuff of personal tragedy and he felt it to be so. Readers of his letters will feel it too. The fallibilities of greatness, here exposed, paradoxically enhance at once its attraction and its stature.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH

[1] There is one other, more understandable perhaps: there is no comment on the abdication of Edward VIII.

Sir Horace Rumbold: Portrait of a Diplomat 1869–1941. By Martin Gilbert. *London: Heinemann. 1973. 496 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £8·00.*

SIR Horace Rumbold belonged to the British Diplomatic Service for over forty years. His first post abroad was in Cairo under Lord Cromer (1892–1895), his last as Ambassador in Berlin (1928–1933), where he had earlier served as Chargé d'Affaires during the dramatic weeks before the First World War. Before 1914 he had also seen service in Tehran, in Vienna when his father was Ambassador, and in Tokyo. During the First World War he gained much experience as Minister in Berne, after it as Minister in Warsaw, High Commissioner in Constantinople, British delegate to the Lausanne Conference, and Ambassador in Madrid where at his farewell party the guests included Primo de Rivera and Rudyard Kipling.

Early in his career his father had criticised his son's jingoism, recommending a more cosmopolitan attitude. But to the end Sir Horace remained convinced that 'the English are the lynchpin of the world, (p. xiii). Though discreet and tactful in public, his xenophobia in private was remarkable. He saw the French 'as a nation of apes and cads', the Russians and Persians as 'both equal swine'. The Spaniards were found 'untruthful, dirty and inclined to idleness', the Swiss in Berne 'singularly unattractive', the Poles 'thoroughly corrupt' and the Turks 'a very irritating people to deal with'. Sir Horace's dislike of the Jews was also strong, though later he sharply disagreed with Hitler's ruthless anti-Semitic measures. Small wonder that after the fall of France in 1940 he confided to his son: 'I have become definitely anti-foreign' (p. 451).

Yet such prejudices did not affect his judicious assessment of political situations and forces, nor colour his reports to the Foreign Office. While his looks gave 'many people the impression of blandness, even stupidity', Harold Nicolson, who worked under Sir Horace, has testified to 'the gift of discernment' as 'his greatest diplomatic quality, apart from patience' (p. xiv). 'Both Germany and Russia will count again some day'—he predicted in his final despatch from Warsaw in 1920—'and possibly become a serious menace to Poland' (p. 217). Reporting from Berlin in the Spring of 1931, he made a strong plea for British support of, and trust in, Chancellor Bruening. Helped by some astute memoranda from his Military Attaché, Colonel Marshall-Cornwall, Rumbold had no illusions about the rapid growth of the Hitler movement and of German militarism.

When he left Berlin in May 1933 he was convinced that Hitler would not be overthrown and that 'sooner or later, especially if the President [Hindenburg] dies, the Reichswehr may be expected to throw in their lot with the present regime' (p. 377). Rumbold inspired Norman Ebbutt, *The Times* correspondent in Berlin, to write during the early months of the regime that 'its coming meant war in about five years' (p. 382).

Drawing on Rumbold's private papers and the documents now available from the Foreign Office, Martin Gilbert has succeeded in presenting a full and meticulous portrait, warts and all. It offers new insights in a balanced, if somewhat dull, fashion. Two minor errors may be noted. The tutorial establishment which prepared young Rumbold, Harold Nicolson and many others for the rigorous entrance examination to the Foreign Office was called Scoones, not 'Scones' (p. 6). And in the 1930s Ulrich von Hassell was German Ambassador to Italy, not to the Vatican (p. 357).

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle Bt. 1880–1961. By Gordon Waterfield. *London: Murray. 1973. 312 pp. Illus. Index. £3·75.*

Sir Percy Loraine (1880–1961) was cast in the traditional mould of the British diplomat. The 12th and last baronet of Kirkharle in Northumberland, with a family tree extending back to the Emperor Charlemagne, he was educated at Eton and Oxford and joined the diplomatic service in May 1904 when young men were only accepted if they had a private income of at least £400 a year. His first major post was as Head of Mission to Persia from 1921 to 1926 where he had the difficult job of defending the semi-independent Shaikh of Mohammerah against Reza Khan, the dictator who later seized the Peacock throne and was bent on unifying Persia. Loraine then served for a short period in Athens before succeeding Lord Lloyd as High Commissioner in Egypt. Here his main task was to negotiate a revision of the 1922 Anglo-Egyptian treaty to bring it more into accord with nationalist demands, but then came a setback when Loraine was suddenly switched to the Embassy at Ankara, and it was Sir Miles Lampson (Lord Killearn) who was to win the credit for the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. In Turkey Loraine grew to admire its modern creator, Kemal Ataturk, although the stories that he spent night after night drinking with the Gazi are evidently legends. In 1939 came another failure of a mission when he went to Rome in May in a vain effort to keep Italy neutral in the coming war. He returned to Britain after the Italian declaration of war in 1940 only to find that Churchill refused to see him and that he was presented with no greater scope for his experience than a post in the Political Warfare Executive (misnamed on p. 289).

Sir Percy had many of the strengths and weaknesses of the old-school diplomat. He was intensely hard-working, capable of long concentration on a subject, helpful and encouraging to younger colleagues. He had the good looks and imposing person of an ambassador and could hold his own with bullying dictators—Reza Khan, Kemal Ataturk, Mussolini. At the same time he could be dull and pompous, as Harold Nicolson found when he joined Loraine's staff as counsellor in Persia. He had the vanity of the politician, showing petulance and pique when his ability went unrecognised. He was, too, a philistine, his favourite pastimes being bridge, poker and backgammon, his greatest ambition victory for his horses in the big races. It was more important, he wrote, 'to be the breeder of *Darius* than to have been Ambassador in a dozen posts abroad'. A readable and sympathetic biography.

F. S. Northedge

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

International Organization: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography. Compiled by Michael Haas. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1973. 944 pp. Indexes. (Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series: XLI.) $35.00.*

This bibliography is based on the card index which the late Professor William Henry Vatcher, Jr., was preparing for publication at the time of his death in 1965. His work has been considerably augmented but it does not include any later material. The more than seven thousand entries for books and articles in some 50 scholarly journals are divided into general works, international organisations from the classical civilisations to the end of the 19th century, the League of

Nations and United Nations systems, regional and non-governmental organisations and proposals for world government. Most of the material cited is in English. The work will probably prove most useful for the period up to the breakdown of the League of Nations.

Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960, Vol. 5: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. By Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. *Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 552 pp. Index. (Hoover Institution Publications.) $27.50. £9·00.*

The title of this bibliography is somewhat misleading, for the subjects covered are very varied and include anthropology, law, literature, medicine, natural sciences, politics and religion. After introductory sections on centres of research, general reference material and bibliographies, there are some three hundred entries arranged by topic, followed by nearly two thousand arranged by colonial power, region and colony and an index to authors, titles, organisations, agencies, colonies and main geographical areas.

A fair proportion of the material is in the language of the colonial powers other than Britain and each entry is carefully annotated.

In all, this is a scholarly work which will be invaluable to anyone studying Africa over the last hundred years.

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Notice. We have been asked to point out that the price of *American Defense and Détente* by Eugene J. Rosi (reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1974, pp. 169/70) has been reduced from $10.50 to $5.95.

CORRESPONDENCE

From Professor C. A. W. Manning.
To the Editor, *International Affairs.*
Madam,

In an article entitled 'International Terrorism: Problems of Definition' in your January 1974 issue (p. 75), the South African Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967 (section 2), is referred to as 'an example' of a statute 'defining terrorism so widely that it embraces any form of extra-constitutional conduct and thereby transforms a political opponent into a "terrorist"'.

There are levels, I well know, of political discussion at which, on the subject at least of South Africa, responsibility in the use of language is commonly not insisted upon. But in the context in which it occurs, what, I wonder, can be the purpose of so readily falsifiable, though presumably studied, an overstatement as the above?

Elaborately, with precision, and in a great many words, section 2 deals, as I understand it, with three matters: *training*, or the furtherance thereof, undergone, or to be undergone, for certain sorts of purpose; the *possession* of arms or explosives for certain sorts of use; and *action* undertaken with a certain sort of *intent*—the intent, specifically, to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic or any portion thereof. That, if admittedly much, is all.

And those, my quotation's, concluding nine words: just what are they meant to suggest? That political opposition, simply as such, is now, in South Africa, a crime? Possibly not. But, if not really that, then really what?

Yours faithfully,
C. A. W. Manning.

Professor Dugard writes:

Professor Manning is well known for his defence of the policies of the South African Government. On this occasion he has, however, chosen to defend the indefensible—the South African Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967.

Section 2 of the Terrorism Act does, as Professor Manning points out, make it an offence to undergo training to endanger the maintenance of law and order and to possess ammunition or explosives for certain uses. But what Professor Manning fails to mention is that terrorism is also defined as '*any* act' committed 'with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic [of South Africa]'. A person is presumed to have such an intention if the act had or was likely to have *any* of the results listed in section 2 (2) (*a*)–(*l*) and if he cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend any such results. The 'results' listed in (*a*) to (*l*) include a number of matters but for brevity's sake I shall mention only the following:

'(*k*) to obstruct or endanger the free movement of any traffic on land. . . ."

'(*l*) to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State.'

In effect this means that if a student demonstrator holds up a poster saying 'abolish racial discrimination' in a busy street, without first having received the permission of the local authority, he commits the crime of terrorism. He has committed an act (demonstration) which is likely to obstruct the free movement of traffic, from which can be inferred an intention to endanger the maintenance of law and order. Professor Manning may view such conduct on the part of the student as 'terrorism' but I prefer to describe it as 'extra constitutional conduct'. No student has been prosecuted in such a case but the threat of a prosecution is always there and student law advisers are obliged to advise students accordingly.

Professor Manning would do well to read the standard work on South African security legislation, *Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa* (Juta. 1971), by Professor A. S. Mathews of the Natal Law School (South Africa). After a thorough analysis of section 2 of the Terrorism Act and its *imprecise* terminology he concludes:

> It is almost superfluous to state that the crime of terrorism is both broadly and vaguely defined. The fact that any act, whether lawful in itself or not, may be the foundation for a prosecution means that any human activity, including speech or writing, could be a terroristic act. . . .
>
> The cloudiness and all-embracing nature of the concepts used to define the crime of terrorism are themselves terrifying aspects of the law (at page 174).

Professor Manning asks me to explain my statement that the wide definition of terrorism 'transforms a political opponent into a "terrorist"'. There are many political opponents of the South African Government who do not favour the violent overthrow of the State or acts of violence, but whose activities are prohibited by the Terrorism Act. Persons who engage in a *peaceful, non-violent* civil disobedience campaign or protest campaign expose themselves to the heavy penalties of the Terrorism Act. (There is a minimum five-year sentence of imprisonment which may not be suspended in whole or in part.)

I am surprised that Professor Manning has only now seen fit to criticise my views on the Terrorism Act. Since the introduction of the Terrorism Act in 1967 I have expressed similar views on public platforms in South Africa and in a number of publications, *e.g.*, *The South African Dialogue* (ed. Nic Rhoodie) (McGraw Hill. 1972), p. 98; (1971) 88 *South African Law Journal*, p. 305. It would appear that Professor Manning, despite his claim to speak with authority on the South African situation, does not make a habit of reading South African publications in the field of security legislation. He would do well to do this for a better understanding of the injustices of the South African security system.

BOOKS REVIEWED, JULY 1974

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THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR

A CASE STUDY IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT DURING DETENTE *

Coral Bell

THE climate of detente affects many relationships, and none more than that between the dominant powers and their respective clients in crisis situations. This article will explore that observation as it was exemplified in the Middle East war of October 1973. The war had, of course, many other significant facets. The fighting itself, the political repercussions in Israel and the Arab world, the strategic-technological revolution in weaponry that it demonstrated—all these were no doubt of great interest, although they will not be explored here. I will be concerned with the war seen primarily as a problem in larger and longer-term diplomatic calculations by decision-makers in America, Russia and Western Europe, as well as in Israel and the Arab world.

Most of the press comment at the time, insofar as it related the war to the detente at all, was to the effect that it illustrated the bad faith of the Russians, or the fragility and illusoriness of detente as a concept. This view seems to me to have been quite mistaken, and demonstrably so in retrospect. I shall argue that, on the contrary, the progress and upshot of events showed the strength of the detente, in that it sustained the frictions of the war with no visible wear and tear. I shall also argue that Dr. Kissinger was able during its course to 'spell out' further some of the conditions of the detente, and that these conditions appear to have been acquiesced in by the Russians.

The logical point at which to begin consideration of this process is, I think, the Nixon-Brezhnev communiqué of May 1972, after the Moscow summit meeting. The affairs of the Middle East were discussed in this communiqué in a brief and non-committal paragraph: the Arab leadership was not given any consoling or promising words to induce the belief that their great and powerful friends in the Kremlin were inclined to press the case of their Arab allies in any way that would jeopardise the detente with America. President Sadat has since made it clear how much this increased the burden of irritation he already felt against the Russians. In effect it seems to have been for him the moment

* This article is a slightly modified version of a chapter in Professor Bell's forthcoming book *The Politics of Detente* (Oxford University Press for Chatham House).

of resolve that he must press the situation to a new crisis in order to force the dominant powers into a crisis-intervention which would in the upshot serve Arab (or at least Egyptian) national interests. President Sadat was at a kind of strategic crossroads. To undo the consequences of the 1967 war (the advance of Israeli frontiers) he had theoretically two options: military action or diplomatic leverage. Military action depended on maintaining his connection with the Soviet Union, since it was only from that source that he could hope to get the advanced weapons he would need to dislodge the Israelis from actual territory. On the other hand, the difficulty and uncertainty of translating military resources into effective pressure on Israel had already been demonstrated. Only the Americans, in fact, could put effective pressure on the Israelis; theoretically, the Russians might be induced to put pressure on the Americans to secure concessions from the Israelis, but, in fact, in conditions of detente they were clearly not going to do so—at least not at the beginning of the crisis.

There remained the possibility of a more direct diplomatic rapprochement with the Americans, a repair of the almost total breach that had followed the 1967 war, in the hope of securing a more even-handed (from the Arab point of view) American policy in the Middle East. The Arabs had had some indirect encouragement from Dr. Kissinger to hopes of this kind. With the rather unnerving candour he sometimes uses, he had indicated the American interest eighteen months earlier:

> We are trying to get a [Middle East] settlement in such a way that the moderate regimes are strengthened, and not the radical regimes. We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence—not so much the advisers but the combat pilots and the combat personnel—before they become firmly established. . . . But we certainly have to keep in mind that the Russians will judge us by the general purposefulness of our performance everywhere. What they are doing in the Middle East poses the gravest threats in the long term for Western Europe and Japan and therefore for us.[1]

To summarise, one might say that the strategic problem confronting President Sadat at this point was so to manage the situation that he could first use the military leverage given him by the Russians to upset the existing 'no war—no peace' situation, which actually suited the Russians themselves rather well, since it maximised Arab dependence upon them. Then he had to use the resulting crisis to induce Russian pressure on the Americans to secure from the Israelis a territorial settlement more acceptable to the Arabs. Comparing his course of action in this crisis with that of President Nasser in the 1967 crisis, one is struck by the greater subtlety of his understanding of diplomatic manoeuvre.

[1] Background press briefing, San Clemente August 24, 1970. Quoted in David Landau *Kissinger: the uses of power* (London: Robson, 1974.)

Indeed, Sadat's policies might be regarded as an object lesson in how to negotiate from a situation of relative diplomatic weakness. This relative diplomatic weakness arose from the fact that he was a rather marginal ally for the Soviet Union, and the Russians had made this brutally clear. It is true that the connection with the Soviet Union had since 1955 secured for Egypt a large quantity of economic and especially military aid, but this was an index of Egyptian dependence on the connection, not necessarily of Soviet valuation of it. No doubt there were differing views of its usefulness in Moscow; the Soviet naval chiefs ought logically to have been the most enthusiastic in its favour. Even this group, however, had a clear countervailing motive against undue identification with Egyptian strategic interests, since they obviously had to seek the re-opening of the Suez Canal, which could only be secured by American and Israeli consent as well as Egyptian.

The ambivalence of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship shows clearly through the events that followed. The first development was the Egyptian expulsion of Russian advisers (15,000 according to President Sadat) from Cairo in July 1972. Some surprise was expressed by Western analysts at the time that the Russians should have accepted this with calm, not to say indifference. One might even say that they had appeared to provoke it, by treating the Egyptian army's pride too roughly; their reply to Egyptian complaints about arms supplies had implied that the arms the Soviet Union had already sent were quite all right—as had been shown, for instance, when they were in the hands of the Vietnamese—and that what was doubtful was Egyptian ability to use them correctly. This standard of diplomatic ham-fistedness, or deliberate toughness, on the part of the Soviet Union in its relations with Egypt seems to have been renewed in the aftermath of the crisis, as for instance in the refusal of a visit by the Egyptian foreign minister in July 1974.

The fifteen months between the expulsion of the Russian advisers in July 1972 and the actual Egyptian strike at Israel in October 1973 offer a neat historical puzzle in what I shall call ambiguous signalling, resulting in successful strategic surprise. President Sadat had proclaimed 1971 as the 'year of decision' in relations with Israel. It turned out not to be so, and his explanations of delay had seemed lame. The impression of infirmity of political or military purpose was reinforced when the same proved to be the case in 1972.[2] Therefore, when he again told the Egyptian armed forces in December 1972 to be ready for war in six months, neither the Israelis nor the Americans nor perhaps even the Russians seem to have taken the declaration entirely seriously. In effect,

[2] The Arabs explained the delay, rather embarrassedly, as due to Soviet pressure. See Mohammed Heykal in *Survival*, Sept.–Oct. 1972.

the stance of one 'willing to wound but afraid to strike' seems to have provided a successful camouflage for the actual seriousness of Sadat's intentions as they developed in 1973. The Egyptian contingency plans are said to have been known to the US intelligence community from April, and presumably also to the Israelis, since there are close connections. The increased supply of advanced Soviet weapons as from about February 1973 was also well known: President Sadat himself proclaimed how well satisfied he was with it in an interview in April with an American journalist.[3]

Yet despite all this, the actual attack achieved a remarkable degree of strategic surprise. Dr. Kissinger received no warning until the morning it was launched.[4] American intelligence may have been unduly influenced by Israeli estimates, which did not conclude that an attack was imminent until October 5, and then got the time of launching wrong by four hours.[5] The Russians were allegedly told the date of the attack on September 22, but they did not put up their observation satellites or pull out their dependents until about October 3, so perhaps they also felt a certain scepticism until the last moment. One has to conclude that the unfulfilled threats of the previous two years had left a pervasive impression of military irresolution, and that this operated as a conscious or unconscious *ruse de guerre* for the Egyptians, concealing their intentions.

Actually, if this had not been so—if, that is, there had been a longer period when war was clearly seen to be impending, and preparations for it were known to and obviously aided by the Russians—the wear and tear on the detente might have been greater. For the Russians ought theoretically (under the 1973 agreement with America) to have warned the United States of any such threat to the peace. But given the general surprise, Dr. Kissinger could shrug off this dereliction, if it was one, philosophically: 'In an ideal world, one would expect closer consultation, but given the particular volatility of the Middle East, it would have been a heavy responsibility to make known certain advance information.'[6]

The impression of Russian ambivalence, to the last, as to whether the Egyptians really meant it this time, and whether, if so, they were going to do any better than on earlier occasions, seems the only explanation for what was, according to Sadat, a Russian attempt to deceive or

[3] *Newsweek* April 9, 1973.
[4] Press conference, Oct. 25, 1973.
[5] The Israeli government set up a commission after the war to ascertain the reasons for this intelligence failure. Its interim report in mid-April 1974 blamed the Israeli Chief of Staff (Gen. Elazar) and Chief of Intelligence (Maj.Gen. Zeira) rather than the Defence Minister, Gen. Dayan. Nevertheless Dayan's political standing seems to have been much damaged, at least for a time.
[6] Press conference of Oct. 25, 1973.

pressure him into calling off the war in its first couple of days. He has said that the Russian ambassador went so far in argument with him as to allege that the Syrians had already asked for a ceasefire, when he knew this to be a lie.[7] One may put this down either to Russian fear of another Arab disaster like 1967, or to apprehension about what the war might do to the detente, or a combination of the two. Presumably, however, this mood passed off during the first week of the war, when it became clear that the Egyptian military performance offered prospects of considerable success.

The restoration of peace only returned as an urgent objective of Soviet policy with the turn of the military tide back towards the Israelis in the second week of the war.

It was this which seems to have precipitated the urgent invitation to Dr. Kissinger to come to Moscow on October 20. Although one must, of course, ascribe this more to a desire to put a stopper on further Israeli success in the drive into Egypt, it also seems to indicate concern to maintain the detente, and especially to use it as a basis for joint crisis-management. And this element in Soviet expectation is even more prominent in the next phase of the crisis, which I would describe as a Russian bid for, and an American refusal of, the idea of condominium.

Russia's bid for condominium

This is, I think, the most interesting aspect of the crisis, seen as an exercise in the politics of detente, since it seems to have involved Dr. Kissinger in spelling-out the message that detente could not be parleyed into condominium. The possibility that it could, and indeed the alleged probability that it would, have provided some interesting nightmares for assorted European and Asian policy-makers and analysts. The notion of condominium—an agreed sharing of effective power *only* with America in a kind of permanent and somewhat institutionalised version of the power-balance as at the end of the Second World War—has deep roots in the Soviet view of the world and of the 'international class struggle'. One could call it congenial and familiar to the Russians from the Stalinist period on.

This would-be collusive element in the Soviet *weltanschaung,* rather than the competitive or adversary side of the relation with America, may be regarded as having precipitated the brief 'confrontation' phase of the crisis, from about October 23 to October 26. It began with the Israeli breach of the first ceasefire, and the drive of the forces commanded by General Sharon to surround the Egyptian Third Army. This military success for the Israelis confronted the Russians with the apparent pros-

[7] Interview of March 29, 1974, with a Lebanese journalist.

pect of an unacceptable level of defeat for their Egyptian allies, and a danger that they would be obliged, in effect, to choose between sacrificing the detente or accepting a serious loss of face as protectors. The Egyptians met the military reverse by asking (presumably after consulting the Russians) that a joint Soviet-American force should be sent to the Middle East. Mr. Brezhnev indicated, in a letter which has not been published but which was apparently forceful, that the United States must either accept this proposal, or risk seeing the Russians acting alone and sending their own troops to the Middle East. At the same time the Soviet High Command made visible various rather ostentatious preparations which conveyed the possibility that they might be intending an air-lift of combat forces to Egypt.

It is these signals which I would describe as the bid for condominium, though with reservations as to how seriously it was intended. Dr. Kissinger was emphatic in refusal:

> The United States does not favour and will not approve the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the Middle East. It is inconceivable that we should transplant the great-power rivalry into the Middle East or, alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be a disaster if the Middle East, already so torn by local rivalries, would now become, as a result of a UN decision, a legitimised theatre for the competition of the military forces of the great powers. And therefore it seemed to us that the political purposes would be best served if any international force that were introduced were composed of countries that have themselves no possibility of being drawn into rivalry as a result of being there. . . . The plan for a joint US-Soviet military force in the Middle East was never broached to us either publicly or privately until yesterday. And we immediately made clear that we would not participate in such a force and that we would oppose any unilateral moves. . . . The measures we took and which the President ordered were precautionary in nature. . . . We are not talking of threats that have been made against each other. We are not talking of a missile-crisis-type situation. . . . We are attempting to preserve the peace in very difficult circumstances. . . . The alert that has been ordered is of a precautionary nature and is not in any sense irrevocable. It is what seemed to be indicated by the situation.[8]

The 'alert of a precautionary nature' authorised by the President was that called 'Defcon Three', a standby alert for troops, including strategic nuclear forces, to await further orders. It was cancelled by the

[8] Press conference, Oct. 25, 1974. Though I have put Dr. Kissinger's words into the form of a continuous answer, they are actually excerpts from individual answers to particular questions. The omission of the journalists' questions does not, I think, in any way change the meaning. The text may be found in *Survival* January-February 1974. Elsewhere in the press conference Dr. Kissinger restated the American assumptions on detente, 'The United States and the Soviet Union are of course ideological and to some extent political adversaries. But the United States and the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility. We possess—each of

26th, and Mr. Brezhnev made a rather conciliatory speech on the same day; I think therefore that the 'confrontation' period may be reasonably regarded as confined to those three days or less.

These exchanges were variously reported in the headlines as 'cracking' or 'splitting' or 'shaking' the detente. And some of the reported comments of Senator Jackson and President Nixon might be taken as indicating that there had been an approach of sorts to a nuclear brink. But Senator Jackson is no friend to the notion of detente, and President Nixon had his reasons for underlining alleged dangers that might seem to imply his own indispensability. There is nothing in the press conferences of Kissinger or of James Schlesinger, the Defence Secretary, to endorse an alarmist view of these events.

Some rather loud signalling

To my mind it is more reasonable to regard the American strategic alert and the Russian moves which evoked it as an exchange of rather loud signals—excessively loud, one might hold, and thus unnecessarily abrasive for the nerves of the world. But they probably needed to be loud, in order to carry over certain background noises and to reach other ears than those of the American and Russian policy-makers concerned, who are, of course, perfectly well able to communicate in whispers, unless it is useful that others should hear. Who were the others whom it was intended should listen to the messages in this case? Primarily, in my view, the allies of the two dominant powers: the Egyptians, the Israelis, the Europeans.

Let us take first the Russian signals, the letter which Senator Jackson described as 'brutal' and the ostentatious military indicators. These apparently consisted of the alerting of airborne forces (50,000 men) and the phasing-down of the resupply operation in such a way as to suggest that the transport planes used in it were being diverted to lift the airborne troops to Egypt or Syria. It is quite difficult to believe that these indicators corresponded to a serious military intention, unless it could have been one that had clearly been given a green light by the Americans. But President Sadat's demand for action to make the Israelis return to the ceasefire lines of October 22 had obviously put the Russians in a situation in which they were obliged to make some démarche. If by any chance the Americans *had* agreed to a con-

us—nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity. We—both of us—have a special duty to see that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life.... We will oppose the use of threat by any country to achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally ... we would resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliances ... we would react if the relaxation of tensions were used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots ... humanity cannot stand the eternal conflict of those who have capacity to destroy it.'

dominium arrangement in the Middle East (as a number of Western journalists were timidly suggesting) it would have provided the Russians with an enormous bonus from the crisis. For the Americans, as against the Russians, it could be neither attractive in power-political terms (since it would disrupt all sorts of alliances and other relationships) nor in my view morally acceptable to the present policy-maker or the electorate. A modus vivendi is not a conspiracy—at least it need not be.

Dr. Kissinger's press conference on October 25 spelled out emphatically, though not in mild enough words, the refusal of any such condominium, and the strategic alert which may have only lasted twenty-four hours, added the message 'nor unilateral initiatives either'. As I said, it might be called too loud a signal for the occasion. On the other hand, it had to be strong enough to carry through the domestic noise of Watergate, which might have misled the Russians into believing the United States government incapable of action, and the noise of the intramural crisis in Nato, which also might have been interpreted as inhibiting action. It had to reach the Egyptians, to convey the excuses of the *Russians* for not acting. It had to startle the Israelis, to convey the dangers of uninhibited military success even to characters like General Sharon or General Dayan. And it had to reach the Europeans, to convey the 'refusal of condominium' message, since that vision is one of their standard nightmares. So altogether there was a very fair case for loudness.

Looking at the episode as an example of crisis-management techniques in general, I should classify it as the use of an emphatic, entirely unambiguous, signal in reply to ambiguous signalling. Ought one to take what I have called the 'bid for condominium' from the Russian side any more seriously than the ostensible threat of unilateral action? On the whole I think one should, since this is clearly one of the possibilities (or, according to your point of view, dangers) of the detente relationship as it develops. And success in such a bid would be seen as an enormous enhancement of both status and power-advantage by the Russians. A less wary American policy-maker than Dr. Kissinger, in a tighter corner than this actually was, might see such an arrangement as necessary, or even desirable.

(One might liken the detente at its present stage of development to one of those dual-control cars that driving schools use—except that the vehicle is an enormous bus with the rest of the society of states willy-nilly in the passenger seats, though not sitting quietly. The two powers that share the driver's seat are agreed that they want the brakes and steering to work, and that they should keep the bus away from the precipice, but they are not agreeed about much else, certainly not about the direction in which the bus should go. And the passengers in the back are all intent on diverting it down roads that lead to their respective

national destinations. Many of them are in a position to grab the arm or chew the ear of one of the drivers, to get where they want to go. They are practically all conscious that too great a level of agreement between the drivers will permit them to overawe their fellow travellers and make the choices for them. Thus—to return from the back of the bus to the world scene—the members of the society of states need continuously to balance what they have to hope from detente against what they may fear from condominium.)

Before I move on to the resolution phase of the crisis, I want to look at one of its side-effects, which I shall call the intramural crisis within Nato. It was produced chiefly by the Arabs' belated discovery of how powerful a weapon oil could be, but was reinforced by the American strategic alert. The crunch came in the second week of the war, over the American resupply operation to Israel. One could certainly say that the Europeans put more obstacles in the way of this effort than either the Russians or the Arabs.[9] The Americans had first to ask the Spanish government for loading and refuelling rights at Spanish airfields. They were refused even passage through Spanish airspace. Portugal permitted refuelling stops at Lajes air-base in the Azores, but forbade any mention of it in Portuguese newspapers. Willy Brandt's government in Germany not only demanded a halt in the resupply of Israel from American dumps in Germany, but announced in a foreign ministry press release that it had done so, which the Americans regarded as a particularly gratuitous slap in the face. Mr. Heath's government in Britain put an immediate ban on arms shipments to the Middle East, which was damaging exclusively to Israel, since it cut off the supply of spare parts and ammunition for the Centurion tanks whose survival was most vital to the battle. The British delegation at the United Nations also made an inexplicable hash of Dr. Kissinger's request, in the first few days of the war, that they should introduce a ceasefire motion in the Security Council—inexplicable unless one bears in mind the traditional viewpoint of the 'Arab Legion' at the Foreign Office. Britain failed to present the resolution apparently on the discovery that the Egyptians did not at that moment want a ceasefire: not unnaturally, Dr. Kissinger was enraged by this and is said to have conveyed his feelings pretty sharply to the then ambassador, Lord Cromer. Perhaps this is why he also reacted explosively to Mr. Heath's demand that if the Cyprus base was used for reconnaissance flights, the planes should be provided with an unbreakable 'cover story'. And if the rest of Nato (with the honourable exception of the Netherlands) exhibited a panic anxiety to dissociate themselves from any connection with American aid to Israel, the French (in M. Jobert's time) seem to

[9] One story has it that Dr. Schlesinger also did a good deal of foot-dragging on this, though the accusation has been denied.

have been positively mischievous, encouraging the Syrians to remain intransigent towards the American effort to secure a ceasefire and disengagement on that front.

It is difficult to interpret these European attitudes except as the effect of a single-minded and craven determination to appease the Arabs by any degree of abasement in order to avert the threat to European oil supplies. In this objective they were more or less successful, but at a very heavy cost. For though an actual oil blockade was averted, the Arabs were taught how much they could with impunity exact, either politically or economically, from the industrialised world by the threat of cutting oil production, and they have since used that knowledge to set oil prices at a level which faces the Europeans with enormous balance-of-payments deficits for the foreseeable future, or possibly even a world slump on the pattern of the 1930s.

Nemesis seems to have been working overtime on the decision-makers responsible for this policy-shambles. M. Jobert, Herr Brandt, Mr. Heath are all out of office, at least temporarily. In the British case, the then ambassadors in Washington and at the United Nations have also vanished from those posts, the latter amidst some controversy. This clean sweep, by electoral and other means, of those responsible for the original policies no doubt helped the relatively rapid recovery of European-American relationships. The complaints—on the American side, that the Europeans had 'acted as if Nato did not exist' and on the European side, that Dr. Kissinger had failed to consult them about the strategic alert—probably helped to conduce the more carefully maintained alliance relationship of the next crisis, that over Cyprus in July 1974. (Unfortunately for the Greeks, the Nato strategic interest marches rather with Turkey.)

As far as the detente is concerned, I think one has to regard all this as an exemplification of the tendency for the links of alliance to be loosened in such a period. One might also note in passing that it appears to indicate that 'Europe' at the moment is *less* than the sum of its parts: its members have not yet learned to act as an ensemble, but have lost their old capacity to act uninhibitedly as sovereign states. If one compares the reactions of Britain and France to the 1973 threat to their oil supplies, with their reaction in 1956 to a much lesser threat to oil supplies which were themselves then of much less economic importance, one must regard the contrast as a case study in the progressive enfeeblement of political will. Deplorable and disastrous as the Suez adventure no doubt was, it showed some degree of initiative and capacity to act quite lacking 17 years later, by which time not even a little ambiguous signalling on the possibility of retaliatory action could be dared.

How much does Russia value detente?

Finally, let us look at how the detente has survived in the resolution phase of the crisis, so far as it has yet gone. One may regard the two disengagement agreements, with Egypt and Syria, as having resolved for the time being the immediate 1973 crisis, and what remains to be done—the creation of a legitimate order in the Middle East—as an effort to solve the whole Arab-Israeli imbroglio from 1948 on. The resolution of the 1973 crisis thus far has turned on the changed local military balance, demonstrated rather than created by the October fighting. The Israelis did not exactly suffer a military defeat: on the contrary, after the initial setback resulting from the Egyptian achievement of strategic surprise, their resilience and usual military *panache* were spectacularly demonstrated. But the almost costless ascendancy of 1967 was clearly gone, and presumably for good. The casualty figures for the Israeli forces were not particularly high by normal expectations of fighting between forces at equivalent levels of competence and armament, but they were traumatic for an electorate and a political elite which had lived by the legends of the effortless superiority of 1967. The Egyptian commanders' demonstration of a new military initiative, the Egyptian troops' demonstration of competence in the use of sophisticated Russian weapons, and the weapons themselves, especially the 'plane-killing' missiles which for the first week effectively neutralised the Israeli airforce—the most telling source of its strength in 1967—all those things effectively changed the local military infrastructure which had underlain the diplomatic relationships of 1967–73. Even the most hawk-like segment of the Israeli political elite has had to face the fact that if Israel has to continue to meet Arab armies of relatively equal competence, over the middle and long term, the cost of maintaining the security of the state by its strong military right arm and the 1967 territorial acquisitions will become almost intolerable. Thus the case for an alternative mode of security, by borders more acceptable to the Arabs and some form of international guarantee, has become more attractive—though still not really attractive to some Israeli opinion, especially on the right. A determined long-term military ascendancy and extended boundaries might remain the most attractive option to a people with as hard a history as the Israelis, if it were believed to be available. And very likely there will always be a sector of the electorate and perhaps of the political leadership who *will* believe it is available. But for the main-stream leadership, the demonstration of Israel's long-term military vulnerability has apparently been enough to induce reconsideration of other possible modes of security.

It was this change in the local military and psychological balance which provided the basis for Dr. Kissinger's resourceful personal diplo-

macy in the creation of the two disengagement agreements, and the prospect of a settlement. And this in turn allowed what might seem the most surprising upshot of the crisis as a whole: the way in which it enabled Dr. Kissinger to repair the damage of earlier history to American standing in the Arab world. The restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria and Algeria, the package deal of economic agreements with Saudi Arabia and the organisation of Mr. Nixon's triumphal tour of Middle East capitals are all indicators of a situation in which American influence and standing in the Middle East have been restored, not merely to a better level than before 1967, but probably to their most potent level ever. It really does seem a feat of diplomatic legerdemain to go into a crisis in which one is obliged to sustain an ally and protegé by a resupply operation in the middle of a war, and come out of it as the proclaimed and trusted friend of the other side.

So the most notable power-advantage from the crisis was undoubtedly to the American national interest, thanks to the virtuoso diplomacy of Dr. Kissinger. The Russians, by contrast, have considerable wounds to lick. Their optimum gain would have been the condominium arrangement mentioned earlier. They did not get it. Next best would have been an increase in Russian influence in the Arab world or the Middle East generally. In view of the amount of expensive weaponry they provided for the war, they might well have expected as much as that. But this also did not result: one could certainly not say that the Russians' diplomatic leverage appears stronger in September 1974 than in September 1973. On the contrary, they have failed even to maintain their earlier dominant position in Egypt and Syria. They can at best be said to have been given a consolation prize for these setbacks: the prospect of the reopening of the Suez Canal.

It is clear from the amount of grumbling in the Soviet press that the Russians did not much enjoy the sight of Dr. Kissinger making the running in the disengagement phase of the crisis, and restoring American influence at the same time. But they did not make any real effort to block it, and this again one must, I think, put down to their reluctance to jeopardise the detente. The juxtaposition of Mr. Nixon's Middle East trip with the Moscow summit meeting might be said to underline this almost cruelly.

To sum up, looking at the three phases of the crisis—development, confrontation and resolution—one may say that in each of them care for the detente appears to have been of more importance to the Russians than care for their local interests in the Middle East or care for the interests of their local allies, Egypt and Syria. One could not, on the other hand, say this of the United States: the detente was undoubtedly

cherished with great care and subtlety by Dr. Kissinger,[10] but during the confrontation phase at least, the vital interests (not *all* the interests) of the local ally, Israel, were accorded a higher priority. These differing priorities with regard to the detente undoubtedly reflected the fact that it is more useful and valuable to the Russians than to the Americans. Some critics of detente speak as if this were one of its disadvantages. On the contrary, it is the reason why it provides such diplomatic leverage for America. The more valuable the central relationship of detente is to the Russians, the less they can afford to put it at risk by 'pushing their luck' in crises in peripheral areas. And by these standards even the Middle East is a peripheral area of interest. This order of Russia's priorities seems clearly illustrated by its policies in the Middle East war, but the point might be regarded as confirmed by their policy (or quiescence) in the Cyprus crisis of 1974. A few years ago either the deposition of the Archbishop or the Turkish invasion would undoubtedly have inspired strenuous Soviet activity, with the objective of damaging Nato, preferably by evicting Britain from the sovereign bases. In 1974 the Russians managed only mild gestures of harassment in the United Nations.

Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy is predominantly one of carrots rather than sticks: he seeks and often receives acquiesence in his rearrangements of the world by showing the parties concerned that there is something in it for them: a better territorial settlement, or economic aid, or more acceptance, or a reopened Canal, or a securer flow of oil. In the Middle East crisis he used local inducements of this sort, of course, but in the case of the Russians they might hardly have been enough (considering the level of the Russian loss of local diplomatic advantage) without the more subtle network of inducements constituted by the detente.

[10] Especially in his choice of language, his readiness to consult the Russians, and his avoidance of imputing disruptive intentions to them.

THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR

LESSONS FOR UN PEACEKEEPING

Michael Harbottle

IT would be injudicious to predict that the re-establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping presence in the Middle East heralds a bright new era for international peacekeeping initiatives. One can, however, say with some confidence that the UN Emergency Force, and the factors that affected its constitution, give cause for hope that the instrument of peacekeeping will be used more often for the settlement of both inter-state and intra-state disputes. What had been written off in the majority of minds as having no viability after ten years in which no UN peacekeeping operations had been mounted, has suddenly become *de rigueur* and respectable once again. Much will depend upon geo-political attitudes towards third party interventions; in particular those of the two super-powers. But the Middle East war of October 1973 and the emergence of UNEF II, followed more recently by UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), is bound to encourage a more positive reaction by governments to the contribution that international forces can make to the peaceful settlement of disputes. More especially, it gives the Security Council a fresh opportunity to review the machinery and political procedures for mounting peacekeeping operations.

It cannot be right that one should have to justify a case for having peacekeeping institutions with third party capabilities. It is equally wrong that it should be necessary to justify the contribution that they can make and have made to the containment of violent conflict without recourse to counter-violence. But because of mistaken prejudices and misunderstanding of the function of peacekeeping forces and of the limitations on their objectives, they have tended to become the target of criticism and cynicism. Because of this, their undeniable potential has been ignored.

Why this misunderstanding and disregard? Fundamentally because the limitations and provisos under which such operations are undertaken are largely underestimated. Furthermore, the lack of political initiative coinciding with the peacekeeping presence, which has been the pattern of so many conflict crises since the Second World War, renders the single instrument of peacekeeping inconclusive and in certain instances counter-productive in the settlement of the dispute, despite the undeni-

able physical success of the operation itself. Since it is the peacekeeping that is providing the tangible on-stage effect while the political peacemaking remains in the wings, it is not unnatural that it is the former that is the target of all the brickbats of condemnation and contempt. This lack of perception has done much to damage the image of the peacekeeping machine and to cause its potential as a contribution to conflict control and resolution to be rated so low that nation states do not take it seriously.

Confusion exists over its function—and its functional capacity. Over the years, the term *peacekeeping* has acquired many connotations—from exercises in oppression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to more conventional military operations in Indo-china. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it has been the label by which all its internal security operations, including that in Northern Ireland, have been described. In this context the modus operandi has been enforcement, and the intervention has been second party in that it has invariably supported the established authority against those inclined towards overthrowing it. In no sense can these operations be described as *peacekeeping*; for peacekeeping by definition must be a third party intervention, peaceful and impartial—the task of a referee, equipped with a whistle rather than a gun with which to control the violence. UN peacekeeping is exactly that; an operation that is conducted without force, coercion or undue persuasion, but with tactful reasoning, quiet diplomacy and above all patient restraint. It is this difference in role between the unilateral and the United Nations' multinational approach that is so often forgotten when judgments are made of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.

The recent crisis in Cyprus illustrates very well what I mean. There were many who considered it ironic, to say the least, that the United Nations peacekeeping force was powerless to intervene, although its presence in Cyprus was to prevent fighting. Others, rather more scathing in their comments, cited it as yet another example of the inability of the United Nations effectively to rise to the occasion when a situation requires a positive response. Grandiose rather than modest achievements always seem to be expected from the United Nations, despite the obvious limitations under which it has to act. Since therefore the correct interpretation has a direct bearing on any discussion of the future of international peacekeeping, it is important to underline this vital point of concept so that the premise on which this attempt at defining prospects and possibilities is founded will be clear and understood.

For the past eighteen years the two salient principles that have governed the creation and implementation of United Nations peacekeeping operations have been (a) that they should be of a peaceful, not of an enforcement nature, and (b) that they should be mounted only at

the request, or with the consent, of those who are a party to the dispute. Though not necessarily running contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, these provisos do not square with the intentions or the visions of the founder members of the United Nations, who envisaged enforcement action as being the only collective measure by which to preserve international peace and security. This divergence from the fundamental principle of the Charter followed the controversy over the Korean War where, because of Russia's absence from the Security Council and its debates on account of its opposition to the seating of China's representative as president of the Council, it proved possible to mount a UN operation in exact accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Such a circumstance is not likely to occur again, particularly in view of the appearance of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations; and therefore the Korean episode can be expected to be a single exception to the general rule for peacekeeping operations that has dictated their character ever since.

This change in the concept of peacekeeping has over the years polarised opinion as to its validity and acceptability, the chief protagonists being the United States and the Soviet Union. The super-powers have in the main argued the issues of procedure, and of command and control. Because of the divergence of opinion, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was set up by a General Assembly resolution in 1965, but has so far failed to agree on proposals for improving the machinery and procedural system for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. This impasse has had a significant effect on the attitudes of member states towards the intervention of international forces in conflict situations, with the result that there has been only inconclusive and often total inaction by the Security Council at times when international peace and security have been in jeopardy. It has also meant that the potential contribution that UN peacekeeping could make towards achieving a de-escalation and reduction in tension in violent conflict situations has too often been ignored. Hence the United Nations was powerless to intervene in the Nigeria-Biafra war and in Bangladesh. Although, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, the United Nations had no call to intervene unless requested, the precedents of the Congo and Cyprus already existed to enable such a request to be made—had there been any inclination on the part of Nigeria and Pakistan to do so. Northern Ireland is another case in which a sovereign state could have sought help from the United Nations.

The prejudices that have often immobilised the Security Council's consideration of highly explosive international situations and restricted the use of international forces in dealing with them, stem from lack of confidence in the viability of such forces and suspicion that there is an ulterior imperialist design connected with their intervention. This has

led to a definite polarisation of geopolitical attitudes, with the Third World particularly tending towards the latter belief. In the case of the big powers the United States, although generally in favour, will resist strongly any question of UN intervention whenever or wherever its own interests are involved—when they are it prefers to deal with the matter outside the framework of the United Nations as it did in Santo Domingo in 1964. The Soviet Union reacts to UN intervention in the same way, but has also maintained that peacekeeping as it is now practised by the United Nations does not accord with the Charter and does not therefore have a standing in international law. It is for this reason that Russia and France, which has taken the same view, have always refused to pay their legal dues towards the costs of peacekeeping as required by Article 17 (2). Russia, not unnaturally, tends to support the attitude of the Third World countries towards peacekeeping, while the People's Republic of China, which sees itself as the champion of the Third World, unequivocally opposes UN peacekeeping operations of any kind on the principle that they are an interference in conflicts which are the concern of the state or states involved and of no one else. With this array of opposites, it is surprising that the United Nations has been able to undertake the operations and missions that it has. It is even more significant that after a vacuum of nearly ten years in which no new UN peacekeeping operations were undertaken, the United Nations is once more in the peacekeeping business. Because of their implications in terms of future peacekeeping prospects and possibilities, the influences and considerations that created UNEF II are worth noting.

The role of the smaller powers in 1973

On the afternoon of October 6, 1973, the fourth war in twenty-five years of Middle East history broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbours. On October 7, the Security Council met to discuss the situation. Further meetings were held on October 9, 11 and 12, but no peace initiative emerged because of a lack of consensus among the Council's members. The United Nations appeared once again to be living up to its popular reputation for talking a lot but achieving nothing. In the meantime, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had been holding an almost non-stop dialogue with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, which initiated a direct communication between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev. Even so, dangerous moves by both super-powers, involving Russia's declared intent to send troops to Egypt, and America's counter-action of placing its nuclear force on war alert, threatened to destroy the detente and with it any chance of peace in the Middle East. The storm passed and on October 20, Kissinger flew to Moscow for talks with the Russian leaders. From

these overtures came the first glimmerings of a unity of purpose which crystallised in the joint resolution 338 on October 22. The resolution required a cease-fire *in situ* no later than twelve hours after the Security Council had adopted the resolution.

A number of factors may have influenced the super-powers to act in unison, but there seems little doubt that the primary consideration was that both had recognised that they were on an undesired collision course which, unless rectified, could lead to a direct confrontation between them. The consequences could have been catastrophic and to avoid them they had to act promptly and together—through the organs of the United Nations. Whatever the failings of the United Nations as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and in spite of its dependence upon the vagaries and self-interests of the super-powers, it is the means by which super-power diplomacy and peace initiatives can be given effect; an instrument that even the super-powers find necessary to turn to on occasion in order to implement peace agreements. The United States and the Soviet Union could not by themselves have imposed the ceasefire on either Israel or the Arabs; it needed the sanction and authority of the Security Council.

This emphasis on the United Nations' role became even more evident a few days later on October 25, when with fighting continuing, the Security Council met to consider a resolution calling for the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Sinai (SC Res. 340). This resolution was brought by the eight non-permanent members of the Council—Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia. When debated the permanent members, excluding China, supported the resolution. This initiative on the part of the smaller nations in creating a UN peacekeeping presence in the Middle East is an important illustration of how the United Nations can still take effective action in an international emergency when the big powers find themselves incapable of influencing events or achieving on their own the conditions that are required for the maintenance of peace and security. It is of course true that without the support of the big powers, the machinery of the Security Council is powerless to implement the resolutions placed before it—nor would it be seized with any such responsibility if it were not in the interests of the super-powers. No doubt on many occasions in the future self interest will prevail, but at least it is a hopeful sign that there are instances of world crisis, as in the Middle East in October 1973, where the interests of the big powers coincide.

The resolution for creating UNEF II was approved in the Security Council with no votes cast against—China simply dissociated itself from the debate and the voting. Initially, UNEF II was created by drawing on the peace force already in Cyprus and the first troops to arrive in the canal zone were the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish contingents from

UNFICYP, followed soon after by the Irish. Later this optimum force was strengthened by the arrival of contingents from Canada, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland and Senegal. The physical mounting of the operation is a story in itself and is an impressive example of multi-national co-operation overcoming the incredibly complex problems arising out of the kind of ad hoc deployments which are the trademark of UN peacekeeping operations. Suffice it to say that the first troops of the United Nations were on the Canal negotiating ceasefire agreements within 36 hours of the order arriving at UNFICYP headquarters from New York. UNFICYP's presence close by was a fortuitous bonus in the creation of UNEF II and cannot be looked upon as a classic model for the future. There is, however, an important detail of the UNEF operation that should not be overlooked. The first contingents into Egypt were seasoned UN soldiers from countries that have had continuing experience of international peacekeeping. Although they came from what could at that time be called a sedentary role in Cyprus to a hot war in Egypt, they were mentally equipped to react immediately to their new roles and to assume their responsibilities within hours of their arrival. Had it been otherwise, the quick reaction on arrival in Egypt would have been lacking. Had the inexperienced arrived first the whole operation would have taken much longer to take effect—which might have had a fatal effect on its momentum and subsequent effectiveness. This is no criticism of the less experienced contingents; they themselves were well aware of their inadequacies and lack of preparation. Some individuals freely admitted that they had little or no idea of the role they were required to perform. They will learn, and learn fast, as their predecessors have done before them—but the hard way. Pre-education, preparation and preparedness would have done much to alleviate their deficiencies.

If the fault lies anywhere, it lies with the United Nations for not giving member states the information they need to prepare themselves. There is no UN handbook or guide to peacekeeping; the policy of the Secretariat has never been to publish evaluations or commentaries based on past experience of peacekeeping operations and missions. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the small member states can acquire the information they seek. Clearly, some kind of handbook is necessary, consolidating in one manual the essence of the information required; the peacekeeping provisions of the Charter, the peacekeeping machinery within the organs of the United Nations, the legal and broad political aspects of the Status of the Force, the mounting and functioning of forces, standing operating procedures and the use of force, as well as aids to preparation and training. The need for such a handbook is strongly supported by almost all those who have a wide experience of international peacekeeping, particularly those who have held senior

command and staff appointments; an opinion borne out and confirmed during my visit to UNEF II, UNTSO and UNFICYP in January this year.[1]

In the Middle East we have seen UNEF II pass through two phases of what could and should be a three-phase operation. In the beginning it established a 'thin blue line' between two armies locked in battle. In January it moved into its second phase, the establishment of a narrow buffer zone to maintain a territorial vacuum between the Arab and Israeli forces, thereby providing a temporary safeguard against a renewal of hostilities. It will depend upon the progress made at Geneva towards reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute whether or not a third phase will materialise; but if one does, the UN may be called upon to fulfil a more comprehensive role. If it is, then a more substantial ground buffer will be required than those which at present exist in Sinai and on the Golan Heights so that acceptable guaranteed safeguards can be offered. This implies demilitarised zones deep enough and strongly enough held to withstand infiltration or erosion.

The future role of UNEF II and UNDOF will not only depend upon the outcome of any peace conference, but also on any change of attitude that may occur among UN members as a result of this successful reactivation of the UN's peacekeeping machine. But the extent of the UN objective must not rest only upon keeping Arab and Jew apart; more important, it must be to bring together the parties to the dispute. This entails a positive political initiative of mediation and negotiation, as well as a major peace-building effort embracing social and economic reconciliation and reconstruction aimed at creating a peaceful inter-state co-existence on which a more stable and peaceful situation can be founded. This will be a hard and lengthy task but one which must be attempted; the absence of any determined peace initiative in the Middle East after the 1956 war made the 1967 war inevitable. This time peacekeeping, peacemaking and, most important, peacebuilding must go hand in hand.

Peacekeeping becomes a multi-professional commitment

What can be done to improve the United Nations' capability for keeping the peace? As at present politically structured, its pre-conflict action is likely to be limited to mediatory interventions of the kind introduced into the Iran-Iraq border dispute of February 1974, when the Secretary-General's special representative, Señor Luis Weckmann-Munoz of Mexico (now his special representative in Cyprus) was able to procure

[1] A handbook is shortly to be prepared by the International Peace Academy.

a solution to that problem before serious hostilities broke out between the two countries. Where hostilities of a major character break out, as in the Middle East in October 1973 and in Cyprus in July 1974, the problem of restoring order becomes much more complex—and generally involves top-level shuttle diplomacy by one or both of the super-powers before a ceasefire can be arranged. The level at which these negotiations are carried out is, in my view, of less significance than their subsequent endorsement and promulgation by the United Nations. The authoritative weight of the member states in the Security Council is more likely to achieve a continuing ceasefire and a reconstruction of both military and social stability than is a single state—even a super-power. It is therefore encouraging that in its resolutions in respect of the Middle East and Cyprus wars, the vote in the Security Council was a unanimous one (the People's Republic of China for the reasons already given took no part in either debate and did not cast a vote). In the case of the sending of a special representative to Iran and Iraq, the Security Council was equally unanimous in its vote.

If then there is a growing unanimity among permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council that it should not only act forthrightly to stop wars, but that it should be the instrument through which initiatives towards this end should be taken, there is an urgent need to improve the procedural and physical machinery for developing peacekeeping techniques and the operational skills required in their practical application. This does not mean revising the Charter of the United Nations in order to embrace new innovative ideas. It means using the Charter as it stands and the organs existing in the UN organisation with greater flexibility. Even in the case of Article 43, which requires all member states to make available 'armed forces, assistance and facilities ... for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security', a more flexible approach is possible; it should involve a less formal and rigid agreement and allow nations more freedom of choice in deciding the kind of contribution and type of operational commitment they are prepared to undertake. A less demanding commitment than that set out in Article 43 could have the effect of encouraging member states to nominate options which they would be prepared to take up on behalf of the United Nations. In other ways too the machinery of the United Nations can be strengthened to meet the peacekeeping responsibility—a reactivation of the Military Staff Committee to a more positive and broadly based role in its relationship with the Security Council; a multi-professional advisory group including political, diplomatic, military, legal, economic and research members whose advice to the Secretary-General could be of some significant value in the preparation and conduct of peacekeeping operations; the creation of a data bank of case studies on conflict which could provide a form of early warning system for the

Security Council and alert it to the developing threat of potential conflict; the development of expertise and techniques directed at improving the overall capacity of member states to undertake commitments under a re-vamped Article 43. These and other related areas need to be examined if UN peacekeeping is to become a potent force in the settlement of disputes. But more than anything else it is the concept of international peacekeeping that requires to be re-examined. No longer is it enough to think of peacekeeping in terms of a purely military operation—it has become a multi-professional commitment.

The essence of peacekeeping is not only to separate the disputants and keep them apart, but ultimately to bring them together. All too often the United Nations and the concerned powers have limited themselves to the former objective. Peacekeeping alone, operating in a vacuum, will eventually become counter-productive, however physically successful it may have been at the start. To be productive it must be closely linked to an overall peace effort. Only in this way can a positive rather than a negative result emerge in the Middle East and Cyprus.

In the Middle East, as already indicated, the second phase of the UN operation is in progress. In Cyprus, where in a matter of days UN achievements over ten years may well have been negated, the long haul back has begun. If as a result of a Geneva settlement on the Middle East the role of UNEF II and UNDOF is enlarged, care must be taken to see that where demilitarised zones are established under UN control, these do not become military cantonments banning access to military and civilians alike. Rather they should assume the character of UN-supervised areas and become development areas in which a civilian community can live and work, cultivating the land, creating light industry, establishing co-operatives and building up private businesses. Hopefully, these protected zones would provide the opportunity for Arabs and Jews to live side by side and build up an inter-communal relationship. If this dual existence, constituting a kind of homogenous cocoon as a buffer around the state of Israel, comes about it will do more than anything else to establish the communication that is essential to reconciliation. In its creation the United Nations could play a significant role, providing a civilian administration as an interregnum for each zone until such a time as a joint community council was ready to take over. An interregnum is nothing new to the United Nations; one was set up in West Irian during 1962–63.

This may seem to be a giant step into the future, but if confidence can be kindled and fear allayed by such development projects, the reconciliation that could derive from inter-community relations within a demilitarised zone could make that significant difference to the strengthening of any peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The United Nations has a clear-cut role to see that once peace has been made at

Geneva, peacekeeping and peacebuilding go hand in hand in the Middle East.

In Cyprus restoration of the morale, confidence and trust of the two communities is as important as the prevention of fighting between them. Any progress that had been made towards peaceful co-existence has been washed away. The UN must recreate the incentive and this is going to require a major peace-building effort, linked and co-ordinated with the peacekeeping operation.

Peacekeeping is three dimensional in character and design, incorporating elements of peacemaking and peace building. Peacekeeping is a variation on a theme; adjusting to the character of the conflict for which it is required. It is like a doctor's treatment of a patient—the prescription applied must be appropriate to the complaint. Peacekeeping is nothing more than a relief operation for a man-made disaster and requires a broad range of professional skills and techniques. This should be the blueprint on which future operations should be constructed and developed. The Middle East and Cyprus give the United Nations the opportunity for that development. It would be most regrettable if the opportunity were missed; for peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building are indivisible and represent a multi-professional commitment in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

NEW LIGHT ON ABSTENTIONS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Sydney D. Bailey

ARTICLE 27 of the UN Charter deals with voting, the veto, and obligatory abstentions by parties to a case before the Council. It reads as follows:

> 1. . . .
> 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [since the enlargement of the Council in 1965, 'nine'] members;
> 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [since 1965, 'nine'] members including the concurring votes of the [five] permanent members; provided that, in decisions [on the pacific settlement of disputes], a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Three questions about the third paragraph instantly spring to mind. First, how shall it be determined that a decision is a matter of substance rather than procedure and thus within the scope of the veto? Second, can a member which is a party to a case before the Council evade the obligation to abstain by describing the matter as a 'situation' or some similar nondescript expression rather than a 'dispute'? Third, does 'concurring votes of the permanent members' mean the same as *affirmative* votes, or may a permanent member abstain from voting without this constituting a veto?

The first question was partially answered at the San Francisco conference: the second and third questions were resolved in surprising ways by the practice of the Council during its first year of working. The recent publication of the documents on US foreign policy for 1946 sheds interesting new light on the way the practices evolved. British archives for 1946 are still covered by the thirty-year rule.

The draft Charter which emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks conferences in 1944 contained no provisions for voting in the Security Council. This was not an oversight: the problem had been discussed exhaustively among the four governments sponsoring the San Francisco conference, but agreement had not been reached. The Soviet Union had wanted great power unanimity (that is to say, the veto) to cover all phases of the work of the Security Council, including decisions to investigate a matter brought to the Council's attention. Britain and the United States, supported by China, agreed that enforcement action by

the Security Council should be subject to great power veto, but they thought that the medium and smaller powers would have no faith in a Security Council from which even investigation of their grievances could be prevented by the ukase of a great power.

The compromise which eventually became Article 27 of the Charter was drafted in the State Department after Dumbarton Oaks and submitted to President Roosevelt on November 15, 1944. Roosevelt accepted the proposal, and on December 5 it was sent to London and Moscow, with the idea that the matter could be initially discussed through diplomatic channels and then settled at a meeting of the three heads of government. Churchill was at first unenthusiastic, but on January 14, 1945, the British Embassy in Washington was able to tell the State Department of Britain's agreement. The Soviet Union had more deep-seated reservations, but on February 7, at the Yalta summit conference, Molotov indicated that the American formula was 'entirely acceptable' as it 'fully guaranteed the unity of the Great Powers in the ... preservation of peace'.[1] Lord Gladwyn, who was in the British delegation at Yalta, considers that neither Roosevelt, Churchill, nor Stalin really understood what they were agreeing to. The two Western powers accepted a more extensive use of the veto than they themselves wanted, and Stalin agreed to have the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine as UN members rather than all sixteen Soviet Republics, as he had originally proposed. Without some such diplomatic bargain, there would have been no United Nations, or a truncated organisation without the Soviet Union.[2]

Under the leadership of H. V. Evatt of Australia ('the most frightful man in the world', noted Sir Alexander Cadogan in his diary on May 23, 1945[3]), the medium and smaller powers made a major onslaught on the veto at the San Francisco conference, as a result of which the first question came to be answered. A meeting of the Big Four[4] to discuss voting in the Security Council was held on May 26, 1945, and, according to the informal notes of the meeting kept by one of the Americans,

> Mr. [Gladwyn] Jebb commented that some fool had already put the question and that the joker question was number 19. . . .[5]

This read:

> In case a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural matter, is that preliminary question to be considered in

[1] FRUS [*Foreign Relations of the United States*, Washington, DC: United States Govt. Printing Office (for USA Department of State)] *1945: Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1955, pp. 48–51, 55–77, 711–712.

[2] Conversation with Lord Gladwyn, Aug. 1, 1974.

[3] *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945*, edited by David Dilks, London: Cassell. 1971. p. 745.

[4] France was supposed to attend, but it was impossible to find a member of the French delegation.

[5] FRUS, 1945, vol. I, p. 933.

itself as a procedural matter or is the veto applicable to such a preliminary question?[6]

In a statement issued on June 8 by the four sponsoring governments, supported by France, it was blandly declared that in the 'unlikely' event of disagreement on the preliminary question, the decision would require 'the concurring votes of the permanent members'.[7]

This, in the jargon of the Council, is the Double Veto, which the Soviet Union has successfully used on three occasions: June 26, 1946, on the Spanish question; September 15, 1947, on the Greek frontier incidents; and May 24, 1948, on the Czechoslovak question. An attempt by Nationalist China to exercise a Double Veto on a proposal to invite the People's Republic of China to participate in a discussion of its complaint that the United States had resorted to armed aggression was thwarted by a presidential ruling (September 28, 1950), as was a Soviet attempt over the appointment of a sub-committee to inquire into the Laos question (September 7, 1959).

Obligatory abstentions

The second question about Article 27(3) concerns what is usually known as an obligatory abstention. The question had been raised at San Francisco as to whether an abstention by a party to a dispute would prevent the Council from reaching a decision (that is to say, whether an obligatory abstention by a permanent member would be inconsistent with 'the concurring votes of the permanent members ...'). The answer of the Big Five had been no.[8]

The possibility of a party to a dispute having to abstain arose three times during the first month of the Security Council's work (January 17 to February 16, 1946): in connection with Iran's complaint of Soviet intervention, the Soviet complaint that Britain was interfering in Greece's internal affairs, and the complaints of Syria and the Lebanon about the continued presence on their soil of British and French troops. Iran repeatedly insisted in the Council that a 'dispute' existed with the Soviet Union, but Vyshinsky, speaking in the Council on February 16, denied that there was any dispute or conflict. Syria also alleged the existence of a dispute with Britain and France. Bidault challenged this, but Bevin took a plain man's view: 'If any accuser State says that there is a dispute, then there is a dispute ...'[9]

The Council's first President, Norman Makin of Australia, who was

[6] UN Conference on International Organization, 1945, vol. XI, p. 707.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 714. Benjamin Cohen, who was to become Counsellor in the State Department in July 1945, was 'gravely concerned' when he first heard about the San Francisco statement. Letter to the author, August 26, 1974.

[8] Wellington Koo Jr., *Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations*, Columbia University Press, 1947, p. 156.

[9] SCOR [Security Council Official Records], 3rd mtg. (Jan. 28, 1946), pp. 33–34, 39–43; 19th mtg. (Feb. 14, 1946), p. 276; 23rd mtg. (Feb. 16, 1946), pp. 357–359.

lacking in diplomatic experience but had plenty of common sense, held that whether or not a matter was technically a dispute (in which case the parties would have to abstain on non-procedural proposals for peaceful settlement) was a question to be decided by the Council itself rather than by the parties—although on one occasion he jumped the gun by concluding prematurely that the Council had already decided that the complaints of Syria and the Lebanon constituted a dispute. Makin was supported in his basic position, though from very different motives, by Egypt, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union.[10]

In the event, the first phase of the Iranian complaint ended when the Council approved a harmless proposal submitted by Bevin. When it came to the vote, Makin asked: 'Are there any objections? If not, the resolution is adopted unanimously.'[11] As the Council had not determined that the Iranian complaint was a 'dispute' Makin took the view that the Soviet Union was not required to abstain.

The question whether Britain would have to abstain in the first phase of the Greek issue was carefully evaded. At the end of the debate, the President simply declared that the Council, having heard different views, had disposed of the matter.[12]

In the case of the complaints of Syria and the Lebanon, the procedure was more complicated—though the outcome was an anti-climax. Egypt (a member of the Council) agreed with the President that it was for the Council to decide whether a dispute existed, but he formally moved that this preliminary decision would be procedural and thus outside the scope of the veto. Vyshinsky immediately intervened with an assertion that the preliminary question was substantive, and he cited the San Francisco statement on the veto. Norman Makin hastily put to the Council a proposal that the Egyptian motion be deferred.[13]

Although the Soviet Union held that a dispute existed and, moreover, was threatening to use the Double Veto to ensure that the Council came to the same conclusion, this was a demonstration of unnecessary bravado, because both Britain and France had said that they did not intend to vote. Various proposals were put to the vote and failed to get enough support to be adopted. An American proposal that the Council should express confidence that 'foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn as soon as practicable' was then put to the vote. Seven members voted in favour, with Britain and France still abstaining; the President then declared that the proposal had been adopted. Vyshinsky at once asked for the floor to point out that he had voted in the negative—the first use of the veto. Makin had to correct his earlier

[10] *Ibid.*, 3rd mtg. (Jan. 28, 1946), p. 44; 7th mtg. (Feb. 4, 1946), p. 125; 19th mtg. (Feb. 14, 1946), pp. 272, 277, 279; 23rd mtg. (Feb. 16, 1946), pp. 357, 360.

[11] *Ibid.*, 5th mtg. (Jan. 30, 1946), p. 71.

[12] *Ibid.*, 10th mtg. (Feb. 6, 1946), pp. 171–172.

[13] *Ibid.*, 19th mtg. (Feb. 14, 1946), pp. 274, 279–281.

statement and say that the proposal had *not* been adopted, but not before Bevin and Bidault had declared their intention of carrying out 'the majority decision of the Council . . .' [14]

The Security Council was at this stage operating under temporary rules of procedure drafted by the UN Preparatory Commission, and a Committee of Experts (with the same membership as the Council itself) was preparing what was intended to be a definitive set of rules. The Committee of Experts held its first meetings in London from January 17 to February 8, 1946, resuming its work in New York on March 20. In preparation for this resumption, the Secretariat issued a paper dealing with some procedural problems which had come to light since the Council had started work. In connection with the question of disputes, the Secretariat pointed out that, from the Charter point of view, the distinction between a 'situation' and a 'dispute' is important for three reasons:

1. In the case of a dispute, a party is obliged to abstain from voting on substantive proposals for peaceful settlement.
2. In the case of a dispute, the Council 'shall' invite a non-member which is a party to the dispute to participate, without vote, in the discussion (Article 32 of the Charter); in the case of a mere situation, the Council 'may' invite a non-member to participate, without vote, when the Council considers that the interests of that state are specially affected (Article 31).
3. In the case of a dispute, the Council may recommend 'terms of settlement', whereas in the case of a situation, it may recommend only 'procedures or methods of adjustment' (Articles 36 and 37).

The Secretariat stated that the 'consensus of opinion within the Council' was that the Security Council itself should decide whether a matter was a situation or a dispute, and that this determination should not be made until after the parties had been heard. But the Secretariat had not at that stage realised that a non-member of the Council may draw the attention of the Council to a matter without itself being a party (though it should have done, since this had occurred two months earlier over the Ukrainian complaint about the disturbed conditions in Indonesia).[15]

During the next phase of the work of the Committee of Experts, the Soviet Union made a determined attempt to entrench in the Security Council's rules of procedure not only the Double Veto as outlined in the San Francisco statement, but an expanded version of it. On March 22, the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee the following draft rule.

Should the Security Council consider a dispute [the continuance of

[14] *Ibid.*, 23rd mtg. (Feb. 16, 1946), pp. 357, 361–368.
[15] SCOR, 1st year, 1st series, Supplement no. 2, pp. 11–15.

which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security], a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting . . .

Should the Security Council consider a situation [which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute] or any other dispute [that is to say, a dispute which is *not* likely to endanger international peace and security], all the members of the Security Council are entitled to participate in voting.

The decision of whether the question . . . is of a procedural nature and also of whether the question . . . is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute [is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security] shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council *including the concurring votes of all the permanent members* . . .'[16]

The reactions to this move varied. The British Foreign Office wanted to exclude from the scope of the veto any decision as to whether a matter was a dispute or a situation, and to do this by seeking agreement on a definition of what constituted a dispute. Joseph Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs in the State Department and at this time seconded to New York to work on the UN Committee of Experts, and Nicholas Lawford, his British opposite number, hoped to solve the problem by eliminating the distinction between disputes and situations. Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the State Department, favoured separating decisions about disputes and situations from decisions about whether, in any particular case, a party should abstain. Benjamin Cohen, formerly of the White House staff and by this time the Counsellor in the State Department, was 'the chief proponent ... [of the position] that an abstention by a permanent member would not constitute a veto.'[17] Cohen hoped to resolve the issue by settling decisions about whether or not a dispute existed and whether or not a particular State was a party by means of a ruling of the Council's President, subject to challenge, rather than by a vote in the Council[18]—although a notation by Hiss on a Cohen memorandum reads '. . . doesn't cover a "situation".' US Secretary of State, James Byrnes, eventually tried to combine the approaches of Hiss and of Johnson and Lawford, which did not please Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Ambassador in New York, or the Foreign Office in London.[19]

Hiss defined his own position in a memorndum dated March 28. He conceded that there could be legitimate differences of opinion both on whether or not a dispute existed in a particular case and on whether

16 FRUS, 1946, vol. I, 1972, p. 252 (my italics). 'The interpretation of the [San Francisco] statement which the Soviet [Union] unsuccessfully sought to have the Committee of Experts incorporate in the Rules of Procedure was not an interpretation but a revision of the Charter . . .' Benjamin Cohen, letter of August 26, 1974.

17 Note by Joseph E. Johnson, July 30, 1974. Johnson stresses the important role played by Cohen after Byrnes had become Secretary of State.

18 Cohen wrote his memorandum after talking with Secretary of State Byrnes. Letter of August 26, 1974.

19 FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 254–257, 259–260, 263, 276, 278 280.

a decision on this question should be a procedural matter (no veto) or one of the 'all other matters' (veto applies).[20] But Hiss wanted to separate this from the quite different question whether a party in a particular case was under an obligation to abstain from voting, which Hiss considered should be decided by a procedural vote in the Council. He noted that in the case of the complaints of Syria and the Lebanon, Britain and France were quite willing to renounce the right to vote but 'might very well have resisted' a determination that a dispute existed. Hiss favoured submitting his approach to the Committee of Experts 'in order to clarify the basic issue ...', but he accepted that this would lead to an impasse. This should not be viewed in too tragic a light, he felt, because opposition to the idea would come only from a state wishing to be a judge in its own cause, and this was 'a most untenable position vis-à-vis world opinion ...'[21]

On March 27, Lawford had handed to Johnson the definition of a dispute which had been drafted in the Foreign Office. Lawford commented to Johnson that the definition 'did not help a great deal' but that he had been 'instructed to work very closely with the U.S.' The draft was 'not meant to be all inclusive, but was designed to narrow the area of uncertainty ...'. The Foreign Office's rather inelegant definition was as follows:

> In deciding under Chapter VI of the Charter [pacific settlement of disputes] whether a matter . . . is a dispute, or a situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dispute arises:
>
> (1) If state or states bringing the matter before the Security Council, and the state or states whose conduct is impugned, agree that there is a dispute;
>
> (2) Whenever the state or states bringing the matter before the Council allege actions or intentions of another state are endangering, or are likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security, and state or states which are subject to these allegations contest [or do not admit] some or all of the facts or inferences to be drawn from the facts;
>
> (3) Further, if a state bringing a matter before the Council, alleges that another state is violating the rights of a third state, and the latter supports the contentions of the first state, then the third state shall also be deemed to be a party to the dispute.[22]

The United States did not like this definition—indeed, any definition—because of its wish to interpret Article 27(3) of the Charter as covering situations as well as disputes. Eventually on May 29, Stettinius (by this time US Ambassador to the United Nations) cabled Byrnes in Washington that he had discussed the veto the previous day with Sir

[20] '"Procedural" seemed to us in our innocence good plain speaking ... "All other matters" left no room, we fondly thought, for quibbles.' Alger Hiss, in a letter to the author dated July 18, 1974.

[21] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 255-257; also p. 266.

[22] Ibid., pp. 253-255, 279 (addition in square brackets in para. (2) inserted subsequently).

Alexander Cadogan, Lawford, and Paul Gore-Booth. Nobody seemed to like the Foreign Office draft, though Gore-Booth said that 'one of the purposes of the proposed definition [was] to wipe away the distinction between "situations" and "disputes" ...'—which indicated either that the British proposal had been very badly drafted or that Gore-Booth had misunderstood the draft's purport. It was, nevertheless, agreed that a definition of a dispute might be useful, and Lawford and Johnson were asked to prepare a new paper.[23]

What happened next is not absolutely clear from the American documents, but it is evident that the Foreign Office was unwilling to abandon its draft, for a fortnight later (June 11), Lawford told Johnson that he would probably put in the British text 'in about a week', with one minor amendment as shown above in square brackets in the second paragraph. Johnson at once cabled Hiss in Washington (June 12) urging that every effort should be made to persuade Britain not to put forward the definition. Johnson had another conversation with Lawford (June 13) who 'fully understands our [US] position and is obviously unhappy about both the text of the proposal and the Foreign Office's insistence of [*sic*] introducing it now ...' Lawford suggested to Johnson, who passed on the idea to Hiss in Washington, that Benjamin Cohen, who was then in Paris for the Council of Foreign Ministers, should take the matter up with Gladwyn Jebb.

On June 20, Cohen and Jebb met over lunch. Cohen explained that he was not opposed to the principle of defining a dispute but that he had misgivings about the adequacy and timeliness of the British draft. He considered it premature to attempt to define or codify the meaning of a dispute or situation.

> To do so would open up all the problems of voting procedures on which agreement was not likely at this time [1946]. It was wiser to proceed case by case in pragmatic fashion and to hope [that] from experience would come agreement . . . I think these were the considerations I stressed with [Gladwyn Jebb] ...

Jebb, who did not care greatly for legal details, was non-committal but sympathetic. He told Cohen the usual story in such situations—'that there was a division among their people' about the American position. The Foreign Office had thought a definition 'might be helpful rather than harmful', but Jebb himself was 'inclined to agree' with the United States.[24] It would appear from the published American documents that the State Department thought that the Cohen-Jebb exchange of views had achieved its purpose, but it is clear from subsequent developments that the Foreign Office had not abandoned the draft definition, merely filed it away for future use.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 276–277, 288.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 277–282, 289; letter from Benjamin Cohen to the author, August 26, 1947.

The matter arose again in 1948 in a sub-committee of the Interim Committee (the so-called Little Assembly). Britain showed admirable tenacity by again suggesting that 'a formula be devised for the definition of a dispute . . . ', and, after exchanges of view with friendly states, submitted an improved version of the 1946 draft definition. The United States, for its part, suggested that the Charter requires that a party to a dispute '*or a party involved in a situation*' should abstain on pacific settlement proposals. China proposed that the determination of whether a matter was a dispute or a situation should be excluded from the scope of the veto.[25] It was quite like old times, even though the Soviet bloc was boycotting the Interim Committee. The outcome was as inconclusive as it had been in the early months of 1946, except that the following year, arising from a report of the Interim Committee, the General Assembly approved a long list of matters which the Security Council was recommended to 'deem procedural'—which was to finesse the question of obligatory abstentions.[26]

By the autumn of 1946, a number of foreign ministries were having second thoughts about the United Nations in general and the veto in particular. Sir Eric Beckett, Legal Adviser in the British Foreign Office, who had not been at Dumbarton Oaks or San Francisco, thought that it was a mistake ever to have agreed to a compromise for Article 27(3). Beckett was, in Lord Gladwyn's view, 'a legal perfectionist.'[27] The United States was by this time taking the position, first, that the omission of 'situations' from Article 27(3) of the Charter was 'inadvertent',[28] a mere drafting error; and, second, that it had been imprudent of the United States to have agreed to the San Francisco statement on the veto, which in the view of some American officials was no longer binding.[29]

Lord Gore-Booth, who was present at San Francisco, questions the first American assumption.

> I would very much doubt whether 'situations' were omitted from Article 27(3) 'inadvertently'. There was very little 'inadvertence' . . . at San Francisco, which was a very thorough conference indeed. My impression . . . is that a real distinction was drawn . . . between disputes and situations, and that this was partly due at least to the hope of a somewhat less intransigent Soviet line than emerged in the immediate post-war period. . . .[30]

Lord Gladwyn, on the other hand, believes that the intention had always been to prevent a state from being a judge in its own cause, and

[25] General Assembly Official Records, 3rd Session, Supplement no. 10, pp. 7–8 (my italics).
[26] General Assembly res. 267 (111), April 14, 1949.
[27] Conversation with Lord Gladwyn, Aug. 1, 1974.
[28] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 268, 286. Cohen confesses to having had some '*unexpressed* misgivings' about the American attempt to deny any distinction between disputes and situations. Letter of August 26, 1974.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 294, 302–307, 328, 338, 339.
[30] Note to the author, July 5, 1974.

that it had not been realised at Yalta or San Francisco that there was a loophole in the text of Article 27(3).[31] Sir Charles Webster, who had been a senior adviser in the British delegation at San Francisco, took much the same position. He pointed out that the British attitude had been derived from Article 15(6) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 'Situations', he said, had been added to parts of the Charter at Dumbarton Oaks 'by a desire for exactness of language . . . at the instance of the United States', but by mistake had not been incorporated in Article 27(3). 'This omission . . . was to cause great difficulty . . .'[32]

China went even further than this. In the Committee of Experts in 1946, China held not only that the intention of those who drafted Article 27 had always been that parties to any case before the Council, whether labelled a dispute or not, had to abstain, but that this was apparent from a reading of the Charter as a whole. While Article 27(3) might seem clear when considered in isolation, 'it is not clear when read together with the provisions of Chapter VI.'

> [I]t was clearly the intention of the authors to exclude from voting those States involved directly in a matter whose continuance might endanger international peace and security.[33]

Alger Hiss, who played a considerable part in drafting Article 27(3), admits that there was ambiguity but suggests that this was not accidental. In a recent letter to the author, Hiss writes:

> When we drafted the veto provisions, we thought it was rather elegant . . . to finesse such prickly terms as 'disputes'. . . .[34]

As for the status of the San Francisco statement, this has always been uncertain. It was not part of the Charter, and it has been argued that it committed only the Big Five. On the other hand, the original members of the United Nations signed the Charter in the full knowledge of the Big Five's interpretation of Article 27(3). There was, indeed, a test vote at San Francisco on Evatt's proposal to eliminate the veto entirely regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, but this was lost by 10 votes to 20, with another 20 states abstaining or absent. The Yalta formula was then approved, and the statement of the Big Five was annexed to the rapporteur's report.

The problem of obligatory abstentions eventually evaporated, not through clever drafting but when states realised that it was not in their interest to label matters submitted to the Security Council as *disputes*.

[31] Conversation, Aug. 1, 1974.

[32] Creighton Lecture, Nov. 19, 1946, 'The making of the Charter of the United Nations', reprinted in *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy*, London: Chatto and Windus. 1961. pp. 80, 84, 87.

[33] Liang Yuen-li, 'The Settlement of Disputes in the Security Council: the Yalta Voting Formula', London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. *British Year Book of International Law*, vol. 24 (1947), pp. 350, 353.

[34] Letter dated July 18, 1974.

Why should a member of the Council risk losing its vote on non-procedural proposals for peaceful settlement? Why should non-members risk debarring their friends or allies from voting? Most items are now described as questions, occasionally as situations; but never as disputes. The only matter which the Security Council has determined was a dispute was the India-Pakistan question (April 21, 1948).

In its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the International Court of Justice held that the provision in Article 27(3) whereby parties to a dispute must abstain on proposals for peaceful settlement 'requires for its application the prior determination that a dispute exists and that certain members of the Council are involved as parties to such dispute.' The Court stated that the question of Namibia had been placed on the Council's agenda as a situation and not as a dispute, and that nobody had objected.[35]

The evasion of the intentions underlying the provision in Article 27 (3) for obligatory abstentions has had consequences which were never envisaged in 1945. It would be tedious to give a comprehensive list of occasions when parties have voted on proposals for peaceful settlement: the following examples are illustrative only. All four occupying powers took part in a vote on the Berlin question on October 25, 1948. Britain and France voted on the principles for operating the Suez Canal (October 13, 1956). Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted on the Soviet complaint of American over-flying (July 26, 1960). The United States voted on a Chinese complaint that American aircraft had bombed China (September 12, 1950), on accusations that the United States had used bacterial weapons in Korea (July 3, 1952), and on a proposal relating to the future of the Panama Canal (March 21, 1973). The Soviet Union voted on the Hungarian question (November 4, 1956), and Britain on the dispute with Iraq about Bahrain (May 11, 1970). Jordan voted on a resolution after the raid on Samu by Israel's forces (November 25, 1966), and Zambia on a complaint that Portuguese aircraft from Mozambique had bombed a Zambian village (July 28, 1969).

There have, it is true, been a few cases where parties have abstained on peaceful settlement proposals, or not taken part in the vote—but only when it was pretty certain that this would not affect the outcome. The idea that a state should not be a judge in its own cause has been largely forgotten.

Voluntary abstentions

The Yalta formula on the veto uses slightly unusual wording. Decisions of the Security Council on merely procedural matters were to

[35] I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 22–23. The Court might, perhaps, have pointed out that the Namibia item was admitted to the Council's agenda in 1968 as *The question of*

be made 'by an affirmative vote of seven [now "nine"] members', but decisions on all other matters 'shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [now "nine"] members including the concurring votes of the permanent members . . .' (*dans lequel sont comprises les voix de tous les membres permanents* . . .). If the Americans, who drafted the formula, had meant that substantive decisions need the *affirmative* votes of the permanent members, why did they choose the word *concurring*? If the word *concurring* was chosen with care and deliberation in preference to *affirmative*, what was it supposed to mean? [36]

The expression 'concurring votes' had been included in the tentative American proposals of July 18, 1944, drafted before Dumbarton Oaks, and it was retained in the formula finally approved at Yalta. That most people thought that it meant unanimity is evident from the American Briefing Book prepared in advance of Yalta as well as from the explanations given by the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, at the conference itself, and later to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.[37] In the diplomatic jargon used at the time, Americans always meant unanimity when they used *concurrence*.[38] Sir Charles Webster took 'concurring votes' to mean 'assenting votes'.[39]

The matter came up at San Francisco after Sir Alexander Cadogan had suggested that if only the medium and smaller powers would agree on what they wanted to know, the Big Four would be delighted to answer.

> I suggested [Cadogan wrote to his wife] that we Four should withdraw (and go for a walk) and the rest could stay behind and try to formulate their questions. They didn't like that a bit, but it brought the meeting, so far as I was concerned, to an end.[40]

Twenty-three questions were eventually submitted to the four Sponsoring Powers and France, of which question 20 read in part:

> [W]ould the abstention from voting of any one of the permanent members . . . have the same effect as a negative vote . . . in preventing the Security Council from reaching a decision. . . ?[41]

Part of paragraph 9 of the reply of the Big Five reads:

> [I]f a majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural decisions, for *unanimity of the permanent members* plus the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members.[42]

South West Africa and it was only on March 20, 1969, that the item was changed to read *The situation in* Namibia. See SCOR, 1464th mtg., para. 10 (my italics).

36 In a letter of July 18, 1974, Alger Hiss has written to the author 'I always liked to think in a fantasy of sophistry [that "concurring"] could—if desired—be read as not identical with "affirmative".'

37 FRUS, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 86–88, 662, 682–683; 79th Congress, 1st sess., 211.

38 FRUS, 1945, vol. I, 1967, pp. 88, 150, 274, 432, 999.

39 Webster, p. 80.

40 *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945*, p. 644.

41 UN Conference on International Organization, 1945, vol. XI, p. 707.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 713 (my italics).

Some of Britain's friends were deeply worried about the San Francisco statement of June 8—Belgium and the Netherlands from among the Europeans, as well as Evatt of Australia and Fraser of New Zealand; Colombia and Cuba were spearheading outright opposition to the veto among the Latin Americans. After some gentle prodding from friendly states, Lord Halifax asked for an urgent meeting of the Big Five in order to reach an understanding on abstentions in the Council.

In preparation for this, the American delegation met at noon on Monday June 11. Senator Tom Connally commented that if a party to a dispute had to abstain, this would prevent the unanimity of the five powers. Stettinius, who was in the chair, was normally rather even-tempered but he was in a tetchy mood that morning because in his absence the previous weekend, American officials had arranged for the circulation of a document which he thought should have been kept under wraps. So when Connally made his comment, Stettinius retorted tartly that 'this was a ridiculous interpretation . . .'[43]

The Big Five met that afternoon, and the item on abstentions was introduced by Leo Pasvolsky, the American specialist on the Charter. Pasvolsky made two main points: that the five permanent members were required to vote on 'all important matters', and that 'abstention [by a permanent member] was equivalent to a negative vote'. But not when a party to a dispute has to abstain from voting in connection with peaceful settlement, interjected a member of the Soviet delegation. Of course, replied Pasvolsky, he had been speaking only of cases in which abstention was not obligatory.

Gromyko, Lord Halifax, and Victor Hoo of China agreed with the American explanation, but Paul-Boncour of France demurred. France was in an awkward mood at this time, wanting the privileges of a sponsor of the San Francisco conference but tending to question decisions reached at the Yalta meeting, in which France had not participated. Paul-Boncour said that in no parliament in the world did an abstention mean a negative vote. Halifax pointed out that the Security Council was not a parliament. Pasvolsky declared that under the Yalta formula, an abstention by a permanent member was equivalent to obstruction and the Council could not proceed; indeed, the provision for the concurrence of the permanent members meant that their abstention was 'not contemplated'. Gromyko agreed, and Stettinius said that there could be no such thing as an abstention by a permanent member, only the absence of an affirmative vote. Paul-Boncour said he would go along with the others 'as long as it was understood that there was no right of abstention for the permanent members . . .'[44]

The conference was not told of this meeting, and two days later,

[43] FRUS, 1945, vol. I, pp. 1236–1251.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 1258–1260.

Canada put forward a complicated amendment which would, in one of its effects, have provided that an abstention by a permanent member was not a veto. The reaction to the Canadian proposal was distinctly unfavourable, and it was withdrawn.[45]

When the Security Council began work the following January, the general understanding was that a permanent member's abstention had the same effect as a negative vote. Then, on March 27, 1946, Gromyko stalked out of a meeting of the Council on the Iranian question—according to the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, with the zipper of his trousers undone.[46] After informal consultations, the Council adopted a conciliatory American draft resolution on April 4, but in the absence of the Soviet representative. Nobody pronounced on whether the decision was procedural or substantive, and nobody asked whether the Soviet Union, by absenting itself, had or had not concurred in the decision.

No doubt the legal advisers in the various capitals had their anxieties about the course which had been followed in the absence of the Soviet Union from the Council. We now learn from the documents on US Foreign Relations for 1946 that four days after the vote (April 8), Benjamin Cohen in the State Department prepared a memorandum on the abstention problem. Cohen, perhaps having been reminded of Senator Connally's comment at San Francisco, noted that a party to a dispute had to abstain on decisions relating to peaceful settlement.

> If a permanent member's concurrence is not necessary when it is *required* to abstain from voting, there would seem to be no sound reason why its concurrence should be required if it *voluntarily* abstains from voting. . . . If [a permanent member of the Council] fails to avail itself of the opportunity [to register its non-concurrence], it should be deemed to have waived its right of concurrence. . . .
>
> It is absurd to insist that a permanent member must veto a proposal if it cannot vote for it . . . .

Cohen was not arguing that an abstention was the same as concurrence; he was simply suggesting that, as a matter of common sense, to abstain was to waive the right to veto. He admitted that there had been 'some informal committee discussion' at San Francisco which had reached a different conclusion, but these conversations had not been publicised, nor were any 'authoritative decisions' communicated to the conference. The withdrawal of a permanent member from the Security Council must not be allowed to bring the Council's work to a halt until the absent member chose to return. Hiss noted on the transmittal chit: '. . . doesn't consider q[uestion] of US Govt commitment to others of Big 5.'[47]

Five days after Cohen had prepared his memorandum, the State

[45] Koo, pp. 153-157.
[46] Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, New York [London] Macmillan 1954, pp. 77-78.
[47] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 258-259 (my italics).

Department drafted some new rules 'for use in informal conversations . . .' in New York. Part of the second rule read:

> Unless a permanent member abstaining, affirmatively indicates that it does not concur, it shall not be deemed to have exercised its veto right, but shall be deemed to be willing to concur without voting on whatever action the Council may take by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the *other* permanent members.

This was an expression of the Cohen doctrine—not that abstention was a form of concurrence, but that it should be 'deemed' as such. Hiss told Johnson in New York that the draft was not 'the firm position of the United States' but that it might help in persuading others 'that a permanent member may abstain . . . without exercising the veto.' [48]

During the next two days (April 14–15), Johnson showed the American draft informally to the other four permanent members, making it clear that if the rule were approved, this would constitute a reversal of the position taken by the Big Five at San Francisco. France was 'rather in favor' of the proposed rule. Britain and China saw no objection but thought it might be difficult to persuade others. The Soviet representative had to consult Moscow, after which he told Johnson that his government could not agree to the proposed rule. While a permanent member 'cannot be forced to vote . . . against its wishes', it should not be encouraged to abstain.[49] Hiss noted (April 26) that Soviet opposition was not to the 'practical operation' of the draft rule but to 'the existence of the rule itself'. He thought that the Soviet arguments were not very persuasive, and he urged Johnson to show the text to the other six members of the Committee of Experts.[50]

That was how the matter stood on April 29, when the Council met to consider the Spanish question. Australia submitted a draft resolution, to which Poland suggested some minor textual amendments. Gromyko objected that the proposal was very weak: 'instead of taking effective measures, [it] will take the path of delays and inaction . . .'. But a weak resolution, towards which the Soviet Union held a 'strongly negative attitude', was better than no resolution at all, and he would therefore abstain.

> I consider it necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that my abstention . . . may in no way be regarded as a precedent. . . .

The proposal received 10 favourable votes, the Soviet Union abstaining.[51]

This surprising event changed the situation completely and led to an about-turn in American tactics. When Stettinius discussed the matter

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 262–264, 332, 334 (my italics).
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 271–272.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 272–273.
[51] SCOR, 39th mtg. (April 29, 1946), p. 243.

again with Cadogan the following month, he said that the United States did not now wish to press the issue but to let it simmer. 'Cadogan and his advisers [Lawford and Gore-Booth] appeared to agree . . . , although they gave the impression that the Foreign Office may have been leaning toward forcing the issue. . . .'[52] The Rules of Procedure for the Security Council were approved on a provisional basis by the end of June, without any reference to abstentions, and ' provisional ' they still are. Often it is the provisional things which persist.

The question of voluntary abstention arose next in connection with UN membership. When Transjordan's application was being considered, the United States had some hesitations about giving it unqualified support. Dean Acheson suggested to Stettinius, who was in Paris, that the United States could abstain, which would be ' consistent with our long-range objective looking towards clear right of permanent member . . . to abstain . . . without this constituting veto.'[53]

The following month (August 23), the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, called an informal meeting of the Big Five plus Poland (President of the Security Council for the month) to consider the pending applications for UN membership. Lie urged the admission of all applicants and no vetoes. Alexandre Parodi of France said that he would have to oppose the admission of Siam (Thailand), with whom France was then having a frontier dispute. The acting United States Ambassador, Herschel Johnson, asked Parodi if he could not abstain, to which Parodi replied that to do so would be contrary to his instructions. In any case the group as a whole took the view that the question of voluntary abstentions by the permanent members had not yet been resolved.

Six days later, when the Security Council was formally considering the applications for UN membership, China asked the President (Poland) whether a permanent member had to vote yes or no, or whether his abstention might not be counted as a neutral vote. At the request of the President, the matter was not pursued.[54]

The General Assembly was due to reconvene in New York on October 23, 1946, and both Australia and Cuba had submitted items dealing directly or indirectly with the veto. The American position, which had been cleared with President Truman, contained two elements bearing on the question of abstentions: that the obligation of a party to abstain should apply to ' situations ' as well as to ' disputes ', and that agreement should be sought in the Security Council that an abstention by a permanent member did not constitute a veto. It was at first intended that these points should be advanced in the context of the debates in the General Assembly, and the State Department wanted to revive the draft

[52] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, p. 277. [53] *Ibid.*, p. 412.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 432-434, 437; Lie, pp. 99-101; SCOR, 56th mtg. (August 29, 1946), p. 95; 57th mtg. (August 29, 1946), p. 98.

rules which Joseph Johnson had discussed with members of the Committee of Experts the previous spring. The Congressional members of the United States delegation, Senators Connally and Vandenburg, who had been delegates at the San Francisco conference, considered that the American position was, in part, contrary to the Charter. In any case, the problem was complicated by the fact that the American representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch, was at that time pressing for a veto-free international agency to control atomic energy.[55]

Partly because of the disquiet of Connally and Vandenburg, the United States decided to begin with private discussions among the Five, and these were held on November 18 and 23. Britain put in a paper which still hankered after a definition of a dispute, but which included a proposal that a permanent member could abstain or be absent without this having the effect of a veto. The United States made a similar proposal, though without expressly raising the question of absence.[56]

According to the informal American minutes of the two meetings of the Five, which were drafted by 'Chip' Bohlen, there was some very plain speaking. Bevin, in particular, referred to the acute disappointment at the way the United Nations was operating. 'Everyone in England [*sic*] wanted to build on the UN,' he said, 'but they could not ride two horses . . .' Before shifting from one horse to another, they wanted to be sure that the UN horse would run. James Byrnes complained that the veto had been used 'in a manner never envisaged at San Francisco'.[57] Parodi spoke of 'a great atmosphere of unquietness' and Wellington Koo of China said that there had been too many arguments about procedure.

Molotov stonewalled by pointing out that they all agreed that to revise the Charter would be neither wise nor timely. What they should do was 'to agree to cooperate more fully' in the future. Molotov submitted a draft resolution which concluded by rejecting 'proposals aimed at the regimentation of the application of the rule of unanimity. . . .' In the absence of agreement, the meeting adjourned.[58] Three weeks later, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which urged the Security Council, and especially its permanent members, to avoid letting the veto impede the reaching of decisions, and in 1947 the General Assembly recommended that the Council's permanent members 'forbear to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been cast . . .'[59]

[55] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 284-286, 294-295, 304, 313, 318, 321-322, 327-329, 332-333, 335-340, 349, 838-840, 1029-1030.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 349.
[57] There had been eight Soviet vetoes and one veto by both France and the Soviet Union during the previous 10 months.
[58] FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 341-348, 350-355.
[59] General Assembly resolutions 40 (1), Dec. 13, 1946, and 267 (111), April 14, 1949.

By the end of 1946, the Council had adopted fifteen resolutions in express terms. One had clearly been procedural, dealing with the method of handling applications for UN membership, on which both the United States and the Soviet Union had abstained; two resolutions on the Iranian question had been adopted in the absence of the Soviet representative; and the Soviet Union had voluntarily abstained on a resolution on Spain, '... in no way ... a precedent...'

If an event occurs once, it is possible to deny that it was a precedent. If it happens twice, doubts arise; if repeatedly, then it perhaps was a precedent after all. During the course of 1947 and 1948, the Security Council adopted 51 resolutions in express terms, of which 10 seem to have been procedural. Of the 41 non-procedural resolutions, six were adopted without a vote after at least one permanent member had voluntarily abstained when the proposal was put to the vote section by section. Twenty-nine other non-procedural resolutions were put to the vote and approved with at least one permanent member abstaining. The Soviet Union had voluntarily abstained on resolutions as a whole 26 times, Britain 4 times, France twice, and China and the United States once each. From time to time, a permanent member would go out of its way to explain that its abstention was not to be regarded as a veto.[60] There was a desultory debate in the Security Council on the veto and abstentions a few weeks before the 1947 session of the General Assembly was due to convene, and the American draft rule was resurrected and referred to the Committee of Experts, where it sank without trace.

The practice of voluntary abstentions has continued over the years, though the situation changed in one respect after the enlargement of the Security Council in 1965. Previously the six non-permanent members of the Council could not obtain the necessary majority to take a decision without the support of at least one of the permanent members. After the Council had been enlarged to 15, *all* the permanent members could abstain or not participate in voting, and a decision could still be taken. Indeed, on a crucial vote last December, by which the Security Council conferred its blessing on the Middle East peace conference, four permanent members abstained and the other one (China) did not participate in the vote.[61]

Portugal had pointed to the possibility of this happening after the Council's decision that force could be used to prevent oil for Rhodesia

[60] *France*: see SCOR, 173rd mtg. (Aug. 1, 1947), p. 1713; 232nd mtg. (Jan. 23, 1948), pp. 170–171; 303rd mtg. (May 24, 1948), p. 21. *United Kingdom*: 173rd mtg. (Aug. 1, 1947), p. 1711; 232nd mtg. (Jan. 23, 1948), p. 170. *United States*: 131st mtg. (April 18, 1947), p. 803; 197th mtg. (Aug. 27, 1947), p. 2269; 442nd mtg. (Sept. 13, 1949), p. 7. 'I have always been pleased that time and practice demonstrated the utility and soundness of an escape hatch from the rigidity of the veto.' Alger Hiss, in a letter to the author, July 18, 1974.

[61] S.C. res. 344 (S/11156), Dec. 15, 1973.

from reaching Beira, on which both France and the Soviet Union had abstained.[62] Portugal asked the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, if a decision to use force could be taken if *all* the permanent members abstained.

> [I]s it to be understood that the [ten] non-permanent members of the Council have the right . . . to take decisions concerning peace, war and world security . . . without the votes of all or some of the permanent members?[63]

U Thant did not answer Portugal's questions directly. Only the Security Council, he wrote, was in a position to give an authoritative interpretation to its resolution,[64] and this the Council has declined to do.

A year later, John Biggs-Davison raised the question in Parliament by asking whether the Foreign Secretary was aware that members of the Security Council 'are or have been' in breach of Article 27(3) of the Charter, to which the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, William Rodgers, replied that in the government's view, 'no breaches of Article 27(3) have occurred . . .'[65]

China has extended the practice of voluntary abstentions even further than the other permanent members since taking its seat in the Security Council on November 21, 1971. On Middle Eastern and certain other questions on which China disagrees with the decision but chooses not to interpose a veto, China does not abstain but declines to participate in the vote.

It is difficult to be sure how many voluntary abstentions there have been since the practice was initiated on April 29, 1946, partly because it is not known whether there have been abstentions by permanent members on proposals for peaceful settlement in closed meetings of the Council, but mainly because it is not always self-evident whether a decision is procedural or substantive. Of the 360 resolutions in express terms adopted by the Security Council up to August 31, 1974, 143 had been adopted with at least one permanent member absent, voluntarily abstaining on part or all of the resolution, or not participating in the vote. China had voluntarily abstained or not taken part in the vote at least 36 times, Britain 41, the United States 42, France 84, and the Soviet Union 148.

It is sometimes said nowadays that because 'concurring votes' must have a different meaning from 'affirmative votes', not to count a volun-

[62] S.C. res. 221 (S/7236/Rev. 1), April 9, 1966.
[63] SCOR, 21st year, Supplement for April to June 1966, pp. 59–62, S/7271.
[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 208–209, S/7373.
[65] House of Commons Debates, vol. 743, 1966–1967, cols. *185–186*.

tary abstention by a permanent member as a veto is consistent with the Charter. Benjamin Cohen, who played a leading part in the American interpretation of the Charter in the early days, is one who has put this point of view with considerable ingenuity.

> Neither the language of the Charter, considering the paragraph in question as a whole, nor logic, nor common sense, was or could be adduced for giving an effect to a voluntary abstention different from the effect given to a compulsory abstention.[66]

But this is not what the permanent members have argued; what they have claimed is that if a permanent member abstains, it should be 'deemed' to have waived its right of concurrence. While (according to Leo Gross) this practice 'is not in literal conformity with the mandatory requirement of Article 27, paragraph 3',[67] it 'seems to have been established and generally recognised'.[68] It 'permits the United Nations to operate most effectively for the purposes . . . for which it was designed.'[69] It has been described by a former Legal Counsel of the United Nations as 'a firm part of the constitutional law of the United Nations'.[70] Trygve Lie called it 'a modification of the veto' which has been 'considered legitimate'.[71]

The final stamp of approval was given to the practice by the International Court of Justice in its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia. South Africa had contended that because Britain and the Soviet Union had abstained on the decision of the Security Council to request the Court's opinion, the decision was invalid. The Court declared that

> the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions. . . . This procedure followed by the Security Council, which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 of Article 27 of the Charter, has been generally accepted by members of the United Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization.[72]

There has thus been a generally-accepted interpretation of a treaty which some have gone so far as to describe as a *de facto* amendment to the Charter.

[66] *Benjamin V. Cohen, The United Nations: constitutional developments, growth, and possibilities*, Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 9.

[67] 'Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from Meetings', *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 60, no. 2 (Feb. 1951), p. 224.

[68] 'Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in relation to the Voting Procedure in the Security Council', AJIL, vol. 44, no. 4 (Oct. 1950), p. 707.

[69] Myres S. McDougal and Richard N. Gardner, 'The Veto and the Charter: an Interpretation for Survival', *ibid.*, p. 285.

[70] Constantin A. Stavropoulos, 'The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations', AJIL, vol. 61, no. 3 (July 1967), p. 752.

[71] Lie, pp. 298 and 432.

[72] I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 22

BRITAIN'S CHANGING ROLE

Joseph Frankel

ON a subject as broad as this one, it is hard not to start with a truism—that Britain's foreign policy has been in a state of flux ever since 1945 and that its future orientation remains uncertain. The withdrawal from East of Suez announced in 1967, the Duncan Report which emphasised commerce and the 'area of concentration', and finally, Britain's entry into the EEC on January 1, 1973, all seemed to indicate a turn towards Western Europe. And yet, at the time of writing, nobody can confidently foresee the future evolution of any of the major factors involved: the country's socio-economic and political system, its participation in the EEC, the shape of that organisation as well as of Nato, the evolution or the global strategic-political and economic-financial systems.

Futurology is highly speculative; all that one can confidently claim for its findings is that they prepare us mentally for certain possible contingencies, although, as the energy crisis has amply proved, this by no means ensures an effective policy. It is not the purpose of this article to add to or to comment upon the forecasts of the future either of Britain or of the global system, whether they stem from the Club of Rome or from its critics, from the Hudson Institute or from the many variants of Marxism. I would merely like to outline very briefly some features of British foreign policy since 1945 [1] and to try to extrapolate some of the trends discernible into the future. The analysis of the record seems to be warranted for its own sake. The practical usefulness and the relevance of the extrapolations are, by necessity, very limited, but they offer at least some substance to thinking about the British angle in any speculations about Britain's role in any future international system.

The Record

We lack not only full information but, even more important, an adequate time-perspective to evaluate what has happened in—and to—Britain's foreign policy since 1945. Nevertheless, there seems to be a

[1] This has been done in some detail in the author's *British Foreign Policy 1945–1973* which will be published by the Oxford University Press for Chatham House in January 1975. The first section of this article briefly sums up some of the main themes of the book.

general agreement that the main theme of the period can be usefully found in Britain's adaptation from a leading world role to a diminished status and that this was due to an interaction between the changes at home and abroad. Some details are bound to remain uncertain or contentious and the nature of the links between domestic politics and external events is obscure; not only politicians but also historians and theoreticians have not managed to understand adequately the relationship between East-West and North-South issues and between the global strategic-political and economic-financial systems. Undoubtedly the international environment has fundamentally changed since 1945, but we remain unclear about the exact connections between the development of the cold war and its evolution towards a detente, the gradual evolution of a nuclear balance and the prospects of nuclear proliferation, the enormous and fairly continuous world-wide growth of production and of trade and the present breakdown of the underpinning Bretton Woods Agreements, the rise of China and of Japan, the rapid growth of the EEC followed by its stagnation, the successful decolonisation movement and the subsequent domestic troubles and conflicts in the Third World, and, lately, the sudden enrichment of the oil producers. The changes have been too fundamental and too rapid to adjust our thinking to the constantly evolving new situations and problems.

Leaving aside the even more uncertain links between all these and Britain's domestic system, it is essential to survey some major themes of the latter, especially those of continuity and consensus, and the issue of economic growth.

For a quarter of a century the continuity of Britain's postwar domestic arrangements as well as of its foreign policy was remarkable. The Attlee government introduced the non-selective welfare state and a mixed private-nationalised economy, began an orderly withdrawal from the Empire, inaugurated Britain's nuclear and Nato strategies and rejected the leadership of Europe; the Conservative governments between 1951 and 1964 deviated only in details, while the Labour governments between 1964 and 1970 merely tried to restore and complete the 1945 Labour programme; the first two attempts to enter Europe were unsuccessful and did not change much. Consequently, the political rhetoric inherent in party competition increasingly bore an air of unreality, obstructing a clear appreciation of the degree of adaptation and change which actually took place, though in opposite ways in domestic and foreign policies: both parties found it electorally advantageous to exaggerate the degree of change at home, while the rhetoric of Britain's continuing independent world role disguised the degree of the country's gradual adaptation to a reduced international status. Fundamental reappraisal and drastic innovation were obstructed by a general social consensus based upon a homogeneous political elite, a two-party system

which discouraged extremism, and a public opinion which was fundamentally passive and conservative.

During the 1960s, the basis of the consensus was gradually eroded mainly because, after an early period of postwar recovery, Britain began to fall rapidly behind other advanced industrial states both in economic growth and in the degree of its world influence: dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the welfare state and of industrial relations went parallel with disenchantment with the Commonwealth, a slow realisation of the degree of dependence upon the United States and an even slower concern with staying outside the increasingly prosperous EEC. The Heath government was elected in June 1970 with a mandate for change—to reorganise and rationalise the administrative machinery, taxation, industrial relations and to bring Britain into Europe. In contrast to its postwar predecessors, it did not strenuously seek to maintain consensus; political and social divisions, stronger than ever since 1945, crystallised around two issues: the Industrial Relations Act and, to a much lesser extent, Britain's entry into the EEC. When the minority Labour government assumed power in February 1974, the immediate prospects of the country appeared to be grim: severe inflation and an actual drop in the GNP, a balance of payments deficit rising to some $10 billion in 1974, continuing industrial unrest, ailing high technology, continuing troubles in Ulster extending to violence in major English cities. Public morale suffered accordingly. And yet, the basic condition and the medium-term prospects of the country were by no means unsound. The stirrings of reform had extended to most areas of social life and of the political system, and at least the need for action had been accepted. The tradition of consensus obstructs adequate innovation and adaptation but also prevents violent upheavals which leave wounds for generations. It offers some hope that the renewal of pressures for a drastic social reform, a redistribution of income and wealth and a new mode of industrial relations, all of which were not fully satisfied during the period of reform under the Attlee government, may lead to a solution moderate enough to be acceptable to society as a whole, as the welfare state and the limited nationalisation programme had been accepted in the later 1940s and 1950s. In the longer run, Britain's mixed private-nationalised economy may prove not to be inferior either to a more laissez-faire or to a more fully socialist alternative, despite the unresolved problems of efficiency of the public sector which, including transfer payments to the beneficiaries of the welfare state, is now taking about one half of the national income.

Perhaps even more important, instead of being the odd man out in the postwar international system, Britain is likely to be much better adapted to the new one which seems to be emerging. The very characteristics of its society which made it incapable of emulating the

remarkably rapid economic growth of the industrialised countries may equip it to cope with the looming problems of a new international system likely to be geared to a much lower economic growth. Moreover, instead of being a mini-super-power, one of the Big Three, with responsibilities which were far exceeding its resources and with expectations which were bound to be disappointed, Britain enters the new era after having shed much of its outdated traditions and with much more limited ambitions. The likely impact of the North Sea oil upon Britain's economy is bound to be important; at the very least, it will put the country on a much sounder competitive basis with its commercial rivals who lack energy resources. With greater prosperity, the present industrial strife and the nationalist discontents in the Celtic fringe are likely to prove manageable.

How does Britain's place in the world today compare with that in 1945? Undoubtedly it has lost much of its power and influence. Its sovereign, independent control of its destiny has been greatly eroded, like that of all other states; moreover, the capabilities of several other states, not only the super-powers but also some middle powers, have grown much faster than have those of Britain. It has, however, emerged with a much clearer perception of the limitations of its resources and a conception of its international role which corresponds much more closely with its capabilities as well as with what other nations expect of it. The greatest source of confusion has been removed with the winding up of the Empire and the subsequent withdrawal from East of Suez; before these, it had been impossible to evaluate the various overseas bases, presences and commitments which had served as elements of Britain's strength but were increasingly becoming grave liabilities. In terms of its territory and population, Britain is clearly in a reasonably advantageous position within the context of Western Europe, as one of the region's three leading countries. Through the cumulative effect of a consistently slower economic growth, its GNP has fallen well below those of Germany and France, but the gloomy extrapolations of past trends are unconvincing, especially in the light of the recent energy crisis and of the increasing discoveries of exploitable oil in the North Sea. Moreover, Britain seems to be nearing the completion of the painful process of its economic and social reorganisation and may, in this important respect, enjoy distinct advantages over its commercial rivals in the future. It can be confidently expected to remain a leading military power in Western Europe, although at a continuing heavy cost. Its greatest challenge will lie in the evolution of what modern sociologists call 'identitive' power, the use of diplomacy to persuade the members of the Community to accommodate British demands for renegotiation of the terms of its entry, and, later, whatever the result, to make them accept, as far as possible, the British interpretation of the

common interests of Western Europe and of the nature of its links with the United States and the world overseas. Britain's traditional principle of 'harmonisation' may here come in good stead.

The main facets of the evolution of postwar British foreign policy can be summed up under the headings of a revision of assumptions, of an improved rational evaluation of policies, of adaptation of the national style, and of the abandonment of the prevalent concepts of Britain's individual world role in favour of a clearer pursuit of national interests, many of which are deemed to be increasingly located within Western Europe. Although such an analysis inevitably leads to the conclusion that Britain's greatest omission lay in the neglect of its opportunities to lead and mould, according to its interests, the integration processes in Western Europe in the late 1940s and the 1950s, especially when the last opportunity presented itself during the Messina talks, it does not inevitably follow that Britain's membership of the EEC or, indeed, the continuation of the EEC in any specific form should be taken for granted. Whatever happens in these vital areas, a great degree of solidarity of Britain's interests with those of its West European neighbours and of subsequent co-operation can be confidently expected.

To turn to some details, the basic assumptions of British foreign policy in 1945, and the perceptions governing it have been drastically revised. The central assumption, that the United Kingdom could and would continue as an independent political unit in the traditional sense and retain its central place within the international system which would return to some sort of prewar 'normalcy', have proved untenable; the assumptions underlying British policies towards the superpowers and the Commonwealth have been drastically revised; with a considerable but understandable timelag, by the late 1960s, the perceptions of the world, some of which had degenerated into dangerously misleading myths, especially regarding the role of sterling and the central importance of the Commonwealth, were being gradually discarded. The need for a careful scrutiny of Britain's interests imposed by the three rounds of negotiations for entry into the EEC and the constraints exercised by the subsequent need to 'think European', provided the occasion for a far-reaching revision of many traditional policies; the present 'renegotiation' can be expected to continue the process. Needless to say this process has not been smooth; especially the Labour electoral victories in 1964 and 1974 were followed by a temporary reversion to the traditional lines of non-European world-oriented thinking.

In the new situation, the major elements of Britain's traditional national style of conducting foreign policy assume a new meaning. Whereas its generally acknowledged pragmatism had been a distinct

disadvantage while it was obstructing a fundamental revision of policy, its traditional virtues of flexibility, of lack of ideological commitment, of recognition of hard facts, will now become useful again. Other traditional principles will be reduced in their importance: that of the 'balance of power' cannot serve as a basis for a fluid and flexible foreign policy while the balancing arrangements inflexibly determine an alignment with the United States and Nato; the spectre of a 'power vacuum' arising and being filled by a hostile state can no longer constitute Britain's major concern when it cannot effectively do much about it; the traditional positive British attitude to the prevalent legal and moral norms of international behaviour may be somewhat modified by the impact of two new factors: first, the rise of a completely new international order and, second, the diminution of Britain's power position. Britain's traditional support for these norms of international behaviour stemmed partly from the fact that they were generally in conformity with its interests and frequently even of its own making, and partly from the important place of moral and legal issues in domestic political debates. In the last few decades, confusion was bound to arise between Britain's actual interests and the broad moral principles it was supporting, but, with the narrowing scope of its foreign policy, this confusion has somewhat diminished. In the postwar world, international law has proved incapable of protecting Britain's established interests and the evolving new rules of international morality, especially those engendered by anti-colonialism, have been directly opposed to them. The present Labour government's declared preparedness to renounce unilaterally the treaty of accession to the EEC, should the renegotiation fail to lead to acceptable results, is only the last but decisive instance of Britain's increasing stress on its national interests.

Perhaps the most central and characteristic element of change can be found in the gradual erosion of the successive conceptions of Britain's world role. This role was very real in the 1940s and early 1950s, when Britain was meeting heavy imperial, post-imperial and postwar responsibilities; with the passage of years, it became increasingly less tenable owing to Britain's limited capabilities, and also less consonant with the much more limited roles deemed suitable for Britain by other nations. But the revision of thinking about the issue was delayed well into the 1960s. This can be attributed to a combination of the obscurity of details, the complexities of the situation and, perhaps most important, to the psychological and electoral difficulties of admitting that Britain's status had been drastically diminished. The rethinking of the world role and the redirection of Britain's attention to Western Europe involved a re-examination of Britain's national interests which indicates a narrower and clearer definition of the objectives of its foreign policy.

In the absence of an adequate historical perspective, it is impossible

to evaluate and explain the record in a fully convincing manner. Many explanations cluster around the decay of the British Empire; others, more specifically, concentrate upon the neglect of basic economic activities or upon Britain's obsolete educational and governmental or industrial and economic institutions. Although many of these explanations refer to the increasingly unpropitious nature of the international system, on the whole this has not been given sufficient emphasis. Hence no single explanation is fully convincing. Undoubtedly, the British who had made such good use of the opportunities available in the previous centuries, especially the 19th, could not maintain their position in the 20th century, when these conditions became much more adverse. In many ways Britain's difficulties are shared by all other Western industrialised nations although, in its case, they are more severe: not only are its economic and industrial institutions older and more complex than those of its commercial rivals, but also it had lacked the compelling challenge to modernise and adapt immediately after the war, which sped the economic growth of others, especially Germany, Japan and France.

Future Orientations

The recent changes both in the international system and in Britain's position in it have been too rapid and decisive to enable us to grasp their full implications. Hence the lines of inquiry into the future are here reduced to a statement of the few major factors which are likely to determine any part Britain may play within any future international system. The starting point for this inquiry is the Duncan Report, the findings of which are still largely, though by no means fully valid.

First, consider the issues of *power* and *status*. It is worth repeating that the major theme of the postwar period may be found in the gradual reduction of Britain's status from what may be called a 'mini-superpower', one of the victorious Big Three, to what the Duncan Report referred to as a 'leading power of the second rank'. In the process, the gap between Britain's capabilities and commitments has been greatly narrowed, though not fully eliminated. A new difficulty has arisen because Britain's economic growth has been much slower than that of other middle powers. Although in the 1970s, Britain's capabilities need no longer be compared with those of the two super-powers, they have now been greatly surpassed also by those of Germany, Japan and France. Britain's economic status has thus been greatly reduced—from commanding some 20 per cent. of world trade in the immediate postwar years, its share has recently slipped to a mere 6 per cent.; it has become the second-poorest member of the enlarged EEC. This loss of the position of being one of the main international traders inevitably reduces trade as

a major instrument of British foreign policy; a reduction in its defence efforts and in its political influence has been following, with a considerable time-lag, but a continuation of this trend seems by no means inevitable. On the contrary, the process could well be reversed when Britain's economic health improves in years to come and, meanwhile, the expectations of the full flow of oil from the North Sea in the 1980s may prevent further deterioration. Thus remaining a 'leading' power of the second rank seems to be fully within Britain's grasp.

Second, let us consider the importance of *commercial* rather than political strategic priorities. It was an anomaly, rooted in the 19th century illusion that international economics are divorced from politics, that the successive postwar governments did not regard commerce as a full part of *haute politique*, as did Britain's commercial rivals. Many British exporters would readily confirm that this was to the detriment of their competitive position compared with that of exporters from more commercially-minded countries. In this respect, the recommendations of the Duncan Report to amend the situation seem to have been fully implemented. As Britain's diplomatic practice has merely become more similar to those of other major exporters, it seems plausible to assume that the present stress on commerce will persist, even if Britain's economic position drastically improves which, as stated above, can be reasonably expected.

Third, consider the main *orientation* of British foreign policy. As the present defence review is likely to diminish further and possibly fully dispense with the last remnants of the British military presence outside the European region, the ideas of Britain's independent world role and of its basis in the concept of the 'three circles', seem to have been finally put to rest. Although relations with the super-powers, especially the United States, are bound to retain great importance, in the future, Britain is bound increasingly to accord a high priority to essentially regional issues. Whatever happens to Britain's membership of the EEC and, indeed, to that organisation, the common interests with Britain's closest strategic allies and largest commercial partners will continue to constitute Western Europe as Britain's main sphere of diplomatic concern. As the Duncan Report puts it, Britain's 'area of concentration' embraces also the United States, and the arguments between the supporters of 'Atlanticism' and the supporters of a narrower 'Europeanism' are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, evoking memories of the past controversies between the supporters of the oceanic and the continental strategies. It seems, however, clear that for the latter part of this century a purely oceanic alternative has become unthinkable, even for very short-term purposes.

In commercial terms, the proposals of the Duncan Report have been overtaken by the sudden rise to wealth and prominence of the producers

of commodities, notably oil. The Middle East, especially Iran, and Latin America, especially Brazil, have become important potential trading partners alongside Japan, Canada and Australia. Whereas, in the 1960s, world trade was expanding much more rapidly among the industrialised, developed countries, the major expansion potential for the rest of the century is likely to be found among the newly enriched commodity producers. Undoubtedly many of these will have to be included in Britain's future ' area of concentration ' and the question must be asked why Britain neglected its initial advantages in many of these countries and allowed itself to be overtaken by its commercial rivals. Britain's turn to Western Europe and its preoccupation with the problems of entry into the EEC throughout the 1960s were an important factor although, as has been argued, this turn constituted no more than a belated recognition of the community of strategic political as well as economic interests with the region. More fundamentally, the neglect of the increasingly promising overseas commercial partners may be found in the diffuse nature of the Commonwealth. In retrospect, it seems reasonable to attribute much blame to the British preoccupation with the Commonwealth as a whole for the relative neglect of the economic and political links with the individual old dominions—including South Africa—all of which, in contrast to the new Commonwealth, were important trading partners; the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth and Australia's irritation with the British immigration laws were only the final expression of the old dominions' fundamental discontent with the merger of their bilateral relations with the United Kingdom in the totality of Commonwealth relations. Also the relative neglect of Latin America was to a fair extent due to the investment and trading priorities that Britain gave to the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth.

Although the Commonwealth has now faded out as a significant element in Britain's foreign policy, the issue of cultivating bilateral relations with other middle and smaller powers, without fully submerging them in concerns with larger states or with multilateral organisations, will continue. In an international system of some 150 states it is easier to deal with groups than with individual states. The dangers of relative neglect of the old dominions within the Commonwealth can be easily repeated by a similar lack of attention, say, to the Netherlands within the EEC or Nato, or to individual, especially friendly, Asian and African states within the amorphous Afro-Asian bloc or the group of seventy-seven in UNCTAD, or of individual East European states, if the common commercial policy of the EEC towards Eastern Europe becomes fully operative.

To conclude, it seems to be likely that Britain's power position has now decisively stopped being unique. Instead of having to cope with

special problems of its own, inherent in its exceptional role in the international system after 1945, behind the super-powers but well ahead of the middle powers, it is now squarely one of the latter. This should make it easier to formulate and explain to the electorate, and to other states, foreign policies commensurate with Britain's capabilities and status, using the example and the yardstick of other middle powers, whenever appropriate, either as one to follow or as a warning against pitfalls. The residue of traditional British policies and historical links remains, nevertheless, quite strong. The main issue in the evolution of the country's foreign policy throughout the remainder of this century can be sought in the question of whether the inevitable mixture of tradition and of a rational appraisal of the changed circumstances will produce a workable amalgam or will still continue to result in frequent clashes. Undoubtedly, although Britain is now firmly one of the middle powers, its foreign policy is bound to retain a fair degree of individual character, as, indeed, do the foreign policies of all other middle powers.

COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY *

J. S. Nye

IN 1973, and again at its fifty-seventh session in Geneva in July 1974, the United Nations Economic and Social Council debated the question of 'collective economic security'. Originally inscribed on the agenda by several less developed countries as part of their pressure for the elaboration of a strategy for the Second Development Decade, the concept of collective economic security was regarded with considerable wariness and scepticism by a number of major developed countries. Too often in the past, Western governments have found themselves pressed by norms that developed out of seemingly innocuous word formulas.[1] Moreover, the concept of collective security seemed to have little to do with economics. Strictly speaking, as developed early in this century, collective security meant a political-military arrangement in which the unlawful use of military force would be deterred or repulsed by the combined force of all other states. In a world of nuclear weapons, super-powers and ideological schisms, the classical doctrine of collective security is of limited validity in its own military sphere. At first glance, it seemed to many statesmen to be an unlikely doctrine for organising global economic relations.

On further analysis, however, the concept of collective economic security is very relevant to today's world and deserves more attention. In current practice, in the political-military sphere, the idea of collective security has come to mean something far broader and less specific than the original doctrine. In its broadest sense, collective security refers to a collective concern for the security of states. It represents the moral view that mankind has a common concern and the belief that insecurity breeds conflicts which may spread. States have come to accept a general principle of collective cognisance in military security matters. This principle of cognisance involves no transfer of control over any aspect of defence or security policy, but it indicates an international interest in national security policies and

* This article is a modified version of Professor Nye's consultant's report to the United Nations on the concept of collective economic security. It is being published in German in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn).

1 The experience of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development provides numerous examples. See J. S. Nye, 'UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group', in Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1973).

the willingness of member states to accept a dialogue over security policies as a proper subject of international study, information and concern.[2]

In this broad sense, the concept of collective security is applicable to the economic as well as military relations among states. There has been a change in the nature of interstate relations over the past decade. Economic issues have risen in importance on the agendas of world politics. In such a world, the composition of threats to states has become more subtle and more complex. 'Security' is more than a military matter. If collective cognisance of the security dilemmas that confront the UN member states is to be effective, it must take into account the broader aspects of security and the economic dimensions of world politics.

'Security' is a word we use every day, yet the concept is somewhat more ambiguous than we first realise.[3] National security can be used to cover a wide range of goals and divergent, even contradictory, policies. In a sense, security is a negative goal—the absence of a sense of danger or threat. Narrowly defined, security means the absence of a threat to survival, but survival is only rarely at stake. Most people want to feel secure in more than just their survival. They wish to feel secure in their continued or future enjoyment of a number of other basic values. Since we can never be certain about the future, the problem of security is a question of degrees of uncertainty. How much of our current enjoyment are we willing to pay for a little more certainty about future enjoyment?

Different people have different preferences for present versus future consumption; and different beliefs about which values are basic. Individual physical survival, for example, is a widely shared basic value but many people have sacrificed it for the sake of group survival, or for non-temporal religious values. Thus the content of 'security' is often a matter of contention. It is not fixed, but varies among peoples and over time. However, at a high level of abstraction, we can identify at least three basic clusters of values which nearly all peoples in today's world rank close to physical survival and which national security policies are designed to protect. These basic clusters of values are: (1) some minimal expected level of economic welfare; (2) a certain political and social autonomy as a group; (3) a degree of political status as a group. Most national security policies in today's world are designed not merely to ensure the physical survival of the individuals within national boundaries but to ensure a certain minimal expected

[2] Leonard Beaton, *The Reform of Power* (London: Chatto and Windus. 1972.)
[3] See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. London: Oxford University Press. 1962).

enjoyment of these other basic values as well. Indeed, some national security policies may be said actually to increase the risks to physical survival in order to ensure greater certainty in the continued and future enjoyment of economic welfare, political status, and group autonomy. If this is an accurate description of what peoples are demanding from their political leaders, then it is clear that the problem of security is much more than just a military problem.

As the efficacy of force for the achievement of many states' positive goals has declined, the threats to state autonomy have also shifted, from the military area—in which the threat is defined largely in terms of territorial integrity—to the economic area. Governments' policies increasingly impinge on one another, as sensitivities increase as a result of the collapse of the natural barriers that used to insulate economies from one another. Thus the purpose of exercising power may be not so much to prevent another state taking military action as to prevent it shifting the costs of its own domestic policy actions on to one's own state—for instance, through trade restrictions, maintenance of an under-valued exchange rate, or non-tariff barriers of one kind or another. Economic sources of power, which are easier to apply gradually and increasingly than threats of force and which are less offensive to national prestige and dignity, are often the handiest means of dealing with other states' policies that impose significant costs on one's own state.[4]

These shifts in the relative importance of military and economic power are paralleled by an increasing complexity of actors and issues in world politics. Recent years have seen the rise of new actors in world politics, both transnational and intergovernmental, with a bewildering variety of characteristics.[5] Multinational enterprises and transnational guerrilla movements both complicate the patterns of interaction among states and pose problems for security policy. Though the new actors lack the legitimacy and the ultimate recourse to the territorial police power or international exercise of military force that remain significant resources of states, and though states will generally continue to prevail over the new actors where there is an open clash, the costs to governments of such victories can be expected to rise, and the influence of the new actors will be felt as an important constraint on state policies.

One of the important effects of the new actors in world politics is

[4] This and several following paragraphs draw heavily on Robert Keohane and J. S. Nye, 'World Politics and the International Economic System', in C. Fred Bergsten (ed.), *The Future of the International Economic Order* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1973).

[5] See Karl Kaiser, 'Transnationale Politik: zu einer Theorie der multi-nationalen Politik', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1969, pp. 80–109.

their role as transmission belts transmitting policy sensitivities across national boundaries. As the domains of corporations, banks and (to a lesser extent) trade unions transcend national boundaries, a wide range of what were once domestic policies in different countries come to impinge upon each other. These effects are reinforced by transnational communications, which occur even in the absence of organisations.

Dilemmas of interdependence

If transnational economic relations were merely a nuisance or inconvenience, states could simply curtail them by resorting to restrictive economic policies or their police powers. Transnational economic relations, however, present opportunities as well as problems. Under proper conditions, transnational economic organisations can be a significant transmission belt for the increased economic welfare which governments are pressed to provide. Access to markets in other countries may permit the achievement of economies of scale not otherwise possible. Economic efficiency is enhanced by the movement of factors of production in accord with the principle of comparative advantage. Imported technologies or management techniques may have a catalytic effect on domestic production.[6]

Rising economic interdependence can also have beneficial political effects. In so far as nations become entwined in each other's welfare, they have a positive incentive to co-operate and to avoid destructive actions. When it is clearly perceived that a rise in another nation's welfare will, through trade or investment, trigger a rise in one's own welfare, the political will to co-operate may increase. There has been no shortage of recent instances to dramatise this increased mutual economic sensitivity and the increased need for policy co-ordination. Poor harvests of grain in the Soviet Union or of fish in Peru have been rapidly transmitted into shortages of fertilisers, or higher food prices in other parts of the globe. Rapid changes in energy or raw material prices have accelerated domestic rates of inflation throughout the world and have reverberated quickly through the negotiations over reform of the international trade and monetary systems. New techniques for exploration and exploitation have led to the development of ocean resources and the formulation of the concept of the deep seabed as 'the common heritage of mankind'.

At the same time, rising economic interdependence presents governments with problems, and the international community with dilemmas as well as benefits. In so far as economic interdependence implies some

[6] Richard Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York, Toronto, London, Sydney: McGraw-Hill. 1968).

reduction in governmental autonomy, governments face trade-offs between their objectives of welfare and autonomy. The way that trade-offs are made in the short run can lead to diminished autonomy or greater autonomy in the long run.

Economic interdependence is a two-edged sword. It involves costs as well as benefits. Interdependence can be a source of political manipulation as well as a source of economic welfare. When states act to control transnational economic relations, they not only risk diminishing economic welfare but they also frequently create a new type of 'policy interdependence'. Often the policy measures by which one government attempts to control transnational economic relations depend for their success upon the policy measures taken by other governments. Competitive tariffs, export subsidies, or exchange rate policies, for example, can lead to beggar-my-neighbour cycles of retaliation, which leave everyone worse off. If economic policy interdependence is to have positive effects rather than reduce welfare, a certain measure of international cognisance and rules are essential. This is the basis for the international collective role in making economic welfare more secure.

In short, the political problem of security that confronts all states has an important economic aspect as well as the traditional military component. If we define security as the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable levels of the basic values which a people consider essential to its survival, then the economic dimension is important both as a potential instrument of threat to basic values, and as one of the basic values itself. Military security has traditionally been defined by the nature of the instruments, *i.e.*, the absence of threats based on military force. We find it more useful, however, to define economic security in terms of values rather than instruments. Economic security in this sense refers to the absence of threat of severe deprivation of economic welfare.

International threats to economic welfare can come from three major sources: (1) from the intentional or unintentional actions of other states; (2) from the intentional or unintentional actions of transnational organisations; (3) from natural causes. Threats to economic welfare arising from the intentional actions of other states or transnational organisations may be based upon the use of force, or may be based upon economic instruments of power. If we think of collective economic security as the problem of creating an international economic order which reduces threats of deprivation of economic welfare, it is clear that a mixture of regimes and institutions will be required to deal with the variety of sources of threat.

Economic welfare is, of course, not a single value but a cluster of

values. It is generally measured in terms of consumption of goods and services. But consumption has a number of dimensions, which may run at cross purposes with each other. For example, a high rate of current consumption may diminish future consumption. Similarly, future patterns of consumption may be affected by the equality of distribution of current consumption. The problem of measuring economic welfare is made more complex if one introduces a distinction between tangible and intangible goods. Prospects of stable employment or of an unpolluted environment are intangible but important aspects of welfare. These intangible aspects of economic welfare are often costly to provide, but are often not adequately reflected in national income accounts.

Among the most important dimensions of economic welfare are: (1) growth—the ability to produce an increasing amount of goods and services; (2) distribution—broadening patterns of consumption of goods and services; (3) efficiency—the ability to produce more goods with fewer inputs of factors of production; (4) price stability—some sense of predictability and protection of future consumption; (5) employment—assurance of ability to earn and participate in the economic system; (6) environmental quality—some assurance against the debasement of the everyday quality of one's surroundings.[7]

Conventional economic analysis tends to place greatest emphasis on efficiency. Concern for economic efficiency in the sense of increasing measurable output from scarce factors of production cannot be ignored. But as other dimensions of economic welfare become more important, it becomes more difficult to reach agreement on the means of measurement of economic efficiency. Growth, for example, may contribute to efficiency, but it also involves costs which are not easily measured. Income redistribution may in some cases diminish, but in other cases enhance, economic efficiency. There are also trade-offs to be made among other dimensions of economic welfare. Price stability and full employment, for example, have proved difficult to reconcile in many economies. A government's commitment to provide stability of employment has frequently led to controls on imports, despite the welfare gains that may accrue to consumers according to the efficiency criteria of comparative advantage. More recently, however, rapid inflation has threatened price stability, and some governments have relaxed controls on imports but resorted instead to controls on exports.

Different peoples put different emphases on these various dimensions of economic welfare values; and different dimensions are subject to different threats. Moreover, the achievement or protection of some

[7] I am indebted to C. F. Bergsten for this list.

dimensions may mean some diminution of other dimensions of economic welfare. Nonetheless, there is a general concern among most people for freedom from threats of severe deprivation of economic welfare along any or all of these dimensions. One of the tasks of international institutions in promoting collective economic security must be to provide both assistance in analysis and a forum in which states can explain and clarify their preferences in the complicated trade-offs among the several aspects of welfare; and in which they can strive to agree upon joint gains.

The principle of joint gain

The basic principle underlying a strategy for the international economic order should be the creation of conditions that encourage joint gain situations, in which all parties are better off, and discourage joint loss situations (where all parties are worse off) or fixed good situations where one country's gains must result in another country's losses. One of the important aspects of economic issues is that they frequently involve a large component of joint gain. The task for institutionalising an economic order is to ensure that this co-operative joint gain aspect prevails. This basic principle represents an interpretation of economic security as a dynamic concept. Severe deprivation of welfare is most likely to be avoided under conditions of expanding joint gain.

The major obstacles to the preservation of joint gain situations may come from within the economic area or from the linkage of economic issues and other values, such as military security or political status. Inside the economic area, there may be disruptive conflicts over the distribution of gains. There are two dimensions to economic issues, joint gain and the distribution of gain. The joint gain may be reaped entirely by one party, or it may be shared among the parties. Where there is strong disagreement over distribution, the ensuing conflict can sometimes destroy the joint gain, leaving one or both parties worse off. Thus a concern for principles of distribution is an important aspect of collective economic security.

Economic welfare does not exist in isolation from other values, and economic change can affect the relative military strength and sense of military security of different countries. States may sacrifice or forgo the joint gain to be claimed from trade or economic co-operation if they fear that a possible military opponent may improve its relative power as a result of its share of the joint gain.

The provision of national military security has been a classic dilemma of politics in a world of states that do not obey a common sovereign. States have tried to provide themselves with greater

security, by increasing their strength, either by investing in military forces or by joining alliances. But often this increased strength appears as a threat to other states, which take similar measures. The increases in military strength cancel each other out. The net result is often a loss of welfare (or autonomy) without any corresponding increase in security. All too often, the struggle to achieve national security has simply resulted in joint losses.

The search for military security need not lead to joint losses. The crucial factor is the intentions of the parties involved. If all important states are pursuing balance and stability rather than preponderance, and are able to communicate this to each other, then a sense of security can be achieved which leaves everyone better off. The problem, of course, has been being sure of other states' intentions. Stability in international military balances and some relaxation of mistrust of political and military intentions are important if international economic welfare is to be made secure.

Issues of political status may also disrupt joint gain situations. Concern for political status or hierarchical rank among states is a particularly difficult political value to accommodate, because (by definition) one country cannot improve its position without another country encountering a relative loss. Where economic issues and political status become closely intertwined there is danger of conflict from which joint losses can ensue. However, it is possible that functional institutional arrangements that provide multiple hierarchies and different ways of measuring status may help to alleviate such situations. Thus the maintenance of a degree of functional autonomy of economic institutions is another useful principle for organising collective economic security.

The overall task for international institutions, however, is to develop the framework within which the principle of cognisance can be expanded in international economic affairs. Economic policies are interdependent and thus the legitimate focus of an international dialogue. As states explain their policies and submit them to international discussion, the mistrust of intentions that breeds insecurity may be diminished. Other states will be able to formulate policies with greater knowledge and less uncertainty and sense of insecurity. This will help to focus attention on areas of joint gain and thus avoid disruptive conflicts that threaten economic welfare.

There has been a gradual but significant growth in international awareness of economic interdependence, and of the interlocking responsibilities of nations. The development of international economic institutions, however, has not been seen as equally necessary or equally acceptable in all areas of international economic life. There are different degrees of interdependence, and different patterns of

awareness of the need for collective action in different areas. In trade and monetary policy, for example, the joint loss experiences of the 1930s led to awareness and institutionalisation of most of these functions after the Second World War. Now the institutional arrangements of that time are subject to further study and change. In other areas, such as ecology, multinational enterprises, and seabed resources, the development of awareness has been more recent, and institutional arrangements are in an early or incipient stage.

Four tasks for international institutions

The United Nations discussions have focused on four major tasks which institutions can perform to enhance collective economic security.[8] In addition to (1) assessment and (2) regulation functions under normal conditions, institutions can also help (3) provide for special emergency situations; and can help to (4) promote the fundamental value of greater equity.

1. Assessment refers to the collection and provision of information about current economic trends and about possible future economic problems. It is an elementary but essential component of collective action to make international economic welfare more secure. Information and forewarning are a basic requirement for sound national policies. The joint provision, sharing and interpretation of such information also helps to dispel the ignorance and uncertainty which breed insecurity. Within the scope of the assessment function are such tasks as data gathering and analysis; circulation and exchange of information; arrangements for consultation and co-ordination by national governments; facilitation of joint planning; and provision of expert assistance to assist governments to develop indigenous capacities for economic assessment.

While it would be foolish to expect international civil servants to surpass other mortals in predicting the future exact conditions of supply and demand in particular world markets, the foregoing analysis makes clear that their efforts to encourage exchange of information and clarification of differing preferences among dimensions of welfare are an important part of the task of developing that global cognisance which is central to the concept of collective economic security.

2. Regulation refers to the development of internationally accepted rules, procedures, and codes of behaviour for economic policy interdependence. While states are generally loath to accept rules that restrict their freedom of action, when there are situations of economic policy interdependence their freedom of action, is, in fact, already restricted. If the efforts of states to deal with economic interdepen-

[8] See United Nations documents E/5263, March 19, 1973 and E/5369, June 21, 1973.

dence is not to lead to competitive cycles involving joint loss of welfare, there must be further acceptance of basic rules and codes of behaviour. These rules may be designed to increase or to reduce economic transactions, but their development and negotiation is an important aspect of securing economic welfare. Regulations may vary in specificity from general principles to specific regulations such as the development of new rules for export controls or central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets. Regulations may be developed both for normal and for emergency conditions; and special regulations may be needed to promote the particularly important value of greater equity. Assisting states to assess properly their economic situation and to establish regulations that enhance possibilities of joint gain are two important institutional tasks in the provision of collective security. Two other tasks, however, are equally important and politically feasible at the present time.

3. The provision of equity refers to measures to ensure that joint gains in economic welfare reach all countries and all levels of society. As indicated above, the provision of equity plays an important part in securing international economic welfare. Where joint economic gain is not shared in some acceptable way among all parties, there is a greater likelihood of conflicts over the distribution of gain which can, in some cases, destroy the joint gain itself. Not all elements in society, nor all countries, are equally well placed to capture a share of joint economic gains. Technical assistance to support the self-help efforts of member countries to overcome internal structural inequalities, as well as assistance and special measures for the least developed countries, are important institutional tasks in ensuring collective economic security.

Merely assuring a balanced distribution of future joint gains, however, is unlikely to be sufficient to provide a sense of equity. Measures for redistribution will also be necessary. Rightly or wrongly, many people feel that past distributions of economic gains have been inequitable, and some measures of redress are important to their sense of equity. Equality is a prime political value of modern society, and this had led some people to express the goal of redistribution in terms of closing the income gap between rich and poor countries. As Rosenstein-Rodan has shown, even under optimistic assumptions, this goal is virtually impossible by the year 2000, and is likely to generate frustrations that could disrupt joint gains. On the other hand, it is possible to gear redistribution to a more positive goal such as constructing a floor under world poverty.[9] As Helmut Schmidt recently

[9] Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), *Economics and World Order: from the 1970s to the 1990s* (New York: Collier-Macmillan. 1972); see also Miriam Camps, *The Management of Interdependence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1974.)

put the point, 'there must be a level on which a convergence of preferences would stabilise the international political situation at a higher level of prosperity for both the wealthier and the currently poorer countries.[10] Although it is often difficult to convince voters in rich countries of the point, a measure of redistribution is essential for ensuring future joint gains and for collective economic security.

4. The emergency task refers to the collective capacity and will to respond to a severe deprivation of welfare that might befall a particular country or group of countries. The assurance of international emergency assistance can allow countries to develop economic policies which enhance the joint gains possible in economic interdependence without running as high risks as would otherwise be the case. An emergency function is also implicit in the acceptance of a general moral concern which underlies the broad notion of collective security. Emergency situations can be natural or man-made. Since the natural conditions which create economic emergencies rarely extend over the whole globe at the same time, there is an easy complementarity involved in this aspect of the provision of collective economic security. A man-made emergency, however, is more likely to reflect political conflict between states or groups. To some extent, economic conflict can be avoided or minimised by agreed regulations, but where this is not possible, institutional arrangements for consultation and conciliation can help to reduce the impact and spread of man-made economic emergencies.

Examples of current problems

These different institutional tasks involved in the collective assurance of economic security can be illustrated in relation to the current economic problems of raw materials, food scarcity and multinational firms.

The problem of *raw materials* has recently attracted considerable attention because of the selective embargo, and quadrupling in the posted price, of oil in 1973, and because of more general concerns that have been raised about reaching the finite limits of various raw materials. Temporary shortages, rapid increase in energy costs, and uncertainty of future supply have contributed to a reduction in economic welfare in both rich and poor oil-consuming nations. While a case can be made that rising prices for raw materials can have a beneficial effect in encouraging greater efficiency in the use of materials in the long term, rapid short-term shifts can have detrimental effects

[10] Helmut Schmidt, 'The Struggle for the World Product,' *Foreign Affairs*, (April 1974), p. 451.

on economic welfare in the the short term and may encourage more autarky in the longer term.

Because of recent events, discussion of economic security in the area of raw materials has focused lately on the question of security of supply. Equally important from the point of view of the producing nations, however, is the question of security of demand. Much of producers' concern for the establishment of commodity agreements and the supplementary financing of shortfalls in commodity earnings in the 1960s was a question of stability of demand. It is important that international institutions focus on both supply and demand aspects of the effect of raw materials on economic security. In terms of assessment, international institutions could collect, interpret and share production information, plans, and the projection of future supply and demand (and price elasticities) for a number of the most important commodities. In terms of regulations, efforts might be made to reach agreement on isolating economic issues in the supply and demand for materials from political complications. Even if this is not fully possible, specific regulations might be developed for situations when economic considerations are paramount. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example, has much to say on import restrictions but relatively little on export restrictions.[11] Yet competitive cycles of export restriction can also lead to a reduction of world economic welfare.

In terms of equity, international institutions might help on the demand side by arranging compensation financing for unexpected short falls of earnings. On the supply side, international institutions might act as intermediaries in arranging special assistance to help the least developed countries to finance increased costs of essential raw materials. Both these measures also relate to the emergency function. In addition, international institutions could offer procedures and assistance in conciliation where raw material emergencies are of a man-made type. At present, there are only rudimentary regulations and inadequate assessment and equity provisions in the area of raw materials. This is clearly an area where there is considerable room for institutional development to implement collective economic security.

Scarcity of food supply is another critical aspect of economic security. For much of the postwar period the food problem in the richer parts of the globe has been one of surplus, not deficit, as governments of industrial nations have tried to maintain incomes in their agricultural sectors by subsidies and restrictions of import competition. Much of the institutional problem of the 1950s and 1960s was finding means, in the light of such policies, to enhance trade and transfer

[11] Roger Hansen, 'The Politics of Scarcity,' in James Howe (ed.), *The United States and the Developing World* (New York: Praeger. 1974).

food from surplus to deficit countries. More recently, increasing demand and rising food prices have transferred the concern of many governments from control of imports to restriction of exports. Such restriction of exports in order to prevent price rises at home can wreak harm on other economies dependent upon the same food supplies. The result can be loss of economic welfare in the short run and reversions to greater autarky in the longer run.

A potentially important aspect of the problem of food scarcity is the growing role of a particular geographical area, North America, as the source of world reserve capacity. The United States and Canada today control a larger share of the world's exportable supplies of grains than the Middle East does of oil. Exports from Australia, the only other significant exporter, are less than ten per cent of North American exports. The danger in this situation comes primarily from natural causes. The recurrence of drought years in North America (such as occurred in the 1930s) would leave the world in a very vulnerable position in terms of reserve food supplies.[12]

There are several roles for international institutions in improving the collective economic security of food supply. In terms of assessment, more could be done by way of collecting and sharing information on crops planned, harvests, and national reserves. In terms of regulation, there is a need, analogous to the situation in raw materials, to develop rules relating to export controls. In terms of equity, there is a need for technical assistance and the transfer of technology to assist the development of agriculture in the least developed countries. In terms of the emergency function, better assessment and forecasting could be supplemented by establishing a world food bank, or the FAO plan of co-ordination of national reserve policies. Thus food supply is another area where collective economic security could be greatly improved.

There are at present some 200 large *multinational enterprises* or clusters of corporations which operate simultaneously in twenty or more different nations and which are tied together by common ownerships and management strategy. The annual value added by each of the top ten multinational corporations is over 3 billion dollars or greater than the gross national product of some eighty member states of the United Nations. Such concentrations of economic power cutting across national boundaries create uncertainty and concern among political leaders who are elected to preserve political autonomy and enhance economic welfare within these boundaries. On the positive side, the multinational corporations can be a major engine for trans-

[12] Lester Brown, 'The Next Crisis? Food,' *Foreign Policy* 13 (Winter 1973–74).

ferring technology and relocating industrial production from the richer to the poorer parts of the globe. Unlike portfolio investment, multinational corporations can organise capital, management, technology, and access to external markets into an economic package which is greater than the sum of its parts.[13]

On the other hand, the costs of this packaging are often high, and political leaders frequently suspect that the corporation is reaping most of the joint economic gain from the direct investment. Moreover, even though most corporations forswear illegitimate meddling in the local political process, they often have an unsettling effect on the local sense of political autonomy, whether they try to or not. In these circumstances, the danger to collective economic security comes less frequently from the occasional blatant cases of corporate political interference, than from policies based on insecurity, uncertainty, and lack of information which may disrupt the creation of joint economic gain.

The assessment function is of major importance in institutionalising collective economic security in regard to multinational corporations. Privileged access to information, ability to shift identity, and mobility of resources are key assets of multinational corporations in their bargaining with states. Information that improves governments' knowledge, improves their perception of their self-interest and reduces uncertainty can help to ensure that bargains are struck which involve broader sharing of joint gain. This equity function can be further enhanced by the provision of experts to help the least developed countries to make better use of the information available to them in bargaining with large corporations. The regulation function is now in an incipient condition, and it may be impossible to make much progress until contradictory national controls have resulted in joint losses for countries and corporations. More optimistically, however, it may be possible to get agreement on a general corporate code of behaviour and more specific intergovernmental agreements in limited areas of taxation and anti-trust arrangements. The emergency function could be filled by provision of a forum for complaints, and procedures for conciliation in cases where conflicts between corporations and countries threaten to spread in a fashion destructive of joint economic gains. The regulation of multinational corporations is an area where the institutionalisation of collective security is at a very preliminary stage.[14]

13 UN, *Multinational Corporations in World Development*, ST/ECA/190, (New York. 1973).

14 UN, 'The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and on International Relations,' E/5500/Add.1 (June 1974).

Conclusion

The development of the concept of collective economic security is likely to be a gradual process. As Joan Robinson has pointed out, despite its ostensibly universalistic doctrines, 'the very nature of economics is rooted in nationalism'.[15] Awareness of economic policy interdependence and willingness to undertake the necessary institutional tasks develop slowly and unevenly as different problems become prominent in public attention. What is essential, however, is the development of the general principle of cognisance and international concern for preserving the structure of joint economic gain and preventing severe deprivations of economic welfare, either for individual states or for the global community of states.

Our analysis indicates that there is no single institutional solution. A broad range of institutions will be necessary. Nonetheless, the principle of general cognisance and concern for the structure of collective economic security could be advanced by the development of a central focal point. The UN Economic and Social Council, which has never lived up to its potential, could become a natural focal point for such a general focus on collective economic security. To be effective, however, EcoSoc would have to develop better procedures, such as meeting on a year-round basis to conduct major systematic reviews of areas of international economic concern.[16] Only then could it really review the programmes of organisations within the United Nations system with a view to evaluating their contribution towards the institutionalisation of collective economic security. In addition, EcoSoc should develop procedures to encourage states to share information openly and tolerate criticism of the ways their policies are affecting specific problems important to collective economic security. Finally, the members of the UN should establish procedures under Article 99 of the Charter to enable the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Economic and Social Council matters which he considers to have an immediate bearing upon the development of the international economic order and the enhancement of collective economic security. In a world of conflict and a world of change, opportunities to enhance and preserve co-operative structures are too precious and too important to be lightly cast aside.

[15] Joan Robinson, *Economic Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1962) p. 117.

[16] United Nations Association of the USA, *The United Nations in the 1970s* ('Katzenbach Report'), New York, 1971

RESOURCES: THE CHOICES FOR IMPORTERS *

Philip Connelly

THE vast bulk of non-renewable resources traded internationally moves from the developing to the developed world. Moreover, many of the low cost reserves of these resources are located in developing countries in whose economies resource industries tend to constitute the main—indeed often the sole—component. These main features in the economic geography of resources mark the frontier between the anatomy and the politics of scarcity. There has been a tremendous increase in both the scale of fuel and mineral industry investments and the volume of resource trade in the period since the Second World War. This period has also witnessed the establishment of many independent national governments in formerly colonial territories, and the strengthening of both Third World political self-awareness and—within severe constraints—economic initiative. These political and cultural changes have reacted with the experience of vastly increased resource demands by the rich and influential nations (many of them formerly colonial powers) to produce a powerful mixture of motives, objectives and policies. This mixture is at the heart of the challenge posed by resource issues to the international community.

A cursory glance at the history of resource industries in the developing world shows that a common characteristic has been the formation of associations or agreements involving either producers alone or consumers and producers. Sometimes the composition has excluded governments and has consisted of companies; sometimes the reverse has been the case; and sometimes both governments and companies have been involved.

The object of all these associations and agreements has been to regulate the market for the commodities in question, either in respect of price or production volume or both. Many primary commodities, especially foodstuffs, have experienced pronounced cyclical variations in price, and pressure from producers to form associations or stiffen up existing groupings or agreements has been stronger in periods of falling prices and weaker in boom conditions.

The participation of developed countries in such international

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commodity agreements as those for wheat, sugar and coffee has been recognised to form part of their aid policy to the parts of the less developed world concerned.

The development of producer country groupings amongst the governments of less developed oil and mineral producing areas has proceeded with the same basic objectives of production control and price raising. Only in oil has dramatic success been accomplished, but this widely publicised success is now clearly regarded as at least a reference point if not indeed a target by other resource producers throughout the developing world.

* * *

Resource producers differ markedly both as between members of the same resource organisation and between those organisations. Among the various countries there are differences—and disputes—of politics, race, religion, geography, economic strength and development status, to say nothing of the different characteristics of the resource markets. In many ways it seems odd to generalise. And yet not only is there virtual identity between many of the specific demands made by producers of different resources but there are also close and growing similarities in their overall ideological framework of policy.

Certain specific demands are easily recognisable as being common: increased national ownership and control, increased revenue, increased local processing, and so on. The tactic of seeking to increase bargaining power by forming associations has been learned by all concerned, and each association is now very much aware of the existence and activities of the others. In developing countries, almost all disposed towards planned economies, the special role of natural resource industries as being usually the most important sector and at the same time one based on wasting assets, ensures a similarity of planning policies.

Underpinning all of this is a less tangible base which unites the producers while admitting wide divergencies of political philosophy, as between Zambia and Chile or Iran and Libya. It consists, firstly, in the belief that political independence is not enough; full nationhood requires economic sovereignty. Secondly, there is the mutual sense of grievance of the resource exporters, who see themselves as nations struggling to regain ground lost to them over the years through what they regard as the unfeeling march to wealth and privilege by the industrial world. Thirdly, the self-confessed global failures and weaknesses of the rich countries (Vietnam, inflation, European disunity) are becoming more than ever apparent to the producers at a time when control over the supply and price of resources much needed by the rich seems increasingly, if still partially, to be within their grasp. These three factors have combined to produce an ideological dimension to

policies centred on resources which is recognisable right across the Third World. It implies a degree of alignment between Third World resource producers which falls short of alliance but need not for that reason exclude concerted policies. It also implies a general politicisation of resource negotiations which partly produces and partly feeds upon specific instances, such as the Arab boycott of the United States and Holland over Israel or the Chilean threat to cut copper supplies to Britain over the Labour Government's attitude to the regime. It clearly implies a virtually irreversible commitment to the maximisation within national boundaries of benefits from resource industries. The desire to indulge in cartel arrangements with others against consumers, even with the prospect of some sacrifice in the process, is not to be under-rated. But this desire seems destined constantly to meet constraints which are to be over-ruled only by very advantageous market conditions plus a strong and distinct political focus, as in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). All these implications clearly bear on the roles, objectives and choices of the resource consuming and importing nations. . . .

Given a continuance and intensification of the trends which have been described in the resource-exporting developing countries, what are the circumstances and options facing the major consumers and importers of resources in the industrialised world?

The formulation of policy options is constrained by the legacy of history. Two elements of this legacy are worth stressing at the start: that produced externally by the historical external relations of the rich countries with the resource producers; and that produced internally by the experience of wealth and growth.

The colonial heritage

Fanning out in space and time from the European Industrial Revolution of the late 18th century, there have developed in the advanced industrial nations of the West similar mass consumption economies whose momentum drives the international trading system and has intimate interconnections with global political and security issues. With less than 20 per cent. of the world's population, the main consuming economies of the United States, Japan and Western Europe account for nearly 60 per cent. of the world's GNP. All these economies were founded on the processing of raw materials which were at first mainly local and then, with the spread of international colonisation and trade, increasingly imported from the 'new' countries. Some—especially Australia and Canada—have achieved comparability of prosperity with the major economies; but the majority, in Africa, Latin America and non-communist Asia, now account in total for only 10

per cent. of the world's wealth, as measured by GNP, although half the world population has come to be situated there.

It would not be productive to enter into the debate on the historical relationship between colonialism and economic interests; it can safely be said that the two were associated to some degree, although historians of different persuasions may point to particular episodes to illustrate either the manifest role of economic interest or alternatively the primacy of political motives. Nor is it relevant here to do other than note that in the long history of colonial investment in raw materials, access was obtained sometimes by conquest and sometimes by treaty or invitation. Similarly, access to materials was retained sometimes by force but also by virtue of superior technical and commercial skill, exercised in peaceful circumstances.

The fact remains that over time there were instances of what may charitably be called myopia or with less charity, exploitation, which in conjunction with many cultural changes have effectively made the words 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' into highly pejorative terms which to this day poison the waters of international relations. There is a considerable body of opinion in the developing world which regards much of the developed world's present-day trade and investment as but the old colonialism under a new guise—with the multinational corporation as the villain of the piece. Whatever the merits of the criticisms, industrial resource importing countries have to reckon with the present day attitudes arising from an historical epoch in which they had a totally different experience from that recollected by many resource exporters.

The Philosophy of Growth

In the industrial nations there has come about over time a general expectation of continued economic progress. This seems to include the belief that a growth process which has demonstrably survived severe shocks in Europe and the United States can persist indefinitely, and a desire that it should continue to confer its broadly dispersed benefits. In the modern era, this philosophy has been refined by the advanced industrial nations into an interconnected set of policies on full employment, industrial development and technological leadership. This is a world view in which natural resources are there to be used for growth. The question of not using them arises only when technology or economics favours such a course of action with regard to a particular commodity, in which case the general response is to seek a substitute. Furthermore, the question of not using them has seldom arisen—apart from wartime—in anything other than a gradual process of change.

Widespread social expectations of high employment have led industrial governments to produce economic planning systems oriented

to continued domestic growth and the viability of important industries and regions. Predicted changes in the pricing or availability of resources will in the first place be evaluated against these objectives. Until recently, the historical experience of the industrial nations has generally been that the unrestricted supply and stable price of raw materials have acted as engines of domestic and international economic development rather than as constraints. As and when this picture changes, the industrial nations may simultaneously face strains in internal economic growth and international clashes of economic interest. Both will place severe demands on domestic social cohesion and the ability to modify community values and expectations.

The actors and their situation

The United States, Japan and Europe account for the vast bulk of the world's consumption of resources. Since 1950 alone they have consumed more materials than the world produced in the whole of its previous history. Table 1 shows the consumption pattern for some main resources.

Table 1

Consumption of Major Minerals by Volume by Principal Consumers as a Percentage of World Consumption 1972

	% Oil	*% Coal*	*% Steel*	*% Copper*	*% Aluminium*
USA	30	18	21	25	42
Japan	9	3	12	13	10
W. Europe	27	14	26	33	22

Source: industry estimates

One of the most important features of these two decades has been the growth of a heavy dependence by many industrialised countries on imported resources. Table 2 illustrates the overall state of self-sufficiency in respect of the same important resources.[1]

This basic data highlights four facts. First, all the main economic units in the West are significantly dependent on imports for at least some of the basic resources (to say nothing of a whole host of

[1] Measurements of the degree of self-sufficiency in metals can cause confusion. Conventions have not been standardised. For example, the self-sufficiency of Japan for bauxite is zero but for aluminium is 34 per cent, because of the contribution, in the latter case, of scrap. We have adopted, as a measurement of metals self-sufficiency, the metal content of indigenous mine production plus indigenous scrap arisings as a percentage of total metal consumption. This reflects the security conveyed to industrial nations by their stocks of metal-in-use, from which scrap supplies arise.

Table 2

Resource Self-Sufficiency
1972

	% Oil	*% Coal*	*% Steel*	*% Copper*	*% Aluminium*
USA	69	100	75	91	15
Japan	0	35	27	23	34
W. Europe	3	83	86	28	41

Source: Industry estimates

individually less important materials). Second, the United States is comparatively well placed when set against Japan and Western Europe. The advantageous US resource position consists not merely in the generally higher ratios of self-sufficiency which happens currently to have been achieved, but also in a totally superior endowment of resource reserves which remain to be tapped if and when circumstances make it necessary. This gives the United States an ultimate flexibility denied to Japan and Europe. A third fact to emerge is that Japan represents the opposite extreme to the position of the United States, with Western Europe as a region coming somewhere midway. Of all the major industrial powers, Japan has the narrowest domestic base of fuel, raw materials and food. Its remarkable economic growth has been based on resource processing industries which have rapidly exhausted its indigenous reserves, already severely depleted by the Second World War.

Finally, the figures in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the outstanding significance of oil in the international system. Japan is totally dependent on imports; Western Europe is currently not much better placed (North Sea production is unlikely to increase regional self-sufficiency much beyond one-quarter by around 1980); and the United States—though it has been emerging as a substantial oil importer—is still in an overwhelmingly superior position.

The point of transition

Japan's progress to the top rank of industrial powers on the basis of a pronounced resource importing and processing economy exemplifies the zenith of the confidence felt by the industrial nations in the international resource supply system. The essential quality of this confidence was a belief that the system was elastic in its supply response to the initiative of consumer demand. Clearly Japan has had little alternative to reliance on imports but this very fact might have

been expected to sensitise it, above all other industrial nations, to the dangers of import dependence. It is true that it has diversified its sources of supply for non-fuel minerals, but over 90 per cent of its oil imports come from the Middle East and 44 per cent of its coal imports from Australia. Further, it was only in 1967 that an objective was declared of supplying a minimum percentage of its 1985 oil consumption from Japanese-developed sources overseas—and that proportion was set at only 30 per cent. Although Japan has been to the fore amongst industrial nations in setting up joint ventures with less developed resource-exporting nations, whereby the latter would have an equity stake in the projects, it has not been noticeably in advance of other importers in recognising the strength of the resource exporters' desire to carry out processing activities. It is true that in the postwar era Japanese foreign policy had to be essentially passive, in both its own interests and those of the United States, and that passivity in foreign relations breeds insulation from relevant political and cultural processes. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, nothing illustrates the past attitudes and experience of rich resource-importing countries better than the founding of the Japanese economic miracle on the historical basis and future expectation of uninterrupted access to foreign raw materials on commercial terms.

The evidence . . . on the less developed resource exporters must lead us to doubt whether such a basis now exists, or will exist for much longer, in quite such a straightforward way.

To put the matter briefly, the industrial resource-importing countries are at a point of transition. Behind them lies an era in the successive periods of which they enjoyed all the privileges associated with real ownership of resources developed under their auspices in colonial territories, or effective ownership through their investments in post-colonial developing countries (as well as in countries such as Australia). Ahead of them lies a situation in which all that seems certain is that their individual initiative in international resource policies will be much more constrained. In the future, a range of relationships is possible both between the industrialised importers and the developing exporters and amongst the industrialised importers themselves (to say nothing of the other actors). In the meantime, a predicament familiar to policy analysts presents itself: that life goes on, demanding and obtaining day-to-day decisions, but that these decisions and their rationale—assembled before or after the event, using good or bad data—go to form the building blocks of longer term policy positions. The resource importers are currently in this very sensitive phase, when much that could make for good or ill in the future is on their agenda of international relations. What they now face are the preliminary movements in a process yet to run its course. Their uninterrupted

access to foreign raw materials on commercial terms of their own choosing is gone in the case of oil and under strain in the case of others. Given their historical experience and the imperatives of modern industrial economies, the first inclination of industrialised resource importers will be to prepare policy options to mitigate the effect on them of a situation of restricted resource supply.

Policy Alternatives

In theory, any consuming country or region fearing restricted supply of a resource traditionally imported from certain sources may pursue four strategies, separately or in combination:

(a) to change to a more liberal source of imports;
(b) to reduce or stabilise imports by exploiting available domestic reserves more intensively, by using technology to develop substitutes or by acting directly to reduce demand;
(c) to continue to rely on imports from the traditional sources but to enhance the security of their supply by making special bilateral arrangements with the suppliers;
(d) to continue to rely on imports from the traditional sources but to seek a multilateral solution to the supply problem in concert with other affected importing countries.

The first strategy, which implies going beyond the Third World resource exporters to 'safer' areas such as Canada or Australia, begs a question. . . . Suffice it to say here that the passive title of 'mineral storehouses' often applied to Australia and Canada is in curious contrast to the very active and individual resource policies now being developed there.

The second strategy reflects the fact that the bargaining power of resource importers vis-à-vis exporters is partly a function of their possessing both the technology and management skills to produce substitutes for any given resource (or otherwise to reduce demand for it) *and* the ability to rearrange an economy around the new substitutes or methods. The maintenance of economic growth in a situation of resource pressure seems to depend on continued gains in the technology of exploration, extraction, processing and transportation of ores and oil and increases in the efficiency of energy use. Underpinning these special technical requirements is the management of Research and Development (R & D) and the process of general management, and behind that the broader educational system at all levels. Acting simultaneously as a check and a spur to this technological solution is the premium increasingly placed by members of the industrialised societies on the quality of their environment. There is no doubt that the energy and extractive industries, with their large-scale operations, will continue to satisfy demand in the future only as a result of

projects presenting environmental problems of a very high order (*e.g.*, open-cast coal mining, shale processing, nuclear generating stations). Acceptable environmental standards can no doubt be achieved, over time and at a cost, by the application of a degree of technical effort and ingenuity commensurate with that devoted to the extraction process itself. It is less certain that the 'technocratic' solution will mollify all the environmentalist groups whose aesthetic principles have recently commanded political support. . . .

Bilateralism and Multilateralism

Some of the features and problems of the third and fourth strategies mentioned above are illustrated by the steps taken by oil importing industrial countries in response to the actions of Arab oil exporters in October 1973. . . . It is important to note, however, that even before those events forced oil importing nations quickly to rethink their international energy policies, some concern had already been felt about the international implications of the predicted tight balance between the long-term supply of and demand for crude oil in the non-communist world.

One of the major bases for this prediction was the impending emergence of the United States as an important oil importer. From a position in 1972, when imports formed less than one-third of United States oil consumption, it was forecast[2] that by 1980 the proportion would have risen to around one-half. The reasons adduced in support of that forecast were many and complex. In brief, domestic United States oil and natural gas production was felt to have reached a plateau; plans for nuclear development had not been fulfilled; coal production had stagnated; the environmentalist movement was having a considerable impact on the pace of construction of facilities affecting all kinds of energy; and the whole economy—particularly the private consumer sector—was characterised by a profligate attitude to energy consumption. The upshot was that the United States was seen in mid-1973 and before to be moving irrevocably towards a position where the Middle East oil exporting bloc would supply the bulk of the increase in its energy demand for the next decade. In this, the United States was converging on the positions of the other two main energy consuming blocs in the non-communist world.

From 1973 to the end of the decade, both Japan and the European Community were expected to increase their dependence on oil as a source of energy; from 77 per cent to 80 per cent and from 64 per cent to 70 per cent, respectively. Japan was already wholly dependent upon imports for this oil. The European Community, on the other

[2] Industry forecasts.

hand, was then expected to reduce the imported proportion of its oil requirements from 97 per cent to the still significant level of 75 per cent through the development of indigenous resources, especially North Sea oil. The absolute volumes of imported oil required by Europe nonetheless were expected to increase substantially over the period, as were those needed by Japan and the United States.

Even before the 1973–74 oil crisis, therefore, the outlook for the future of the Western oil consuming economies was one of mutual and increasing dependence on oil, and on oil imports, which for a decade or so could be obtained in substantial quantities only from the Middle East. At a financial and technical level, the energy industries were contemplating vast expenditures on exploration for and development of conventional crude oil reserves, as well as of the solid fuel deposits and non-conventional oil reserves in shale and tar sands which, on the demand and price assumptions then reigning, seemed necessary in some degree to supplement conventional crude oil reserves. On an international political level, it was recognised that the scene was set for competition between oil importing nations to secure preferential access to scarcer supplies. . . .

After the oil price rises, production cuts and embargoes of October 1973 such statements occurred more frequently and were followed by action. In early December the French Prime Minister, Pierre Messmer, told a political rally that 'Producing countries are interested in getting the largest possible return for their industrialisation, and no one can blame them. Therefore, we ask if the effort towards industrialisation ... doesn't necessitate accords between governments rather than between governments and companies.'[3] One month later, on January 7, 1974, the French government announced that it had agreed to conclude a deal with Saudi Arabia for crude oil supply. M. Messmer stated that, faced with major and lasting rises in the prices of all raw materials, France's policy must be to establish new supply pacts with producer nations, not only of oil but of all raw materials.[4]

The counter-philosophy, that a multilateral approach by consumers was the only appropriate way to solve world energy problems, was most forcefully expressed by the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, in a speech delivered in London on December 12, 1973.[5] He advocated setting up an energy action group of the major Western industrial nations to produce a programme designed to deal with energy conservation, new energy sources, the incentives necessary for oil producing countries to increase supplies, and a co-ordinated international approach to energy research. The underlying world oil supply

[3] *Le Monde* Dec. 4, 1973.
[4] *Financial Times* Jan. 8, 1974.
[5] United States Information Service; *The Times* Dec. 13, 1973.

and demand trends constituted a 'chronic crisis' which the Middle East war had made acute. The underlying problem was one that the United States could solve alone, 'though with great difficulty', but one that Europe 'cannot solve in isolation at all'. It did not seem to be an accident that Dr. Kissinger's speech was delivered two days before a European Community Summit meeting in Copenhagen. However, the immediate response to the proposals at the European Summit was lukewarm and French opposition was particularly marked.

The Washington Conference

The American initiative was nonetheless reinforced by President Nixon on January 9, 1974, when he called for an energy conference to be held in Washington in February between the United States, Japan and the European Community. Between the invitation and the holding of the conference, however, European diplomatic exploration of bilateral oil deals with suppliers continued. The French deal with Saudi Arabia announced on January 7 was followed in the same month by a British barter arrangement with Iran, both accompanied by talk of further and more considerable agreements in the future. West Germany stated its desire for a united Community energy policy but pressed ahead with discussions with oil-producing countries, as did Italy and several other oil-importing countries.

These events revived the debate about the merits and drawbacks of bilateral arrangements between oil importing and oil exporting governments. The arguments against fell broadly into four groups:

(a) In what was expected to be a continuing condition of tight supply and demand, competition for supplies would bid up prices beyond what they would otherwise be, thus hurting everyone, and especially the poorer oil importing countries.

(b) The supply of a basic commodity should not be linked to individual government to government deals because of the risk that an unrelated political dispute would compromise the supply of the commodity. A neutral and efficient supply system, in the form of the companies, was already in existence.

(c) The desire of many oil producing states to purchase arms might cause a dangerous race amongst oil importers to outbid each other in arms supplies for oil.

(d) A common oil policy was a test of the overall strength of European Community solidarity, and agreement between the Community and the United States on this issue was likewise a token of the ability to conclude other and wider Atlantic agreements. Bilateral deals which were not made within a wider framework of agreement thus threatened the overall political unity of the West.

The proponents of bilateral deals tended to take a more pragmatic line, arguing that:

(a) Multilateral agreements between oil importing countries, if achieved, would be interpreted by oil exporters, rightly or wrongly, as a hostile gesture and might therefore provoke confrontation on a much broader front, with consequent dangers to global security.
(b) In the European Community, the basis for co-operative action did not yet exist. In the meantime, nations must act individually, in order both to protect their vital interests and to preserve any possibility of gaining the confidence of the oil producers.
(c) The interests of the United States in the Middle East were not necessarily identical with those of the European Community or its member states. Further, the United States, in contrast with Europe, was able to survive in the future without Middle East oil (and had indeed announced its intention to do so through 'Project Independence'). Bilateral deals could not therefore threaten an accord which did not exist; but, if such deals succeeded in increasing the amount of oil available globally beyond what would otherwise be produced, all would benefit.

Considerable suspicion on the part of the oil producers attended the preparations for the Washington Conference, although it had quickly been announced that the consumers' conference would be followed by a consumer-producer conference. Amongst the consumers, too, the split widened between the French and the other European Community members. . . . France . . . postponed its decision to attend in Washington until the last moment. Japan made it clear that it saw the conference as only the first step towards what should become a dialogue between oil producing and oil consuming countries. In short, conditions were far from propitious for the success of the conference.

Dr. Kissinger's opening statement[6] in Washington proposed seven areas for co-operative exploration: energy conservation, alternative energy sources, research and development, energy sharing, international financial co-operation, the situation of less developed countries, and consumer-producer relations. Under the last heading, he argued that the proposed consumer-producer conference would not lead to confrontation, but would form the basis of a new co-operative relationship. But it would do so only if consumers did not seek selfish advantages, either as a group or individually, and only if they had first established a solid foundation of co-operation amongst themselves. He further proposed the establishment of a consumer co-ordinating group to carry forward the work of the consumer conference.

There then followed an attack on all the principles of the conference by France, and an attempt by the others, particularly the Europeans, to reach a joint compromise line, close to the American position but including the French.

The search for a compromise proved unsuccessful. France remained,

[6] United States Information Service Feb. 12, 1974.

in particular, totally opposed to the proposals for a continuing organisation to follow up conference decisions.

The conference nevertheless resulted in a decision by the consumer nations, minus one, to co-operate—despite the original reservations of more than one of the participants—and, in particular, in an unprecedented agreement by eight members of the European Community to over-ride the firm decision of a ninth and senior member. These results were both worthy of note.

Although another part of the conference's outcome—an understanding not to prosecute further bilateral oil supply deals—remains unwritten, it is abundantly clear that the Washington accord also involved the rejection of bilateralism in its broadest sense. Contacts have admittedly taken place since between Washington signatories and individual oil producers, albeit without any clear result. At the same time, however, groups of consumer country officials have been set up and are already functioning in the areas nominated for joint action. The overall commitment to co-operation seems, in fact, to be viable, despite problems such as United States resentment at the European Community's long-postponed decision to open a dialogue with Arab oil producers on broad principles of co-operation.

Lessons are not easy to draw from the Washington Conference on bilateralism versus multilateralism in other resource situations. Detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, their tight interrelationship over a Middle East settlement, the United States defence commitment to Europe, the credibility of a United States threat to use force to solve Middle East oil supply restrictions, and other superpower considerations are embroiled in the international politics of oil to a totally different degree than is likely to occur with, say, bauxite or copper. This argues both for and against a quicker and less dramatic resolution of future consumer country differences over other resource problems. An optimistic view would stress the learning experience of Washington and its continuing aftermath, in the sense that the difficulties and hard decisions tied up in consumer negotiations on this scale are unlikely in future to be underestimated even for less obviously vital resources. The indications remain strong, on the other hand, that the immediate response of a consumer nation faced with a restriction of supply which threatens the smooth running of a high employment economy without raising serious international issues is simply to pay more and thereby obtain the supply, and in the longer term, if possible, to develop alternatives domestically.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence. By Benjamin J. Cohen. *New York: Basic Books. 1973. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 280 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (The Political Economy of International Relations Series; Ed.: Benjamin J. Cohen.) £4·95.*

States in Evolution: Changing Societies and Traditional Systems in World Politics. By George Liska. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 1974. 184 pp. (Studies in International Affairs No. 19.) £3·80.*

Peace, War and Numbers. Edited by Bruce M. Russett. Introd. by Betty Crump Hanson and Bruce M. Russett. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1972. 352 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. £8·75.*

THE three books deal with the central features of the international system from different angles and for different readers: Cohen writes for the general reader as well as for scholars, Liska primarily for the systems analysts, and the Russett contributes for those interested in quantitative methods.

Professor Cohen attributes 'imperialism' to the nations' search for power because of their insecurity within the anarchic international system; he refutes the radical and marxist arguments which blame the capitalist structure of imperialist states. This is, however, an orthodox interpretation with a difference. First, the author, himself an economist, manages to bridge the gulf between economics and politics, for example, by proposing an interesting structuring of imperialist relations as non zero sum games, resembling relations analysed in the theory of oligopoly. Secondly, he has patiently explored, neatly summarised, partly accepted and partly criticised the major radical and marxist theories from Hobson, Lenin and Schumpeter to Baran and Sweezy and Magdoff. Owing to the comprehensiveness and the clarity of his argument, he provides both a source of information on the major theories and an intellectually respectable standpoint between the extremes; incidentally, he makes a contribution to the history of intel-

lectual thought by tracing the evolution of the concept throughout this century. The argument is amply and convincingly documented by quotations and statistics, drawn largely both from the IMF and from modern radical writers. Very few doubts arise. To mention two issues relating to Britain, do really only 62 per cent. of the 5–14 age group enjoy here primary education against 84 per cent. in Argentina (pp. 48–50)? If correct, how informative is this figure in view of our compulsory education starting at six, and what is its significance? The otherwise illuminating analysis of the issue of investments in poor countries does not mention the extreme case of Britain's postwar investments in the sterling area which can be justifiably considered as a heavy net loss in terms of their opportunity cost. But these are minor points in an informative and well-balanced book.

Professor George Liska's *States in Evolution* can be appropriately labelled as an application of systems analysis to the recent changes in the United States foreign policy epitomised in the 'Nixon Doctrine'. The author rightly concludes that the United States seems now to aim at the achievement of regional balances of power, which is the very opposite of imperialism. Thus, through an empirical study of the foreign policy of the arch-capitalist state, he reinforces Cohen's critique of the radical model, although neither writer denies that the United States, like other powerful countries, endeavours to exercise as much influence as it can.

Liska's argument is tight and is stated in what to many British readers may appear to be inhibiting jargon, but it is logical and richly rewarding. He convincingly places the 'Nixon Doctrine' in its historical setting, stressing that it merely formalises the continuous changes which American foreign policy has been undergoing in its attempts to maintain a power position in the world while being disinclined to intervene with American manpower. The longest and most substantive chapter deals with the gradual evolution of regional systems, mainly in terms of the relations among the lesser and less-developed states. The author analyses in fair detail several major aspects of conflicts arising in the Third World and stresses the so far unfulfilled promise of their resolution through some form of regionalism and development. He then turns to the main strands of the policies of the super-powers and the middle powers; he analyses the failures of the Americans and Russians to dominate the Third World and attributes to both of them a relative 'conservatism' in their present common concern for a minimum order. The evolution of their policies is bound to be hesitating and complex as they have to combine a new global system with various multiple structures; the uncertainties about China's intentions further obscure the picture. In his conclusion Liska analyses the American foreign policy which is now emerging through the difficult processes of integrating all its strands. This policy revolves around a revision of the previous attitudes to potential regional imperialists, who may be the key to the new regional policies, and a definition of the co-responsibility with communist countries. It is extremely hard to conceive any exact form of some such 'new internationalism', but this seems to offer the only way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of imperialism.

Peace, War and Numbers, the volume edited by Professor Bruce M. Russett, is an impressive collection of eleven papers, all of which are of a very high standard and closely bear on the central theme. The purpose of the book is to present a 'macroscopic' systemic view—the analysis deals

with a collectivity of states and not with single powers, and most papers make good use of the data assembled over the years by Rummell and Singer. The method generally consists of factor analysis, often starting with bivariate analysis before engaging in the much more complex multivariate one. Although following in detail the mathematical presentation may be beyond the scope of skills and interests of many readers, anybody with analytical interests going beyond history could not but profit from the verbal analysis which is quite readable and is assisted by a brief synopsis at the beginning of each paper.

Several promising concepts are applied, for example, those of 'distance' and 'status', and interesting perennial problems are re-formulated, often in a refreshingly sharp form, for example, the dynamics of conflict and the relationship between external and internal factors. The findings are modest but plausible. It is always worth reiterating the frequently determining role of the existing, established patterns of action, as is done by several contributors; more striking is the re-formulation in a partial, more rigorous and therefore much more plausible form, of the hypothesis that armaments lead to wars, which has been rightly rejected in its utopian, absolute form, fashionable early in this century. The editor's concluding paper is methodologically unambitious but probably most illuminating both in its findings and in their interpretation. Professor Russett shows how public opinion polls fully refute the previously upheld myth that the Americans have been traditionally opposed to massive armaments but that this popular permissiveness has been lately giving way to opposition. He rightly rejects the simplistic explanation by the Vietnam experience but admits that we can only speculate on the additional reasons several of which he shrewdly discusses.

JOSEPH FRANKEL

International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects. By David Wainhouse *et al.* Foreword by Robert E. Osgood. *Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press in cooperation with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. 1974. 634 pp. Index. £10·70.*

THIS is a useful and nearly a very good book, consisting of summarised information about international peacekeeping. In spite of its size and price, it can be described as a mini-Higgins. But in two respects it goes beyond the volumes which Dr. Higgins has compiled[1]: in providing information on national (and especially United States) support for peacekeeping and by including operations not under UN auspices (*e.g.* Kuwait 1961, Dominican Republic 1965). Peacekeeping is defined more restrictively than by Dr. Higgins so that the Korean war is excluded. The operations covered in greatest detail are the Congo 1960–1964, the Middle East Emergency Force 1956–1967, and Cyprus since 1964.

[1] *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–67: Documents and Commentary. I. The Middle East.* Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1969, p. 688.
United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–67: Documents and Commentary. II. Asia. Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 754.

The authors have extensive experience and express wise judgments; but the book is marred by factual errors (to cite only one example, the Bangladesh war is dated 1972 three times on one page), a capricious system of citing UN documents is used, and the source of some important documents is not given at all (*e.g.*, pp. 405–408). The fact that the book includes a number of unusual abbreviations, some patently useless information (*e.g.*, six *un*satisfactory methods of dividing the Congo operation into chronological phases, pp. 274–276, or that the United Kingdom has lent the UN forty-six padlocks in Cyprus, p. 364), and a few typographical errors, suggests a too hasty or casual scissors-and-paste editorial job.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence. By Richard Hiscocks. *London: Longman. 1973. 371 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·95.*

THIS book sets out to assess the record of the Security Council from the establishment of the United Nations until April 1972. First there is a backward look at the experience of the League of Nations and earlier attempts to maintain peace on an institutionalised basis. Then there are chapters on the Security Council in theory and practice (although the section on practice only goes up to 1965), its procedures, its use as a forum and rendezvous, problems of peacekeeping, the Council's relations with the General Assembly, and its future. But the heart of the book is a very long chapter in which Professor Hiscocks examines the work of the Council case by case. The result is a work which will undoubtedly be of great value to students, providing them with easily accessible material on all the main issues and themes relating to the Security Council.

It is, however, a book on which some teachers will wish to issue a cautionary word, for it is written very much from an institutional perspective. The individual case studies often fail to give an adequate picture of what went on inside the Security Council and hence of what was going on outside the United Nations; instead they speak of the Council rather as if it were a homogeneous and autonomous body. This could to some extent be due to lack of space, but it is evident that it also reflects the author's basic orientation. He suggests, for example, that had the Security Council begun with some co-operative venture by the great powers, the UN might have developed on very different lines; that if the UN's anti-Rhodesian sanctions were to work it would be an important step towards the solution of the problem of apartheid in South Africa; and that the future of the Security Council depends in part on how far it is able to deal with certain deficiencies of composition and procedure. It is arguable that such an approach puts too much emphasis on the Council's decisions and devices and too little on the attitudes and policies of its member states.

Another warning, of a less controversial kind, is in order. Professor Hiscocks has given his book a most seductive subtitle. But those readers who look forward to a discussion of how the idea of growth from infancy to maturity might be applied to the Security Council will be sadly disappointed. The concept of adolescence is mentioned on but three occasions and on two of these only in passing. The third reference is at the very end of the book where Professor Hiscocks asserts that the UN 'has been

experiencing institutional adolescence' and hopes that it will be outgrown through the development of a 'truly international approach' (p. 328) to the world's problems.

ALAN JAMES

Intelsat: Policy-Maker's Dilemma. By Judith Tegger Kildow. *Lexington, Mass., London: Lexington Books, Heath. 1973. 118 pp. Index. (Studies in International Relations and Foreign Policy.) £5·40.*

THIS is a handy case study, generously footnoted and with a useful bibliography, many of its main points being underlined by some rather long quotations. Its chief weakness is freely conceded in the introduction, namely that it is mainly based on stated positions, the underlying motives having proved difficult to identify. Within that limitation the account seems to be factually sound, comprehensive so far as length allows, perhaps somewhat repetitious, but certainly fair and balanced. It is indeed this objectivity which makes one wish that the author had felt like teasing out rather more insights than are set down in the four pages of conclusions.

During the 1960s, as Kildow shows, the behaviour of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), was in many ways the best argument of those who were pressing for integrated and independent European science and technology policies. But that the Comsat-Intelsat arrangement should become a 'vehicle for nationalism' was not at all an inevitable consequence of the relative technological positions of the United States and its Intelsat partners. It may not even have been an inevitable outcome of the fact that the United States, in establishing Comsat, neither distinguished between foreign policy and economic advantage nor seriously attempted to give primacy to the former. The degeneration all round to restrictive national attitudes was, however, a virtually unavoidable result of the unenlightened way Comsat went about its business. More cynical interpretations are certainly possible, and the conclusions the author reaches on page 16 a French observer would undoubtedly express more decisively. There was, he would say, no generosity in offering to share communications when technology, profits and potential political influence remained firmly under American control, and those who created Comsat must have known this.

Although Kildow reminds the reader that technological imperatives have altered the nature of foreign policy making, in particular enhancing in principle the role of those offering technical and managerial advice, the reality is that such advice is still more often than not mobilised, as in this case, for the furtherance of the traditional goals either of politics or of commerce. And as this study and so many others demonstrate, the concept 'foreign policy' has a coherence wholly belied by the extremely complex inter-state interactions so characteristic of modern industrial societies. This, it is generally recognised, makes even basic analysis difficult, and still more disturbing is the evidence that many practitioners are also not infrequently misled. Studies of this sort in this situation are all the more welcome.

ROGER WILLIAMS

The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations. By George Scott. *London: Hutchinson. 1973. 432 pp. Illus. Index. £4·80.*

IN this book the distinguished journalist, George Scott, has tried to 'recapture the atmosphere of Geneva and to gain some understanding of the dramatic events enacted there during the life of the League'. His colourful narrative is at its best in descriptive passages dealing with such historic events as the first League Assembly meeting in 1920 and the Locarno conference, and he conveys a lively impression of the atmosphere surrounding such occasions. What is almost inevitably lacking, however, in a popular historical account of this kind, is any depth of analysis, and serious students of international relations between the wars will find little here to add to their knowledge of the period.

The most serious omission is any detailed examination of the League Covenant and of the various roles which the League was equipped bv its architects to play. Without this kind of basic analysis Mr. Scott's observations are rather meaningless. He makes the generalisation that 'if there was one line of thought which linked virtually all British Cabinets between the two wars it was that they had no wish to extend Britain's international commitments beyond those prescribed by the Covenant' (p. 102); but it falls rather flat in the absence of any summary of exactly what commitments the Covenant did prescribe. His further observations that 'Britain's influence was often the most decisive in keeping the League out of things' (p. 166) and that Austen Chamberlain, as Foreign Secretary, was seeking 'the defence of British interests' (p. 167), are equally imprecise. What things, which interests? The real truth of the matter was that successive British governments were quite happy to utilise some articles of the Covenant but were totally unwilling to contemplate action under others; and they concentrated their efforts on trying to minimise the likelihood of the successive stages of Article 16, the sanctions article, from being invoked.

While Mr. Scott makes lengthy quotations from British cabinet papers, though without much analysis of their content and without any footnote references, he surprisingly does not quote from the Admiralty, Treasury and Board of Trade memoranda drafted in 1923 during the Corfu crisis, which all informed the government that in their view economic and military action under Article 16, in the absence of the United States from the League, would be extremely hazardous and should not be supported by the British government.

Mr. Scott is similarly imprecise on other important issues. His comment that the progress of the League's preparatory disarmament commission in 1926 was so slow that 'even the British Government was worried' (p. 189) certainly does not take account of Hankey's view that 'I should like to see the [Preparatory Disarmament] Committee postponed until the Greek Kalends' or Cecil's plea to Baldwin to use his influence to try to modify his Cabinet colleagues' obstructive attitudes towards schemes of arms limitation. His comment that 'South America was a continent which prided itself upon fidelity to the League' (p. 242) is equally misleading. What price Argentinian or Brazilian loyalty? While his accounts of the Corfu crisis and the Austrian financial reconstruction scheme are similarly superficial, the crises of the 1930s get much fuller coverage and are handled with a surer touch. Mr. Scott seems much more at home in the 1930s and he gives full play to all the complex factors involved in the League diplomacy of this period.

Mr. Scott's narrative is always fluent and full of colour, and the reader's interest is sustained not only by his vivid descriptions of people and places but also by the marvellous collection of caricatures of leading League statesmen which is included. This narrative history of the League, while too superficial for the specialist or student, will undoubtedly appeal to the general reader.

RUTH HENIG

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

The Rationale for NATO: European collective security—past and future. By Morton A. Kaplan. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. 1973. 94 pp. Index. (AEI-Hoover policy studies.) $3.00.*

American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of deterrence and disarmament. By Warner R. Schilling *et al. New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1973. 218 pp. Index. (Institute of War and Peace Studies of the School of International Affairs of Columbia University.) £6·00.*

Era of Negotiations: European Security and Force Reductions. By Wolfgang Klaiber *et al.* Foreword by Charles E. Bohlen. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, Heath for the Atlantic Council of the United States. 1973. 192 pp. £5·00.*

THESE three volumes have something in common beyond their concern with European security and the fact that they all emanate from distinguished stables; they all embody prescriptions and suggestions for future policy development. In this way they mark something of a change from much recent work on security and defence affairs and recall rather more the analyses of the early 1960s. Certainly they offer useful insights into the ways in which American scholars are now endeavouring to reshape American perspectives, even though we may doubt how receptive official circles are nowadays to brain-storming initiatives of the once traditional type.

Professor Kaplan's little book is a work of open advocacy and, in its way, of homily: 'if we are to reinvigorate NATO in a world in which the United States is no longer the dominant power, we must become sensitive to the fact that other nations have views and interests that differ from ours. Our capacity to persuade is now more important than our capacity to compel acquiescence' (p. 1). And so he proposes for Nato a strategy of dissuasion, which identifies provocative forces like Pershing missiles and quick-reaction aircraft, and urges that Nato should distinguish between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as target areas, deliberately avoiding 'the use of weapon systems that would produce large amounts of collateral damage in Eastern Europe or that would do grievous injury to the Eastern European economies and social and political infrastructures' (p. 65). He also suggests a quick-transfer system between the United States and Nato Europe to allow FBM submarines to be switched to European states under attack; luckily, most of the homily makes more sense than that particular echo of the MLF.

Professor Schilling's composite symposium is altogether more substan-

tial: it is a discussion based upon the continuing dilemma of the United States' 'effort to reconcile its policies for the preservation of the European balance of power with its policies for the prevention of a Soviet-American nuclear war' (p. 5). The book is a companion volume to *European Security and the Atlantic System* [1] and the two together represent an extended analysis prepared by the Institute of War and Peace Studies for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The chapter on the changing strategic environment (by Professor Schilling) is particularly interesting and comprehensive; and there are eight models of conceptually possible security arrangements for those whose taste lies in the direction of schematic projection.

Era of Negotiations is published for the Atlantic Council and is another composite volume, half of which is made up of appendixes (*sic*) of relevant texts and documents beginning with the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966 and the Harmel Report of December 1967. There is an account of the historical build-up to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the MBFR negotiations, and an analysis of the major issues, related primarily from a United States viewpoint. The didactic element in this work is perhaps less adventurous than in the other two books under discussion, but the tone is nonetheless edifying. Thus: 'the burden on U.S. policy makers, as this Conference process unfolds, is not just the burden of leadership in East-West relations, it is also the burden of leadership within the West. It is, in fact, the burden of responsibility and farsightedness in the building of a Western world from which the United States cannot extricate itself because it is politically, economically and culturally so deeply involved' (p. 95). (See St. Matthew, Ch. 17, verse 20.)

PETER NAILOR

The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. By George H. Quester. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1974. 249 pp. Index. $11.50. £5·50.*

MR. QUESTER, Professor of Government at Cornell and author of more than one previous book and numerous articles on nuclear weapon diplomacy, has conducted this study of the prospects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty under the headings of the main countries concerned (seventeen in number), plus a chapter on the International Atomic Energy Agency of Vienna, and another setting out briefly his conclusions for the future. His coverage is thorough and, for all the absence of a bibliography, gives evidence of wide reading, as well as first-hand acquaintance with the subject, even if there may not be a lot here that will be new to the specialist reader. Some of the country studies show considerable insight, notably perhaps those on India, Israel and Sweden: and Professor Quester can claim due prescience for his estimate of India as likely to be the first non-nuclear-weapon power to carry out a nuclear explosion.

It is in the nature of a somewhat ephemeral book such as this that in a number of respects it is already being overtaken by events. A more avoidable failing is that portions of it contain evidence of having been

[1] Columbia University Press for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, 1973. London: Columbia.

written two or three years earlier than the rest and not up-dated—this applies for instance to the various references to putative British membership of the European Community. Apart from that, the actual treatment of the subject matter tends to be uneven; and Professor Quester's writing is not always felicitous or free of banality (to say nothing of his occasional confusion of words, for example 'discrete' for 'discreet', 'sensibility' for 'sense'—and 'torturous' seems a new one, at any rate on this side of the Atlantic). His language is also sometimes exaggerated, as in his discussion of the IAEA, which is more dramatised than the facts seem to warrant—for example, his surmise that the agency could itself become a 'sixth nuclear weapon power'!

One tends naturally to read the book against the background of the forthcoming review conference of the NPT, and to look for ideas for helping to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the treaty as part of a wider non-proliferation regime. Here the author rather disappoints. What he has to say is for the most part sensible enough, but his recommendations for action and policy do not go very far. It might also have been useful if the section on peaceful nuclear explosions had gone deeper into the problems which these explosions entail *vis-à-vis* not only the NPT but also any possible future test ban.

Subject to these criticisms, the book constitutes quite a useful survey, and is well produced—though is it too much to hope that one day a publication on the subject will dispense with the picture of the familiar mushroom cloud on the dust-jacket?

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

Crisis in European Defence: The Next Ten Years. By Geoffrey Lee Williams and Alan Lee Williams. Foreword by Eugene V. Rostow. *London, Tonbridge: Charles Knight. 1974. 334 pp. Index. £5·50.*

The Defence of Western Europe. Papers presented at the National Defence College, Latimer, in September 1972. Edited by John Garnett. Foreword by T. D. H. McMeekin. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 134 pp. Index. £4·95.*

Force Reductions in Europe. Preface by Frank Barnaby. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press; London: Paul Elek. 1974. 105 pp. (A SIPRI Monograph.) Sw.kr.38.00. $8.00. £4·00.*

OF these three volumes the more intellectual is that edited by John Garnett, the more clinical the SIPRI monograph, and the more journalistic that of the Williams brothers.

The last mentioned purports to examine 'the major defence issues and developments which Western Europe faces over the next ten years' (p. xii). It does not. Or, at least, its crystal gazing is based on such speculative scenarios and assertions 'for which we can advance no concrete evidence' (p. 128) that the outcome is so insubstantial as to be of very little value. What the book does do, however, with much more success, is to present a *history* of Western European security in the post-war period, and the problems and constraints associated with it. A useful introductory chapter places European security in its great power setting, but is followed by a weak, fragmented chapter on techno-political restraints—the sociological and economic views expressed would suggest that

neither brother is practised in these arts. Five, primarily historical, national studies, dealing with the principal actors in European security, precede what ought to be the highlight of the book, the chapter dealing with the next ten years. It marks instead a nadir. This is a pity, for tucked away amongst the bland, the purely speculative, the platitudinous, and the bizarre of this, and the final three chapters, are ideas that are worthy of further consideration and development.

The Williams's proof reading is appalling. Beginning with the contents page which has no pagination for chapter two, there is barely a chapter without several proof reading errors, sometimes amusing, for example, p. 291, but usually just irritating. More serious is the lack of consistency in giving references, and the errors that creep into this area—for example, chapter 6, reference 1. This is indicative of the rather slapdash style from which the book suffers in parts. However, if one can ignore the subtitle, and the relatively small sections of the book that justify it, and forgive the other faults, the student of European security will find it an interestingly written background to the present situation.

John Garnett's volume—a collection of papers given to a residential conference at the National Defence College in September 1972—more nearly fulfils the aspirations of the Williams brothers. Six articulate and scholarly papers examine various diverse aspects of West European security, and the future forms that these might take. The first paper, by Professor Laurence Martin, is concerned with the impact on Europe of the Nixon Doctrine. This paper establishes a high standard in the quality of its argument and the ease of its expression—a standard that all the papers emulate, even if they sometimes lack Professor Martin's panache. In examining the future relations towards Europe of the United States and the Soviet Union, both the late Wayne Wilcox and Malcolm Mackintosh base themselves firmly on the perceived interests of these powers, and it emerges from both studies that economic factors may come to have an overwhelming relevance in foreign policy in the future decade—occupying, perhaps, the role of security in foreign policies in the 1960s. The Editor's paper, the longest in the book, examines the impact of an enlarged EEC on European security, and the possibility of defence procurement co-ordination in the area. This is an interesting and fashionable focus, and has a certain rationale if concern is to be only with the Central Front area of Nato. But if the flanks of Nato are to be satisfactorily included, then the framework must continue to be Nato or some successor organisation. Taking up the theme of co-ordinated arms procurement—and also paralleling the theme of 'disbalance' in national forces to create a cheaper and more effective overall balance—Hugh Green of the Ministry of Defence advocates economically optimum procurement policies, which must entail co-operation and co-ordination. But it is, perhaps, fair to suggest that procurement sources are determined by other than purely economic factors—as projects both civil and military in Great Britain would indicate. The final paper, by a 'senior serving officer of the British Army' using the somehow very British and abstruse title of 'Cormorant', is concerned with the strategies of the European states, culminating in a plea for a new deployment of ground forces, posited in the belief that by the 1980s all forces will be regular forces. Perhaps the weakness of such a volume is its lack of comprehensiveness and inability to be totally integrated. The individual papers, obviously, stand in their

own right, but the thread of unity between them ought, perhaps, to be strengthened—an editorial prologue could give added value to an already admirable book.

The SIPRI monograph, in contrast to the other two volumes, is very narrowly conceived, seeking to survey relevant facts on mutual force reduction in Europe. It does, however, execute its remit with great thoroughness. All three chapters—on recent proposals, the military strategies of Nato and the Warsaw Pact, and on the reduction of forces in Europe—are based on speeches, writings, and documents from the two alliances and the member states, and confine themselves to reiterating known positions and views. The lack of comment gives a peculiarly 'flat' impression. The little comment that does exist often spoils the impression of impartiality, as there is a not totally unexpected underlying presumption that disarmament is 'a good thing' that will, of itself, produce security, and that parity equals stability—neither of which propositions is necessarily true. The documentation is excellent, and the appendices, occupying a quarter of the book—dealing with the balance (a word that has still to be defined) between the Warsaw Pact and Nato, and the military expenditure of the two alliances—are a helpful adjunct to the textual material. The volume will be useful as a secondary source.

ROGER CAREY

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Economics of Poverty. 2nd ed. By Thomas Balogh. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 291 pp. Index. £4·50. Paperback: £2·00.*

IN this second edition of Thomas Balogh's work, the author has included two new chapters (6 and 7) to reinforce his continued conviction of the importance of agrarian and educational reform in developing countries, and three revised chapters (10, 11 and 12) to cover what he terms 'the most urgent of questions, the reform of planning for development and aid administration'. In introducing these innovations, Dr. Balogh nevertheless maintains a balance between adopting a highly controversial approach to development problems whilst, at the same time, displaying great sensitivity for the difficulties facing developing countries in their struggle for social and economic advancement. The study makes for refreshing reading in that the author adopts an interdisciplinary approach to his analysis, realising that development can only come about through a concerted effort in the sociological, political, and educational spheres, in addition to the economic.

Dr. Balogh concedes that one of the greatest constraints on development has been the blind imitation of Western methods in African and Asian states, especially in education; expatriate modes of living by the new governmental, civil service, and commercial elites have brought about a class apartheid and, even in those countries where independence was granted after a prolonged rebellion or civil war—as in Algeria—the same elitist deterioration may be seen. In particular, he argues for greater equality in educational opportunities; the present pernicious income differentials should be attributed to the feudal or tribal ruling-class status of the educated, which is derived from exploitation and is incompatible with economic development (p. 148).

Repeatedly, the author laments the failure of efforts to redistribute wealth more equally on an international scale and, realistically, he stresses that we have run into a deep-seated intellectual and emotional crisis where attempts at redistributing resources and knowledge to mitigate global inequality and to reduce privilege have met with limited results. The roots of this crisis derive from the intimate connections between many of the former colonies and their late metropoles, their respective capital structures, and the difficulty involved in the finance of anything but international trade. More serious still for the world community, neither the United Nations and its agencies nor the World Bank have succeeded in alleviating this condition of post-imperial dependence.

On aid, Dr. Balogh comes to the defence of bilateral as opposed to multilateral assistance. Although he criticises certain aspects of bilateral aid programmes as they function at present, he argues forcefully that multilateral aid, too, has often proved futile or been frustrated by the lack of relevant expertise, especially as regards its phasing and co-ordination in planning. Moreover, he explains lucidly how multilateral aid is not always free from the political pressures which donor countries exert in their bilateral activities.

In an incisive section (Chapter 7) on planning for development, the author points out that since 85–90 per cent. of the population of Africa, and 78–80 per cent. of that of Asia depends for its livelihood on agriculture, any plan which relies heavily on industrialisation to solve the problem of poverty is doomed to failure (p. 139). Whilst this hypothesis may be realistic in economic terms, it is not likely to meet with wholehearted approval by many governments in the developing areas, since industrialisation *per se* is viewed by many leaders in the new states as not only a token of their independence, but also as a symbol of their growing equality in political status with the developed nations.

Dr. Balogh feels that a complete revolution is needed, not merely of property relations and other basic social institutions, but in attitudes (notably religious attitudes), and in technical knowledge. Successful development demands new socio-technical solutions in agriculture as well as in education (p. 141).

In Part Three, covering the international aspects of development, the author postulates that the deterioration in the terms of trade has contributed to the growing international inequality in income distribution. Indeed, it is unrealistic to expect any reversal in the unfavourable trend for primary producers without a change in the sociological framework of the countries concerned; Dr. Balogh is more controversial, however, when he asserts that this change is more likely to be stimulated under well-planned aid programmes than by commodity schemes, or even by the liberalisation of trade in manufactures. He stresses this belief when he says that 'trade, and especially an induced improvement in the terms of trade, is no alternative to a well-conceived programme of aid combined with internal reform' (p. 174).

In a section on international monetary reform, the author advocates the creation of increased liquidity as a first step towards the establishment of an effective central banking mechanism, which in turn could make loans to developing countries through international agencies, such as the World Bank. It is a pity that Dr. Balogh does not elaborate further his

ideas on monetary reform and the developing countries, especially on such controversial issues as the proposal for a link between SDRs and aid, and the changes taking place in the various monetary zones.

NICHOLAS HUTTON

The High Road and the Low: A Study in Legitimacy, Authority and Technical Aid. By D. V. Segre. *London: Allen Lane. 1974. 176 pp. Index. £2·50.*

IN their efforts to remedy the shortcomings of foreign aid, the late Lester Pearson's report on 'Partners in Development', the Jackson report on the UN Development System, and the various reports to the President of the United States fully aired the disenchantment on the part of both donors and recipients. Yet, the search continues for answers to the questions which the transfer of advanced technology to non-developed societies raises. Dr. Segre is not one who looks for 'technical solutions to basically non-technical problems' (p. 3). In his experience, which includes fifteen years in the Israeli Foreign Service and research assignments at Oxford and the MIT, the most important task in the process of modernisation falls to the 'man-in-the-middle'. He is the carrier of innovations from the elite of the advanced country to that of the backward society. Below the thirtieth line of latitude, where most of these societies are found, the conquerors and colonial administrators came, and went, as foreigners, upholding their own values and terms of reference and largely remaining 'carriers of unacceptable changes' (p. 57)—or so the author holds. The same can, no doubt, be said of some modern carriers of change, coming—and leaving—in the garb of the technical expert or foreign aid administrator. Only where the 'man-in-the-middle' acts as a stranger, who (in Simmel's definition) 'came yesterday and stays tomorrow' (p. 53), living in a situation of distance and proximity at the same time, feeling marginal to his own and to his adopted society, and oscillating between remoteness and intimacy, is he likely to succeed as a transmitter of change from the advanced to the advancing society. Not everybody will agree with Dr. Segre that success depends on the innovation being legitimised by the traditional authorities. Here the role which non-governing elites sometimes play should not be underestimated.

The author, himself a 'marginal man', has analysed with great perception his selected cases of legitimacy, authority and technical aid: Madagascar under colonial rule; the Peruvian Sierra and Kabul (Afghanistan) under the impact of the Peace Corps; and the West Bank of Jordan under Israeli occupation. Each of these cases shows how rare is the phenomenon of the 'man-in-the-middle' or the 'Development N.C.O.'—as he is sometimes called in Israel's technical assistance service. On the occupied bank of the Jordan, a particularly gifted agricultural administrator, with the help of his development NCOs, persuaded Arab cultivators to accept his advice without appearing to co-operate with the enemy. However, each development situation is unique and needs its own 'man-in-the-middle'. The author, a supporter of the Jewish co-operative settlement, is the first to acknowledge that 'the situation on the West Bank could not easily be reproduced elsewhere' (p. 118).

W. KLATT

Private Foreign Investment in Development. By Grant L. Reuber with H. Crookell, M. Emerson, G. Gallais-Hamonno. Foreword by M. Yudelman. *Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 1973. 371 pp. Index. £5·50. Paperback: £2·25.*

Science, Technology and Development: The Political Economy of Technical Advance in Underdeveloped Countries. Edited by Charles Cooper. *London, Portland: Cass. 1973. 199 pp. £2·75.*

THE continuing debate over the role of foreign private investment in the development process has been growing in heat as world attention has been turned on that investment's visible manifestation, the multinational company. Reuber's book is a useful contribution to this debate, bringing geographical balance to a field which is North American oriented, and adding new empirical evidence to official statistics which, by now, have been virtually wrung dry of further significance.

It is, however, a book by economists, generally lacking the political overtone of the study undertaken by the UN's Group of Eminent Persons. This is hardly surprising since it sprang from the OECD's Development Centre in 1969, and has incorporated data from that organisation's Development Assistance Committee on the stock of private investment outstanding in developing countries at the end of 1967. Reuber and his associates have added to the value of this book by collecting data on approximately eighty private foreign investment projects in less developed countries from head offices of foreign investors in North America, Europe and Japan.

The advantage of this particular parentage is that Asia and Africa get equal treatment with Latin America, and that lesser known investing countries like Sweden and France are given some analysis in their own right. In particular, there is an appendix written by Michael Emerson, which summarises the structure and distribution of foreign private investment in less developed countries with an analytical clarity and conciseness which is genuinely novel. Each of the continents involved in importing such capital is analysed in turn, with Emerson drawing together the statistics and illuminating the policy differences of the countries concerned. A similar section summarises the salient characteristics of the capital-exporting countries, major and minor, giving an idea of the sectors involved, the names of the more important companies involved (this is particularly useful for the smaller nations), and the geographical areas in which their investment has clustered.

In addition to this valuable 40-page appendix, the authors do a carefully documented, if somewhat conservative, analysis of the economic arguments for and against such investment. They give portfolio investment a chapter to itself, reminding us that much current thinking about multinationals assumes that there is much less variety in the form of overseas private investment than there is in the real world. In the rest of the book they look at types of direct investment, how and why firms invest, the effects of such investment in areas like production and trade, and various aspects of the technology transfer argument.

Those who are sceptical about the overall social and political impact of such investment will not be won over by the generally bland conclusions, but they will find themselves referring to the bibliographic and statistical material in which this book abounds. However, what the authors have

not really tackled is the role of private foreign investment in development, in the widest sense. Because they do not adequately consider the debate over alternative forms of development, they will leave theorists in this latter field ultimately dissatisfied.

The authors of the volume edited by Charles Cooper are much more aware of this debate and have produced a book which is interesting in parts, but which is ultimately disappointing in that the standard of contributions varies heavily. Cooper admits that there is a bias towards the industrial sector, but there is a good article by Clive Bell on the acquisition of agricultural technology. It is also useful to have Cooper's views on science and technology in less developed countries, and those of Vaitsos on the way the patent system is used against these countries. The collection of papers was originally a special issue of the *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (October 1972).

LOUIS TURNER

Opportunity and Response: Case Studies in Economic Development. Edited by T. Scarlett Epstein and David H. Penny. *London: Hurst. 1972. 268 pp. Map. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £4·80.*

THIS volume of studies originated in a series of seminars held in 1970 at the Research School of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University, with which its contributors—economists, sociologists, historians, demographers and anthropologists—are, or have been, associated. The essays, though related to the subject under discussion, are tied rather loosely to the common theme of response to new opportunities. They provide, nonetheless, a good sample of the kind of problems modernisers have to face.

Dianne Barwick gives an historical account of the grim conditions under which two communities of aborigines lived on Australian Crown lands in Victoria and New South Wales. R. T. Shand points at the close interrelation between transport costs and the development of a cash crop, such as coffee, in an area of subsistence in New Guinea. The impact of migration and land tenure on a Karo village in North Sumatra is described by David Penny and Singarinmbun. A paper by B. R. Finney on the 'achievement-oriented' society of the Gorokans in New Guinea shows the role of the entrepreneur in a changing society. This is also the subject of a paper by Scarlett Epstein, who compares one of her paddy communities in South India,[1] where social status is determined by hereditary relations between cultivators and functionary castes, with an 'egalitarian-oriented' community in New Guinea, where achieved rather than ascribed status serves as a prime agent of development. Brian Lockwood and Moulick disclose the detrimental effects which seed multiplication, a by-product of the 'green revolution', visited on a village in North India. Fisk and Honeybone followed the path which had led C. S. Belshaw ten years earlier 'under the ivi tree' in Fiji. Following his approach they examined to what extent the existing institutional and organisational framework had helped or hindered Fijians to participate in the market economy. Colin Barlow, who has been long associated with Malaya's rubber

[1] *South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. By T. Scarlett Epstein. London: Macmillan. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1973, p. 669.

industry, has examined the effects of different marketing systems on rubber growers. Professor Silcock, the doyen of economists in South-east Asia, prudently rejects the quest for universal laws of development. He reports that Thai cultivators tend to minimise risks rather than maximise yields—a timely reminder to those who try to apply, without adaptation, the concepts governing developed economies to those of subsistence farming. Mrs. Richter's paper is of a different kind; she gives a useful account of Burma's economy under the impact of 'socialist' ideas—a subject rather neglected since Ne Win took office more than ten years ago. In the final chapter Scarlett Epstein tries to dispel the notion that traditional societies are inimical to development. In fact, the wish to minimise risks in subsistence economies and the opportunity of maximising returns in cash farming can exist side by side in small-scale societies such as those studied in the volume under review.

The scepticism displayed throughout the book about the validity of general theories of development is more than welcome, but in his introduction David Penny is perhaps a little too reticent when he savs that 'there is not yet any agreed-upon framework of development theory within which we can order our thoughts and observations' (p. 5). If nothing else, Professor Epstein's remark in the closing section is worth recalling: 'Development is not a linear but a multidimensional process' (p. 247). It cannot be said too often. A great deal of interdisciplinary co-ordination has yet to be done if traditional value systems are to be adapted so as to respond favourably to opportunities for development.

W. KLATT

Collected Papers. By Lloyd A. Metzler. Foreword by Alice Bourneuf, Evsey D. Domar, Paul A. Samuelson, Richard E. Caves. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 598 pp. (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. 140, under the direction of the Department of Economics of Harvard University.) £7·50.*

LLOYD METZLER was one of the pioneers of modern mathematical economics in the 1940s and 1950s. His principal interest lay in the properties and stability of general equilibrium for market systems. One natural field for this interest was the theory of international trade, and many of the papers in this volume deal with problems in the theory of trade and international monetary adjustment. In particular there are his early papers which contributed substantially to the elucidation of the international aspects of the Keynesian model. One of these—'Underemployment Equilibrium in International Trade' (chapter 10)—worked out the main properties of the foreign-trade multiplier for a two-country model. Later Metzler extended this to an analysis of trade and income with many countries. An important application of this Keynesian analysis of trade was to the 'transfer problem', which examines the consequences of capital transfers between countries for the terms of trade and income levels. This is the subject of several papers in the collection, including Metzler's original demonstration that a transfer would always be under-effected if in each economy the sum of the marginal propensities to consume and invest was less than one. In other words, under most circumstances a capital transfer will have some impact on the paying country's balance

of payments—and thus its exchange rate—since it cannot be wholly effected via income changes. Further, these papers stress the importance of government budgetary policy for the final outcome. Another aspect of international trade covered in these papers is the influence of tariffs on the terms of trade and the distribution of income. Metzler clarified this problem significantly by establishing conditions under which a tariff might improve the terms of trade and might have a perverse effect on the real income distribution.

His interest in international economics was not limited to trade theory. This volume reproduces a long paper written in 1947 for the Federal Reserve System, 'Exchange Rates and the International Monetary Fund', which discusses the problems of using the purchasing-power-parity approach in setting postwar exchange rates. In this paper and in his 1948 review articles on the theory of international trade Metzler proved remarkably prescient in anticipating many of the problems which have characterised the international monetary system since the early 1960s. The latter paper also contains an interesting review of the experience of flexible exchange rates during the interwar period. Other papers in this collection focus on specific aspects of international monetary adjustment.

This review has concentrated on Metzler's important contributions in various spheres of international economics. However, this volume also contains his seminal work on the theory of inventory fluctuations as a factor in the business cycle. Finally there are the papers in which he provided the first unified treatment of the theory of stability for multi-market or multi-country general equilibrium systems. In them he pioneered the analysis of stability matrices and laid the foundations for much of the subsequent work on the stability of general equilibrium. Thus this collection as a whole testifies to a notable achievement in many branches of economic theory.

GORDON HUGHES

Outline of International Trade: commodity flows and division of production between countries. By L. Sirc. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 156 pp. Index. (Reading Economics; Gen. Ed.: G. R. Denton.) £3·25.*

International Trade and Payments. By W. M. Scammell. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 607 pp. Index. £6·95.*

BOTH works are textbooks written by economists for undergraduates whose main field of study is economics. Both present the conventional theory and do not venture into the political economy of international relations. Within this common framework of carefully stated assumptions of contemporary, largely Anglo-Saxon economics, are two lucid expositions of how the economist sees trade between sovereign states. The one important difference is that Dr. Sirc deals only with trade in a short book which is part of a series, whereas Professor Scammell has written a more traditional textbook which covers trade, commercial policy and the economics of the balance of payments.

The first two chapters of Dr. Sirc's book argue strongly the importance of the price mechanism in international trade, citing the history of the East European economies in the last twenty years as evidence for the proposition that 'there is no way of replacing the market in its proper sphere

of co-ordinator of individual consumption and production and of inter-industry flows.' (preface p. i). This may well be true but the author has no space to discuss the very important question of how large this 'proper sphere' is, nor that this sphere is being constantly redefined by the actions of governments, international organisations and firms which are significant actors in international economic relations.

The discussion of the inadequacies of the price system (pp. 27–33) and the communist experience (pp. 33–37) is interesting to the student of international relations but is a very small part of the book. The value of trade theory and of much of the rest of the book depends on the answer which one returns to the question posed on page 31:

> Johnson, in *Comparative cost and commercial policy theory* (p. 11) puts this problem as follows: These assumptions are, like the assumptions of all theorising, abstractions from the complexity of reality capable of refutation as universally valid assumptions by an appeal to the facts of observation; the scientific issue, however, is whether observed deviations of facts from assumptions are empirically significant enough to destroy the validity of the conclusions of the theory.

The consensus view of economists is that international trade theory is still worthwhile and is still with us—to the extent that undergraduates must still learn this theory and sit examinations in it, international trade theory is very much still with us, but there are doubters among whom we must number Dr. Sirc himself. At the end of the book we read: '. . . a considerable proportion of international trade is intra-company trade taking place at *Transfer Prices* (accounting or imputed prices), which are not determined by market forces and can hence be manipulated according to the needs and wishes of the company. . . .' (p. 146).

Yet it is difficult to reconcile these doubts with the confident exposition of the welfare effects of international trade (pp. 87–90). We pass from the Pareto criterion to the Kaldor/Hicks compensation principle to the Scitovsky condition and on to the debate between Olsen and Samuelson and emerge with this conclusion: 'with trade it is always possible, at least under conditions of perfect competition to re-distribute the gain from trade in such a way that everybody is better off'. (p. 90).

Professor Scammell devotes a great deal of a much larger book to balance of payments issues, with a wealth of historical and institutional material which is very well put together. Trade theory and commercial policy are dealt with in the early parts and it is a criticism of the publisher rather than the author that explanations of diagrams do not appear where the eye can travel from explanation to diagram and back again. This is an easy book to read and there is a leisurely scepticism about economic theory which non-specialists might well find attractive. It is amusing to read this comment in an economics textbook when the author discusses the Rome Treaty: 'Perhaps the textbook quality of the economies of scale argument in itself makes one suspicious of it. There are great and efficient industries which are not large and do not enjoy large markets' (p. 212).

Students of international affairs will profit considerably from a selective use of Professor Scammell's textbook.

F. L. GARDNER

LAW

International Organization: Law in Movement. Essays in Honour of John McMahon. Edited by J. E. S. Fawcett and Rosalyn Higgins. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1974. 182 pp. Index. £2·75.*

THIS book is a tribute by friends and colleagues to the memory of John McMahon, an international lawyer who died in 1969 at the tragically early age of 32. It has been edited with care by J. E. S. Fawcett and Rosalyn Higgins, and is offered 'as a token' of McMahon's own book on decision-making in the specialised agencies which he was writing for Chatham House. The essays deal with aspects of law as part of the operation of international institutional life, and closely reflect John McMahon's interests and concerns. One of his own articles is printed first, 'The Court of the European Communities: Judicial Interpretation and International Organization'. This is taken, with minor modifications, from the *British Year Book of International Law*, 1961,[1] and is confined to cases under the Coal and Steel Treaty. Re-reading it after twelve years, one is struck by the accuracy of his remarks about the court's functions in the process of integration, not simply as an assessment of its status at the beginning of the 1960s but as a prescient prediction of the increasing importance which the court has come to have for the development of the Communities. The period covered by the article is of unsurpassed significance in the court's work. In these early cases, it formulated its position as an organ of the Community and as the ultimate interpreter of the Treaty. McMahon discerned the relative importance of the various issues that had already come before the court, and he selected the fundamental questions for examination—the nature and sources of Community law, the role of principles and concepts from the domestic laws of the Six, the choice among various maxims and rules of treaty interpretation, the scope of judicial review of the acts of the High Authority (Commission), and the extent of the Community's implied powers. Above all, he brought out the significance of the court's role as interpreter of a constitution, with long-term economic and social objectives, a role which demands a very different approach from that of a court interpreting a treaty of the contractual type.

The stimulating and perceptive piece by Ian Brownlie, taken from the *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1972, concerns the United Nations as a form of government. Not all the ideas are original, but when woven together they compel us to look at the UN in a different way and give new insights into the relationships between it, and particularly the General Assembly, and the Great Power members. Rosalyn Higgins's paper on the Desirability of Third Party Adjudication is based on a lecture given in 1970 and not previously published. She holds up to scrutiny 'the commonly held belief among Western lawyers of the desirability of third-party adjudication' and criticises the assumption that 'all disputes are suitable for adjudication so long as they are "legal" rather than "political"'. She rightly suggests that recent work on the typologies and causes of conflict, citing in particular John Burton, merits careful examination by lawyers who are often ignorant of it, or dismissive of its relevance to the function of international law and courts in the society of

[1] Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1961.

states. Her plea is for the production of a typology of conflict and an effort to relate this to various alternative methods of settlement.

Oscar Schachter conveys in ten pages, entitled 'Some Reflections on International Officialdom', the essential feel of the working environment of senior international officials. He sees a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive and better integrated approaches to problems, such as economic development, the environment, and the sea-bed and its regime. These developments present new challenges to officials, and also show that national governments and administrators from diverse cultures realise the importance of the scientific method. Men have learned that 'its rationality and objectivity are needed to produce reliable knowledge, the kind of knowledge that has predictive power and enables men to exert control over their environment.'

A particular poignancy attaches to the next contribution since it must have been one of the last essays to come from the pen of Stanley de Smith before his own untimely death earlier this year. His article concerns the problems of mini-states, the subject of a study paper by John McMahon during his service with the UN Secretariat in 1968. Professor de Smith, who advised several leaders and governments of such territories, published a book on the American Pacific Islands and other small territories, *Microstates and Micronesia*[2] in 1970. His article is a lucid and pithy introduction to the problem, with some telling comments on the achievements and attitudes of the UN Committee of Twenty-Four, and a closer look at the case of Micronesia, islands forming a United States Trust Territory with strategic value and a population of some 100,000.

Another close personal friend of John McMahon, Andreas Jacovides, contributes an essay on peacekeeping viewed 'from within'. Mr. Jacovides is Deputy Permanent Representative of Cyprus at the UN. His paper, presented to a meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1969, concludes that UNFICYP is an excellent illustration of a successful UN peacekeeping operation 'insulating a crisis and filling a power vacuum while the processes of peacemaking are under way'. He has some perceptive comments on peacekeeping as an aspect of the UN functioning as a government, which may be contrasted with Ian Brownlie's bolder views. The final essay, by Michael Hardy, Senior Legal Officer at the UN, is a highly competent and useful survey of legal aspects of the international control of marine pollution. Michael Hardy chose this subject because John McMahon, when at the UN, had dealt with legal problems of a future regime for the deep sea-bed. Here we have a prime example of 'Law in Movement'. There is no doubt that the article will outlive its present great utility to those actively concerned with these problems, and remain a valuable contribution to our understanding of the role of the lawyer in an international organisation at this delicate preliminary stage of the ponderous and complex process of remaking the law to meet enormous new needs.

This volume is a fitting tribute to a man who had already made significant contributions, as teacher, writer and official, to the wider and clearer understanding of the task of law in international organisation. The book's intrinsic value should be apparent from the preceding com-

[2] New York University Press; London: University of London Press. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 463.

ments. It is available at a very modest price, thanks to benefactors who are acknowledged in the foreword. It should quickly find a place on many bookshelves.

GILLIAN WHITE

The Treaty Maker's Handbook. Edited by Hans Blix and Jirina H. Emerson. Foreword by Sven Hamrell. *Uppsala: The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1973. 355 pp. Sw.kr. 90·00.*

THE Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation arranged one-month seminars at Uppsala, Sweden, in 1966 and 1967 to discuss various aspects of the law of treaties. During the course of these seminars, in which the participants were predominantly young lawyers from African countries, illustrations were given of the varying kinds of final clauses included in treaties and governing such matters as signature, ratification, accession, reservations, duration, amendment, termination, provisional application, entry into force and territorial application. Examples were also cited of the differing types of formal documents utilised in treaty-making practice, such as full powers, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession, acceptance or approval.

Dr. Hans Blix, director of the two seminars, and Mrs. J. H. Emerson, co-director of the 1967 seminar, have now collated, systematised and expanded the illustrative materials used and have published them in the present volume.

The 'treaty-maker' is of course normally a specialist. He is to be found primarily in the legal or treaty department of the various ministries of foreign affairs. But with the burgeoning growth of international co-operation in new areas of activity, such as technology, environmental control and outer space, there is a need for a broader understanding of the basic techniques of treaty-making.

The editors of this handbook would no doubt modestly disclaim any intention of producing guidance in the techniques of treaty-making and would insist that their collection of materials does no more than illustrate the wide variety of formal provisions and formal instruments which are, or can be, utilised in the treaty-making process. But it is valuable for the specialist (and, even more so, for the non-specialist) to be reminded of the flexible nature of the treaty-making process, and of the differing techniques which can be used to achieve particular ends. The variety of the materials presented by the editors amply confirms the wisdom of the Vienna Conference in framing so many of the rules embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as 'residual rules', thereby leaving treaty-makers a reasonable degree of freedom of choice in framing the formal provisions of the particular treaty.

One may occasionally have doubts about the inclusion of particular items in this collection of materials. For example, item 32 in the section entitled 'Types of Treaties' is the partial text of an 'Agreement regarding the Leasing of a Legation Building' in Bucharest concluded between the British Minister to Romania and the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires. There must be considerable doubt whether this can be said to constitute a 'treaty' at all; it is much more in the nature of a private law transaction,

and it is significant that the 'agreement' does not appear to have been registered with the United Nations.

Even accepting that the inclusion of certain items may be open to question, and that there may be significant gaps in the collection of materials, there can be no doubt as to the value of this compilation. It demonstrates, particularly in relation to the various types of instruments expressing consent to be bound, the differing national practices; and it shows how the final clauses of a treaty may be drafted to meet the particular requirements of the negotiating states as regards such matters as entry into force, duration, termination, territorial application and reservations. The Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation is to be congratulated on its initiative in making this compilation of treaty materials available to a wider audience.

I. M. SINCLAIR

Controversial subjects of contemporary international law. An examination of the new entities of international law and their treaty-making capacity. By Chris N. Okeke. Foreword by His Excellency Sir G. G. Fitzmaurice. *Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. 1974. (Distrib. by Academic Book Services.) 243 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. Fl.49.50.*

WHILST not denying the notion that states are the principal subjects of international law, Dr. Okeke's thesis is that international personality exists much more widely. His thesis is an interesting one which becomes expanded as he successively discusses the claims to legal personality of states within a federation, the Holy See, Rhodesia, national liberation movements, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private corporations. Their claims to personality are discussed primarily against the background of their treaty-making capacity, though one cannot ignore other very important indices of personality such as recognition and membership of international organisations.

If Dr. Okeke's book has a weakness it lies in its selectivity. The early chapters are concerned with general notions, but the bulk of the book is devoted to specific illustrations and some interesting problems are omitted. A more general discussion of the world's mini-states might have been more interesting than a special essay on the Holy See. The position of national liberation movements provides some very interesting questions but Dr. Okeke confines himself to Biafra and Bangladesh, both of which are discussed at length. As an Eastern Nigerian Dr. Okeke is especially qualified and interested in the Biafran affair. It would have been interesting to have had the author's views on the personality of the Vietnamese and Palestinian movements. On the Biafran and Bangladesh movements he becomes something of an historian in describing their development and fortunes. Although the stories are interestingly told, they slightly unbalance the book.

Dr. Okeke's views are controversial, but they are cogently expressed. Whilst one might challenge his statement (pp. 101–102) that 'Britain impliedly recognised the Rhodesian regime as the *de facto* authority in the country' by the Conservative government's initiative in 1971, few can deny the sense of his decision (p. 4) to 'reject unequivocally the suggestion of absolute sovereignty as the *conditio sine qua non* to qualify as a subject of international law'. Given this premise he shows a readiness

to extend the scope of international legal personality to the atypical and the novel members of the international scene. Although he remains dubious about extending personality to non-governmental organisations and to private corporations (p. 215), his temptation is to ascribe legal responsibility through legal personality to all participants whose activities can be subsumed within the concept of international relations.

The book is nicely presented, though there are some misprints both in the text and the footnotes on pp. 131–132.

J. A. ANDREWS

New Directions in the Law of the Sea: Collected Papers—Volume III. Edited by Robin Churchill, K. R. Simmonds and Jane Welch. Preface by Professor K. R. Simmonds. *London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1973. 358 pp. Index. £7·00.*

Actualités du Droit de la Mer. Colloque de Montpellier. Foreword and conclusion by J.-P. Quéneudec. *Paris: Pedone. 1973. 296 pp. (Société Française pour le Droit International.)*

The Control of the Sea-bed: A New International Issue. By Evan Luard. *London, Melbourne, Toronto, Johannesburg, Auckland: Heinemann. 1974. 309 pp. Index. £4·75.*

THE first two of these three books are collected papers, prepared for conferences. The value of publishing such papers is always questionable. Much depends on a perceptive choice of topics, on the avoidance of repetition of themes and their discussion, and on some account being taken of the impact of the conference debates on the papers. Neither volume is wholly satisfactory by these criteria. Some of the topics chosen are all too familiar; for example, those concerned with the law of the sea surely do not need to be told yet again about the geophysical features of the sea-bed, or the forms of marine pollution, or the present modes of national appropriation of 'ocean space'. There is nevertheless useful material in the British volume on the regulation of navigation (Part V), on particular regional and national practices of maritime management (Parts VIII and IX), and on the record of fisheries conservation in the North East Atlantic and North Sea (chapter 4). Again the French volume has interesting papers on systems of oceanic data acquisition; submarine archaeology; and the role and experience of the FAO in maritime management. But the themes of conflict between national claims and common interests, and of the particular solution by way of 'exclusive economic zones' for coastal states, are also repeatedly discussed; and, though in the French volume the conference debates are briefly reported, they are put to little substantive use in either volume. The British volume succeeds two invaluable documentary volumes to be complemented by a fourth volume later this year.

In a characteristically lucid and perceptive study, Evan Luard concentrates on the uses and best management of the sea-bed. He surveys the background, noting particularly the development of military uses of the sea-bed, and analyses the issues at present facing the maritime countries, and the advantages and disadvantages of various possible regimes for the sea-bed. He posits a basic choice between relatively limited economic zones for coastal states, combined with a mild international regime for

the ocean floor lying beyond, and a relatively wide exclusive economic zone for each coastal state, but with a strong international regime for the remainder. A table summarises the various areas that could result. If an international sea-bed agency were to be established, with power to grant licences and to take in revenue, he would favour the granting of licences—for sea-bed exploration, evaluation or exploitation—directly to entrepreneurs rather than to governments, and he describes various modes of handling and distributing the revenue resulting from exploitation. He also makes a particularly interesting analysis and projection of the impact of sea-bed production of minerals, and especially of copper and cobalt, on established land producers, such as Chile and Zambia.

The value of the book lies particularly in the fact that it both has vision and also sees the management of the sea-bed within the international framework we know, the UN system, with its weaknesses and its potentialities.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War. By James E. Bond. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 280 pp. Bibliog. Index. $11.00. £6·10.*

THE purpose of this work is not entirely clear. A clue may be gathered from the closing sentences of the Introduction (p. 6): 'Perhaps then, international law ought to draw a line beyond which the government cannot go in its fight to survive. Legal scholars have not yet addressed themselves to this problem of line-drawing, which will be the focus of this study'. It has not helped the author in his endeavour to draw lines that he has attempted no clear demarcation between the law of armed conflicts, human rights regimes, international 'humanitarian law', and the internal law of a state governing rebellion. Part of this confusion is implicit in the title of the work. It is common ground that the scope of 'internal conflicts' rests on no sure juridical foundations, but there is a broad consensus among governments that riots, as such, are not within that scope. It is no precision of thought to use language suggesting that the law governing internal armed conflicts is brought to bear upon the exchange of bottles and abuse at a football match.

The author divides his work into four parts: a brief historical sketch of the law of war; the rationale for the application of 'humanitarian law' to 'internal conflict'; the opposing trends for the application of the 'laws of war' to internal 'conflicts'; and current recommendations. Five Appendices (pp. 199–264) complete the work. Appendix A contains the ICRC's 'Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of Armed Conflict', now obsolete. More pertinent to the work is Appendix B, the Draft Additional Protocol to Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Unfortunately, Mr. Bond has been the victim of events overtaking the appearance of his book. Not only has the vital Article 1 ('material field of application') in the final draft text now before the Diplomatic Conference been substantially changed from the version printed on pp. 209–210 of the work, but the optimism expressed in the author's 'Conclusions' (pp. 193–196) has been belied by the work of the conference to date.

The present Diplomatic Conference was convened by the Swiss Federal

Council in February 1974, at Geneva, to consider two Draft Protocols. The first deals with some aspects of the law governing international armed conflicts, while the second deals with the law governing non-international armed conflicts, the subject-matter of the common Article 3 in each of the four Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, of 1949. What has happened to date is that persistent and successful endeavours on the part of African and associated states have opened up the scope of the first Protocol, dealing with international armed conflicts, to include armed struggles in exercise of the right of self-determination selected on strictly political criteria aimed at the Portuguese African territories, South Africa and Israel. The effect of this move upon Protocol I is, as yet, uncertain, but its apparent effect upon Protocol II, dealing with internal conflicts, has been to reduce its interest and relevancy to vanishing point.

Central to Mr. Bond's theme is his conviction, strongly held, that if only new and adequate humanitarian law could be established to control governments in their handling of armed rebellions, much of the cruelty, destruction and loss of life attendant upon these activities would be reduced. As an article of faith, one can but applaud it. As an exercise in practical reason applied to the experience of such conflicts, the law-making endeavour gives less cause for hope or enthusiasm. Only governments can be instrumental in establishing new international law governing internal armed conflicts. It is no less true that all legal restrictions upon the conduct of internal conflicts weaken governments in their struggles for survival. The practical impact of these two factors is not reduced when most governments know only too well that most of the armed movements opposed to them have neither the facilities nor the organisation to comply with the detailed and intricate rules proposed, even if they were invariably minded to do so.

Finally, it must be said that it is a curious omission in Mr. Bond's bold approach to a difficult subject that nowhere does he mention the vital topic of modalities for supervising the implementation of the rules he advocates, let alone the means for their enforcement when violated. It is a contemporary truism that nowhere in the law of war is the lack of such mechanisms more evident and more disastrous than in the law relating to internal armed conflicts.

G. I. A. D. Draper

WESTERN EUROPE

Between Sovereignty and Integration. Edited by Ghita Ionescu. *London: Croom Helm. 1974. 192 pp. Index. (Government and Opposition; Ed.: Ghita Ionescu.) £5·00.*

Une Chance pour l'Europe: Difficultés et progrès vers l'intégration. By Mario Pedini. Foreword by Pierre Harmel. Preface by Giuseppe Petrilli. Trans. from the Italian by Onello Onelli. *Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles. 1974. 198 pp. B.Fr. 3.75.*

Between Sovereignty and Integration is a collection of papers whose common concern is the viability of the nation-state in the face of the increasing stress placed upon it, both internally and externally. Internally, the stress is seen to come from the need to process demands which emanate

from dissatisfied but articulate groups within society; and externally, the threat to national sovereignty is inherent in, for example, the logic of nuclear weaponry or the success of multinational companies. The papers are arranged so that the argument can develop 'in stages of its own unfolding, going from the aspects of the governability of sovereign nation-states to those of the effects which regional integration might have on peace' (p. 17). Broadly speaking, the contributors take as their *point d'appui* the important theoretical distinction (made in Goodwin's paper) between a state's *legal* sovereignty and the *capacity* to exercise sovereignty. The paper, by Coombes, on 'concertation' is one of several which straddle the internal and external dimensions of national sovereignty. His argument for greater executive authority in Community decision-making is the logical corollary of his belief that the present system 'eschews parliamentary and constitutional processes in favour of private, informal contacts among selected individuals' (p. 99). His view is echoed by Luxemburgensis who sees that sovereignty is being lost by the nation-states and gained by the Community, but that the two processes are not developing *pari passu*. Hence a vacuum has appeared in those areas where the national governments have lost the capacity to act, and where the Community has failed to take up the reins resolutely. And it is this vacuum which Coombes argues should be filled. Kavanagh's paper on multinational corporations sets out dispassionately the potential threats to national capacity for action posed by these transnational institutions, but the notion of legal sovereignty remains inviolate. It is only with Spiro's paper that we get a suggestion that sovereignty may become an obsolete concept; and so he strikes out boldly for a new concept of interdependence which, he prophesies, will be based on a 'pentagon of power' (USA, USSR, China, Japan, EEC). He pleads for mechanisms to enable this 'pentagon' to operate successfully since it will be precarious diplomatically.

The final essay, by Deutsch, is rather disappointing as a critical synthesis of the preceding discussion. The concept of integration is too diffuse to be speculated on unless some working definitions are offered. The concept of sovereignty, arguably the most important in the book, deserves more than scant attention. Deutsch emphasises the need for 'concertation' but in the 'harmonisation' sense of the word, and therefore rather differently from Coombes's paper on that topic. Deutsch's paragraph on multinational corporations bears no relation to Kavanagh's paper on the same subject. When Deutsch says (p. 184) that multinational corporations would make 'singularly poor instruments of government', one is bound to agree, since no one has suggested otherwise, least of all Kavanagh. The fundamental issue is the degree to which multinational companies impinge upon the sovereignty of governments. But there is no hint of this in Deutsch's comments. Instead, we are told that the United Fruit Company has not improved the standard of living in Central America (p. 184). Who said that it would, or could? Deutsch is understandably attracted by Spiro's 'pentagon of power' but his accusation that the system will not endure because it is a 'pentagon of wealth' is anticipated by Spiro, arguing quite clearly for a *modus operandi* which will be 'popularly understandable to keep it from frustrating or driving to desperation potentially marginal groups, to make the new system absorptive and resilient, and to make it work' (p. 167). In sum, Deutch fails to do

justice to the variety and stimulation of the theoretical issues raised in the course of the discussion.

Une Chance pour l'Europe, by Mario Pedini, brings us down to earth again. The author has been closely associated with the EEC as a representative of the Italian government in the Council of Ministers, and as a member of the European Parliament. The book concentrates on the development of the EEC from the mid-1960s to the end of 1972. Having taken part in the Hague Summit, and in the 'enlargement' negotiations, the author is very familiar with the events he describes. It is difficult to accept his basic thesis that the Community only came alive after de Gaulle's death. Certainly, the Hague Summit opened the way for new members to join the EEC, but it also ushered in a period (which is still with us) when the gap between promise and achievement in the Community is uncomfortably wide. The author's attitude towards de Gaulle remains ambivalent throughout the book. On the one hand, he is blamed for almost everything that went wrong in the Community, but on the other hand Pedini assures us that the General was a 'good European' because he knew that France's survival depended on Europe's survival. The other members of the Community are chided for not standing up to de Gaulle; and Britain is gently scolded for not having joined the European adventure in the first place. The latter part of the book is optimistic about the future of the EEC; and strong arguments are put forward for implementing monetary union, instituting direct elections to the European Parliament, and recruiting the enthusiasm of youth for the whole enterprise. Concepts like national sovereignty do not appear to worry Pedini too much: he seems confident that the nation-states will soon wither away.

E. MOXON-BROWNE

Die Dritte Französische Republik: Entwicklung und Kampf einer Parlamentarischen Demokratie (1870–1940). By Charles Bloch. *Stuttgart: Koehler. 1972. 573 pp. Bibliog. Index. DM 38.00.*

A century after the emergence of the Third French Republic and a generation after its fall, Professor Bloch, a foremost student of modern French history, has put us in his debt by producing a lucid and comprehensive account of what he considers to be the most remarkable parliamentary regime of its time. As a disciple of Pierre Renouvin, he has paid particular attention to the social and economic factors which influenced the evolution of French society between 1870 and 1940.

The major achievement of the Third Republic, according to Bloch, was the conversion of the masses to the democratic gospel and the creation of a stable parliamentary regime which proved equal to the test of the First World War. In 1870 the republic was accepted as a lesser evil, and the first decade of its existence may be described as a period of birth-pangs. There followed a period of consolidation (1880–1900), during which crises like the Boulanger episode and the Dreyfus affair were successfully overcome. The years from 1900 to 1914 were the golden age of French democracy, a time of great political and cultural progress, coupled with faith in the triumph of reason and justice.

After the First World War it seemed for a moment that the Third Republic was finally secure. It soon became evident, however, that the

price paid for victory (1,350,000 dead) had been too high; though outwardly the leading European power, France was rapidly declining. Among the factors which contributed to this decline Bloch stresses demographic stagnation, industrial backwardness, the emergence of new anti-parliamentary forces on the Left and the Right, the economic crash of 1929 and—last but not least—growing political isolation, mainly due to Britain's balance-of-power policy and American isolationism. The resignation of Poincaré in 1929 marked the end of political stability; the economic depression in the 1930s undermined the faith of many Frenchmen in the efficacy of the parliamentary system. Hitler's seizure of power, followed by Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and the Spanish civil war, resulted in an ideological schism which dealt the death-blow to national unity. France's weakness was reflected, first in its failure to react to Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland (which destroyed the European balance of power), and next in its betrayal of Czechoslovakia which marked the abdication of France as a Great Power and the end of the French system of alliances. On the outbreak of the Second World War the Third Republic was a house divided against itself, with defeatist leaders and obsolete armed forces. Russia and Italy were now Germany's allies America was still isolationist and Britain was militarily unprepared. The defeat of France and the fall of the Republic were the inevitable result.

As an ardent Francophile, Bloch is apt to be unjust both to France's enemies and to its 'false friends'. His criticisms of British policy are unduly harsh, and so are his strictures on the 'pro-Hitler' line of Pope Pius XII. Such minor defects, however, do not detract from the value of this eminently readable and scholarly work, which no student of French history can afford to ignore.

MEIR MICHAELIS

Regionale Verflechtung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme. Foreword by Reinhard Lohrmann. *Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1973. 311 pp. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik E. V. Bonn; Vol. 33.) DM 34.00.*

THE twelve essays in this volume offer a progress report on, rather than a balance sheet of, Federal German involvement in the processes of West European integration. It is of some interest to note that the title is not easy to translate into English: it refers to the Federal Republic's regional involvement (or entanglement?) and it assumes without further specification that the region in question is Western Europe. This understanding would not come so easily for someone writing in English. But as several contributors admit, the concept of 'Verflechtung' is vague and certainly it is impossible to give a quantitative measure of its realisation. Nevertheless, the contributors do make a brave effort to survey some of the more important aspects of the Federal Republic's participation in the EEC, and there is one essay (by Wilfried Hofmann) on the part played by Western Germany in Nato.

The style and approach of the essays differ considerably. Some are by officials, one by a member of the Bundestag (Marie-Elisabeth Klee) and a few are by academics. On the whole, the officials are more concerned with giving a factual and occasionally formalistic account of

particular institutional relationships: Hofmann on Nato, Ernst Ulrich Junker on decision-making in the Council of Ministers, Theodor Holtz on some problems of the EEC bureaucracy and Ulrich Everling on the intermingling of Community and German policies over a wide area of EEC activity. But one or two of the other contributors who are not actually officials, Reinhard Lohrmann on multi-national decision-making in the Community and Herward Schmidt on the common agricultural policy, also provide a fairly formal account, concentrating chiefly on describing the structures through which various problems are handled. There are also some contributions by political scientists which raise wider political questions, for example Beate Kohler on the integrative value of direct elections to the European Parliament (she is sceptical) and Gerda Zellentin on the definition of objectives in West German European policy and the limitations affecting it (a clear and balanced piece of analysis).

Inevitably a collection of essays of this kind is difficult to sum up. There is not much in the way of analytic coherence and the division of the subject matter is rather arbitrary; one has the feeling that the design of the book was simply determined by the interests of the contributors. Nevertheless, it is full of useful information, carefully referenced and for the most part lucidly presented. The final chapter by Professor Ziebura, in which he offers some reflections prompted by these mainly factual chapters, is undoubtedly the most interesting. He provides some cogent criticisms of the work of the neo-functionalists, comments on the difficulties encountered in defining and measuring 'regional involvement', and underlines the extent to which there is a serious gap between the levels at which political preferences are shaped into demands (*i.e.* 'Willensbildung' in the nation state) and those at which Community policies are painfully hammered into hesitant decisions. In other words, the political basis of West European integration remains splintered and fragile, and it is a mistake to believe that there is a natural process of economic 'involvement' which can relieve us of the need for common European political decisions and supporting structural changes within the member states of the Community if the experience of 'involvement' is to culminate in genuine integration.

NEVIL JOHNSON

Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland—eine Bilanz. Edited by Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz. *Stuttgart: Seewald. 1974. 970 pp. DM 78.00.*

WEST Germany's economic miracle was perhaps only surpassed by its political miracle and of course the two miracles are closely interrelated. The object of Löwenthal and Schwarz's reader is to analyse, explain and evaluate this political miracle, and to look at the roots and future prospects of political legitimacy and stability in Western Germany. It is a mammoth 950-page book and is not easy reading. As a reader it lacks clear connections between sections and between chapters within sections. Moreover, the differences in style and approach of the thirty-one contributors can be quite irritating.

Despite these reservations about the unwieldy nature of the compilation it is indeed a rich mine to work. The book is divided into six sections—

the formative period, the institutional framework, societal change, processes of consensus formation, the determination of the system's place in the world, and economic and social organisation. Individual contributions vary considerably in quality; for example, the treatment of federal-state relationships by Carlo Schmid is sadly inadequate. By contrast the contributions of Bracher on Christian Democracy, of Lepsius and Tenbruck on society and culture, of Kaack on the Free Democrats, of Scheuch on political extremism and of Maier on the Churches are both competent and informative. The development of political thought is, surprisingly, given little attention—despite the recent clash between Löwenthal and Schelsky over the implications of increased participation and mobilisation.

In the postwar period a conservative democracy was established in the new Federal Republic which was not the product of internal revolution. The concept of 'restoration' has therefore to be used with care in discussing the 1950s and early 1960s. There was undoubtedly, as a reaction to the Hitler period more than to the new democratic period, a revival of traditional views of the importance of authority in many areas of social life. This revival was to be followed by a deep and comprehensive crisis of authority from the mid-1960s as a new postwar generation matured into this rather rigid society. The most interesting feature of this new generation was not so much its rejection of the materialism and provincialism of the earlier generation (something which it shared with the youth of other countries) as its lack of a sense of a worthwhile history. It is not surprising if the European ideal seems to offer far more to Germans who possess a crisis of identity in the post-Nazi regime period than to the British. It may be, however, that the sense of being *West* German and belonging to the *West* German state will continue to increase in future years and make that state a much tougher bargaining partner within the EEC.

Löwenthal's introduction is one of the best features of the book. It emphasises the high degree of success of West German politicians in dealing with decisions during two critical formative periods. Successful decisions in the fields of party formation and management, currency and economic reform, the constitutional framework and integration within the West, both militarily and economically, were followed by a new 'Biedermeir period', self-centred provincialism and material egoism, an odd mixture of external Americanisation and traditional German elements. The mid-1960s ushered in a period of crisis—economic, foreign policy and social. The reforging of economic and financial policy instruments, Eastern policy as a response to altered world conditions, attempts at educational reform and the change of power in 1969, all indicated the capacity of the system to adapt. Even the grand coalition—which started off a flood of despairing literature—illustrated the willingness of politicians to find refuge not in the enemies of democracy but in co-operation. Eastern policy has not only secured the West German state but also increased its room for manoeuvre in international affairs. With the collapse of the NPD, it is, as the authors admit, all too easy to drift into ill-founded optimism. Analysis of existing and impending problems—most of which, for example, inflation, are world wide—indicates the fragile nature of all democratic systems. At least the West German system has been tried

and tested and been seen to be able to work well. It has greater reserves of loyalty to which to appeal than ten years ago; the same cannot be said of British government.

K. H. F. DYSON

Konrad Adenauer: Ein Charakterbild. By Horst Osterheld. *Bonn: Eichholz. 1973. 136 pp. Illus. Bibliog.*

THIS is a short but fascinating character study of Adenauer by one of his leading officials. Herr Osterheld, who for some years was in charge of the Chancellor's Bureau for Foreign Affairs, offers us a clear and intimate insight into the physical, emotional and intellectual make-up of his chief, warts and all. On the whole the book is not concerned with individual events or with party politics, but rather with Adenauer's typical attitudes and character traits.

Equipped with an astonishingly robust constitution and a strong will to power, Adenauer's greatest forte was his cool and discerning judgment of men and affairs. Trained as a lawyer, he made his debut as *Oberbürgermeister* of Cologne, a post from which he was sacked twice, first in 1933 by Hitler's men and again in October 1945 by a brigadier of the British Occupation Force. Yet four years later, as chairman of the CDU/CSU, Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic. He was to hold the position for fourteen years, longer than any Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, and also longer than Hitler.

'*Der Alte*', as the people of Bonn used to call him with a mixture of respect and incredulity, could be stern, even ruthless, and sometimes malicious. Yet he never lost his balance or succumbed to the German extremes of *himmelhochjauchzend-zu Tode betrübt*. . . . He disliked all sorts of utopia, and romanticism was as alien to the Catholic Rhinelander as was Prussianism. A hard task-master, Adenauer combined persistence in the main lines of his domestic and foreign policies with great tactical elasticity. As early as 1919 he pleaded for a German rapprochment with France, a line he tenaciously pursued again after 1945. The ultimate result was the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, signed by Adenauer and de Gaulle in 1962. Adenauer was suspicious of other politicians, even of de Gaulle, and hostile to any serious rival or potential successor. Like Winston Churchill he was a fighter, maintaining that 'he who has never had a conflict is not worth much; but once the conflicts have been fought out, they belong to the past' (p. 24).

Adenauer was complex. There existed, as Frau Poppinga, his secretary, put it, a 'hard' and a 'soft' Adenauer. Perhaps his foxy, Macchiavellian traits are somewhat underrated in this book. However, the author does not conceal a major mistake made by the Chancellor towards the end of his reign. He thinks Adenauer's passivity in August 1961, when Ulbricht erected the Berlin Wall, was a blunder. Unlike his rival Willy Brandt, the Chancellor did not at once fly to West Berlin. Even though his immediate appearance there would not have changed the harsh facts of the situation, it would probably have prevented the serious setback his party suffered in the general election that September. The CDU/CSU's loss of its absolute majority led to a diminution of Adenauer's influence in the party, and to the insistence of leading members of its caucus that

he should preside over his Fourth Cabinet for two years only. In October 1963 he was forced to retire at the age of 87.

Herr Osterheld's concise and penetrating portrait is likely to prove indispensable for any student of the Adenauer era.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation. By Isaiah Trunk. Introduced by Jacob Robinson. *London: Collier-Macmillan. 1972. 664 pp. Index. £5·70.*

Crystal Night: 9–10 November 1938. By Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann. Trans. by Gilles Cremonesi. *London: Thames and Hudson. 1974. 192 pp. Index. £3·75.*

ONE of the most difficult and painful questions to emerge from the holocaust was the degree to which the Jews themselves were to blame for their plight and ultimate fate. How far was their relative passivity and co-operation (or collaboration?) with the Nazi overlords, after the creation of the special ghettos a necessary element for the successful execution of the Final Solution? At his trial in 1961 Adolf Eichmann argued that it was, a point stressed by Hannah Arendt in her commentary on the trial with particular reference to the work and role of the Jewish Councils: ". . . if the Jewish people had really been unorganised and leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people '.[1] This is an arguable assertion, but there can be no denying the participation of the Jewish Councils in the process of annihilation, especially in that dreadful task of drawing up lists of names for the transports to the euphemistically named ' resettlement areas '.

The value of Isaiah Trunk's detailed and masterly study of the Jewish Councils in Poland, the Baltic States and parts of occupied Russia, is that he meets these and other controversial questions head on in an analysis based on a wide range of primary material that makes for extremely harrowing reading. What emerges is hardly likely to change the viewpoint of those who were already critical of the part played by the Jewish leaders *vis-à-vis* the Nazis; if anything, Trunk's details will confirm them in their opinions. On the other hand, he shades the picture from darkest black to lighter grey by detailing in separate chapters many of the positive aspects of the work of the Councils in the ghettos, for instance in the fields of relief, housing, education, welfare and religious work. What makes these sections of the book particularly heart-rending is the knowledge, which the Jews increasingly had, that all measures designed to save life in the ghetto and to make it more orderly or at least bearable were almost as cruel as the final act of killing because they gave some hope of life where there was none. On the other hand, it is difficult to know what else the Councils could have done, since while there was life it had to be sustained.

The most vital sections of the book concern the relationships of the

[1] *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of Evil.* (New York: Viking Press. 1963. London: Faber. 1963.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1964, p. 508.

Councils with their Nazi overlords. At the time there were two forms of co-operation: the first where ghetto industry was organised by the Councils to supply the German war machine with all manner of finished, semi-finished, and repaired articles of clothing and machinery, and the second where the ghetto leadership and police participated in the 'resettlement' processes, drawing up lists of names and searching buildings and hiding places for the unfortunates. Both forms of activity arose from the initial acceptance by the Jewish leadership of Nazi orders to form representative Jewish bodies in the ghettos. Those opposing such bodies argued that this would only make it easier for the German authorities to carry out their persecution of the Jews, while others suggested that such bodies would help alleviate the persecution. From this it was an easy step to argue that the establishment of close economic ties between the ghettos and the German authorities to serve the German war machine prolonged the lives of the inhabitants by making them useful to the Germans.

The bitter debates on these matters were surpassed by those relating to the Councils' role in the 'resettlement' procedures. Forced by the Germans to provide the names and number of those to be deported, the Councils were faced with what Trunk described as 'perhaps the most excruciating moral predicament encountered by a representative body in history' (p. 420). The answer was an equally terrible one: 'Beset by the impending ordeal, a sizeable number of Councils fearfully came to the fateful conclusion that since not all the Jews could be saved, it was better to deliver to the Nazi Moloch those ghetto dwellers with little or no chance of survival in order to save others' (p. 420). Although this conflicted with the teaching of Maimonides that if one Jew was to be offered as a sacrifice to save others, then all should die together, the policy was followed of sacrificing the old and young, weak and infirm, so that the others might live that much longer.

Trunk's harrowing analysis makes it clear that the choice facing the Jewish leaders and communities in the terrible and barbaric conditions imposed upon them by the Nazis was an impossible one, and that while some individuals adopted the easy way of emulating their persecutors, many others followed more courageous paths with dire consequences for themselves and their families. His book is therefore neither a total indictment nor a total apologia for the Jewish Councils, nearly 80 per cent. of whose membership in the east suffered the same fate as other ghetto inhabitants, but rather a plea for understanding the terrible pressures imposed upon a persecuted minority in a climate of total evil.

The book on *Kristallnacht* is a short account of the events connected with and following the assassination in Paris of the young German diplomat, vom Rath, by the German-Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, in November 1938. Originally published in France, it is readable and interesting at a fairly general level.

JOHN P. FOX

Italy—Republic Without Government? By P. A. Allum. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 267 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Modern Governments; Gen. Ed.: Max Beloff.) £5·50.*

DR. ALLUM's larger volume on *Politics and Society in Post-War Naples* was reviewed in the July 1974 issue of *International Affairs*. There he

examined in detail the extreme case of a particular Southern constituency, that of Naples-Caserta, governed by exceptional factors of history, economic situation and tradition.

In the present volume, Dr. Allum's analysis covers the broader canvas of political institutions in Italy as a whole. He divides the book into three parts. Part I, on Italian society, gives a brief historical outline of the main influences in development since the country's unification, and stresses that although in 1870 it became 'one nation', it has remained 'two societies'. Part II, on civil society in Italy, discusses the main groups composing that society—the Catholic Church and its political activities; the political parties, their organisation, and their relations with the electorate; and the various interest groups, economic and otherwise. Part III describes in some detail the institutions of the Republic: the constitution, president, and parliamentary system; how the administration operates; an interesting chapter on the judiciary ('archaic laws and judicial confusion'); and local and regional government, the latter still in its early stages.

Italy, despite its frequent changes of government (by now thirty-six since the fall of Mussolini in 1943), has shown remarkable, and what Dr. Allum regards as excessive, stability in its voting patterns. This he attributes in part to the 'Namier-style' party system (pp. 65, 247)—a permanent government party, the Christian Democrats, surrounded by a group of minor, possibly supporting, parties which can never become strong enough themselves to achieve hegemony; and a permanent opposition party, that of the Communists. The political interplay to which this situation gives rise has produced the immobility and slowness in reform and decision-making which has increasingly plagued the Italian scene: it has even caused some Italian observers to say: 'We're better off without a government'. Dr. Allum believes that Italy will eventually have to break the deadlock by choosing either a new majority (including the Communist party) or new (presidential) institutions, presumably of a Gaullist kind. His own preference would plainly be for the former.

This is an interesting and useful study of Italian governmental institutions, and, as such, students of Italian politics will find it helpful. It is perhaps carping to reproach the book for not doing what its terms of reference may have precluded—this is, after all, a book in a series on 'Modern Governments', and Dr. Allum has stuck to that bill. But in so doing he tends to forget that the 'governed'—or misgoverned—are still real people, with a will of their own, rather than just pawns in a political pattern. They may sometimes arouse themselves from their traditional scepticism of government to assert that will—indeed they have recently done so since Dr. Allum wrote his book, over the divorce referendum last May.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis. By Kemal H. Karpat and contributors. *Leiden: Brill. 1973. 373 pp. Indexes. (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East, Vol. VII; Ed.: C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze.) £14·50.*

STUDENTS of modern Turkish politics have the benefit of a more substantial supply of literature on their subject than is available for most other Middle Eastern states. Nevertheless, there is still room for well-researched studies of the relationship between Turkey's social and political systems.

As Dankwart Rustow remarks in his contribution to this collection, 'to the student of modernization and the policy choices that it poses, Turkey offers one of the most fruitful locales' (p. 94). It has prolonged experience of cultural, political and economic reform, dating back to the 1920s and, before that, to the *Tanzimat* period of the 19th century. This allows us to assess the impact of such changes over a relatively long time scale. The introduction of competitive party politics in 1950 has also permitted a wider freedom of investigation and discussion of such problems than is to be found in many developing countries.

Professor Karpat has long established himself as an important contributor to this discussion and his own papers fill a major part of this collection. In an opening chapter he examines changes in Turkish society during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the degree to which they were influenced by, and in turn influenced, the political system. In particular, he charts the rise of a bureaucratic ruling group and its role in the directive reformism of the Ataturk period. The hegemony of this group was ended by the rise of an economic and professional elite which has played a leading part in Turkish politics since 1950. In two later chapters he concentrates his attention on the 1960s, first in discussing the growing differentiation of economic groups during the decade, and later in explaining the ideological changes of these years.

Other contributors take up particular aspects of Professor Karpat's theme. Dankwart Rustow correctly criticises a standard analysis of modern Turkish history which envisages a 'single and protracted contest between perpetual and distinct forces: Progress vs. Reaction' (p. 104); reality, he points out, is far more complicated. In most respects, Ataturk's methods were within the classic traditions of the Ottoman state which he overthrew. This link with Ottoman traditions is also brought out by Ilhan Başgöz in a paper on the free boarding schools through which the republican government recruited its personnel from among humble families of the Anatolian interior. This was a programme whose historical origins can be traced to the Palace School established by the 15th-century Ottoman Sultans.

The assumption that Turkey's modern leaders are 'middle class' prompts questions about the size and definition of this group which are answered in another paper by Nezih Neyzi, a former market researcher who is currently Director of the Turkish Maritime Bank. Mr. Neyzi uses extensive statistical research to indicate that around 20 per cent. of Turkey's population fit into this category. The extension of new cultural and political patterns into rural areas is taken up by John F. Kolars and Frank Tachau. Professor Tachau gives us a particularly valuable and detailed examination of party politics in two Turkish provinces, Adana and Aydin. He makes the important point that the Republican People's Party of earlier days often relied at the provincial level on landed notables to whom the party's current leftward reorientation causes some grave misgivings.

This redirection of Turkey's oldest political party is the achievement of a group led by the present Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, whose appearance on the list of contributors to this collection will probably help to ensure it wide attention. Mr. Ecevit was Minister of Labour in Ismet Inönü's second coalition cabinet (1962–63) and as such was instrumental in enacting legislation which provided the legal basis for a growing labour union movement. He draws on this experience to outline the

history of labour unionism in Turkey, emphasising the 'constructive attitude' (p. 159) of the majority of unions.

The last three years have witnessed some important developments in the labour union field which Professor Karpat summarises in an all too brief addendum. The same problem affects his final paper, where the experiences of the Turkish Left since 1969 are crammed into a scant three pages. Clearly, this valuable book still leaves leeway for further discussion of the topics it introduces.

WILLIAM HALE

Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945. By Wilhelm M. Carlgren. *Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget. 1973. 612 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index.*

DR. CARLGREN'S account of Swedish foreign policy during the Second World War has most of the merits and few of the defects of official history. He writes from a privileged position, not only as archivist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also as something of a *spiritus rector* amongst the older generation of Swedish diplomats. Not surprisingly, therefore, the book exudes the polished civility of a remarkable institution which has managed, along with other relics of Sweden's past (like the 'fifteen great families' of whom the Carlgrens are one), to preserve, at least until recently, its ways and powers in the Social Democratic present.

The war provided advocates of the old diplomacy with a new *raison d'être*. The days of luxurious moralising at Geneva seemed singularly irrelevant by the end of 1939, with wars in both east and west and the prospects for a neutral or Scandinavian bloc increasingly gloomy. Sweden found itself isolated, and the promptings of sentiment or the obligations of kinship had to be carefully subordinated to the realities of power. It was not a particularly glorious predicament, but neither was it an unfamiliar one. Since 1863, if not earlier, Sweden has always ranked the preservation of national integrity higher than the claims of Scandinavian solidarity. Thus when Richard Sandler seemed likely to abandon the golden rule, with proposals for help to Finland which were perhaps consonant with the doctrines of collective security but which nevertheless threatened Sweden's relations with the nearest great powers, he was forced to resign as Foreign Minister and his place was taken by a career diplomat, Christian Günther. The traditions of the professionals had won.

The main outlines of the story are already familiar from the works of Krister Wahlbäck[1] and the memoirs of Hägglöf,[2] Boheman,[3] Wigforss[4] and others. But Dr. Carlgren, drawing on substantial collections of hitherto unused official and private papers, still manages to throw fresh light on most aspects of his theme. The best chapters are those dealing with Swedish-Finnish relations. But the book as a whole constitutes a major

[1] *Cf.* especially Krister Wahlbäck, *Finlands Fragen i svensk politik, 1937–1940.* (Stockholm: Norstedt. 1964.)

[2] Gunner Hägglöf, *Diplomat: Memoirs of a Swedish Envoy in London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Washington.* (London: The Bodley Head. 1972.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 327.

[3] Erik Boheman, *Pa Vakt: Kabinettssekreterare under Andra Världskriget.* (Stockholm: Norstedt & Söners Förlag. 1964.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1965, p. 692.

[4] Ernst Wigforss, *Minnen. Vol. III 1932–1949.* (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag. 1954.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1955, p. 383.

reappraisal of Swedish foreign policy. In personal terms, the chief beneficiary is Günther himself. For a variety of reasons Hägglöf and Boheman have tended to overshadow their Foreign Minister. They wrote memoirs: he did not. They travelled: he remained in Stockholm, and while they earned the praises of Eden or Dingle Foot—who only recently described his negotiating partner Hägglöf as the architect of Swedish neutrality—he was not sufficiently known to be either praised or damned. It is greatly to Dr. Carlgren's credit that he rehabilitates Günther, without debunking the reputations of his two principal associates.

The faults in the book are in many ways a reflection of its strength. Though long and lucid, it is an insider's piece. It launches straight into a detailed narrative, without the structural analysis of Swedish decision-making which contemporary fashion and the complexity of the subject would seem to demand. It is also excessively concerned with what the author describes as the 'great political' problems. More details about the development of Swedish external trade would have been a distinct asset; so too would more thorough discussion of the moral and humanitarian dilemmas raised by German occupation policies. It is not that Dr. Carlgren dodges these issues; he simply ignores them, preferring to leave to one side not only the complex relations between the Swedish authorities and the Norwegian resistance, but also the much more creditable story of Swedish efforts in 1944 on behalf of Hungarian Jews.

The book, however, is still a considerable achievement. It provides a welcome relief from vacuous generalisations about 'small power diplomacy' and throws a great deal of incidental light on the policies of the great powers with which Sweden had to deal. In the present publishing climate even an abridged translation is unlikely, but it would certainly be welcome and useful.

PETER LUDLOW

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stalin: The Man and his Era. By Adam B. Ulam. *New York: The Viking Press; Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada. 1973. 760 pp. Index. $12.95.*

Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend. By Ronald Hingley. *London, Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland, Wellington, Johannesburg, Cape Town: Hutchinson. 1974. 482 pp. Illus. Index. £5·85.*

Stalin as Revolutionary 1879–1929: A Study in History and Personality. By Robert C. Tucker. *London: Chatto and Windus. 1974. 519 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·75.*

THE almost simultaneous appearance of these three impressive biographies of Stalin inevitably prompts the question: Why at this particular moment? Have they been inspired by some major hitherto unknown disclosures from the Soviet secret archives providing keys to such long outstanding problems of Stalin's career as Kirov's murder, the 'Leningrad Affair', or indeed the basic question of the dictator's baffling mental-psychological make-up?

Unfortunately, under the cautious, and somewhat pro-Stalinist, Brezhnev regime no sensational releases from the Stalin archives have been made, which might have provided a jumping-off point for these historians

of Stalin's notorious regime. It is rather that all, in their several ways, felt that the permanent impact of his outstanding personality and sinister techniques of government on Soviet society, as well as the motivation of his savage crimes against friend and foe alike, merited a consolidated analysis and assessment not hitherto available. They were all also fascinated by the extraordinary success story of this unattractive but clever youth from the Caucasian hamlet of Gori, and, as historians, were anxious to penetrate, as far as possible, the heart of the Stalin mystery and the dictator's role in history.

With this aim in view, they are to be congratulated on the thoroughness of their research. Until the unlikely day when the secrets of the Soviet archives are unveiled, no more definitive records of Stalin's career can be expected than are now given to us by Dr. Hingley and Professor Ulam. Professor Tucker's book, being the first part of a projected trilogy and extending only to 1929, is in a different category, and a full review must await its completion. It may suffice to say that Professor Tucker's study of Stalin's early years is extremely detailed and scholarly. I would only demur at his, in my view misguided, use of 'personality type' psychological techniques to explain Stalin's more abnormal character aberrations, because they demand an unjustifiable degree of subjective assumptions about Stalin's private persona. Thus, Tucker takes as a basic thesis that 'Stalin employed a number of internal security operations familiar to students of modern depth psychology, notably repression, rationalisation and projection' (p. 431). Applied to the dictator's excesses, these technicalities and this terminology seem more ingenious than realistic as explanations of the vicious truth of the flesh and blood Stalin.

In broad outline, both Dr. Hingley's and Professor Ulam's books follow much the same chronological pattern. Being also a history of the Stalin 'era', Professor Ulam deals with the economic-political developments of the period in more detail than Dr. Hingley. Dr. Hingley's book is the most readable of the three. It is written in a brisk, forthright style which is agreeably linked with very precise scholarship and a keen political grasp of the significance of Stalinism. There are also many colourful descriptions of men and events but, perhaps because of the zest with which Dr. Hingley handles his subject, he occasionally lapses into some rather cheap gibes about Stalin. Unlike Professor Ulam, who takes a less jaundiced view of the young Stalin, Dr. Hingley tends to see, as it were, the later serpent in the egg. He emphasises Stalin's schoolboy vindictiveness and other nasty traits, while playing down his significant role in prerevolutionary Caucasian and metropolitan party politics. In the light of the record, Professor Ulam's estimate of the young revolutionary seems nearer the historical truth, still in many ways obscure. Stalin was always rude and aggressive, but nonetheless his abilities were obviously recognised early by Lenin, who included him in his first Soviet government and subsequently assigned many high offices to him.

The worst excesses of Stalin's rule—the savage collectivisation campaigns, the horrible travesty of the 1934–39 trials, the postwar deportations and camps—have already been the subject of careful studies elsewhere and will therefore be familiar ground to most readers. But other episodes in Stalin's life, on which the spotlight of publicity has not been so directly focused, are also fully examined. Thus Stalin's arrogant exchanges with Lenin, and indeed his behaviour throughout the Civil War, clearly reflect his self-assurance at this time and may be regarded as typical of his

future political conduct. More important, and probably generally less known, is the macabre background to the notorious 'Doctors' plot' of 1952, with its strange prelude in the election of the 'giant' new Presidium by the 19th Party Congress. Both Dr. Hingley and Professor Ulam analyse this mysterious episode in considerable detail. Linking many clues now more obvious than at the time and with the benefit of hindsight, I wonder whether they do not rather exaggerate the fear among members of the old Presidium and the public in general of an impending 'new Great Terror'. Dr. Hingley questions Stalin's sanity in the light of these events and Stalin's ill-grounded fears of the medical profession at a time when, according to his daughter's impression on her last visit in December 1952, he seems to have been in desperate need of expert medical aid.

On the eve of his death two months later, in March 1953, the Indian Ambassador K. P. S. Menon found him 'alert and fully in possession of his faculties as he discoursed on world affairs'. No indication of madness then. This interview sets the seal on Stalin's life-long capacity to display an engaging, even charming, personality to visitors while organising the most odious cruelties. The only foreigner who seems to have detected the monster beneath the mask was de Gaulle. In his obsession with power and its retention by both fair means and foul, Stalin became paranoid in his suspicion of his fellow men and quite ruthless about their physical elimination. Unbalanced in these respects, even schizophrenic, but scarcely mad according to medical criteria.

After some 700 cogently argued, fully documented pages on the extraordinary career of Joseph Djugashvili, which still contains baffling discrepancies and problems, Professor Ulam's conclusion comes as an anticlimax. We do not, he writes, 'need any sensational revelations to understand Stalin . . . the explanation of his life is as banal as many of Stalin's own speeches: he was corrupted by absolute power' (p. 740). Banal is surely a curious word with which to describe a degree of corruption by absolute power that is almost unique in history. Professor Ulam ends with a final exposition of Stalin's manipulation of ideology which, as it were, rendered the Great Purges necessary. Millions 'died so that life should prove the truth of dogma' (p. 740). 'Life must be seen as a constant struggle between the forces of light and darkness. To deny this struggle would have been to strip Communism of all its uplifting meaning.' I must confess that such esoteric flights of rationalisation are beyond my grasp. The implication seems to be that this so-called 'constant struggle' (*i.e.* the massacres of the Stalin regime) were necessary to maintain the 'uplifting meaning' of Communism. But, what 'uplift' was left in Russian communism after these horrors? And since in the end we can only make assumptions about Stalin's motives, I suggest that there is equally good reason to assume that he both acted and thought along far simpler and cruder lines.

Having pondered all the evidence collected in these volumes, I remain more puzzled by the passivity of Stalin's peers, and even of the peoples of all nationalities under his murderous rule, than by the motivation of his actions. Even personalities of the calibre of Marshal Zhukov remained stunned and seemingly panic-stricken when Stalin, paralysed in mind and body by the German attack in 1941, lay at their mercy, and a political-military coup might have been expected against the dread dictator. There

was certainly nothing 'banal' about Stalin's unique capacity to quell and mesmerise his contemporaries for his own ends—a talent which to a great extent enabled him to attain and retain supreme power.

VIOLET CONOLLY

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945 to 1965. Third Volume of a three-volume series. By Antony C. Sutton. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University. 1973. 482 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Hoover Institution Publications No. 113.) $15.00.*

THIS volume completes a three-volume study [1] which surveys with assiduity an extremely large amount of material, little of which has been revealed before, and derives from it very important conclusions. Although each successive volume, covering a consecutive period, contains more pages than its forerunner, each consecutive period is longer. The enlargement since 1917 in the scale and complexity of Soviet economic activity must limit further the coverage of the later volumes. This coverage is, on the whole, remarkably detailed, although the study concentrates on manufacturing industry.

The particular strength of this volume, as of its forerunners, lies in its analysis of the actual technical situation and in its author's imperviousness to propaganda. Sutton's view, which is maintained very consistently throughout, is that Soviet economic development has depended essentially on the acquisition of modern technology from the West. He investigates many technologies in service in the Soviet Union, identifying their Western origins, disclosing the companies involved (very largely American), and in many cases the occasion of the transfer and the destination of the equipment. Western governments, especially that of the United States, are shown to have participated in effecting, or in failing to prevent, these transfers. Sutton finds this blameworthy; he argues that it has been in fundamental conflict with American defence policy. 'To subsidize and support a system that is the object of massive military expenditure is both illogical and irrational' (p. 400). This confrontation makes Sutton's study of direct interest to students of international affairs, as well as of technology as a factor in Soviet development.

As he expresses it, the confrontation is too simple. Sutton sees international relations in almost black and white terms. He apparently believes that the West could have denied exports of technology to the Soviet Union, and without itself suffering appreciably. This exaggerates the economic self-sufficiency of the West, while skating over its interwar economic problems.

Sutton does not allude to forces within Western societies which oppose trade with the Soviet Union, unless implicitly in brief references to CoCom which, however, appears in these pages mainly on occasions when it did not restrict trade with Russia as severely as Sutton would have

[1] *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917 to 1930.* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 369.
Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945. (Stanford, Calif.. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1972, p. 329.

preferred, or when its ban was circumvented. He deduces that unidentified circles within Western societies promote trade with the Soviet Union. One is reminded (in mirror image) of the 'imperialist' forces that figure in Warsaw Pact communiqués. Actually, the existence of trade-promoting forces is scarcely mysterious; businessmen are usually little interested in international politics while Western democratic governments are non-omnipotent, inclined to rank their traders' performances as if these were competing in an international league table, mindful of their balances of payments, and sensitive to domestic unemployment—which timely export orders may relieve. Even a country as wealthy as the United States cannot brush aside such considerations. It is also supposed, certainly not wholly without justification, that trade contributes to detente; while the act of trading does not necessarily generate goodwill, mutual dependence is thereby increased—which is a deterrent to breaking off trade connections. Furthermore, diplomacy traditionally envisages that nations can be induced to shift their allegiance.

It may also be contended that defence output is advantageous, rather than the contrary, to the performance of a market economy: incomes are generated, technical skills exercised, benefits of large-scale production realised.

Each country, consulting its short-term interest and not reckoning on reaching an understanding with others, maximises its profits in trade relative to certain parameters. (There are a few exceptions, such as the present embargo on British sales of arms to South Africa.) Western governments have not normally behaved as if believing that they could influence Soviet behaviour by giving or withholding economic advantages.

As to why they have not done so, one reason, which surely must be extremely important, is that each Western government sees only part of the picture. It probably sees only a fraction even of what its own firms are doing (owing to business secrecy, which is reflected in a tendency of firms to under-inform even their national trade departments). The Soviet side, possessing far more complete information, can reach decisions which command a greater probability of being right. Imports of advanced technology must consequently loom larger to the Soviet government than they do to any Western government that concerns itself with them.

These considerations ought to be weighed by Western policymakers, at any rate if technological imports from the West have indeed made a substantial contribution to Soviet economic growth. Typically (as is clearly documented in this study) Western spokesmen discount this contribution. Sutton, in contrast, believes technical progress to be that dynamic element, essential in economic progress, which the Soviet system is constitutionally unable to generate on an adequate scale, and so must either lack or import. He recognises as exceptions to Soviet inability only scaling-up (uncomplicated enlargement of the dimensions of imported prototypes), a very small amount of indigenous innovation, and military equipment. Even in this last category he identifies many Western prototypes, and hypothesises that even in nuclear weaponry, controlled thermonuclear reactions and some other fields of nuclear science and technology, there have been large transfers of equipment and technology from the West (p. 247). Thus implicitly—in contrast to the view of many Western observers but perhaps correctly—he denies that there is a big difference in quality between Soviet civil and military items.

Soviet writers seem to agree with Sutton's assessment of the importance

of technological progress in economic development However, the Soviet understanding of technical innovation is confusing (p. 420); thus Soviet support is not conclusive evidence. Yet it would be surprising if Soviet views were not rather closely related to domestic experience.

This road is bringing me closer to Sutton's viewpoint, but I am turned away by the seeming bias of certain of his generalisations against the Soviet Union. For instance, if 'Soviet exports in the late sixties were still those of a backward, underdeveloped country' (p. 415), how could about one-fifth (in 1967, 21·1 per cent.) of Soviet exports consist of machinery and equipment (in contrast to 0·3 per cent. in 1913)? Likewise, we are told that during the Second World War, 'The Russian produced aircraft were mainly obsolete prewar types and most were one-engine wood and canvas models with inferior engines' (p. 254); that only one dive bomber, the IL-2, was in production; fighter production was concentrated on the YAK-3, etc. Yet the YAK-3, which when fitted with a more powerful engine reached a top speed of 745 kph. (483 mph.), can scarcely be described as 'obsolete prewar', nor was the IL-2 in fact the only dive bomber (the more advanced IL-10 entered service in 1944). Sutton does not at this point mention four-engined bombers, but later (p. 267) observes that the Tupolev PE-8 'was generally considered not to be a successful design'. But he lacks an explanation for the Soviet success in reproducing within three years 'a usable copy of the complex B-29 US four-engine bomber' (*ibid.*). The Russians had to use materials that were to hand, and at the time in question light metals were in short supply. While the assortment of Soviet warplanes was much less varied than that of the British or Americans, so also were the geographical and tactical environments in which they operated.

Space exploration and military technology form apparent exceptions to the thesis of Soviet technical inability; thus Sutton's treatment of these areas is particularly interesting. He quotes facts which indicate Soviet backwardness in space (p. 279, footnote); records that foreign delegates to a congress on automation found that it did not support what they had understood about Soviet achievements in space research and engineering (pp. 323–324); but also mentions rocket technology as one out of three sectors of concentrated indigenous technical progress (p. 362). His most explicit evaluation (p. 274) accents purposefulness, not backwardness. Pointing out that the Soviet Union has been unresponsive to American proposals (pp. 276–279) he deduces the Russians' technical inferiority from their unreadiness to co-operate, whereas it would appear equally possible to deduce their superiority.

Military technology, understandably, is not examined in detail. However, nuclear reactors for military purposes might have been mentioned: Sutton states that in atomic generating stations the Russians are well behind the United States (p. 334, and *cf.* 247 and 378), but does not mention the approximately one hundred Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. It is also not exact to say that the Russians have claimed leadership in 'atomic energy' (p. 378): the claim relates to 'controlling atomic energy' (E. Zaleski *et al.*, *Science Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (1969), paragraph 1,067, quoting Academician N. N. Semenov); this clearly refers to the level of achievement in a science-based technique, not to the quantity of atomic power generated. It is thus not surprising to find no mention of the Soviet 'Tokamak' process, which is recognised as the nearest approach made so far towards harnessing nuclear fusion.

It would be incorrect to infer that Sutton ignores Soviet achievements; they are, however, usually presented in a light which seems intended to shed doubt on their rationality or utility.

The archival or specialised nature of many of his sources puts these out of the reach of the present reviewer. The author must be congratulated on the use of these original sources. A few corrections are needed. Not three-quarters of Polish exports to the Soviet Union consisted of rolling stock and ships (p. 87), but three-quarters of Polish *engineering* exports. In 1972 the percentage of Polish exports to the Soviet Union that consisted of rolling stock and ships was under ten. Disastrous harvests did not *result from* Khrushchev's New Land Plan (p. 150), without which the Soviet grain position would, on the contrary, have become worse. Mogilev is not in Soviet Armenia (p. 181). There are a few linguistic curiosities such as Kassan (p. 68: presumably Kazan), Zemchug (p. 290), or Severod Vinsk (p. 289). Yet the general level of accuracy seems high, as far as I can verify it.

Generalising his results in all three volumes, Sutton finds that the percentage of technology originating in the Soviet Union among the technologies in use there has been: 1917 to 1930, 0; 1930 to 1945, 10; 1945 to 1965, 11. He emphasises that this is the most favourable interpretation of the empirical findings (p. 370). This important conclusion, distilled from a mass of material, is (as far as I know) the only attempt to quantify the proportionate importance of Soviet indigenous technology that has ever been made. Sutton sees these low proportions as an indictment of the Soviet economic system. However, a proportion of indigenous technology that falls far short of 100 per cent. can be regarded as low only if other economies or types of economic system register higher proportions; there is no indication in the book of what these proportions normally are. Neither can I fill the gap, but I would conjecture that the proportion is *ordinarily* small. The relationship must also be put into its historical setting. The fact that, within little more than a decade, the Soviet proportion had been raised from 0 to 10, might be seen as a substantial accomplishment.

Thus in the end the Sutton thesis seems overstated. There is, however, no doubt that he constructs in its favour a strong case. Certainly at present, when huge new development deals are in the offing, and some loans are being extended to the Soviet Union at below market rates, it is timely to inquire whether history has provided sufficient retrospective justification for such promotions.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective. Edited by V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 349 pp. Maps. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·75.*

IN their introduction to this volume the two editors deplore the neglect of regional studies in the Soviet Union. They rightly emphasise that the country is not a monolithic entity but a multinational state, comprising 170 national and linguistic groups. Along with their eleven fellow contributors, they subject to close scrutiny the official thesis, proclaimed since the early days of the October Revolution, that under their socialist system,

the fifteen republics making up the Soviet Union are moving steadily towards equalisation in economic development and standards of living. The 'prison of nations' under Tsarism, so strongly condemned by Lenin, is being transformed, it is said, into the 'merging of nations' under the present regime (p. 215).

The writers approach their tasks from different points of view, which makes for a good deal of overlapping but reinforces the unanimity of their conclusion that so far little progress has been made towards implementing official policy on equalisation between the regions. Sincerity of ideological intention has not succeeded in overcoming such barriers as: persisting nationalist feeling; the need for economic growth to take precedence over regional interests where the two come into conflict; opposition on grounds of dogma to land valuation, which contributes to the fragmentary and insufficient nature of regional information, thus denying a sound statistical basis for rational decision-making; the failure to eradicate features evolved in the Stalinist period, notably the use of vertical rather than horizontal channels of communication which obstructs co-ordinated action; and the existence of powerful vested interests among planners, local administrative bodies and others, which holds back regional development by hindering necessary changes in the command structure of the economy.

The two chapters (4 and 5) dealing with the Ukrainian Republic show no sign of the idealism inherent in official policy, which assumes willingness among the economically stronger areas to sacrifice their own interests in favour of less favoured regions. Mr. Melnyk analyses the methods by which the central government, using the mechanisms of the price system, the turnover tax and the All-Union budget, redistributes capital and other values generated in the Ukraine in accordance with its own plans, and on a non-compensatory basis; this, he says, is a 'burden' which gives rise to 'potential inequities' in carrying out Soviet social and economic policies (pp. 119, 126). Mr. Bandera holds that such arbitrary transfers 'are indeed an exorbitant price for the Ukrainian Republic to pay for being in the Soviet Union' (p. 149).

Several writers voice the opinion that ideological and political considerations, combined with the failure to make regional development an integral part of the planning system, have forced the national republics to develop as branches of a national Soviet economy, with the result that the aim of equalisation, although preserved in theory, has in fact been pushed into the background. Frequent reference is also made throughout the book to the lack of a logical basis for economic relationships among the regions, which could only have been provided by 'realistic market prices and the delegation of genuine decision-making authority at enterprise level' (p. 228). Neither the Khrushchev nor the Brezhnev-Kosygin economic reforms have succeeded as yet in providing such a base.

This useful study does not make easy reading, encompassing as it does a multitude of complex and varied problems, arising over an area whose very vastness creates additional difficulties. One of its contributions is to stress the importance of non-economic criteria in the formulation of Soviet policies. The overriding urge to close the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the United States for prestige and political reasons, forces the government to concentrate on priorities that contribute to this end, at the expense of cherished ideological beliefs including that of regional equality. Another significant factor is the widespread fear among

the upper echelons of losing control over a social and economic structure that is loosely integrated, and is always subject to centrifugal forces 'extremely dangerous to Soviet society' (p. 225).

MARGARET MILLER

The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. By Abraham Katz. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1973. 230 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·25.*

DR. KATZ's monograph on the politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union displays how widely the author has read around his subject. The book contains a fifteen-page bibliography of sources in Russian and English and there are further references in the footnotes. He has read and deals with all the major and most of the minor contributions to the debate on economic administration and institutions by Soviet academics, journalists and politicians.

Dr. Katz believes that the discussions of the late 1950s and 1960s can only be understood (or as least can be best appreciated) in a historical perspective. Consequently his work is presented in a chronological format—with the first three chapters being devoted to an account of Soviet economic administration during the period of war-communism and NEP, the development of the Stalinist system in the 1930s and the first murmurs of criticism and proposals for reform at the end of the 1940s. Subsequent chapters deal in much greater detail with the experience of the Khrushchev period and with the formal modifications introduced by Kosygin. The book ends with an evaluation and an attempt to assess the prospects of further modification in Soviet economic institutions.

I am not convinced of the value of a historical perspective. Dr. Katz is not the first commentator to be seduced by the apparent similarity of the issues that appear to have been most contentious in the recent debates with those of NEP in the 1920s. But this similarity is largely superficial. However perceptive Bukharin and Preobrazhenskii were as economists there is a fundamental difference between their understanding of the problems of co-ordination and the control of resource allocation and that of contributors to the recent debate—Birman, Novozhilov, Leontiev and others. The attempt to draw parallels is as often obfuscating as it is illuminating and in total gives a fallacious impression that where the problems of Soviet economic institutions are concerned *plus ça change plus c'est la même chose.*

I do not want, however, to give the impression that Dr. Katz is mistaken in his conception of the problem. Indeed I found this a fascinating book to read—but difficult to review. It is extremely densely written and it is difficult to summarise the main themes without doing injustice to the author whose most significant contributions very often lie in the details. Scattered throughout the main body of the text there are paragraphs that show his understanding of the *political* problems raised by the issue of economic reform. Politics, it has been said, is the art of the possible and Dr. Katz is very sensitive to the limits of the possible—and how these have changed in the Soviet Union. He frequently draws attention to possible constraints on contributors' freedom of action where other commentators—economists in particular—have been so preoccupied

with the logic of the rational arguments being developed that they have misinterpreted the nature of Soviet developments.

This point is connected to my major criticism of the book: these insights are buried in the text, and nowhere in the concluding chapters does the author attempt to bring them together, to bring out the political problems involved; indeed his conclusion stresses another aspect—the rather more abstract problem of the party's fear of potential loss of control over the system. But one of the insights the author provides is into the limited extent of effective control over various aspects of system operation at present possessed by the party. The Soviet economy just happens and this is one of the sources of inefficiency. But this is a minor weakness in a thought-provoking monograph.

A. McAuley

The Changing Party Elite in East Germany. By Peter C. Ludz. Foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Translated by Israel Program for Scientific Translations. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press for the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University in the City of New York. 1972. 506 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. £6·75. $15.00.*

The author of this book—highly interesting though not easy to slog through—is professor of political science and sociology at the University of Bielefeld and visiting senior lecturer in political science at Columbia University. Dr. Ludz's volume is the first in-depth study of the Communist party elite of the German Democratic Republic, and this scholarly pioneer work could serve as a model for a similar analysis of the structure of the ruling party in any other country in the socialist camp.

In his first chapter Dr. Ludz presents a new image of the SED[1]—that of a system characterised by authoritarian rather than totalitarian concepts. 'All-inclusive, total rule by the SED leadership, with terror as its keystone', he affirms, 'has been replaced in broad areas by measures necessitated by the need to balance quasi-pluralistic social and political forces.'

The second chapter is an analysis of the organisational structure of the SED policy-making bodies as well as of the influential groups of managers and technical experts. Dr. Ludz describes these two constellations as the 'strategic clique' and the 'institutionalized counter *élite*'. The SED's membership at the time of the 1946 merger was about 680,000 of which 52 per cent. had previously belonged to the SPD. In 1949 the membership rose to almost 1·8 million, but in 1953, after the first major purges and the 'intensification of political emigration', it dropped to 1·2 million. Since 1954 there has been an almost unbroken rise in membership, which by the spring of 1967 had regained the 1949 level.

Trends of continuity and changes in the social composition of the SED leadership are the theme of the third chapter. This study is based on biographies of 275 full and candidate members of Central Committees 'returned' by the 1954, 1958 and 1963 party congresses. The social origin of members is illustrated by the following figures: upper and middle-class 19 (1954) and 26 (1963); lower class, 36 and 48 respectively; workers, 34

[1] *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* is a merger of the old KPD (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*) formed on January 1, 1919, and of part of the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) created in 1875.

and 45. The vocational situation of members and candidates improved considerably between 1954 and 1963. Here are the data (for 1963 in brackets): elementary school, 48 (73); secondary or high school, 6 (10); trade or technical school, 19 (27); trade or technical college or university, 21 (44). Besides the SED there are four other political parties in the GDR. They are represented in the state administration but at every level Communists remain in an absolute majority.

In his last chapter Dr. Ludz describes major ideological trends as well as 'inertia' within the SED system. He concludes that in spite of the rejuvenation in the ranks, the professionalism within the Central Committee, and the rise in educational qualifications of party cadres, 'both the sclerosis at the top level, and the reduction of mobility within the more prominent leadership groups' are apparent. For instance, no member of the 1963 Central Committee with definite ties to the 'strategic clique' was demoted from this body either before the convocation of the 1967 Seventh Congress, or as a result of its proceedings.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936–1954. By Howard M. Sachar. Introd. by William L. Langer. *New York: Albert Knopf. 1972. London: Allen Lane. 1974. 687 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £8·00.*

PROFESSOR SACHAR'S new book takes up the history of the Middle East in 1936—twelve years after the terminal date of his previous work.[1] The author has endeavoured to analyse what he describes as 'eighteen years of equivocal and hopelessly convoluted Western disengagement' (p. xvii) and he argues that the British and French departure from the Middle East was a more difficult process than their entry to the area had been. Withdrawal was, as the writer shows, influenced more by external factors than by the pressures of internal revolt; but in concentrating on the international aspect, too little attention has been given to such factors as the ethnic and religious composition of the various mandatory states. It was these aspects that gave—and continue to give—politics in the Arab Middle East much of their bitterness and turbulence even after the withdrawal of the European powers.

With the author's narrative there can be relatively few quarrels. His discussion, for instance, of the considerable attempts by the Axis to arouse Arab hostility to Britain, France and the Jews is good, but some of the broader judgments are certainly open to question. The Allied governments were not the first to establish honest and efficient governments for the people entrusted to their guidance (p. 7). They might have been the first to introduce Western techniques of government and administration, but it is possible to question the value of this inheritance. Justice in the courts had been known in the Middle East before the British and French arrived, and the idea of legislation to control weights and measures was not a new concept (p. 7). At the end of the book we are told 'that even the most enlightened of Western efforts to modernize and liberalize the Middle East foundered on the rock of Moslem

[1] *The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914–1924.* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. 1970.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 432.

immobilism' (p. 609). Leaving on one side the implied superiority of the West in this statement, the reader must ask whether the author means Islamic beliefs or Islamic social practices and legal institutions.

The book contains maps, several of which are devoted to the Palestine problem and to Second World War military campaigns, but the one which shows political alignments in the Middle East in 1936 (pp. 2–3) is somewhat misleading. It uses the same shading for Aden and a vague 'British hinterland of Aden' stretching up to the Persian Gulf, as it does for British India. Iraq and Kuwait also share a common shading but the status of British relations with the two states was very different. The same map also omits to mention the Trucial States and shows Oman as embracing the whole area up to the Qatar peninsula. Aspiration possibly, but not the truth!

R. M. BURRELL

The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. 3rd rev. ed. By Benjamin Shwadran. *Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press. 1973. (Distrib. in U.K., Europe, Africa and the Middle East by John Wiley.) 630 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University; The Monograph Series.) £9·75.*

THIS new edition of Professor Shwadran's earlier work, first published with identical title in 1955, has been in part re-written. It has been greatly increased in scale and scope, and in the extent of years covered (up to late 1972), though still omitting, to the author's confessed regret, the North African oil countries. The work is now of an intimidating bulk, and at a price prohibitive to most private buyers. This makes it likely to take its place rather as a book of reference than as an easily-readable unit—in spite of the blurb's claim of 'an absorbing narrative style'. It is, in any case, a very solid and reliable compilation of undoubted present and future value. Some who consult it may feel (as does the present reviewer) that the corpus of super-meticulous notes to every chapter, the forty-four tables and the fifty crowded pages of bibliography contain many barely relevant items of material or of quoted authority, and could with advantage be greatly shortened; and one might add that far better (though still uncoloured) maps than those included would have been an improvement. Nevertheless, the author's scholarly thoroughness and impartiality, his command of an over-plentiful mass of material, and the sheer hard labour for which the work must have called, are all admirable.

Mr. Shwadran's main concentration is on great power relations and occasionally confrontations in the field of Middle East oil, squabbles or agreements between Arab, and sometimes Iranian or Turkish, neighbours, on government-company controversies or polemics (but without offering any moral judgments), and above all on the hard facts of concession terms (too often later unilaterally breached or torn up), and on the sheer statistics of the production, collection, transport, export, revenues and prices (forever disputed) of the flood of oil gushing from the soil of a dozen previously poverty-ridden countries. Understandably, these hard facts do not include other matters of high interest but alien to the scheme of the book—such as the social and environmental conditions in the countries

concerned, or their outstanding personalities, or the immense and costly scientific and technological achievements in the field created by the now largely-dispossessed Western enterprises and capital. This latter aspect of the scene is also little emphasised in the ruling circles of the Middle East countries themselves.

STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG

A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War. By Sylvia Kowitt Crosbie. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 277 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Modern Middle East Series, Vol. 7; sponsored by The Middle East Institute, Columbia University, New York.) £7·10. $13.50.*

THIS is an account of the curious informal kind of alliance which developed between France and Israel in the 1950s and 1960s. The title says between Suez and the Six Day War, but the collaboration in fact started before 1956 and persisted beyond 1967, even if in attenuated form. It is a fascinating subject and Miss Crosbie has produced a very readable and reasonably short account of it.

It began with Free French sympathy for the Jews at the end of the Second World War and French assistance in getting Jewish immigrants into Palestine and in the supply of arms to the Jews. Thereafter a curious combination, on the French side, of frustration at the loss of France's position in the Middle East, of the loss of Indo-China, of the needs of the French aerospace industry, of the loose structure of the Fourth Republic's governmental machine and finally of the Baghdad Pact caused the right-wing French military, helped by certain key individuals, to turn to Israel as the counter to the British, the Russians and the Americans. On the Israeli side, arms were needed badly, especially after the Egyptians turned to the Soviet bloc, and could not be got freely from either the United States or Britain. The Algerian revolt and Nasser's support for it only reinforced these trends on the French side. Then came Suez and from then on an increasing collaboration which led, not only to the prosperity of the French armament industry, especially the aircraft industry, but also to Israel acquiring atomic expertise. Throughout this time neither the Quai d'Orsay nor the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs really approved and indeed were continually by-passed by ministries of defence which, particularly in Israel under Ben Gurion and Simon Peres, conducted their own foreign policy.

Under de Gaulle and Levi Eshkol the collaboration gradually tapered off; too many of the policy's supporters in France were right-wing opponents of de Gaulle, and Eshkol turned towards the United States. But as late as December 1969, after a French embargo on arms to Israel had been in operation for over two years, five gunboats slipped out of France for Israel.

It is an extraordinary story and by its very nature impossible to document. Miss Crosbie has done her best, but, as she frankly admits, so much of the story is secret and so many of the people she saw felt bound to be discreet that the account itself inevitably suffers. It is too detailed in some places and there are gaps in others.

How significant was the 'tacit alliance'? To Israel's defence it was of great but temporary importance; to the French armaments industry of

great value at a key point. It could never have been formalised. It was not relevant to the long-term objectives of either party; it was a cynical but immensely profitable short-term operation for both sides.

COLIN CROWE

The Gentile Zionists: A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy, 1929–1939. By N. A. Rose. *London, Portland, Oregon: Cass. 1973. 242 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £3·75.*

THIS book is a study in Anglo-Zionist relations with special reference to the political activities of Gentile Zionists. These activities ranged from advice and the establishment of contacts to influencing public opinion, parliamentary lobbying, putting pressure on the government and passing inside information. Walter Elliot, in particular, is reported as having 'consistently fed cabinet confidences to the Zionists through Mrs. Dugdale' (p. 124) until 'he was no longer trusted by his colleagues' (p. 195). Since support of the Jewish National Home was part of British policy, some Gentile Zionists followed their own line or outpaced their Jewish comrades. Thus Wedgwood fought for the transformation of Palestine into a 'Seventh Dominion', and several Gentile Zionists opposed partition although the Zionist leadership had accepted the principle. On the whole, however, the Gentiles followed Jewish guidance. The book gives a balanced account of the interaction of both groups.

As for Anglo-Zionist relations the author concentrates on the question of 'how the Zionist movement reacted to the crises that emerged with persistent regularity in its relations with the government' (p. ix). The investigation is based mainly on the Weizmann and Zionist archives, including the diaries of Blanche Dugdale. It shows that throughout the period under review the Zionist leaders failed to grasp both the reality of Arab resistance and the depth of the Arabs' conviction of the justice of their cause. To them, in the agony of the Jewish people, every limitation on immigration or the purchase of land appeared to be the product of British hostility or ignorance, and they felt the Jews to be the victims of a conspiracy between the Palestine administration and the permanent officials of the Colonial and the Foreign Office. This necessarily led to a disastrous deterioration in human relations and extended to the links with those who until then had been accepted as friends and comrades, but who now in Zionist eyes were 'tired and weak men' or 'broken reeds' (pp. 4, 67 (note 78), 151, 152). The summit of alienation was reached when Weizmann himself told Malcolm MacDonald that in Hitler 'at least one found the virtue of frank brutality, whereas he was covering up his betrayal of the Jews under a semblance of legality' (p. 203). The author does not describe how those Gentiles who had 'fallen from Zionist grace' (p. 20) reacted, or whether they felt that the disillusion was mutual. Nor does he indicate whether any of the Gentile Zionists developed independent thoughts on the Zionist-Arab tragedy. A remark by Wyndham Deedes, written on the eve of the establishment of the state of Israel, points in that direction: 'The last word on Zionism has not yet been spoken, nor will it be in our lifetime! "History" will decide, not this generation.' [1]

WALTER ZANDER

[1] *Zionist Review*, March 26, 1948.

Class Conflict in Egypt 1945–1970. By Mahmoud Hussein. Translated by Michael and Susanne Chirman, Alfred Ehrenfeld and Kathy Brown. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1974. 379 pp. $13.95. £5·45.*

WHEN the United States, West Germany, Japan and Iran are all looking to Cairo as a place for investment, a Marxist critique (Chinese persuasion) of the direction of Egyptian society immediately before and since the 1952 Revolution is particularly timely.

Given the fairly orthodox line of most students of the modern Egyptian economy, an uncompromising approach from so different a theoretical standpoint is of considerable importance. In regard to theory, indeed, this work is perhaps the most rigorous and consistent study we have on the subject.

The theme is the transitional nature of the economic and political systems and the factors that blocked any real revolution in the social structure. In this perspective, Egypt in the colonial period had a limited degree of capitalist transformation in banks, insurance, commerce, cotton and industry, but remained essentially a country of unilateral development relying on monoagriculture (cotton) for export to industrial countries. With such a policy the British destroyed any base for autonomous development, and broke the efforts of the middle classes to pave the way for capitalism. Agricultural workers also—although typically 'feudal' relations between big proprietors and direct producers declined—were still left with personal rather than mechanical means of labour. Moreover the excess of labour to demand meant that workers were integrated in the system of production in an unstable way. The surplus produced by Egyptian labour went to essentially non-productive investment. The bourgeoisie, such as it was when undercut by the British, collaborated with foreign interests and transferred rural profit to rentier urban investment. Any real transformation was thus blocked at the economic, political and ideological levels.

With this starting point the book examines the structural and political reasons for the emergence of a society dominated in the Nasserite period by a state bourgeoisie, but still in many ways transitional and riddled with class contradictions. The author has penetrating analyses of the reasons for the failures of the regime to transcend these contradictions, and discusses the emergence of capitalism in Egypt up to 1968 in a way that is always provocative and often, it seems to this reviewer, absolutely correct.

He does so, however, at some cost. The framework is highly schematic and doctrinaire, and lacking in a sense of what is problematic, both in theory and historical analysis. Terms about which there is much debate—petit bourgeoisie, state bourgeoisie, 'the masses', state capitalism—are applied, as are 'the laws of class analysis', without any sense of the real difficulties they entail. The understanding of rural Egypt is limited and some odd forcing of the empirical material is accomplished (*Métayers* are described as 'already in fairly stable positions, having a shack on their landlord's land and the opportunity to work for him or his supervisors as servants' (p. 177)). The historical periodisation is somewhat arbitrary and one gets the feeling of 'Mao or nothing' as the yardstick for all change. And when the regime which has 'upset the traditional class's economic domination' and overturned its forms, 'replaced the

hegemony of private property' *and* broken 'patterns of relations of dependence' on world capitalist markets (pp. 184–185) is dismissed for doing so because it only 'constituted the necessary condition for the rise of the petty-bourgeois elite and corresponded to the class interests of the state bourgeoisie in the making' (p. 185), then there is a serious failure of perspective on the historical and particular nature of Egyptian society, and on all Third World political movements.

MICHAEL GILSENAN

The King's Vista. A Land Reform which has changed the Face of Persia. By D. R. Denman. *Berkhamsted, Herts.: Geographical Publications Ltd. 1973. 368 pp. Illus. Map endpapers. Bibliog. Index. £6·50.*

THE process of land reform in Iran, one of the most wide-sweeping reorganisations of the rural sector carried out in the developing world in recent years, is the subject of Professor D. R. Denman's *The King's Vista.* In this beautifully produced book, Professor Denman has sought to describe and evaluate the Iranian land reforms of the last two decades, from the viewpoint of a specialist in land economics. In so doing, he leans heavily on official Iranian government material, including the Shah's own writings, and upon private conversations with the Shah and his ministers. This has enabled him to present a very clear picture of the rationale of the land reform programme as seen in official Iranian circles, showing how each phase of the process developed from the previous experiences and correctly emphasising the need for a 'twin pillar' of support services alongside the reform itself.

It is unfortunate that Professor Denman's book refrains from making a detailed assessment of the impact of land reform. Indeed, he takes its success very much for granted in that he feels that 'Economic efficiency and productivity . . . take second place to the pursuit of social justice and political freedom' (p. 255). Even in the latter respects, however, it may be argued that he has not fully proved his case. The author admits that the effects of the reform programme have not been uniform, either between areas of different pre-reform ownership, or within individual villages. Certainly the institution of farm corporations, albeit only an 'experiment', has tended to remove the farmers' freedom as fast as this was granted. In economic terms, although there are suggestions that the land reform has helped to increase rural incomes, the evidence produced is scanty, and any such figures must be set against the very heavy capital investment made by the Iranian government in the reform programme and the as yet relatively poor record of the farming population in paying for their newly acquired land. As the author himself notes, only time will enable a clearer assessment of the value of the reform programme. Until it can be seen in greater perspective, it is perhaps unwise to describe it in the glowing terms used throughout this book, or to suggest that the process will have great application outside Iran; particularly in countries lacking Iran's vast oil revenues, the contribution of which in financing the scheme receives curiously little comment.

HARVEY DEMAINE

Muscat and Oman: the end of an era. By Ian Skeet. *London: Faber. 1974. 224 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £3·95.*

Pari passu with the improvement of communications since the Second World War, descriptive travel books about outlandish places have proliferated. They are generally enlivened by excursions into curiosities of history, and often conclude with descriptions of current political problems and guesses about future developments. Most of them are of small value to the serious student of the area concerned. This one is an exception. It provides a fascinating account of the geographical and political complexities of Muscat and Oman, and a cool description of the policies of the late Sultan Sa'id bin Timur.

> Brought up in the imperial surroundings of the Chief's College, Ajmer, India, and sensitive to his family traditions of rule, his attitude towards the Egyptians is not far removed from that of the average British Tommy of World War Two; a lot of wogs. . . . (p. 199).

Such an attitude helped to determine his relationship with successive British governments, a relationship compounded of equal parts of mutual admiration and mutual exasperation.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

AFRICA

Power and Politics in Africa. By Henry L. Bretton. *Chicago, Ill.: Aldine; London: Longman. 1973. 402 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·50.*

AFRICAN Studies are dead! Long live African Studies! Such is the cry of this book which claims to be the first genuinely integrated study of the ingredients underlying political power and leadership. But the attempt falls short, doing little but endlessly repeat the major ingredients of 'reality': avarice and the conspiracy of economic power politically expressed as corruption and neo-colonialism. Also, Dr. Bretton asserts that 'political thought on or about Africa must be cut adrift from its traditional Western moorings' (p. 344), which to him have a narrow legal-constitutional conceptual base, and claims that the basic factors in the analysis of all political systems must be economic: in particular he emphasises the control and distribution of wealth. Unfortunately, he uses these economic theses to promote inaccurate, emotive or vague conclusions, including the assertions that the degree of independence is dependent on the availability of capital and that colonialism was but a 'thinly disguised form of largescale theft' (p. 328). This latter statement scarcely seems to take account of the vastly increased colonial expenditure north of the Zambesi after 1945.

However, to the student of contemporary Africa, there are some useful observations, particularly in the cogent analysis of tribalism. The term is 'rooted quite evidently in Western social consciousness' and is 'an extremely undependable analytical tool' (p. 262). But, after illustrating the overestimated influence of tribalism, he then admits that it does play a role in, for example, the unions, army recruitment and patronage. Similarly, the observation that corruption is deeply embedded in African society is true, but he exaggerates in arguing that its arrest could be likened to the cessation of blood circulation. The close relationship between the public and private sectors of African economies is well

described, particularly regarding the position of the centrally-placed and crucially important bureaucracy in this nexus. But his overall assessment of African elites is unjust. He says that, through being kept in virtual total ignorance of the outside world by colonialism, they now have little significance since the real (economic) power lies outside Africa. But the fact remains that, as Amin alone has shown, the indigenous power elite does and can have a very considerable internal (and external) impact.

The excessive fragmentation of the text is irritating and occasionally over-didactic to the point of being unclear (as in his definition of 'political'). But he is certainly expressive, as with the 'fiscal elephantiasis' of the funding of the bureaucracy, and the 'economic narcotic' of aid. Finally, although the maps are poor, there is an excellent bibliography.

TONY THORNDIKE

Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization. By Donald Rothchild. *London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations. 1973. 476 pp. Index. £7·00.*

IN the exchange of polemics over the possibility of peaceful movement towards majority rule in Rhodesia, those who have stressed that this can occur without violence have looked to Kenya as a substantial precedent. The transfer of power in Kenya did indeed occur without broken heads; Europeans who wished to stay have done so without significant personal disadvantage, while those who felt threatened by the changed circumstances were free to leave, reasonably compensated financially if not spiritually. The least powerful racial group in this terminal phase of colonialism, the Asian population, have fared less well and few would doubt the truth of their own pessimism about the future.

Professor Rothchild's study is an attempt to get to grips with the dynamic processes by which a European-dominated country became an African nation. This complex history is seen in 'terms of a model of shifting bargaining relationships among the three racial communities' (p. vii). The periodisation is clear; the immediate run-up to independence was characterised by direct racial bargaining in which the African aspiration for self-rule neatly coincided with the minority groups' interests in 'stability', the maintenance of rights to property, and even a degree of political representation. In this process, obligations were created between all groups, but of course in the ten years since independence minority power has sharply declined. Minority groups can only defend their position by pointing out their disproportionate role in the economic success of the country, and the chosen planning trajectory of the country's rulers has led to a degree of recognition of this in a way that would be less credible in a socialist country. Rothchild comments sensibly that this functionally inspired bargaining process will survive only so long as a sufficiently wide dispersion of power persists to make such reciprocity essential.

Professor Rothchild has built up his impressive case study around two major opinion surveys conducted in the mid-1960s and he synthesises a great deal more published and unpublished material in this book. For the new data, and for his impressive powers of analysis, scholars are in his debt. But in some respects this study is less satisfying. Race is undoub-

tedly a major element in Kenya's history but one wonders how immutable are the values that have surrounded this vexed constellation of problems. For example, once the fundamental decision to decolonise had been taken, it seems clear that race, *per se*, ceased to hold the centre of the stage as it had done before. To be sure, it provided the key issues of debate between Her Majesty's Government and the Kenyan nationalists, but by the late 1950s at least, African politics—the most important element of context for an understanding of the 1960s and 1970s—turned inwards ideologically and organisationally. The relationships between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, the historically reinforced divisions within Kikuyu society and, more simplistically, the clash of personalities, took on new significance as the political cement of nationalism lost its cohesive strength. But because of its history, Kenya's political idiom and many of its political symbols remain obdurately racial although the terminology connotes factors of declining importance. Politicians, who understand such things far better than searchers for truth, mercilessly play upon this area of susceptibility. This manipulation of exterior threats is played at several levels; the Luo ' threat ' is useful in pursuit of Kikuyu integration, just as the Asian ' threat ' and Africanisation are vital in the encouragement of national integration.

While this grossly over-simplifies the ' stuff ' of Kenyan politics, it is a dimension lacking in Professor Rothchild's important study. And it is a serious lacuna, for its omission leads him to discuss African political values in Kenya in an entirely transactional way although they palpably carry the values of the past, selectively arrived at and manipulated out of recognition, right into the present. These perceptions are not necessarily about reality, and discussion of reality in politics is usually misleading, but a transactional approach to inter-group politics implies some measure of common currency. Essentially, inter-racial politics in Kenya today are partly ritual and cannot be reduced to a zero-sum game any more than can potlatching or the Kula ring. Despite his tendency to over-rationalise politics, Professor Rothchild has written a very scholarly work, replete with new data and new insights, which adds very usefully to the slowly growing literature on modern Kenya.

RICHARD RATHBONE

Kenyatta and the Politics of Kenya. By Guy Arnold. *London: Dent. 1974. 226 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control. By Henry Bienen. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University and the Center of International Affairs, Harvard University. 1974. 215 pp. Bibliog. Index. $10.00. £5·30.*

PROFESSOR BIENEN is concerned in his detailed study with the politics of independent Kenya, or to be more precise, with African politics in independeht Kenya. He refers to the pre-independence period, but only briefly, in order to set the scene for his analysis of what the position is now.

For his part, Mr. Arnold not only begins his account many years before independence, but he examines developments in the country from the point of view of the remarkable man who leads it, and who has been

the dominating influence in its political development for many years, whether from State House or from a colonial prison. Mr. Arnold does not claim to have written a definitive biography of Jomo Kenyatta. He has, however, quite rightly, seen Kenyatta's role as being crucial, not merely after he returned, in 1961, to active political life after imprisonment and restriction, but long before that.

Settlers' fears of what he stood for, the failure of Sir Philip Mitchell as Governor to give him the opportunity to play a responsible part in the colony's life when he returned after the war from Britain, and above all the hysterical and irrational—not to say unjust—attitude of Europeans during and after the Mau Mau period, all these are recorded and discussed. The author is fiercely critical of the colonial authorities. He devotes much space to the Kapenguria trial, and condemns it as a travesty of justice. He remarks pertinently: 'It is understandable that the colonial authorities were disturbed by Mau Mau; what is inexcusable is the fact that at no time does it seem to have occurred to them that they were responsible for it' (p. 127). In short, he describes the background against which Kenya emerged into independence in 1963, a background which most people did not see as auspicious, and certainly not likely to produce 'the particular brand of quiet stability that has been the hallmark of Kenyatta's reign' (p. 191).

It can be said at once that Mr. Arnold and Professor Bienen are writing about the same country! Their emphases are different, but the overall picture that emerges coincides. The themes which run through both accounts are the themes of stability, of government through the civil service machine—working to the President—rather than through the party, and of government by an elite.

Kenyatta's personal supremacy, and his position above the party battle, are recognised by both authors as the key to Kenya's politics. Yet in spite of the highly personal, and authoritarian, flavour of 'Mzee's' rule, Professor Bienen argues convincingly that the extent of participation in Kenya is high. 'Nonetheless, despite the extreme ethnic tensions, despite a faction-ridden political system, the Kenyan regime has maintained a strong base of support' (p. 183). This, it may be said, is the reason for giving an optimistic answer to the question which is always asked about Kenya, and which arises inevitably from Mr. Arnold's study: what will happen when Kenyatta goes?

The two books, indeed, complement each other well. Mr. Arnold's strongly sympathetic interest in what independent Kenya stands for gives his work a flavour that is missing from Professor Bienen's more academic concern, and Mr. Arnold succeeds in giving a depth of reality to some questions—notably the importance of land tenure—which in Professor Bienen's pages appear rather as merely interesting issues. Professor Bienen's account, on the other hand, is a far closer analysis of the system under which Kenya, so successfully, runs. It would be much easier to read, incidentally, if he had not allowed his footnotes to run away with him, but that is a small point. The two works are notable contributions to the study and understanding of Kenya.

W. P. KIRKMAN

War and Peace in the Sudan 1955–1972. By Cecil Eprile. *Newton Abbot, London: David and Charles. 1974. 192 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. (World Realities Series.) £4·50.*

THIS book discusses the long civil war in the Republic of the Sudan and its recent apparent ending. It is intended for popular reading and does not attempt a study in much depth. But as a hasty yet more or less up-to-date report on a confused and poorly documented situation, it has its merits and its uses. The author, described on the dustcover as a journalist specialising in African affairs, visited Khartoum in late 1971 and interviewed leading figures in the government, that is, in the Northern camp. The core of the book appears to have been written immediately after this visit, and expresses sympathy for the Southern rebels, suspicion of Northern leaders and their intentions, and marked hostility to alleged Russian influence in the Sudan. However, the author revisited Khartoum in late 1972 and early 1973, after the government of General Nimeiry (spelled 'Nimery' throughout) had suppressed a coup from further left, had turned anti-communist, and had made peace with the South. Hence the introduction and epilogue to the book, and occasional references in the main text, reflect the author's later optimistic belief that the peace between North and South will be lasting and beneficial to both parties. Apart from a tendency to exaggerate the extent of Russian penetration and influence, the judgments are moderate and sensible. Inevitably, perhaps, they are based more on instinctive goodwill and liberal faith than on analysis of hard information. Most of the previous literature is cited, including some material which it would be otherwise difficult to track down. Unfortunately the greater part of this is wild propaganda, and as a result many dramatic and presumably significant events have to be recounted from reported 'eyewitness' statements and from unreported personal interviews. The account of the civil war adds little detail to existing knowledge, despite interviews with former Southern commanders, and the reader often has to make do with claims and counter-claims about massacres and atrocities. There is more interest in the concluding section of the book, particularly when it reports recent attitudes of Southern leaders to the new situation of peace and proclaimed reconciliation. Despite some journalistic padding, the book is short—and hence overpriced.

P. E. H. HAIR

Autonomy and Dependence: The Urhobo Kingdom of Okpe in Modern Nigeria. By Onigu Otite. *London: Hurst. 1974. 215 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·60.*

LIKE some of his British predecessors, Dr. Otite turned to anthropology after a spell as an administrative officer. Unlike any of them, he was able to look at the policy he was administering from the inside as well as the outside. The strictly anthropological part of his book actually owes a good deal to the 'reorganisation report' made by a British District Officer after the tax riots of 1928.

A recurring theme is the permanence of respect at grass-roots level for traditional kings and chiefs who have been disregarded or misunderstood, and in any case had their powers severely curtailed, by the external authorities to which they are subordinated. Writing of Okpe, the largest

of the seven Urhobo kingdoms in the Niger delta area, with a population of some 80,000, Dr. Otite shows that the introduction of representative government did not instantaneously set free a love of democracy inherent in every man, as some of its sponsors expected. At the same time it did make people realise that for some purposes their elected representative was a more important person than their chief.

The earliest African agents of British policy were the Warrant Chiefs, who, we have been accustomed to think, were appointed without reference to their status in their own communities. In Okpe, town meetings put names forward. What was resented was the creation of a kind of executive agency that was entirely foreign to a system in which authority was distributed among the members of age-grades, and *a fortiori* the elevation of Warrant Chiefs to be recognised as Native Authorities. The new Native Administration set up in 1931 purported to re-create the traditional system. According to Dr. Otite, the king's council of chiefs whom he had chosen to hold traditional titles—thus a quite differently constituted body—continued to function alongside the new one.

With the coming of representative local government and national political parties, the Okpe king and his chiefs had to trim their sails to a different wind. The new higher authorities, however, also had to take them into account. In a sense they were still used as agents, but in another sense their goodwill was necessary before officials of wider government—say the local council's rate collector—could operate in their areas. Party leaders solicited the favour of chiefs, although this did not make it unnecessary to canvass for votes. At the same time, the winning party had, in its control of finance, a powerful sanction against those who had opposed it. The refusal of grants of course affected everyone. Intervention directed specifically at chiefs included the creation of new titles to reward political supporters and the nomination of favoured persons to the House of Chiefs.

Unfortunately Dr. Otite's narrative ends before the military coups of 1966. It would be interesting to know what are the alignments in the covert power struggles which must undoubtedly have been going on since that time.

LUCY MAIR

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Radical Politics in South Asia. Edited by Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda. *Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1973. 449 pp. Maps. Indexes. (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution (formerly 'Studies in International Communism') No. 19; Gen. Ed.: William E. Griffith.) $15.00. £6·75.*

IN the last few years the Indian subcontinent has seen some rather radical changes. There were those caused by external conflict, such as the clash between West and East Pakistan and the ensuing war between India and Pakistan, which led to the creation of Bangladesh to whose people this volume of essays is dedicated. Other changes, less closely observed by the outside world, have come about as a result of internal conflicts, such as the violence caused by the Naxalites in several States of the Indian

Union or the revolt of young radicals in Ceylon. Rightly, Kerala, the first State in which a communist regime came to power by constitutional means rather than by revolution, provides the first case study in this volume. Robert Hardgrave recalls its history from the early activities of the Congress Socialist Party to the emergence of E. M. S. Namboodiripad as the Chief Minister of the first (CPI) and second (CMP) government and of Achutha Menon as head of the CPI-Congress coalition cabinet of 1971. The author points to caste politics and agrarian unrest as elements in the growth of radicalism. He might also have considered the role of the Christian churches, the high proportion of literate unemployed, the isolation of the State from the rest of India and its closeness, throughout its history, to ideas ferried to its shores across the seas.[1] West Bengal, one of Marcus Franda's subjects of special interest,[2] is the other State in the Indian Union in which radical politics are at home. Here the role of the *bhadralok*, an elite unique to Bengal, to whom Professor Franda has devoted much of his work, the influx of large numbers of refugees at the time of partition, the size of the unemployed labour force and the proximity of China have been among the elements contributing to the politics of radicalism. As shown by Maniruzzaman, this radicalism has rubbed off on the neighbouring Muslim State of East Bengal, though for much of the time political activities were stifled by Ayub Khan's martial law administration. Politics was thus mainly about the liberation from Pakistan rule. This preoccupation of Bengali nationalists hindered the growth of radical political groups whose opportunities for agitation among urban workers and landless cultivators are yet to come. At present the radical, Maoist, Left is weak because of internecine factionalism and China's support for Ali Bhutto's regime in Pakistan, but this could change.

Mohan Ram, a commentator on Indian communism for more than a decade, traces the highly individual approach of the communists in the Telugu-speaking part of Andhra Pradesh from their first clash with the leadership of the CPI over the interpretation of the Zhdanov line to the recent revival of radical politics as a result of the growing polarisation of village communities outside Hyderabad, where evicted tenants are turned into landless labourers. In Bihar, the subject of an essay by Paul Brass, differences in caste rather than language fuel the flames of radical politics. Here the PSP and the SP, and more recently the new Samyukta Socialist Party, have provided the main political frame within which militant radicals of the Left operate. On the island of Ceylon, which is the subject of an essay by Robert Kearney, Marxists have been entrenched for a long time, but they have been weakened in their effectiveness by in-fighting between factions of Stalinists, Trotskyists and Maoists. In the spring of 1971, the left-wing government of Mrs. Bandaranaike was thus startled by the sudden armed revolt of the JVP (People's Liberation Front), a previously almost unknown ultra-left faction. Though it has been suppressed, if not obliterated, young urban intellectuals and farm workers remain restless.

The general reader will find much of this political detail tedious, but he should not fail to read with care the long introductory chapter by

[1] W. Klatt, *Caste, Class and Communism in Kerala*. *Asian Affairs*, October 1972.

[2] *Radical Politics in West Bengal*. By Marcus F. Franda. Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1972, pp. 701–702.

Paul Brass, joint editor of the volume under review. Brass is sure to be right in seeing the main causes of the radicalism of the Left in internal political conflict rather than outside interference. Even so, the influence exercised by Russia and China is undeniable. The reader should also bear in mind that radicalism is not limited to the Left. A companion volume on the parties of the Right could provide valuable additional insight into radicalism which threatens the politics of consensus in South Asia.

W. KLATT

Partners in Peace: A Study in Indo-Soviet Relations. By K. Neelkant, *Delhi, London: Vikas. 1972. 192 pp. Illus.*

Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent. By Vijay Sen Budhraj. *Bombay, New Delhi: Somaiya Publications. 1973. 296 pp. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 40.00.*

SINCE the tragic events of 1971 culminating in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, a new balance of power has emerged in the Indian subcontinent. The important features of the 'new order' are the emergence of India as the dominant regional power and of the Soviet Union as the most influential major power in the area. The Indo-Soviet relationship, which has a history of about twenty years, was formalised in the so-called Treaty of Friendship during the 1971 crisis. This treaty, which many observers believe is a concealed military pact, ended India's policy of non-alignment in favour of Russia. Indian writers have, however, sought to justify Soviet policy and objectives as those of 'peaceful co-operation', and India's growing ties with the Kremlin as being motivated by 'peaceful intentions'. India and the Soviet Union are depicted as 'partners in peace', as Neelkant's book is entitled, or as following a 'policy of peaceful co-existence', as Budhraj seeks to demonstrate.

Both these books give a typically Indian view of the Soviet policy in the subcontinent. But to anyone familiar with the region's *realpolitik* since the 1950s, their interpretation, however sincerely believed, will appear highly biased. The Soviet Union often accuses the 'Western imperialist powers', and recently China, of creating regional tensions and bitterness. But an analysis of Soviet policy in the subcontinent shows that Russia, more than any other power, has consistently sought to take advantage of Indo-Pakistan tensions. The most recent Soviet activities in the area—such as vigorous campaigning for a so-called Asian collective security plan; the expansion of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean; the encouragement of the further fragmentation of Pakistan by supporting 'Pakhtoonistan' and 'Greater Baluchistan'; and penetration into the new state of Bangladesh in the guise of cultural and economic co-operation is all evidence that belies Budhraj's and Neelkant's interpretation of Soviet objectives and India's response to them.

These two books are useful if one is interested in the 'official view' of Moscow or New Delhi, but they are of little use if one wants an objective assessment of the emerging balance of power in the subcontinent.

G. W. CHOUDHURY

India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement. By Francis G. Hutchins. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1973. London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 326 pp. Index. £8·00.*

THIS curious work—first published in India in 1971 under the title *Spontaneous Revolution*—consists in effect of several essays and monographs, uneasily related to each other and patched together to spell out the thesis announced on pp. 1–2: Britain withdrew from India in 1947, not because it was weakened by the Second World War, still less in fulfilment of earlier British policy, but because 'the local pressures had become uncontrollable'; and these pressures, culminating in the Quit India agitation of 1942, amounted to a successful revolution.

The book contains a detailed narrative of the Quit India movement, drawn from official documents and from interviews with participants; an analysis of Gandhi's role as non-violent revolutionary; an essay on British rule in India; another essay on revolution in general; and—probably closest to the author's heart—a running polemic directed not at 1940s British policy in India but at 1960s American policy in Vietnam, in Cuba, even in the black ghettoes at home. On occasion the book turns into an argument with the author's fellow-Harvard professors Henry Kissinger and Samuel P. Huntington; the last sentence—'Britain only learned to live with the world after she gave up the idea of conquering it' (p. 289)—confirms that the inner impulse at work is anguish at America's role in Vietnam, and that India serves to point the moral.

This is not to dismiss the book's main thesis as irrelevant. There is something in it; Mr. Hutchins makes the most of documents recently opened to show that the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and some of his officials wished to 'smash Congress', while after the Quit India disturbances these same men (and many other British) were for the first time beginning to doubt the future of British rule. But to go on to assert that Linlithgow knew he had 'lost his legitimacy' (p. 276) because he had used violence to repress Quit India (rather successfully, by the way) is absurd; it is not borne out by the evidence which Mr. Hutchins himself brings forward. To dismiss Britain's wartime reversals and postwar exhaustion as an 'undefined' irrelevance (p. 1) is merely arbitrary. To accept the Gandhian view of revolution as inward spiritual transformation and apply it to Quit India requires sleight-of-hand to take care of those who remained aloof—not only an important region like the Punjab but the entire Muslim community.

This insistence on single-cause explanation is a pity: amid many highly questionable statements Mr. Hutchins usefully opposes the assumption that the British all along meant to get out; his interpretation of Gandhi—'intent on revolution, by non-violence if possible, by violence if necessary and possible' (p. 138)—is often shrewd, though not everyone will share his certainty that he understands Gandhi's motives at every point. But, despite much interesting detail, the book remains disjointed and unsatisfactory.

JOHN ROSSELLI

Pakistan: failure in national integration. By Rounaq Jahan. *New York, London: Columbia University Press, sponsored by The Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University. 1972. 248 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

THIS book originates in a Ph.D. thesis on the 'Centre-Provinces' relationship in Pakistan'. Subsequently, while doing post-doctoral research at Columbia University, the author adapted it to its present form. She begins with what has been described as the 'problem of national integration' (chapter 1) in new Afro-Asian countries. This part is so heavily dependent on quotations from secondary sources that it is difficult to distinguish the wood from the trees—Dr. Jahan contributes hardly anything.

The author then devotes six chapters (II to VII) to an analysis of various aspects of Pakistan's political and administrative system under Ayub; here again Dr. Jahan could hardly add anything to what has already been published. She discusses, for example, the *per capita* economic disparity between East and West Pakistan, but the relevant works of well-known economists like Dr. A. R. Khan and Professor Anisur Rahman are so much more comprehensive and analytical that this book can add hardly anything new.

The real theme of the book, as the author claims, is an examination of how Ayub's political system failed to achieve national integration and how it contributed to the 'birth of Bangladesh' (epilogue). The author, however, has missed the most important aspect of Ayub's political order: as is often the case in a 'constitutional dictatorship' or 'controlled (basic) democracy', it was in two parts. There were assemblies and cabinets, both national and provincial; and there was a ceremonial body called the 'Governors' Conference'. These were, however, simply showpieces. The real power or decision-making process lay elsewhere, in a cabinet of top military and civilian officials more powerful than any organs of the constitution. By describing the 'Governors' Conference' as the 'highest decision-making body', Dr. Jahan betrays a lack of understanding of Ayub's system. The real weakness of this system, as observed by the present reviewer from his personal knowledge and participation, was the lack of adequate opportunities for the Bengalis to have any share in the decision-making process; and this contributed to the birth of Bangladesh, which was also facilitated by foreign intervention and influences—a factor which Dr. Jahan has completely ignored. The book does not, in fact, answer the question raised by the author herself.

G. W. CHOUDHURY

Malaysia—New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia. By R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam. *London: Cass. 1974. 501 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. (Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History, No. 2; Gen. Eds.: W. H. Morris-Jones and Dennis Austin.) £9·00.*

THIS book contains an excellent and lucid analysis of political development in Malaysia's two Borneo States, Sarawak and Sabah, from the creation of Malaysia in 1963 to 1970, by which time both States had their own wholly elected state legislatures. As separate British colonies, constitutional change before 1963 had been slow, and both States were far behind Malaya in both political and economic development at the time

of the formation of Malaysia. For instance, 'Sarawak's first political party was formed only in 1959, North Borneo's in 1961' (p. 9).

The Alliance formula for the distribution of political power could not be exported from Malaya to Sarawak and Sabah without major amendments. In both the Borneo States there is a greater complexity of ethnic groups than in Malaya, with a heterogeneous indigenous population, part-Muslim and part non-Muslim, part Malay and part non-Malay, and, of course, the Chinese with their own cultural and linguistic attributes. Parties were set up, particularly in Sarawak, which entered into 'mutually destructive activities' in their attempts 'to become the accepted spokesmen of their particular Native communities' (p. 143), even when these parties were all members of the State Alliance. Political development in Sabah and Sarawak between 1963 and 1970 was thus centred largely on changing coalitions within the State government and on mergers and demises of political groups: in Sabah the Muslim-dominated United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) won the day, and that State now has virtually one-party government following the disintegration of the United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Organisation (UPKO), whilst in Sarawak rival Muslim parties at length merged and, with one of the two Iban parties, formed the government of the day until 1970 when the Chinese-dominated SUPP was also enticed into the coalition.

These developments, together with a description of the Sabah State election of 1967 and the Sarawak State election of 1969–70, form the central theme of the book and take up the first five of the eight chapters. This part of the book is really excellent, and based largely on the authors' own observations during field trips. In comparison the sixth chapter, on local government, including the position of the Residents and District Officers, and on development machinery, appears to this reviewer to be rather pedestrian and to contain some detail which is hardly relevant to the general argument of the book. Suffice it here to say that the authors consider that the District Officer has a future, but they are not so sure about the Resident, who is in overall charge of a number of districts.

This book is expensive, but it is essential reading for serious students of South-east Asian politics. It will also be of considerable interest to former expatriate administrative officers who have worked in Sabah and Sarawak.

T. E. Smith

Twentieth-Century Indonesia. By Wilfred T. Neill. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1973. 413 pp. Map. Illus. Index. £7·50.*

This volume of introduction to modern Indonesia attempts to unravel the complexity and diversity which is the essence of that country by examining the environmental, cultural and historical dimensions of Indonesian life. To this end chapters on topography and plant and animal ecology are followed by others on maritime context, human movement and religious and cultural penetration. For readers of this journal, the most pertinent chapters are those which discuss the period from the declaration of independence up to and including the establishment of the New Order of President Suharto. The outcome of such an exercise in historical compression is tolerable if not fully accurate in terms both of fact and assessment. In this respect, the most useful pages of condensed historical

record are those dealing with the circumstances and immediate aftermath of the actual declaration of independence by Sukarno. What is engaging in this book is the extent to which the author is concerned to convey a sense of feel about his subject.

MICHAEL LEIFER

The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. 1: Contradictions among the People 1956–1957. By Roderick MacFarquhar. *London, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The East Asian Institute of Columbia University and The Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University. 1974. 439 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR'S book is the first of what is planned as a trilogy. He begins his story in 1956, when collectivisation had been completed in China, and carries it down to the important plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1957. At this point an agreement was patched up between Mao and a number of the other leaders, particularly Liu Shao-ch'i, who had quarrelled bitterly, if never quite openly, about various major domestic policies—the attempted economic 'leap forward' of 1956, and Mao's subsequent effort to mobilise the non-communist Chinese intellectuals behind the national economic effort of reconstruction (the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign). Roderick MacFarquhar's second volume will cover 'the euphoria and demoralisation of the great leap forward, the three bitter years (of economic disasters) and the Sino-Soviet dispute during which the contradictions among the Chinese leaders on these issues sharpened'. In the third volume he will trace how all these developments combined to cause the unleashing of the Cultural Revolution.

This is an invaluable book for the specialist. The author has made full use of material which became available during the Cultural Revolution to check and supplement the story of the political manoeuvres of 1956–57, as it had previously been pieced together from material published at the time. Stanley Karnow, in his *Mao and China*[1] covered some of the same ground and used some of the same material; but Roderick MacFarquhar's book is more detailed on the period with which it deals, and is unlikely to be superseded, though some of the critical apparatus may be hard going for non-specialists.

There is however very much to interest them. The issues of internal policy between Mao, the revolutionary romantic, and Liu, the efficient *apparatchik* (to simplify both the personalities and the characteristics) were of great importance. Was China concentrating too much on heavy industry, which involved large imports of material and specialists from the Soviet Union? Was industry concentrated too much in the interior, and insufficiently in the coastal towns? Was the zeal of the good party man repellent to the Western-educated experts, or oppressive to the middle peasant? Did party officials inevitably exaggerate when reporting their own achievements during a campaign?

It is important too that the debates and quarrels on such issues were held against the background of de-Stalinisation and the succession of shock waves which rocked the communist world after the 20th Congress of the

[1] New York: Viking. 1972. London: Macmillan. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1973, p. 675.

Soviet Communist Party. Liu and his supporters could suggest that Mao was encouraging a cult of personality and separating himself from the party. Mao could counter by implying that the gravest danger, as exemplified by the Hungarian revolt, occurred when the party as a whole became separated from the masses and subject to 'bureaucratism'. By the autumn of 1957 (the end of Roderick MacFarquhar's first volume) Mao had suffered a severe set-back. The 'Hundred Flowers' campaign, designed to encourage non-party elements, had misfired. 'Rectification', which Mao had wished to apply mainly to the party leaders themselves, was now being directed by the party towards the people as a whole and particularly the 'rightists' or remaining bourgeois elements. Mao was due to visit Moscow, and it looked as if the principal leaders of the 'socialist camp' would be united in a generally cautious and repressive policy. Roderick MacFarquhar's second volume will no doubt show in fascinating detail why this did not happen.

DUNCAN WILSON

The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets. By Ilpyong J. Kim. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press for the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 1974. 232 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.50. £6·25.*

THIS book focuses on the brief period of the so-called 'Kiangsi Soviet' from 1931 to 1934. The 'politics' of the title refers particularly to those organisational precepts and practices that held sway in the soviet over those years. The chief interest of this study lies in the fact that for about three-quarters of the time, at least, Mao was in charge of this experiment in government and mass mobilisation, which blossomed into fuller flower after he came to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 and established his headquarters at Yenan. The value of Mr. Kim's book is that it shows conclusively, from an exhaustive study of documents (in Chinese, Japanese, Russian and English), that the whole development of Chinese communism under Mao, which is usually ascribed to the Yenan period, had an earlier genesis in Kiangsi.

'The Soviet became the basic organisational form by which Mao and his followers attempted . . . to attain the revolutionary goals of creating new political institutions, accomplishing the equal distribution of land, and throwing off KMT rule' (p. 22). At the heart of this organisation lay the concept of the 'mass line'. The book deals very largely with this concept, to which the Chinese leaders have always attributed their success, and which some scholars see as the core of the distinctively Maoist contribution to communist theory and practice. Its importance, therefore, can hardly be overstated.

What, then, is the mass line? In a word, it is a method of linking Communist Party leadership and the masses, a technique of mass mobilisation, an organisational framework providing for interaction between leaders and led, often summarised as 'from the masses, to the masses'. Mr. Kim traces how it works in the soviet government institutions, policies, leadership, administration, education and recruitment. The whole operation runs on the ball-bearings of the 'cadres', those executives of central authority working at the rice-roots among the people.

It is easier to describe what it is, or is supposed to be, than to agree on

interpretation of its implementation and import. Opinions range all the way from a brave new brand of genuine participatory democracy to a method of enforcing rigid central control throughout society. Mr. Kim's viewpoint would seem to be somewhere between the two. The mass line equals mass mobilisation. He sees it as an auxiliary role of government, sending the cadres on their errands which have at times included a 'ruthless class struggle'. Yet it involves mass participation, even an electoral process, and a channel for the articulation of grievances. Not everyone will agree with the author that this can be equated with 'parliamentary procedure', or that 'what Mao attempted to develop in the Kiangsi soviet was exactly what contemporary political theorists are concerned with: government and administration that would move mass organisations quickly, act decisively, and respond readily to the people's needs and demands' (p. 204). There is a little matter of Marxism-Leninism, and the precedent of the Soviet Union, where even Stalin theorised about the mass line. These broader perspectives are missing from this account, which has an exclusively sinocentric view. To be fair, Mr. Kim distinguishes between mass participation and actual support, and between the mass line as it operated in Kiangsi and in China after 1949. But what is not explained clearly is how the mass line operates in a situation of total rejection and hostility. That is the acid test.

VICTOR FUNNELL

China's practice of International Law: Some Case Studies. Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1972. 417 pp. Index. (Harvard Studies in East Asian Law 6.) £7·50.*

THIS volume of studies on specific problems in international relations and Chinese attitudes to international law was sponsored by a study panel of the American Society of International Law in 1967 (at the height of the Cultural Revolution) and was intended to supplement general studies then in progress. It forms a worthy memorial to John M. H. Lindbeck to whom it is dedicated.

Given China's earlier experience, the Chinese Communist Party's avowed policies, and the birth of the People's Republic of China into an ideologically divided world already possessing atomic bombs, there were bound to be problems. Here competent specialists, in skilfully edited contributions, probe crucial issues which will interest scholars and those increasing numbers with a practical interest in relations with China. Topics include recognition and diplomatic practice, trade negotiations, border settlements, disputes with India and Russia, and China's attitudes to international organisations up to its entry into the United Nations. The approach is generally to see how far legal considerations or legal motives operated, and particularly whether Chinese responses accord with the established practice of international law or can be regarded as initiating distinctive innovation.

From early 1950 Peking showed a disposition to redefine diplomatic relations rather than merely to step into the position occupied by its predecessors according to generally accepted conventions. While adopting different policies towards socialist countries and others, it expressed willingness to settle outstanding issues by peaceful negotiations. With

most Asian neighbours this succeeded. But it did not, as is well known, with India, while frontier definition was left to stoke the fires of other Sino-Soviet disagreements. Whereas in arguing with India about prisoners or contesting the status of Taiwan, Peking asserted its case in accordance with Western international law, it was only when the Sino-Soviet rift took on an inter-state character that it moved from a Leninist position (which stated that proletarian internationalism provided a better basis for a debate between fraternal parties than did international law) to a juridical position.

An analysis of Sino-Netherlands relations suggests an emerging Chinese communist conception of international law, deriving partly from traditional legal conceptions. This may prove to be valid and enduring. Or the explanation here, as in diplomatic practice during the Cultural Revolution, may lie more directly in the politics of that movement. A comparative study of diplomatic practice in a less disturbed period would have been useful, but the choice of period does illustrate the dangerous situation that could arise if legal and conventional forms are not allowed to operate in crises, which are precisely the situations they were designed to meet. It is not unprecedented for sovereign states to act contrary to international law, and China's lukewarm attitude to this is understandable, but the disregard of facilities and immunities conventionally accorded to foreign representatives (and the International Red Cross) would not, if it were elevated to a principle, impress the civilised world as an advance.

The editor draws the tentative conclusion that 'although the PRC has not articulated a comprehensive new theory of international law . . . in important respects . . . it has maintained an innovative, distinctive outlook' (p. 12). One hopes for a further volume to test these findings.

SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL

A History of Hong Kong. 2nd rev. ed. By G. B. Endacott. *Hong Kong, London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. 337 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Oxford in Asia Paperbacks.) £3·25.*

The Changing Face of Hong Kong: New Departures in Public Policy. By Alvin Rabushka. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution. 1973. 79 pp. (AEI-Hoover Policy Studies.) $3.00.*

Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore. By Theodore Geiger assisted by Frances M. Geiger. *Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association. 1973. 239 pp. Map. Index. (Studies in Development Progress, No. 3.) $3.50.*

THE economic miracle which has placed Hong Kong among Asian countries second only to Japan in terms of world trade—and, what is less often realised, in industrial wage rates too—has hardly been reflected in scholarly literature about its history, economy, or society, perhaps as a result of its anomalous political status and, equally anachronistic in many people's eyes, its exemplification of the virtues of a free market economy. Singapore, close on its heels if not actually ahead from time to time, has perhaps received a little more attention. Although its political regime is certainly not less authoritarian in practice, its sovereign status and willing-

ness to use some of the vocabulary of development planning make it seem less untypical of today's world.

The late George Endacott, in an unpretentious if stolid way, contributed a good deal to what we know about Hong Kong and his history of the colony, first published in 1958 remains, for all its deficiencies, essential. It is, as he himself recognised, not strong on the all-important economic history and is too closely restricted to the view from Government House. Written, moreover, when Colonial Office records were open only up to the early years of this century, its treatment of the period after 1914 was never more than sketchy. For the last twelve pages of the original, this new edition substitutes twenty-four new ones, but is otherwise unchanged. Welcome as it is that it should again be available, those who have the earlier version need not replace it. A *modern* history of Hong Kong is indeed urgently needed.

The Changing Face of Hong Kong is a succinct and clearly written exposé of the economic policies of Sir John Cowperthwaite, Financial Secretary from 1963 to 1971. Although it gives disproportionate space to his views on the disutility of economic statistics, it does show an understanding of some of the more subtle aspects of monetary and fiscal arrangements of which too many of his critics were blissfully ignorant. But in hostility to all welfare measures and suspicion of recent (and long overdue) changes in educational, health, and social service policies (including greatly extended programmes of low-cost housing)—all of them well within Hong Kong's means—it borders on a fanaticism far removed from the cool empiricism of the best Hong Kong administrators. Continued prosperity must, owing to the severe constraints within which Hong Kong necessarily operates, depend heavily on unusual mobility of economic resources and consequent capacity to react rapidly to changing external economic pressures. But its future difficulties seem more likely to arise from restricted access to overseas markets, from disadvantageous changes in the terms of trade of its industrial exports for its food and raw materials imports, and from the effects of international monetary disequilibrium. These, and other aspects of Hong Kong's situation are more fully explored in *Tales of Two City-States*. This well-researched (and also well-informed) study provides the best analysis of Hong Kong's current state and future problems of which I am aware. Its comparison of the similarities and differences between Hong Kong and Singapore illuminates understanding of both, besides providing an interesting and realistic assessment of the relevance of their experiences to the problems of development elsewhere. This survey is warmly recommended to anyone who needs an up-to-date, well documented, and sophisticated analysis of either of these remarkable economies.

KENNETH ROBINSON

The Emerging Japanese Superstate. Challenge and Response. By Herman Kahn. *Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1973. 318 pp. Bibliog. Index. (A Pelican Book.) £0·50. A$1.70. NZ$1.70.*

Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. By Kakuei Tanaka. Trans. by Simul International. *Tokyo: Simul Press. 1973. (Distrib. by International Scholarly Book Services, Portland, Oregon.) 228 pp. Illus. Maps. Y 2,700. $12.95.*

Japan's Foreign Policy. By F. C. Langdon. *Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1973. 231 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $9.00.*

HERMAN KAHN'S book on Japan has aged a lot since the original was published three years ago.[1] Perhaps, simply, the outside world has become much better informed about Japan. Or, maybe, people are becoming more allergic to this kind of scenario-making exercise.

The book is as unconditionally flattering as was the author's study, also prepared within the Hudson Institute, on France's future.[2] Its material is divided into four main parts. In the first, relying heavily on second-hand experience, there is a rapid but perceptive view of Japanese psychology. In the second, Japan's postwar performance and its springs are examined. The author is in his element in the third part where he can indulge in projections and prognostications. Finally, a fourth part is made up of inimitable 'Kahnesque' synoptic tabulations of complex sociological and psychological components, admired by those in search of intellectual short-cuts but irritating to others unable to accept schematisation beyond reasonable limits. As usual, all this relies on impressive knowledge, reading and intelligence but is pressed into a pseudo-scientific mould and is expressed in a pretentious vocabulary either to state the obvious or the highly contestable.

One has the uncomfortable feeling of being invited to participate in a game of eliminating all the arguments likely to obstruct one's arrival at the conclusions the author had already reached. Some important arguments, for example those concerning diplomatic relations with China (p. 16), look strangely outdated after only three years. A statement, like the one that Japan's GNP is 'growing about two or three times the rate' of China's, just was not the case in 1970 and is even less so today (p. 171). As for GNP projections up to the year 2,000, we did not need an oil crisis and a world resources shortage to prove their utter vulnerability. Then, highly personal interpretations, usually in the form of quotations, are given disproportionate weight as proof. When Kahn gets down to essentials, as in the case of the sense of 'cultural hierarchy' of the Japanese (p. 174), he shies away from drawing conclusions which may not suit the desired scenario. One of the by-products of such an approach is that Kahn may go very wrong on some major issues, such as the future of Sino-Japanese relations. In more than 284 closely printed pages, filled with scenarios and alternatives, the possibility of Sino-Japanese collaboration at some point in the future is not even considered.

Herman Kahn's celebrated book on Japan is a helpful tool with which to see that country from a given angle. But whatever assets Japan may possess, geo-political realities make it difficult to agree with the book's central message, namely that a thin archipelago of overcrowded islands, very poor in natural resources, could ever constitute a superpower. With less scientific jargon and on much fewer pages, Brzezinski's *The Fragile Blossom*[3] did better. It offered deeper intuition, far more objectivity and a much more readable style.

Mr. Tanaka, confirming Kahn's enthusiasm, believes that Japan has

[1] London. André Deutsch. 1971.

[2] Stillman, Edmund, *et al. L'envol de la France: Portrait de la France dans les années 80.* Introduction by Herman Kahn. Published under the auspices of the Hudson Institute by Hachette, Paris, 1973.

[3] New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

'both the necessary funds and ingenuity for this great enterprise . . . [the remodelling of the Japanese islands] . . . if we remain a peace-loving nation and if, on the strength of our high growth potential, we manage our economy to make growth and welfare compatible' (p. 220). For the time being, however, his plan is practically shelved because of more urgent preoccupations produced by the oil crisis and the contraction in Japan's economic growth. Yet it is still worth reading, both as a warning of the environmental cost of over-concentration on growth and as a summary of urgent aspirations in response to which postwar Japan's first 'populist' electoral platform was formulated.

Mr. Langdon's book—by an American with a great deal of private and official experience of East Asia—is an excellent analysis and synthesis of Japan's external policies since the war. He is confident that Japan's low-profile attitudes will prevail, that trade will remain its main instrument for enhancing its standing in the world, and that anti-militarism will resist coming temptations. He concludes that '. . . Japan's future world role is surely as a major economic power . . . not that of a new armed super-power bent on the traditional obsession with arms races and domination of smaller countries' (p. 207). Coming from such a highly perceptive observer such optimism is rather reassuring.

TIBOR MENDE

The Canberra Model: Essays on Australian Government. By David Butler. *London, Basingstoke, New York, Dublin, Melbourne, Johannesburg, Madras: Macmillan. 1974. 146 pp. Index. £4·95.*

As an interested and sympathetic observer from abroad, Dr. Butler has noted the lack of material on the contemporary machinery of government in Australia, especially as regards the 'rules of the game' in parliament, the ministry and the bureaucracy, although he acknowledges that electoral behaviour and foreign policy have been much less neglected. He is right to point out this lack of essential work, and to say that what is needed to advance the study of Australian government is 'the straightforward chronicling of the existing state of affairs'. This applies not only to the federal government, with which Dr. Butler's book is concerned, but also to the state governments. With large departments of political science in each state capital, and sometimes two or three, it is surprising that there are so few books on how the states are run. The federal government is slightly better off, but not very much so. It will be a good thing if Dr. Butler encourages more young Australian political scientists to lift their eyes from the intricacies of voting behaviour and public opinion polls, and ask how their cabinets, police forces, railways, education systems and other day-to-day governmental bodies operate.

In this book Dr. Butler does not pretend to provide a model of his own, and perhaps the title is unfortunate, promising or implying more than is justified. What he has done has been to draw attention to a great many gaps, and to provide some reflections on certain aspects of federal politics and government. There are three sections. The first provides some background about what needs to be studied and how Australia's situation and political style are changing. The second looks at the position of ministers in Canberra, with special reference to the position of the prime minister, and to questions of ministerial responsibility and what happens when

there is a change of government. The third is about elections and public polls, including two shrewd articles on the 1969 and 1972 elections. Australia's peculiarities in having compulsory and preferential voting are examined and found not to be so strange as outsiders often think.

The core of the book is its examination of ministerial power. Dr. Butler gives a clear and interesting picture of the relations of ministers with one another and with their senior civil servants, as these applied during the latter years of the Liberal-Country Party government. Unfortunately his sources did not take him back to the Curtin and Chifley governments of the 1940s, or to the situation when the Liberal-Country party government took office in 1949. Consequently, he was not equipped to foreshadow the particular difficulties which Labour ministers in the Whitlam government would encounter with one another and with their permanent heads. He was, however, able accurately to predict in general terms a number of the administrative and political problems which a new ministry would face; and his Chapter 9, 'The Tragedy of Gaining Office', which was an address to the Victorian Fabian Society in September 1972, is an admirable example of what the political scientist can tell the politician in advance.

J. D. B. MILLER

NORTH AMERICA

The Making of the President 1972. By Theodore H. White. *London: Cape. 1974. 391 pp. Index. £5·00.*

The Imperial Presidency. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1973. 505 pp. Index. $10.00.*

THE essence of tragedy lies not in loss alone but in unnecessary waste and careless dishonour. Theodore White continues his saga of mid-century American presidential politics in a volume pervaded by the involuntary betrayal of ambition, ideals, social and civic virtue and commonsense. A lonely President, committed to the cause of peace, and with domestic policies more enlightened than his critics allow, succumbed to the tensions generated by his curiously mixed career and, so often himself excluded from circles of influence and style, came to believe that he had to 'build a shield' around the White House. By so doing he cut himself off from the political and cultural values of his country. Although the potential rewards of statecraft and sound politics were very great, President Nixon stumbled at the moment of his greatest political success.

White presents this American tragedy and tells the story of the campaign of 1972 with considerable skill. This is a quotable book of a President who seemed 'as if he had been brainwashed by listening to too many sportcasts' (p. 222); of a National Democratic Party that 'is not a conspiracy; it is a continuing commotion' (p. 292). It is a book full of insights but also of emotion and prejudice, as if the reporter lost his own objectivity somewhere along the campaign trail. The seizure of the Democratic party by McGovern's 'guerrillas' is ably discussed, but with many *obiter dicta* suggesting that something un-American was happening. 'If they won in California, New York would fall by itself, as Shanghai fell of itself once Peking had been seized in 1949 in the revolution in Asia' (p. 102). Students are the 'campus proletariat' (p. 109). The new Demo-

cratic Party's adoption of quota representation within the party structure was a break with tradition, but when White almost parodies the Liberal Idea and the Liberal Theology (pp. 34–38) he suggests a degree of personal ideological commitment that arouses disquiet. New Jersey has its problems, but can the state be simply dismissed as 'a national sadness, the stamping ground of demagogues and ignorants' (p. 253)?

In part, the desire for solitude on the part of the President stemmed from his preoccupation with foreign affairs. His sense of the power, the obligation and the capacity of the Executive President to act as he saw fit in the interest of his country is a minor yet compelling theme in White's account and the total concern of *The Imperial Presidency*. Professor Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a man known both for his style and his partisanship, is a leading member of the social and intellectual elite from which Richard Nixon has always been totally alienated. But he is also one of the major historians of our time, and *The Imperial Presidency* is a work of historical as well as tractarian importance. In the first half of the book Schlesinger illuminates the historical development of some of the problems of the contemporary presidency. In examining the constitutional authority of President and Congress he is primarily concerned with the separation of power rather than with the other traditional principle of checks and balances, although he notes Madison's 'partial mixture of powers' and underlines that the war-making and treaty-making powers were, as Hamilton said, a matter of 'joint possession'. Following Corwin's 1940 thesis of the ongoing struggle between President and Congress for the control of foreign policy, he traces a cyclical development. The 'rise of presidential war' (Chapter 3) is followed by the re-assertion of congressional control after the Civil War. This phase continues until the Second World War when FDR presided over a 'presidency resurgent' (Chapter 5) which develops, because of the cold war, Korea and Vietnam into a 'presidency rampant' (Chapter 7). Foreign policy pressures in the post-1945 world created an imperial presidency which enabled Nixon to 'complete the design of the revolutionary Presidency' (p. 351).

The second half of the book is devoted to the Nixon presidency and to Watergate and its implications. There is timely discussion of executive privilege and claimed prerogative; acceptable concern about the Nixonian emphasis upon secrecy that is buttressed by appeals to the principle of national security. There is a devastating analysis of the apparent acceptance that the presidency is above the law. The questions raised are of great contemporary and historical importance, but in the multitude of studies of the implications of Watergate, its origins and its aftermath, this would be more impressive were it less tractarian. There are too many *ex cathedra* remarks that if taken seriously reveal political naivety. There is imputation of motive where other explanations offer themselves. For example, it is suggested that Nixon moved towards the end of conscription and the resumption of the old tradition of a professional army because 'a professional army is by definition a much more compliant and reliable instrument of presidential war' (p. 199), although Schlesinger rightly points out that it was Congress which placed a professional army at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. This points to one of the paradoxes of recent times that might have been given more attention. Much of the apparently enhanced power of the presidency has been the result of either congressional negligence or active support

for his policies. If, in the tripartite form of government, the executive branch is not subjected to the checks and balances provided by the constitution, it is inevitable that the potential vacuum of power and policy be filled by the extension of executive authority. It has often been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty and in an organic political system it behoves all parts to be both sceptical and assertive.

D. K. ADAMS

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. By Thomas G. Paterson. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1974. 287 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.00. £6·00.*

A book has been written (by R. J. Maddox)[1] about the scholarly inexactitude of 'New Left' interpretations of the cold war, and a work of at least equal length could be written about similar faults in interpretation of the opposite persuasion. Without a doubt many of the early works in this field did fail, in their passion and haste, to meet the highest academic standards. Thomas G. Paterson's book is among a growing number which go a long way towards rectifying the weaknesses of their predecessors. Its essential thesis is: 'The United States was no more evil or more noble in its relations with international organisations than Britain or Russia; each major power attempted to employ them for its own national purposes. But there was a difference; the United States held a distinct advantage in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund and so added them to its arsenal of Cold War weapons' (p. 147). And so, of the IBRD and IMF conference in March 1946, their erstwhile defender Lord Keynes complained: 'I went to Savannah expecting to meet the world and all I met was a tyrant' (p. 153). In Part II of his book, entitled 'Confrontation in the American Sphere', Paterson examines from this point of view not only the creation of Bretton Woods but also the British loan, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the rehabilitation of West Germany. In Part I, 'Confrontation in the Soviet Sphere', he looks at such subjects as the abortive loan to and trade with Russia, United States relief policy and UNRRA, the 'Open Door' and 'Dollar Diplomacy' in Eastern Europe. The reason for a foreign policy which 'often was haughty, expansionist, and uncompromising' (p. 260) Paterson finds in a combination of American expansionism and ideology. Economic and strategic considerations merged with a self-righteous world outlook in which Soviet Russia replaced Nazi Germany as the arch evil-doer. But he is far from being a Soviet apologist, declaring in his preface that 'Soviet sources are shamefully restricted and manipulated' (p. x); and so he makes no serious attempt to scrutinise what Soviet sources there are, possibly because of a language barrier in addition to his stated reservations. He also finds Soviet conduct on several occasions 'reprehensible' (*e.g.* p. 260), although he makes a creditable effort to go beyond condemnation to understanding the motives of Stalin and his advisers. The most noteworthy feature of his book is its employment of a wide range of Western sources, including

[1] *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1973). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 341.

many private papers and public documents. It thus states and develops a by no means unfamiliar theme with a new thoroughness.

PAUL DUKES

Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox. By David Rees. *London, Basingstoke, New York, Dublin, Melbourne, Johannesburg, Madras: Macmillan. 1974. 506 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

TODAY the case of Harry Dexter White arouses vague memories of traitors in the United States, of fellow travellers who passed on information to the Russians. This notoriety has tended to obscure his contribution to the modern international monetary system. White, born in 1892, emerged from a Boston Jewish background, his family being in the hardware business. During the First World War he served in the army in France, and then embarked on an academic career, moving into the Treasury on the wave of the 'New Deal' programme in 1934, serving a seemingly brilliant apprenticeship under the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., and, at the same time, according to Whittaker Chambers, becoming involved in the communist underground. By March 1938 White was Director of Monetary Research, and able, Rees points out, to pass on information to the Russians which could help them to assess the possibility of the United States 'being drawn into an understanding with the other democracies' (p. 96). Mr. Rees leaves the question open as to whether White actually did this, though he does entitle the chapter *The Secret Agent.* Before Pearl Harbour White twice suggested sweeping proposals to reconcile United States and Japanese interests in the Far East. As Assistant Secretary in 1942 he drew up the White Plan which, together with the work of Maynard Keynes, helped to lay the foundations of the international monetary system. Mr. Rees might have devoted more space to White's role in the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at the Bretton Woods Conference, and less to his complicity in the Morgenthau plan for the pastoralisation of Germany. White's effective career in government ended in November 1945 when he was placed under FBI surveillance as a possible Russian agent as a result of the information passed on by Elizabeth Bentley, a self-confessed courier for Russian intelligence. White died in August 1948 while under investigation.

The work is subtitled *A Study in Paradox*, the paradox being that White was both a patriot and a 'security risk'. But in the end Mr. Rees is not able to decide whether White was a Russian spy and a traitor, or an American nationalist, or whether in the 1930s and 1940s White was able to see these two roles as being compatible. Mr. Rees would make a poor detective writer. The last section of the book, a survey of White's case and the evidence presented against him as a Russian spy, does not make compelling reading. Perhaps this is because Mr. Rees is reluctant to employ the historical techniques of internal criticism. It is not enough merely to recount the evidence. He concludes that 'if some of White's large schemes involved the Soviet Union, such as his successive proposals for credits, what seems most likely is not that White was a Communist, but rather, as Lord Robbins has suggested, "a sentimental and highly indiscreet fellow traveller"' (p. 426). This verdict is rather lame.

There is a clear distinction between a master's and a doctoral dis-

sertation: the former is supposed to show an ability to handle sources; the latter to make a substantial contribution to knowledge. David Rees's work on Harry Dexter White belongs to the former category. It consists of an efficient compilation of material from different sources, mainly secondary, and adds little that is new either to the history of the times or to what is known about the shadowy figure of Harry Dexter White. As biography this work lacks balance: there is too much general history and not enough concern for how the subject viewed the events or the role that he played in them.

R. OVENDALE

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Politics of Regional Organization in Latin America. The Latin American Free Trade Association. By Edward S. Milenky. *New York, Washington, Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 289 pp. Bibliog. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £7·75.*

THE book sets out to investigate the political dynamics of regional integration in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), from the signing of the Montevideo Treaty in February 1960, to January 1972. The study is based upon detailed research in LAFTA's extensive documentation and many interviews. The book includes nearly 90 pages of references, explanations and sources for the Appendix tables and graphs, and extensive and useful bibliographical material.

What the study actually succeeds in providing is primarily a very detailed but yet succinct account of the development of the integration idea in Latin America and a history of LAFTA's progress (so far) towards trade liberalisation, and the successive crises which have been encountered. Also included is a discussion of the evolution of the regional planning and development issue in LAFTA, and of the economic co-operation which has occurred—partly outside the framework of LAFTA—in such spheres as ad hoc complementarity agreements for particular industries, projects for co-operative development of infra-structure services including transport, frontier integration projects and finally, payments arrangements. Some reference is also made to the regional co-operation which has developed at subcontinental level—principally in the shape of the Andean Group—in response to the difficulties experienced in LAFTA over the distribution of the benefits of continent-wide trade liberalisation, and in particular, over the problems of the least developed of LAFTA member countries in this context. Running through all this there is a good account of the way in which the discussion on the equitable distribution of benefits has evolved among the LAFTA countries. There is a great deal of interesting material here, and students of LAFTA will find in the book's careful documentation of events a useful source not otherwise conveniently available.

It is perhaps unfortunate that in pursuit of a scientific approach, an attempt is made to force intractable facts into a somewhat rigid theoretical framework which is not always illuminating. Quantification is extensively employed. Apart from providing useful data on trade, the pace of concessions, etc. attempts are also made to quantify aspects such as depen-

dence, capacity to participate and gains which, though they are undoubtedly important, are really very difficult to quantify in terms which are at once simple and useful. The indicators employed are in fact in most cases extremely crude: for instance, dependence is defined in terms of trade shares to LAFTA, and gains in terms of exports—and in some cases the exercise rests on subjective weightings by the author which are not made explicit. Some of the resulting indicators are even graphed against each other to depict relationships which can usually be expressed more clearly in a sentence or two—as in table 14 where a numerical scale is assigned to a member state's reaction to a given issue. Here, what emerges is simply that small countries are inclined to favour planning and large countries to oppose it. The author's propensity to use the language of science and still more to attempt to force the inadequate data into the mould of the economist's cost-benefit analysis is hardly worth attempting at this general level. Such analysis would need to be considerably more refined if it were to be capable of throwing much light on the issues discussed.

When the author escapes from his strait-jacket ('integration occurs as a feed-back loop') he makes some sensible comments on the future of LAFTA, and puts forward several suggestions for improving its effectiveness, though most of these presuppose a degree of commitment which may not exist. As he says, 1974 may be a crucial year for LAFTA, but if the history of that organisation tells us anything, it is that an inability to meet dead-lines has not hitherto been allowed to prevent it from continuing.

P. Robson

Latin American Modernization Problems. Case Studies in the Crises of Change. By Robert E. Scott. *Foreword by Carl W. Deal. Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press. 1973. 365 pp. Index. $12.50. £5·75.*

The eight studies collected in this volume are based on individual 'field' investigations carried out during the past few years by staff members of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Illinois as part of its programme of research. The studies are divided into three groups; the first dealing with human attributes and relationships affected by the modernisation process; a second dealing with problems involving the physical setting—land tenure, migration and housing the urban population; and a final section concerned with aspects of national policies designed to influence the character and pace of change.

After a synoptic introduction to modernisation problems contributed by the editor, the field studies commence with an anecdotal account, in the Oscar Lewis vein, of the attitudes, aspirations and qualities of a Brazilian factory worker, which is full of trivia. Racial adaptation in Cartagena is the subject of the following essay in which the conclusion is reached that in this particular city where 'miscegenation' is general, class conflict may be more disruptive than racial differences. Of the three studies on the physical setting, the first is a detailed study of land reform in Columbia which reviews its operations and the reasons for its limited success. The next on internal migration in Peru is based on analysis of statistical data and makes the point that in the case of Lima,

contrary to the generally accepted view on the characteristics of migrants in developing countries, immigrants were of relatively high quality. The third study, of shanty towns in Mexico, emphasises the variety which exists in such settlements and the danger of generalisations about the nature of such communities. In the concluding section, the first essay shows how in São Paulo state during 1890–1937, foreign economic ties and influence made it possible to resist pressures for national integration. A second essay reviews development strategy and performance in Peru over a twenty-year period and accounts for the limited success of structural reform in terms of the strength of established power groups. The final essay, contributed by the editor, reviews attempts by a number of military regimes to deal with problems of national integration.

A justification for gathering together these studies was the collaborative nature of the programme on which they were based. The benefit of this interdisciplinary collaboration is, however, far from evident for most of the contributors seem to stick firmly to their own lasts. For the general reader the book as a whole provides a somewhat unbalanced and unsatisfactory introduction to modernisation problems and processes, although several of the individual studies are well conceived and contain material of some interest. For the specialist, the best advice would perhaps be to await the promised monographs in which the individual studies will be reported at greater length.

P. ROBSON

Brazil: Awakening Giant. By Philip Raine. Introd. by Lincoln Gordon. *Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1974. 268 pp. Index. $7.00.*

THIS book can certainly not be described as a careful academic analysis of the 'Brazilian reality'. On the other hand, it is more informative than many such analyses, and never descends to the level of unimaginative panegyric that the title might lead one to expect. In short, it is an intelligent, journalistic inquiry into the various aspects of Brazilian political and social organisation, replete with historical vignettes—most of them recent.

Raine must have absorbed much of the information and comment he presents during his long years of diplomatic service in Brazil. This may explain the recurrent failure to distinguish between established fact and personal reflection (it is in this sense that parts of the presentation do not answer to academic criteria); similarly we may thank Raine's personal experience for the full treatment he gives to aspects of the reality which receive scant attention in more academic studies. His chapter on the 'Framework of Government', and in particular the section on the judicial branch, is especially useful. There is almost nothing written in English on the legal system in Brazil. Elsewhere, he has an excellent section on the Church, and Church hierarchy and politics, but this account tends to become confused when it merges unexpectedly into discussion of torture and repression by military governments in Brazil. Clearly, no one would deny that the two issues have become closely interrelated during the last decade. The quibble is one of presentation. The tens of topics which arise in Raine's wide-ranging survey are difficult to discipline without a structured analytical approach. Hence his material is often very interesting, but the presentation patchy.

Given Raine's career background, the general impression created by the book seems remarkably balanced. However, he does finally hold a brief for the United States, even if he is rarely simply an apologist for the United States view. Dealing with industry he says that 'in fact, only 5 per cent. of the country's industries is foreign owned' (p. 143). Happily, there are few statements so completely misleading as this, and in some instances he is openly critical of United States policy (as when he condemns assistance to 'authoritarian police' which is applied 'not only to normal problems of law and order but to repressive activities as well' (p. 208). The brief finally emerges most strongly, but at the same time most diffusely, in his last chapter which popularises various development 'problems' and regurgitates the debate on Brazil's future 'major power' status. The chapter is implicitly confined within W. W. Rostow's categories and proceeds from a perspective which is now discredited. In general, the conceptual confusion apparent in the discussion reduces its credibility—even though Raine is evidently determined to reach a set of 'enlightened' conclusions.

JOSEPH FOWERAKER

Brazil: The Land and People. 2nd ed. By Rollie E. Poppino. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 385 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. (Latin American Histories; Ed.: James R. Scobie.) £4·25. Paperback: £1·40.*

THIS is a clear and uncluttered account of the history of Brazil from the time of its discovery to the present day. The author writes with an academic detachment which is matched by an emotional commitment to his subject. This combination enables him to encompass the contradictions and inconsistencies of the country, its 'great impossibilities', without sacrificing the quality of succinct statement which characterises his style.

From the outset Poppino emphasises the regional and cultural diversity within the national unity, and he develops these themes in counterpoint throughout the opening chapters which describe the gradual emergence of the nation. The Portuguese vindicate their claim to sovereignty in confrontation with the French and the Dutch; the *bandeirantes* and *tropas* (the Amazon expeditions) extend the country's boundaries into the interior, until they expand far beyond the prescribed limits of the Treaty of Tordesillas. With sugar in the north-east, and gold in Minas Gerais, the political area takes on economic substance, but the 'boom or bust' cyclical growth of the economy only accentuates regional differences.

Poppino achieves clarity by choosing to write what is largely an economic, and occasionally a social, history. This is certainly true of his treatment of the colonial period and the Empire, including the excellent account of the slave-trade and the end of slavery. It becomes less true as he moves into the present century, and begins to talk of modernisation and the increased role of the state in the economy. But this is never a political history. Whether he is describing the labour organisations and 'social question' of the 1920s, or the debate which delayed for some two decades the building of the integrated steel mill at Volta Redonda, the realities of political power and institutional influence remain very

much in the background. His approach, even to the topics of industrialisation and foreign capital, is consistently apolitical, and his few political judgments (such as the reference to October 1930 as the Revolution 'that broke the power of the rural oligarchy' p. 256) tend to be terse and simplistic. One result of Poppino's choice is that Brazil is portrayed as something of a social paradise, with a bright economic future just around the corner. Only in the last chapter (The New Society) do the unpleasant political and social truths—for instance, the vast inequalities of wealth and income and all that goes with them—receive any emphasis. Even here, by concentrating on the economic aspects again, Poppino is too kind to the post-1964 regime (and particularly to the Medici government), and ends by projecting an image of political unity and social consensus which do not exist in reality.

These comments are not designed to detract from the author's principal achievements, which are considerable. As an economic and social history the only conspicuous lack is an adequate description of economic and social organisation in the countryside (we learn nothing of the social relationships within the *fazendas*, and little of the persistence of traditional agricultural techniques). In general, this is an impressive and elegant piece of scholarship, which deserves to become a standard work in its field.

JOSEPH FOWERAKER

The Brazilian-American Alliance 1937–1945. By Frank D. McCann, Jr. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 527 pp. Index. $18.50.*

IT is a matter of considerable importance just how, and for what reasons, Brazil came in 1942 to be one of the Allies. It is even more important perhaps to try to elucidate just how far Brazil's benefits from the alliance were counterbalanced by the value the alliance had for the Allies themselves. Professor Frank D. McCann, Jr., who teaches history at the University of New Hampshire, undertook the task in the first instance on account of his sympathy with Brazil, and, though he has just criticisms to make of the errors inseparable from diplomatic negotiations in a crisis of such magnitude, he has done so in an essentially rational way.

His work is, moreover, based on high standards of research and documentation among original sources. He has used (though with some limitations for security reasons) the records of all the relevant departments of the United States government except for the Justice Department, the Roosevelt Papers, the records of Pan-American Airways, and others. On the Brazilian side he was given access to the archives of the Brazilian foreign ministry and the papers of Getúlio Vargas and Oswaldo Aranha. Printed materials, official reports, newspaper files and personal interviews fill out the basic structure of the work. Inevitably there is some unevenness, but the unanswered questions—of which there are many—are the product and not a sign of absence, of the author's efforts.

Professor McCann argues that between 1937 and 1940 the main initiative for closer relations with the United States came from the Brazilian side. The reasons were, he says, the desire of Brazil to offset the dominance of British interests, and concern for its isolation in the uncertain alliances of its Spanish-speaking neighbours. At the same time, a reciprocal interest

on the part of the United States led to a conscious decision to continue to treat Brazil, in face of the possible evidence to the contrary offered by the Estado Nôvo, as essentially a democratic country. The United States initially saw Brazil as a local ally against Nazi subversion in the southern continent. However, with the outbreak of war, and its localisation in North Africa, good relations with Brazil were no longer enough; an alliance, so that the United States might make use of Brazilian facilities to create an 'air bridge' to Dakar, became essential and was in fact achieved.

The question of how Brazil then became the only Latin American state to take part in the fighting with ground troops is, Professor McCann suggests, primarily to be seen in terms of Brazil's desire to obtain a seat at the postwar table reserved for the Great Powers. Brazilian military methods received only belated revision, since the force formed for the purpose was isolated during its training and disbanded immediately on its return. What Brazil did not receive, since the 'dollar a year men' had other ideas, was domestic economic aid which, Professor McCann shows, was both explicitly and implicitly promised on the conclusion of the war.

PETER CALVERT

Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. By Carl Stone Preface by Alister McIntyre. *Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1973. 188 pp. Index. J$3.50.*

THE Caribbean has long been regarded by European and American sociologists as a research laboratory. This is particularly true of political scientists. Many investigations by such scholars have proved disastrous because Euro-American models have been imposed on West Indian society. A common language does not necessarily connote institutional identity. Dr. Stone's monograph is an excellent corrective to such research. Himself a West Indian, a product of the University of the West Indies and with experience in local government, the author is admirably equipped for the work in question.

The basis of the book is an analysis of the data obtained from a sample survey of the Jamaican urban population. There were 605 respondents representative of the socio-economic spectrum, ranging from big businessmen to labourers. One of the major problems facing the investigator in Caribbean communities is to assess the significance of race and colour to the class system. Dr. Stone indicates this difficulty:

> Most of the discussions of racial attitudes in Jamaica have been dominated by an exaggerated sociological conception of social attitudes which portrays an over-socialised view of individuals. There is clearly a limit to which any social strata internalises negative self-images, and too often, deferent behaviour towards whites has been interpreted as reflecting a sense of black inferiority. No account is taken of the possibility of a significant element of role-playing and instrumental adaptation of blacks to a condition of white economic and social dominance that need not involve an internalisation of negative self-concepts. . . .(p. 101).

Broadly, it can be said that the evidence produced substantiates Dr. Stone's contention that political influence can be exercised by the masses, and that this is of considerable significance for the political future of

Jamaica, and by extension, the Caribbean. The author has made a valuable contribution to both political studies and Caribbean scholarship.

FERNANDO HENRIQUES

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Churchill as Warlord. By Ronald Lewin. *London: Batsford. 1973. 283 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

THE period of Churchill's wartime premiership continues to exert a profound fascination. The apogee of Churchill's astonishing career, when he was not only the leader of Britain but a world statesman, coincided with the last years of Britain as a world power. For the last time, Britain could stand alone and decide the course of world history, and the Prime Minister could talk as an equal with the rulers of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1945, the events of the war and Churchill's role in them have been subject to constant review. The memoirs of Churchill himself and many others, the official histories, and recently the opening of the British archives, have produced a complicated and shifting picture of the war and of Churchill as war leader. It is Mr. Lewin's achievement to have taken this vast complexity and reduced it to a clear, balanced and incisive analysis.

To perform this almost impossible task in the brief compass of the present book, Mr. Lewin has imposed severe limits on himself. He appears to have made only minor use of archive material. In terms of chronology, he concentrates on the period between 1940 and 1943, arguing that after that time Churchill's role as warlord diminished rapidly as British resources dwindled and the predominance of the United States and Russia became plain. The events of 1944 and 1945 thus occupy a bare thirty pages. Above all, although the author's broad approach is chronological, he essentially dispenses with narrative and concentrates on analysis and discussion. The chapter on 1940, for example, picks out five main tasks which Churchill faced when he became Prime Minister, and deals with them in turn. It is a method which achieves remarkable success in cutting through the material and clarifying the issues, though it may sometimes pose problems for readers who are not already familiar with the events.

The book opens with a succinct and perceptive discussion of Churchill's past experience of war, his personal qualities and defects, and his sense of history. This personal aspect is kept constantly in view in the rest of the book. Mr. Lewin is careful to show Churchill 'at his infantile worst' (p. 44), asking his generals to produce forthwith plans for impossible operations, as well as at his skilful and far-sighted best, notably in his relations with Roosevelt. The author also emphasises Churchill's interest in intelligence matters and scientific developments, and notes the strain which his secret knowledge must have imposed on him. Churchill's personality, however, is always subordinated to a careful review of the strategic issues and problems. The importance of the British governmental machine, with its interlocking committees under the control of the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff, is fully brought out, so that Churchill's personal rôle is firmly held in context. Churchill's papers for the 'Arcadia' conference receive their proper emphasis; myths about the Mediterranean and the Balkans are faithfully dealt with; and there is a balanced chapter on the bomber offensive.

The presentation of the book might be improved in another edition.

The map of Churchill's wartime journeys is interesting, but not a substitute for maps to illustrate strategic problems. There appears to be no system of footnoting—references are given for some quotations, but not for most. Occasional misprints have slipped through, one of which rather engagingly transposes Stilwell into Sitwell.

P. M. H. BELL

Memoirs 1897–1948: Through Diplomacy to Politics. By Lester B. Pearson. Foreword by Barbara Ward. *London: Gollancz. 1973. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1972. 301 pp. Illus. Index. £4·50.*

Memoirs 1948–1957: The International Years. Vol. 2. By Lester B. Pearson. Edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis. Foreword by Geoffrey Pearson. *London: Gollancz. 1974. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1973. 344 pp. Illus. Index. £5·25.*

Lester Pearson's Diplomacy. Guest-edited and with a prologue by Robert W. Reford. *Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 153 pp. (International Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Winter 1973–4; Eds.: James Eayrs and Robert Spencer; Assoc. Ed.: Marion Magee.) $2.50.*

LESTER PEARSON died in December 1972. We now have, posthumously, two volumes of his memoirs. One, which he finished himself, deals mainly with his career as a civil servant in the Canadian Department of External Affairs. The second, which has been put together from Pearson's own papers by the editors, Professors Munro and Inglis, covers his time as Secretary of State for External Affairs under Louis St. Laurent. There remains for the final volume his years as Prime Minister and Liberal leader. In the special number of the *International Journal*, which the Canadian Institute of International Affairs has devoted to the appraisal and recollection of Lester Pearson by friends and colleagues in other countries as well as his own, we also now have an invaluable commentary and gloss on the memoirs themselves:

> L. B. Pearson had a number of basic objectives in mind for his memoirs. They were to reach as wide an audience as possible. They were to be well written. They were to stand the test of time and future historical research. They were to tell his own story and present his own view of the world, both past and present. They were to sound some warning knells. . . .

These are the words in *International Journal* of the joint editors of Volume 2, and describe what they set out to collect in compiling after his death the account there of Lester Pearson's contribution to Nato, to the new Commonwealth, and above all to the United Nations and the pursuit of peace in Korea and the Middle East.

In her fond and admiring foreword to Volume 1, Barbara Ward calls 'Mike' Pearson not only fortunate, able, good and gay, but 'creative' as well. He was not, though, a man of original ideas. If he was creative, it was in a different way, glimpsed perhaps in this comment by the American, Edward K. Hamilton, in *International Journal:*

> . . . this catalytic role has been his most precious asset throughout his career. Although very accomplished, he was not a man of dazzling intellectual gifts. His prose and oratory, while sprinkled with stylishly turned phrases and classical references, was certainly not spellbinding. Nor did he seek or

achieve great technical expertise in any substantive area of public policy. Rather, Pearson specialised in the *process* of getting the public business done.

All his official life, whether in Ottawa or in London's Canada House, in Washington or the United Nations building in New York, or at the end when, in retirement, he chaired the World Bank's itinerant Commission on International Development, 'he was the catalyst which allowed the whole enterprise to function'. It was he to whom Dag Hammarskjöld was referring when he wrote that 'Canada was a key in the solution of many issues confronting the United Nations'. Indeed the gifts of very practical, very personal conciliation and the ability to recognise, and act upon, what was negotiable (and what was not), which made him a chief guide out of the Suez thicket in 1956, have perhaps caused his reputation to rest too narrowly on Suez—and Korea. These memoirs show plainly that Lester Pearson's career was all of a piece from the movement when faced, bizarrely, with the choice between being primarily a university sports coach and going on, with less pay, in External Affairs, he chose the latter.

This was in a period when Canada was coming of age, when the assertion of its autonomy without breaking its ties was the crucial task, and the creation and recruitment of Canada's external affairs service by O. D. Skelton was, within the rougher framework of Mackenzie King's leadership, the condition of the task's accomplishment. Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong, Arnold Heeney—and Lester Pearson: these were the best of the men (as Lord Garner's little essay in *International Journal* illustrates) who came to represent Canada in every sense of the word. Because of them, during and after the war, we always used to ask of any international gathering or conference, 'Which was the best delegation—apart of course from the Canadian? '

Pearson was a Canadian before he was an internationalist: indeed, he would have said that he was an internationalist because he was a Canadian. That is why he was able to speak so well and naturally both with and for the newly independent countries of the postwar Commonwealth. What will be tested in the years ahead is his conception of the importance of the 'middle powers' beside the super-powers in the nuclear world: whose *Realpolitik* will last best, Lester Pearson's or Henry Kissinger's?

DONALD TYERMAN

With Great Truth and Respect. The Memoirs of Paul Gore-Booth. *London: Constable. 1974. 440 pp. Illus. Index. £5·00.*

PAUL GORE-BOOTH is not obviously like Harold Wilson, but they share two qualities which are basic to both of them. One is loyalty, to service or party, as well as their country. The other is a battered optimism about the outcome, despite their experience.

Fortunately, Lord Gore-Booth does not share the Prime Minister's prolixity in reminiscence. His terse memories have been blamed for being too bland about persons: the resolution that he records of old girl friends—'not to disturb the memory of people who are not now here or the tranquillity of those who are' (p. 93)—is applied much more widely, when he might have told tales out of school. But he has been applauded for being sage about the processes of international relations (p. 399). This is no doubt how a diplomat who reached the top of his tree would wish to be thought of: keeping his eye on the ball, as his political masters and the interests of

his country required, undisturbed by personalities, on whatever side, apart from little chits giving credit where due. Does the man emerge from the reticence?

Lord Gore-Booth's career in the foreign service was not conventional. After London, Austria and Japan, where he was interned in 1941–42 (p. 75), he began a series of attachments and appointments which, retrospectively, seem to lead straight to the climax of becoming Permanent Under-Secretary in 1965 (p. 322)—and in 1968 the first head of the combined Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. The special features of this qualifying quarter of a century would evidently seem to be his dedication to economic affairs, first in the European recovery period, and then in London (p. 226) as a new-model Deputy Under-Secretary (when we journalists used to call him, in his European hat, 'Mr. Sixes and Sevens'); and the fact that his own overseas missions were not the traditional embassies but Burma (p. 200) and India (p. 262).

I am sure, however, that the experiences which most of all shaped him to be 'a model major-general' in the late 1960s were the years he was in the United States (pp. 119 and 169); and the fascinated, not to say knowing, interest he always had in public relations, long before he went to head the British Information Services in Washington, perhaps right back to 1932 when he nearly joined the *Financial News* (p. 40) before deciding on the diplomatic service. These were what kept him, in the diplomatic context, young, and prevented him, if there was the danger, from becoming a stuffed shirt. They meant, though he would detest the word, that he was always kept just trendy enough.

All this does just peep out of the effacement and the understatement—but only, perhaps, if you know where to look. It is the story of a very determined man: nothing so crude as iron in that velvet glove, but something stronger and whippier. It is the story of a man who has always been reasonably sure that he was in the right, not only because of his lifelong faith but because of his professional pride as well. It is, peculiarly, the story of a man who brought to all his tasks a fresh curiosity. The superiority of this Balliol Etonian was by no means effortless, but these memoirs do manifest it.

DONALD TYERMAN

From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920. By Paul C. Helmreich. *Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 1974. 376 pp. Bibliog. Index. $15.00.*

PROFESSOR HELMREICH has produced a scholarly and well-documented monograph about the negotiations which led to the Sèvres treaty in 1920, and he explains why, of all the peace treaties, that with the Ottoman Empire took the longest to conclude and was, as a result, still-born at the moment of its signature. The Turkish settlement was impossible to reconcile with either Wilsonian or nationalist principles. While the British had made conflicting wartime agreements with the French and the Arabs over the Middle East, Lloyd George entertained ambitious schemes of his own in the area, which involved reducing France's occupation of Syria to the smallest possible area, a dispute which was not resolved until November 1919. Furthermore the pro-Hellene and pro-Venizelos British prime minister emerged as a fervent champion of Greek designs in Turkey-Thrace,

Smyrna, perhaps even Constantinople (should the American mandate fall through). A grateful Greece would thus help to protect British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The author is very critical of Woodrow Wilson's vacillations over Turkey, claiming that the President connived at the destruction of his own principles in supporting the Greek occupation of Smyrna in May 1919, which led to the rise of the Turkish Nationalists, who were virtually ignored by the Allies down to 1920. The United States abstention from further peace negotiations during the autumn allowed Britain and France to settle Near Eastern questions between themselves, with scant reference to Italy, for whose pretensions neither had much sympathy. A further delay ensued when the British cabinet rejected a Curzon-inspired proposal to expel the Turk from Constantinople, a scheme which, strangely enough, the author praises for its realism.

The final treaty was a humiliating document for the Turks to swallow and led to a Nationalist advance on Constantinople. The French, needing British support in Europe, agreed to a British inspired Greek counteroffensive, which temporarily defeated the Nationalists and forced the Sultan to agree to the signature of the treaty. Lloyd George ignored the warnings of Churchill and his military advisers concerning the folly of using Greek troops in Turkey, with tragic consequences for the Greeks in 1922. They should have heeded the fate of the Armenians.

Despite two rather inadequate maps, this work is a clear and comprehensive analysis both of the complexities and the unrealities of the peace-making processes in the Near East after 1919.

M. L. DOCKRILL

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The Major International Treaties 1914–1973: A history and guide with texts. By J. A. S. Grenville. *London: Methuen. 1974. 575 pp. Maps. Index. £7·90. University Paperback ed.: £3·95.*

TEACHERS, students and writers of contemporary history will be greatly indebted to Professor Grenville of the University of Birmingham for the compilation of this admirable guide to diplomatic history over the last sixty years. It contains a short history and analysis of the major treaties and agreements since 1914, together with the texts of the most important of them. A useful feature of the index is the inclusion of such catch titles as 'Bay of pigs', 'Fourteen points' and 'Pact of steel'.

World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1974. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1974. 526 pp. Index. Kr. 75.00. $16.00. £7·50.*

THE SIPRI yearbooks are now firmly established as essential reference books on armaments and disarmament. This, the fifth in the series, contains separate and important chapters on the military lessons of the Middle East war, the military developments following the ceasefire agreements in Indo-China, mutual force reductions in Europe and the nuclear deterrence debate.

The whole of Part III is devoted to advances in weapon technology.

Part IV is concerned with developments in arms control and disarmament with a useful chronology of major events in the field during 1973.

Annuaire Européen, European Yearbook: Vol. XIX. 1971. *The Hague: Nijhoff under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 1973. 881 pp. Bibliogs. Indexes. Fl. 150.*

THE first part of this yearbook contains eight articles on the protection of the environment, human rights, patents and other topics of current interest to students of Europe. Probably the most valuable part, however, is the documentary section which comprises over 600 pages divided into sixteen chapters each dealing with the activities of a different major European organisation during 1971. In most cases the text is in both French and English. Finally, there are book reviews and a selective bibliography of the periodical and pamphlet literature of 1971.

Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights. 1971. Introd. by A. H. Robertson. *The Hague: Nijhoff. 1973. 989 pp. Bibliogs. Index. Fl. 215.00.*

THIS volume relates to the year 1971. The first part is entitled *Basic texts and general information.* It includes amendments to the convention, to the rules of the Court and to the rules of procedure of the Commission. Part II contains information on the work of the Commission and the Court, and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Part III is devoted to debates on the convention in national parliaments and decisions referring to it in the courts of the contracting parties. The select bibliography included in the appendix contains a high proportion of articles in journals and other composite works which would otherwise be difficult to trace.

Africa South of the Sahara. 1974. Fourth edition of a survey and reference book of all the countries south of the Sahara Desert. *London: Europa. 1974. 1119 pp. Maps. £12·00.*

IT is difficult to find anything new to say about a well-established yearbook such as this is, except that the usual high standard has been maintained. In order to save space the editors have wisely decided to omit in this edition the detailed information on learned societies, museums, art galleries and universities which is already in their other reference book *The World of Learning.* Amongst the articles, one on Africa and the EEC by Timothy Curtin gives a useful summary of the 1973 negotiations and another on the recent history of Portugal in Africa provides useful background information for the period preceding the change of regime in Lisbon in April.

The Far East and Australasia 1974. Sixth edition: A Survey and Directory of Asia and the Pacific. *London: Europa. 1974. 1339 pp. Maps. £12·00.*

AFTER a good general introduction and a useful chapter on regional organisations, this reference book contains country by country surveys. These consist of essays written by specialists on the history, geography and economy of the area, followed by statistics and factual information on the

government and political, economic and cultural life of the country. Finally there is a *Who's Who?* and also lists of research institutes.

Handbook of Latin American Studies No. 35. Social Sciences. Prepared by a Number of Scholars for the Latin American, Portuguese, and Spanish Division of The Library of Congress. Edited by Donald E. J. Stewart. *Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press. 1974. 545 pp. Indexes. $25.00.*

THE last volume of the handbook to deal with the social sciences was number 33 published in 1971 and the present volume carries on from there, although some earlier works are included. For those not familiar with the series, volume 35 contains over eight thousand annotated entries to books and articles on Latin America and the Caribbean, classified by subject subdivided by country, with author and subject index and a title list of journals analysed.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

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BROWN, Bruce: *Marx, Freud, and the Critique of Everyday Life:* Toward a Permanent Cultural Revolution. New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1974. 202 pp. Index. $7.50 £3·35.

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CORRESPONDENCE

From Jon Kimche.
To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

Madam,
I am naturally troubled that Sir Harold Beeley should question (in hi review of 'Palestine or Israel' in your April 1974 Journal) the reliabilit of the source for my statement attributing at least partial patrimon for the UN Security Council Resolution 242 to him. All the more so since the source in this instance was Sir Harold himself. Clearly, one cai never be too careful in checking one's sources.

Yours sincerely,
JON KIMCHE

Sir Harold Beeley writes:
I am sorry Mr. Kimche is under the impression that he has hear me make a claim I cannot possibly have made. I can only agree with th last sentence of his letter.

From Professor C. A. W. Manning.
To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

Madam,
It would seem that Professor Dugard (*International Affairs*, July 1974) while silent on the essential point of my January letter, sees it as relevan to refer, though not with overt sympathy, to the use I have made of th years, now nearing twelve, since my retirement. A word, therefore, firs about that.

It is alas true that the distinction—as pertinent to policy-analysis as I would assume, to criminology—between explanation and justification is in my experience, only too apt to go seemingly unappreciated, even b some of those, the specialising intellectuals, with whom its ready recog nition should, one might have thought, be second nature.

To account for men's misbehaving is one thing: to condone it i another. Criminology is not typically concerned to do both. And com parably the subject of international relations, as I at least have understoo it, involves the attempted explaining, though by no means therefore neces sarily the excusing, of the activities of sovereign states. This is so whethe the conduct considered be that of the Kremlin or the Quai d'Orsay, o Lagos or Pretoria. I for my part would certainly never dream of nc including South Africa's policies among those in perennial need o explanation. And I would be hard put to it to see why anyone shoul wish to think the worse of me for this.

It is not, however, simply as explaining the South African Terrorisr Act, but, specifically, as defending it—or endeavouring to—tha Professor Dugard now manages, or affects, to see me; and this on th evidence, ostensibly, of my January letter! My one-time legal studie never having extended to the law of crime, mine would at best be mode

marks whether for the defending or the explaining of any such measure. And before even thinking to defend it I would need at the very least to have convinced myself that so widely decried a piece of legislation was in fact so very deserving of defence: for which purpose I would, I hopé, in the first instance have had recourse, not so much to the writings, his own and other, to which Professor Dugard refers me, but rather to the columns of the South African 'Hansard', for evidence of what Parliament might have been told, as to why it was felt to be necessary, at the time of its enactment. This is, incidentally, the sort of precaution that even the least scrupulous of South Africa's calumniators might sometimes, in my opinion, be well-advised to take.

The fact of course is that in so far as I am conscious of having made myself, in my January letter, the advocate of anything, all that I there appealed for was responsibility in what I may term the academically-professional use of language. And, as to my personal perception of the ambit of Section 2 of the Terrorism Act—as distinct from its effect, on which, *pace* Professor Dugard, I said exactly nothing—I note that this has apparently not been called in question.

Meanwhile we have still not been told, and one wonders if we ever shall be, whether, in the opinion of Professor Dugard, such self-proclaimed political opponents of the South African government as, say, Sir de Villiers Graaff and Mrs. Helen Suzman are indeed now, as by express definition, malefactors in the sight of the law. I doubt, even so, if they should worry.

Yours faithfully,

C. A. W. MANNING.

BOOKS REVIEWED, OCTOBER 1974